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ABSTRACT 
Corruption has firmly taken centre stage in the development agenda of international 
organisations, developed and developing countries. One area in which corruption 
manifests is in public procurement and as a result, states have adopted various 
measures to prevent and curb corruption in public procurement. One such mechanism 
for dealing with procurement corruption is to disqualify corrupt suppliers from 
bidding on or otherwise obtaining government contracts. 
The disqualification of corrupt suppliers raises several issues, many of which are 
examined in this thesis. Implementing a disqualification mechanism in public 
procurement raises serious practical and conceptual difficulties, which are not always 
considered by legislative provisions on disqualification. Some of the problems that 
may arise from the use of disqualifications include determining whether a conviction 
for corruption ought to be a pre-requisite to disqualification, bearing in mind that 
corruption thrives in secret, resulting in a dearth of convictions. Another issue is 
determining how to balance the tension between granting adequate procedural 
safeguards to a supplier in disqualification proceedings and not delaying the 
procurement process. A further issue is determining the scope of the disqualification 
in the sense of determining whether it applies to firms, natural persons, subcontractors, 
subsidiaries or other persons related to the corrupt firm and whether disqualification 
will lead to the termination of existing contracts. These issues and the others 
considered by this thesis illustrate the limits to the efficacy of the disqualification 
mechanism in fighting procurement corruption. 
The thesis compares and contrasts the legal, practical and institutional approaches to 
the implementation of the disqualification mechanism in the European Union, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, the Republic of South Africa and the World Bank. 
The thesis examines how these jurisdictions have implemented a disqualification 
mechanism and whether their approaches may be regarded as appropriate. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This thesis would not have been possible without the help and support of a number of 
people. My sincere thanks go to Professor Sue Arrowsmith for her patience, support 
and guidance. 
I am also grateful to my friends and colleagues with whom I exchanged ideas and 
who were never too busy to listen to me- Dr Abi Jagun, Dr Ama Eyo, Funke Adeyemi, 
Dr Annamaria La Chimia, Sangeeta Shah, Dr Adeline Chong, Busola Akande, Dapo 
Akande, Dr Janelle Bryan, Muyiwa Amodeni and Dr Ezekiel Alawale. 
Special thanks go to my parents, Chief and Mrs F. O. Williams and my husband Dayo 
Elegbe for their continual and unwavering support. 
I am indebted to you all. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
I. Introduction 
.................................................................................................................. 
1 
II. Research objectives 
..................................................................................................... 
5 
III. Methodology 
.............................................................................................................. 
5 
IV. The choice of jurisdictions 
........................................................................................ 
6 
V. Structure 
...................................................................................................................... 
8 
CHAPTER ONE: THE CONCEPT OF CORRUPTION AND MEASURES 
AGAINST CORRUPTION 
1.1 Introduction 
............................................................................................................... 
9 
1.2 The concept, nature and effects of corruption 
........................................................... 
9 
1.3 Measures to address corruption 
............................................................................... 
16 
1.3.1 Domestic measures against corruption 
......................................................... 
16 
1.3.1.1 Introduction 
............................................................................................... 
16 
1.3.1.2 Administrative tools 
.................................................................................. 
17 
1.3.1.3 Regulatory tools 
......................................................................................... 
18 
1.3.1.4 Social Tools 
............................................................................................... 
18 
1.3.2 International measures against corruption 
................................................... 
19 
1.3.2.1 Introduction 
............................................................................................... 
19 
1.3.2.2 The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
........................................................ 
20 
1.3.2.3 The Organisation of American States Corruption Convention 
................. 
23 
1.3.2.4 The European Conventions 
....................................................................... 
24 
1.3.2.5 The African Convention on Corruption 
..................................................... 
27 
1.3.2.6 The United Nations Convention against corruption 
.................................. 
28 
1.4 Public Procurement and corruption 
......................................................................... 
30 
1.4.1 Introduction 
................................................................................ 
30 
1.4.2 The incidence of corruption in public procurement 
.............................. 
30 
1.4.3 The common types of corrupt activity in public procurement 
.............. 
31 
i 
1.4.4 Measures used in procurement regulation to fight corruption 
............... 
33 
1.4.4.1 Introduction 
.......................................................................................... 
33 
1.4.4.2 Administrative measures 
...................................................................... 
33 
1.4.4.3 Regulatory measures 
............................................................................... 
35 
1.4.4.4 Social measures 
...................................................................................... 
37 
1.5 The use of disqualification in public procurement 
.................................................. 
38 
CHAPTER TWO: PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REGULATION, ANTI- 
CORRUPTION POLICY AND DISQUALIFICATION 
2.1 Introduction 
................................................................................................................. 
47 
2.2 The European Union 
................................ ...... . 
47 
.. ...... .................................................... 
2.2.1 Public procurement regulation in the EU 
............................................................. 
47 
2.2.2 The EU's policy against corruption 
...................................................................... 
50 
2.2.3 Disqualification in the EU 
.................................................................................... 
51 
2.3 The United Kingdom 
................................................................................................... 
56 
2.3.1 Public procurement regulation in the UK 
............................................................. 
56 
2.3.2 The UK's policy against corruption 
..................................................................... 
60 
2.3.3 Disqualification in the UK 
.................................................................................... 
62 
2.4 The United States 
......................................................................................................... 
65 
2.4.1 Public procurement regulation in the United States 
............................................. 
65 
2.4.2 The United States' policy against corruption 
....................................................... 
68 
2.4.3 Disqualification in the United States 
.................................................................... 
70 
2.5 The World Bank 
.......................................................................................................... 
74 
2.5.1 Procurement regulation in the World Bank 
.......................................................... 
74 
2.5.2 The World Bank's anti-corruption policy 
............................................................ 
76 
2.5.3 Disqualification in the World Bank 
...................................................................... 
80 
2.6 South Africa 
................................................................................................................. 
82 
2.6.1 Public procurement regulation in South Africa 
.................................................... 
82 
2.6.2 South Africa's anti-corruption policy 
................................................................... 
86 
2.6.3 Disqualification in South Africa 
........................................................................... 
88 
11 
CHAPTER THREE: OFFENCES AND CONVICTIONS FOR 
DISQUALIFICATION 
3.1 Introduction 
................................................................................................................. 
94 
3.2 The European Union 
.................................................................................................. .. 
94 
3.2.1 Offences for disqualification 
.............................................................................. 
.. 
94 
3.2.2 Disqualifying on the basis of convictions 
........................................................... .. 
97 
3.2.3. The status of foreign convictions 
....................................................................... 
.. 
99 
3.3. The UK 
..................................................................................................................... 
101 
3.3.1 Offences for disqualification 
.............................................................................. 
101 
3.3.2 Disqualifying on the basis of convictions 
........................................................... 
103 
3.3.3 The status of foreign convictions 
........................................................................ 
105 
3.4 The United States 
....................................................................................................... 
107 
3.4.1 Offences for disqualification 
.............................................................................. 
107 
3.4.2 Disqualifying on the basis of a conviction 
......................................................... 
109 
3.4.3 The status of foreign convictions 
........................................................................ 
110 
3.5 The World Bank 
........................................................................................................ 
111 
3.5.1 Offences for disqualification 
.............................................................................. 
111 
3.5.2 Disqualifying on the basis of convictions 
........................................................... 
112 
3.5.3 The status of foreign convictions 
........................................................................ 
113 
3.6 South Africa 
............................................................................................................... 
114 
3.6.1 Offences for disqualification 
.............................................................................. 
114 
3.6.1.1 Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 
............................. 
114 
3.6.1.2 Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act Regulations 
................ 
115 
3.6.1.3 Public Finance Management Act Regulations 
......................................... 
116 
3.6.2 Disqualifying on the basis of convictions 
........................................................... 
117 
3.6.3 The status of foreign convictions 
........................................................................ 
118 
3.7 Analysis 
..................................................................................................................... 
119 
3.7.1 Requirement for convictions 
.................................................................... 
119 
3.7.2 The issue of foreign convictions 
............................................................... 
121 
iii 
CHAPTER FOUR: PROCEDURAL ISSUES AFFECTING 
DISQUALIFICATION 
4.1 Introduction 
............................................................................................................... 
124 
4.2 Procedure for disqualifying 
....................................................................................... 
125 
4.2.1 Introduction 
........................................................................................................ 
125 
4.2.2 The stages of the disqualification process and accompanying procedural 
requirements 
................................................................................................................ 
126 
4.2.2.1 Has a relevant offence been committed 
........................................................... 
127 
4.2.2.2 Giving a supplier notice of a proposed disqualification and an opportunity 
to make representations 
............................................................................................... 
131 
4.2.2.3 Deciding if disqualification is justifiable on the avaiable evidence 
................ 
137 
4.2.2.4 Giving reasons for the decision to disqualify 
.................................................. 
143 
4.2.3 Are disqualification procedures fair and transparent? 
........................................ 
146 
4.2.3.1 Are disqualification procedures fair? 
.............................................................. 
146 
4.2.3.2 Are disqualification procedures transparent? 
.................................................. 
149 
4.3 Time limits for disqualification 
................................................................................. 
152 
4.3.1 Time limits in the EU and UK 
............................................................................ 
152 
4.3.2 Time limits in the US 
.......................................................................................... 
156 
4.3.3 Time limits in the World Bank 
........................................................................... 
157 
4.3.4 Time limits in South Africa 
................................................................................ 
158 
4.3.5 Time limits, proportionality, reasonableness, fairness and transparency 
........... 
159 
4.4 Disqualifying entities and the scope of disqualification 
............................................ 
161 
4.4.1 Introduction 
........................................................................................................ 
160 
4.4.2 Disqualifying entities 
......................................................................................... 
162 
4.4.2.1 Courts 
............................................................................................................... 
162 
4.4.2.2 Procuring authorities 
........................................................................................ 
165 
4.4.2.3 Administrative bodies 
...................................................................................... 
168 
4.4.2.4 The legislature 
................................................................................................. 
171 
4.4.3 The scope of disqualification 
.............................................................................. 
172 
4.4.3.1 A requirement that disqualification be extended and discovering previous 
disqualifications 
........................................................................................................... 
173 
4.4.3.2 No clear requirement hat disqualification be extended 
.................................. 
175 
iv 
4.4.3.3 The elements of the disqualification decision left to the non-disqualifying 
entity 
............................................................................................................................ 
198 
4.5 Analysis 
..................................................................................................................... 
179 
4.5.1 The existence of a clear procedure for disqualification 
...................................... 
179 
4.5.2 Time limits 
.......................................................................................................... 
180 
CHAPTER FIVE: INVESTIGATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
......................... ..................................................................................... 
182 
5.2 The existence of a requirement or obligation to investigate 
...................................... 
183 
5.2.1 The requirement to investigate for disqualification measures based on a 
conviction 
.................................................................................................................... 
183 
5.2.2 The requirement to investigate for disqualification measures not based on a 
conviction 
.................................................................................................................... 
186 
5.3 The entity with the power to investigate and the extent of the entities powers......... 188 
5.4 The nature and sources of information and evidence 
................................................ 
190 
5.5 Analysis 
..................................................................................................................... 
193 
CHAPTER SIX: THE DISQUALIFICATION OF PERSONS RELATED TO A 
CORRUPT SUPPLIER 
6.1 Introduction 
............................................................................................................... 
194 
6.2 Rationes for disqualifying related persons 
................................................................ 
195 
6.3 The related persons 
.................................................................................................... 
196 
6.3.1. Natural persons 
.................................................................................................. 
197 
6.3.1.1 Disqualifying a firm for the corrupt activty of a natural person 
...................... 
197 
6.3.1.2 Disqualifying a natural person for the corrupt activity of a firm 
..................... 
207 
6.3.1.3 Analysis 
........................................................................................................... 
212 
6.3.2 Connected companies 
......................................................................................... 
215 
6.3.2.1 Disqualifying a parent company for the offences of a subsidiary 
................... 
215 
6.3.2.2 Disqualifying a subsidiary company for the offences of a parent 
................... 
222 
6.3.2.3 Disqualifying a firm for the offences of a sister company 
.............................. 
223 
6.3.2.4 Analysis 
........................................................................................................... 
225 
V 
6.3.3 Cooperating companies 
...................................................................................... 
226 
6.3.3.1 Subcontractors 
.................................................................. 
227 
6.3.3.2 Joint Ventures 
.................................................................................. 
231 
6.4 Analysis 
................................................................................................................. 
237 
6.4.1 Discovering the existence and complicity of related natural and legal persons: 
The expense and difficulty of investigations 
............................................................... 
237 
6.4.2. Procedural burden and delays to the procurement process 
................................ 
238 
6.4.3 The absence of procedural safeguards 
................................................................ 
238 
6.4.4 The lack of clarity in the legislation 
................................................................... 
239 
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE EFFECT OF DISQUALIFICATION ON EXISTING 
CONTRACTS 
7.1 Introduction 
................................................................................ 
241 
7.2 Rationales for contractual termination 
................................................ 
243 
7.3 Is there a duty to terminate existing contracts for disqualification? 
............... 
244 
7.4 Problems with contractual termination 
............................................. 
261 
7.4.1 Determining if termination is prospective or retrospective 
............... 
261 
7.4.2 Restitution and apportionment of losses 
....................................... 
263 
7.4.3 Disproportionality and the rule against double jeopardy 
.................. 
273 
7.4.4 Waste and Inefficiency 
......................................................... 
277 
7.4.5 The effect of termination on the delivery of public services 
............. 
278 
7.4.6 The effect of termination on third parties 
....................................... 
280 
7.5 Analysis 
.................................................................................... 
283 
7.5.1 The existence of a duty to terminate 
................................................ 
284 
7.5.2 The nature and consequences of termination....................................... 285 
CHAPTER EIGHT: DEROGATING FROM DISQUALIFICATION 
8.1 Introduction 
............................................................................................................... 
288 
8.2 Reasons for derogating from disqualification 
........................................................... 
289 
8.2.1 Exceptional reasons 
................................................................. .................... 
289 
8.2.1.1 Public interest (including public health) 
........................................................... 
289 
8.2.1.2 National security 
............................................................................................... 
295 
vi 
8.2.1.3 The economic osts and impact of disqualification 
............... ......................... 
299 
8.2.1.4 Factors to be taken into account in deciding if an exceptional situation 
exists 
................................................................................................................................ 
301 
8.2.2 Rehabilitation measures 
.......................................................................................... 
302 
8.2.2.1 Does a disqualifying entity have a discretion or obligation to take 
rehabilitation measures into account? 
.......................................................................... 
304 
8.2.2.2 The kinds of measures sufficient to avoid disqualification 
.......................... 
311 
8.3 Preventing abuse in the use of derogations 
............................................................... 
315 
8.4 Analysis 
..................................................................................................................... 
319 
CHAPTER NINE: REMEDIES FOR AFFECTED SUPPLIERS 
9.1 Introduction 
............................................................................................................... 
321 
9.2 The availabilty of a right of review 
........................................................................... 
322 
9.2.1 The EU 
................................................................................................................. 
323 
9.2.2 The UK 
................................................................................................................ 
324 
9.2.3 The United States 
................................................................................................. 
326 
9.2.4 The World Bank 
.................................................................................................. 
329 
9.2.5 South Africa 
......................................................................................................... 
333 
9.3 The kinds of remedies available 
............... 
336 
................................................................. 
9.4 Analysis 
..................................................................................................................... 
345 
9.4.1 Balancing the tension between effective remedies and delays to the 
procurement process 
........................................................................ 
346 
9.4.2 The availability of a right of review 
............................................. 
347 
CONCLUSION 
I. Reflections on the research 
................................... ......... 
349 
.............................................  
II. Areas for filTther study 
................................................................................................ 
351 
III. RecoIendations 
..................................................................................................... 
353 
IV Concluding remarks 
............................... 
BIBLIOGRAFHy 
........................................................................ 
356 
vii 
INTRODUCTION 
I. Introduction 
Corruption is a problem of antiquated origin, which has been deplored by the thinkers 
of every generation. ' The literature on corruption is extensive, and there is no 
shortage of material on the history, nature, effects and consequence of corruption. 
Less prevalent is information on the `cure' for corruption or on the utility or 
effectiveness of existing measures against corruption. 
Corruption can be defined in several ways, to cover a range of behaviours from 
"venality to ideological erosion". 2 A wide definition of corruption will include the 
public and private sectors and cover activities consisting of fraud, extortion, 
embezzlement and abuse of office. This thesis will focus on public sector corruption, 
which includes bribery, kickbacks, `gifts' and illicit payments to government officials 
in their capacity as public servants, in order that the giving party may achieve a stated 
purpose. Accordingly, this thesis will adopt a definition of public sector corruption 
favoured by social scientists which states that corruption is "behaviour which deviates 
from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close 
family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise 
of certain types of private-regarding influence. "3 
Corruption in the public sector has necessitated concerted efforts to fight it by 
organisations such as the World Bank, the United Nations, the OECD, the Council of 
Europe, and the European Union. The prevalent view is that corruption undermines 
democratization, the rule of law, the consolidation of market economies, 4 and is a 
' Hamilton & Cairns (ed) Plato, The Laws, (1961) book 12, sec. d; MacMullen, Corruption and the 
Decline of Rome (1988); Jacoby et at, Bribery and extortion in world business: a study of corporate 
political payments abroad (1977) 7-43; Alatas, The Sociology of Corruption: The nature function 
causes and prevention of corruption (1980), 9,77; Levy Peck, Court Patronage and Corruption in 
early Stuart England (1990); Byrce, Modern Democracies, (1921) Vol. I 2 Nye, "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis" (1967) 61 (2) A. P. S. R. 417, 
419 [hereafter, Nye]. 
3 Nye, 417. 
4 Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, Reform (1999) [Rose- 
Ackerman, 1999]; Soreide, Corruption in public procurement: Causes, Consequences, Cures (2002) [Soreide], Nichols, "Outlawing Transnational Bribery through the World Trade Organisation" (1997) L 
I 
threat to the international economy. To counter this threat, anti-corruption measures 
have become increasingly global in outlook. For instance, the OECD was the first 
inter-governmental institution to seek an international framework for combating 
corruption in 1994.5 In 2003, the United Nations adopted a Convention against 
Corruption obliging states to criminalise a wide range of corrupt activities. Similarly, 
the EU has in place, legislative measures designed to combat corruption within 
Member States and its institution.? 
In addition to international efforts at combating corruption, many national legal 
systems have mechanisms and legislation aimed and preventing and punishing 
corruption. One of the `tools' in the armoury against corruption in national systems is 
public procurement regulation. Public procurement is the purchasing by a government 
of the goods and services it requires to function and maximise public welfare. In 
doing so, a government will often adopt regulation and procedures to ensure that it 
obtains these goods, services or `works' (construction contracts) in a transparent, 
competitive manner and at the most economically advantageous price. 8 It is believed 
that transparency in public procurement will assist in ensuring that public 
procurement procedures foster competition and obtaining value for money. 9 Public 
procurement may also be subject to secondary criteria and a government may use 
public procurement to achieve non-procurement related goals such as the 
development of a region/industrial sector or encouraging environmentally friendly 
manufacturing, by favouring relevant firms in public contract awards. '0 
Corruption control can also be included as a goal of procurement regulation. This is 
consistent with the other goals of procurement regulation- as the elimination of 
& P. I. B. 305,337; Nichols, "Regulating Transnational Bribery in times of Globalization and 
Fragmentation" (1999) 24 Y. J. I. L. 257, Noonan, Bribes (1984) [Noonan]. 
S Recommendations on Bribery in International Business Transactions, 1994. 6 43 I. L. M. 37. 
Convention on the Protection of the European Communities Financial Interests [1995] O. J. C 316/48 
and its Protocols [1996] O. J. C313/2 and [1997] O. J. C151/1; Convention on the Fight Against 
Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States of the EU 
[1997] O. J. C195/1; Action Plan to Combat Organised crime [1997] O. J. C 251/1. 
8 Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement, 2°d ed. (2005) ch. 3 [Arrowsmith, 20051; 
Schooner, "Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law" (2002) 11 (2) P. P. L. R. 
103 [Schooner, 2002]. 
9 Schooner, ibid. 
'° Arrowsmith & Kunzlik (eds. ), Social and environmental policies in EC procurement law: New 
directives and new directions (2009) [Arrowsmith & Kunzlik]; Caranta and Trybus, The Law of Green 
and Social Procurement in Europe (2010); McCrudden, Buying Social Justice (2007) [McCrudden]. 
2 
corruption will facilitate the award of contracts to the most competitive firms and not 
those preferred for ulterior reasons. However, a focus on corruption control can also 
detract from achieving the competition and efficiency goals of procurement regulation 
as anti-corruption measures may be so intricate as to constitute a financial and 
procedural burden on the procurement process. " Anti-corruption measures included 
in procurement regulation ensure the absence of corruption within the procurement 
process and ensure that a government contractor is ethical or honest. Whilst criminal 
and civil sanctions12 on corrupt firms and corrupt public officials13 are an obvious 
way of combating corruption in public procurement, less obvious are the myriad of 
administrative rules and regulations intended to ensure transparency and openness in 
the procurement process and deny the conditions under which corruption takes place. 
Administrative methods for combating corruption may be more effective than 
criminal methods, especially as corrupt practices are often clandestine and can make 
meeting the burden of proof in a criminal trial difficult for prosecutors. As a result, 
countries are increasingly using non-criminal devices to combat corruption. One such 
mechanism for dealing with corrupt firms is to disqualify them from bidding on 
government contracts. 
A number of questions are raised by the use of procurement regulation to combat 
corruption. One may begin by asking whether combating corruption through 
procurement is desirable or necessary. Procurement regulation is designed to ensure 
that a government obtains the goods and services it needs at the best price and 
procurement procedures should reflect the ideals of procurement regulation such as 
competition, transparency and efficiency. Where corruption control is imposed as an 
additional objective of the procurement process, by rules requiring the disqualification 
of corrupt suppliers, this can have serious practical and conceptual implications, 
which are not always considered by legislative provisions on disqualification. Some 
of the problems that arise from the use of disqualifications include determining 
" Anechiarico and Jacobs, "Purging Corruption from Public Contracting: The "Solutions" are Now 
Part of the Problem" (1995) N. Y. L. S. L. R. 143 [Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1995]. 
'Z White (ed), Procurement and Organised Crime: An EU wide Study (2000) [White, 2000]; Jacobs, 
Friel & Radick, Gotham Unbound: How New York City was Liberated from the Grip of Organised 
Crime (1999) [Jacobs, Friel & Radick]; TMC Asser Institute, Prevention of and Administrative Action Against organised Crime: A Comparative Law Study of the Registration of Legal persons and Criminal Audits in Eight EU Member States (1997) [TMC Asser]. 
13 Kofele-Kale, International Law of Responsibility for Economic Crimes: Holding Heads of State and Other High Ranking officials Individually Liable for Acts of Fraudulent Enrichment (1995) [Kofele- 
Kale]. 
3 
whether it applies to natural persons, subcontractors, subsidiaries or other persons 
related to the corrupt firm and determining whether a conviction for corruption ought 
to be a pre-requisite to disqualification, bearing in mind that corruption is an activity 
that thrives in secret, resulting in a dearth of convictions. This leads to the issue of 
understanding the limits to and efficacy of procurement initiatives in tackling 
corruption. '4 
Many of these issues such as determining the limits of disqualification and the issue 
of convictions remain unanswered in the few studies on the use of disqualifications in 
public procurement. A brief literature review indicates that existing work on using 
government procurement to sanction corruption is limited. Although significant 
contributions have been made by US authors, 15 there is little literature available on 
disqualification outside of the US. In relation to the EU, a limited amount of research 
has been conducted, 16 especially since disqualifications for corruption became 
mandatory in 2006. There is similarly very little research on disqualifications in 
organisations like the World Bank. 17 Other jurisdictions contain a limited amount of 
information on procurement disqualifications, but there is not enough information to 
provide a coherent understanding of all the issues raised by disqualification. 
Finally, the available literature on disqualifications generally focuses on one 
jurisdiction, and there is nothing that adopts a multi jurisdictional approach to 
understanding the challenges posed by the use of disqualifications in public 
procurement. 
14 Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1995. 
is Anechiarico & Jacobs, The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity: How Corruption Control makes 
Government Ineffective (1996) [Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996]. Jacobs, Friel & Radick; Kelman, 
Procurement and Public Management: The Fear of Discretion and the Quality of Government 
Performance (1990) [Kelman, 1990]. 
16 Piselli, "The Scope for Excluding Providers who have committed criminal offences under the EU 
procurement directives" (2000) 6 P. P. L. R. 267 [Piselli], Arrowsmith, 2005; Arrowsmith, 
"Implementation of the new EC procurement directives and the Alcatel ruling in England and Wales 
and Northern Ireland: A review of the new legislation and guidance" (2006) 3 P. P. L. R 86 [Arrowsmith, 
2006]; Williams, "The mandatory exclusions for corruption in the new EC procurement directives" 
(2006) 31 (5) E. L. R. 711 [Williams, 2006]; Medina, "EU Directives as an Anti-Corruption Measure: 
Excluding Corruption Convicted Tenderers from Public Procurement Contracts", in Thai (ed. ) 
International Handbook of Public Procurement, (2008) [Medina, 2008]; Arrowsmith, "Application of 
the EC Treaty and directives to horizontal policies: A critical review" in Arrowsmith & Kunzlik. 
17 Williams, "The debarment of corrupt contractors from World Bank-Financed Contracts" (2007) 36 
P. C. L. J. 277 [Williams, 2007a]. 
4 
II. Research objectives 
The aim of this research is to examine and analyse the legal texts of selected national 
and multilateral procurement instruments, which provide for the disqualification from 
public contracts of suppliers who are convicted or otherwise guilty of corruption and 
provide a legal critique of the provisions in these instruments. In doing so, the thesis 
will highlight and analyse the problems that attend the implementation of a 
disqualification measure, study and compare the approaches of selected jurisdictions 
to these problems and examine the solutions that the selected jurisdictions have 
applied or may apply to these problems, to determine the respective advantages and 
disadvantages of these approaches. 
The research will aim to develop a coherent framework for understanding the rules 
pertaining to the use of procurement disqualifications as an instrument for sanctioning 
corruption. This will be of interest to policy makers and countries contemplating 
adopting procurement laws or translating international instruments, which contain 
disqualifications into national law. '8 The information provided by this thesis will also 
contribute to an understanding of the limits of the use of public procurement law as an 
anti-corruption tool. The thesis will aim to state the law in the jurisdictions as at 30th 
April 2011. 
III. Methodology 
The methodology for this thesis will be both a doctrinal and comparative legal 
analysis. The doctrinal study of law aims to reconstruct and provide an understanding 
of a legal system, and create a rationalized body of information from that which has 
been produced by legal academics, courts, legislators and international bodies. The 
analysis in this thesis will be conducted by an investigation into primary and 
secondary legal materials and texts on the subject matter. 
18 Art. VIII (3) WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). 
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The primary sources include the EU public sector procurement directives, the United 
States federal procurement regulations, the United Kingdom procurement regulations, 
the Procurement Guidelines of the World Bank and South African public procurement 
legislation as well as case law. Secondary sources such as official reports and existing 
literature on disqualification may contain qualitative empirical information on 
disqualification, which will be referred to where relevant, but this thesis will not 
undertake any fresh empirical study. However, the thesis will draw on the existing 
literature on disqualifications in public procurement to provide the factual background 
and legal information on disqualification and critically appraise and evaluate the 
issues that are highlighted therein. 
Although doctrinal study can provide one with the tools necessary to analyse a legal 
system, the arguments allowed by this type of study are limited since it does not take 
actual legal practice into consideration, and may produce arguments, rationales or 
solutions that are divorced from reality. A comparative approach as a method of legal 
study evaluates a number of legal systems, usually in order to provide a better 
understanding of a particular system or issue under consideration. This type of study 
can contribute to the development of legal systems or issues and be used to advocate 
for change. 19 Therefore, in searching for a deeper understanding, the thesis will adopt 
a comparative approach to understand the way in which the legal systems under study 
have addressed the problems created by the disqualification mechanism. 
IV. The choice of jurisdictions 
The thesis will consider the disqualification of suppliers from public procurement as 
an anti-corruption tool in the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United 
States, South Africa and the World Bank. 
In 2004, the EU adopted a procurement directive, which required the public bodies of 
Member States to disqualify from public contracts, suppliers convicted of corruption 
among other offences. This represented a departure from previous EU directives, 
which permitted, but did not require the disqualification of persons convicted of 
19 Zweigert& Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3`a ed. (1998), 5. 
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certain offences. The EU was chosen because of its significance as the organisation 
that provides the template for the procurement legislation of 27 nations. However, 
because European law is better understood within the context of implementation by 
Member States, a specific Member State has also been chosen for study, namely the 
United Kingdom. The UK has implemented the EU procurement directives and the 
materials needed to analyse the UK's implementation of the EU directives will be 
accessible to the researcher. 
The United States has had a long experience of procurement disqualifications, and is 
thus an ideal candidate for this study. In addition, there is available research on the 
effects of incorporating anti-corruption mechanisms into procurement law, and the 
effects of such mechanisms on the machinery of government. 20 
South Africa is a developing country with a developed procurement regulation 
system. Like many developing countries, it has a problem with corruption and has 
adopted the use of disqualifications in public procurement. The study will examine 
the manner in which the disqualifications in South Africa are structured and applied, 
given the contextual challenges faced by South Africa. 
The World Bank was the first development bank to utilise disqualifications where 
corruption was established within Bank-financed procurement and other development 
banks have subsequently adopted the Bank's disqualification practice, 21 making the 
Bank an appropriate system to examine in this thesis. The practice of disqualification 
within the Bank provides insight into the challenges that are created by 
disqualification irrespective of the nature of the legal system or limits of its 
jurisdiction. 
20 Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996; Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1995. 
21 Para. 2.14 Asian Development Bank's Guidelines for Procurement; Para. 2.12.3 & 2.12.4 African 
Development Bank Rules of Procedure for Procurement of Goods and Works. 
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V. Structure 
The thesis will be divided into nine substantive chapters. Chapter one will briefly 
examine the concept and problem of corruption and the various measures used to 
address it in national and international systems. It will examine the use of 
procurement regulation to combat corruption and in particular, examine the rationales 
for disqualification in public procurement. Chapter two will examine the background 
to and provide an overview of public procurement regulation in each of the 
jurisdictions; examine the anti-corruption policy in the jurisdictions and consider the 
rationales underpinning the use disqualification in each jurisdiction. Chapter three 
will examine the offences that trigger disqualification in the jurisdictions and examine 
whether convictions are required for disqualification and the status of foreign 
convictions. 
Chapter four will examine the procedural aspects of the disqualification decision 
including whether procedural safeguards accompany the decision, the time limits for 
disqualification and the kinds of entities used in the disqualification process. Chapter 
five will consider the issue of investigations- specifically whether a disqualifying 
entity is required to conduct investigations into whether an offence was committed or 
a conviction exists, the extent of the entities investigative powers and the kind of 
evidence that may be relied on by such a disqualifying entity. Chapter six will 
examine the effect of disqualification on natural and legal persons related to the 
disqualified firm and compare the approaches to this issue in the jurisdictions. 
Chapter seven examines the impact of disqualification on existing contracts and 
examines whether and in what contexts the jurisdictions require the termination of 
existing contracts where a supplier is disqualified. Chapter eight addresses the 
exceptions to or derogations from the disqualification requirement allowed in the 
public interest or in exceptional situations. Chapter nine will consider the remedies 
that are available to a supplier or another person who alleges improprieties in the 
disqualification process. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE CONCEPT OF CORRUPTION AND MEASURES AGAINST 
CORRUPTION 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter will present an overview of the concept of corruption and examine the 
measures adopted against corruption, to illustrate the various measures that may be used 
against corruption and put procurement-related mechanisms like disqualification into a 
general context. 
1.2 The concept, nature and effects of corruption 
Corruption as an economic, social, legal or political concept can be hard to define. First, 
corruption is steeped in morality' and ethics2 and is imbued with elements of moral 
approbation, shame and wrongdoing, making it a sensitive subject to address. 3 Secondly, 
although corruption might offend inherent (and possibly universal) values of morality and 
ethics, it is also to some extent, culturally specific, with a dichotomy between western 
and non-western conceptualisations of corruption. 
In spite of the recognised definitional difficulties, definitions of corruption are not 
lacking. As mentioned in the introduction, one such definition states corruption is 
"behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private- 
regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates 
' Wilson, "Corruption is not always scandalous" in Gardiner and Olson (eds. ) Theft of the City: Readings 
on corruption in America (1968), 29. 2 Noonan, 702-703. 
3 Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption (1988), xi [Klitgaard, 1988]. 4 Kim & Kim, "Cultural Differences in the Crusade against International Bribery: Rice Cake Expenses in 
Korea and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act" (1997) 6 P. R. L & P. J. 589. [Kim & Kim]; Hooker, Working 
Across Cultures (2003), 88,204 & 317. 
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rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. "5 This definition 
will be adopted as the meaning of corruption in this thesis as the focus in the thesis is on 
public-sector corruption, or the corruption that occurs between private individuals and 
public sector agents. 
Although there is little value in presenting a list of existing definitions of corruption, the 
definitions of corruption may be utilised to determine the characteristics of corruption. 
An inquiry into some definitions of corruption raises six characteristics of corruption. 
(a) corruption is an activity that occurs when the public interest is subjected to private 
interests. 
(b) corruption violates local and universal rules, 7 and duties, 8 but includes an element of 
cultural specificity. 9 
(c) corruption can be "trivial or monumental"10 or as Nye puts it, range from "venality 
to ideological erosion. "" 1 (d) corruption covers a wide range of activities which may be defined as embezzlement, 
fraud, bribery or theft. 
(e) corruption is present in developed and developing countries, but occurs with varying 
degrees of severity. 12 (f) The activity labelled corrupt need not be illegal, it is enough that it is considered 
unethical or immora1.13 
Most definitions of corruption characterise corruption from the point of view of the 
public official. This is not to deny the corruption, which takes place in the private sector, 
but it appears that private-sector corruption poses less of a problem to governments and 
the international community, since market forces invariably dictate the price that people 
pay for a good or service. Also, private-sector corruption is less likely to become 
' Nye, 417. 
6 Nye, 417; Klitgaard, 1988, xi. 
7 Noonan, 702-703. 
8 Kofele-Kale, 113-164. 
9 Salbu, "Are extra territorial restrictions on bribery a viable and desirable international policy goal under 
the global conditions of the late twentieth century? " (1999) 24 Y. M. L. 223,232-239; Tun, "Bribery among 
the Korean elite: Putting an end to a cultural ritual and restoring honour" (1996) 26 V. J. T. L. 1071,1084; 
Johnston, "The political consequences of corruption: A reassessment" June (1986) Comparative Policy, 
463. Rose-Ackerman, 1999,2; Klitgaard, "Gifts and Bribes" in Zeckhauser (ed. ), Strategy and Choice (1991); Klitgaard, 1988,62. 
'o Klitgaard, 1988, xi. 
" Nye, 419. 
'2 Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Klitgaard, 1988,8-9. 
13 Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996, ch. I. 
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systemic and cannot be sustained, as the increased costs of doing business will decrease a 
firm's competitiveness over time, if that firm is not a monopoly. Furthermore, private- 
sector corruption rarely produces the social costs of public-sector corruption such as the 
`contagion of corruption' 14 or the waste and inefficient allocation of public resources. 15 
As stated, this thesis will focus on public-sector corruption due to its peculiarities such as 
the tendency for public corruption to be sustainable16 and its effect on socio-economic 
development. Also, measures introduced to combat corruption, such as disqualifications 
are usually, but not exclusively aimed at public-sector corruption. 
Whilst there is some agreement on the basic components of a definition of corruption, 
there is less agreement on the nature and effects of corruption and there is a diversity of 
opinions as to whether corruption is an economic, social or political phenomenon with 
each perspective providing models for analysing and understanding corruption. 
Economic theories of corruption 
Within the economic framework, '? the agency (or incentive) model of corruption is the 
most dominant. 18 This model assumes that the public servant is the agent of the 
government and is employed to further the government's (his principal's) interests. In 
addition to the public interest the agent is supposed to be furthering, the agent also has his 
own private interests, which may conflict with that of his principal. Corruption occurs 
when the agent decides to pursue his private ends at the expense of the public interest, or 
subordinates the public interest to his private goals. The economic model assumes that 
the agent is a rational (if amoral) being and will weigh up the benefits of being corrupt 
'° Caiden and Dwivedi, "Official Ethics and Corruption" in Caiden (ed. ) Where Corruption Lives (2001), 
245. 
15 Rose-Ackerman, 1999,3,30. 
16 See generally Doig and Theobald, Corruption and Democratisation (2000) [Doig & Theobald]. 
'7 Rose-Ackerman, 1999, ch. 2. 
IS Groenendijk, "A principal-agent model of corruption" (1997) 27 C. L. & S. C. 207-229; Andvig et al, 
Corruption: A Review of Comtemporary Research (2001). 
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against the costs and where the net benefits exceed the net costs, the agent will act 
corruptly. ' 9 
The problem with economic models of corruption is that they are sterile and do not take 
into account any inclinations towards religion, morality or ethics, which may dissuade a 
public agent from acting corruptly, and ignore normative factors, which can impact the 
agent's decision. In assuming that all officials are morally neutral and will act corruptly if 
it benefits them, the models are unable to explain why some agents are not corrupt, and 
how the non-economic motivations of non-corrupt officials may be harnessed as an anti- 
corruption mechanism. The assumption that once it is beneficial and the opportunity 
presents itself, all public officials will act corruptly is also not based on the evidence 
where there are few detriments to an agent for acting corruptly, because corruption is 
systemic, tolerated and rarely penalised, and some agents still do not engage in corrupt 
activities. Whilst economic models of corruption are helpful in understanding the 
economic drivers behind corruption, they are limited in the nature of solutions that can be 
proffered- as the solutions are also economically driven, often ignoring the complexity of 
the subject matter. 20 
Political theories on corruption 
The political conceptualisation of corruption has similar shortcomings. Here, corruption 
is perceived as a consequence of a particular system of government (democratic or non- 
democratic), 21 or a failure of leadership 22 The arguments are that the non-democratic and 
non-accountable nature of the political machinery contributes to corruption23 or that the 
existing personalities in government are the cause of the problem. 24 However, these 
Zö Klitgaard, 1988,69-74. 
Becker, "Crime and Punishment: An economic approach" (1968) 76 J. P. E. 169-217. 22 See generally, Doig & Theobald. 
Hope, "Corruption and development in Africa" in Hope and Chikulu (eds. ) Corruption and development 
In Africa: Lessons from Country case studies (2000), 19. 23 Friedrich, "Corruption concepts in historical perspective" in Heidenheimer et al (eds. ), Political Corruption: A handbook 2"d ed. (1989). 24 Coolidge and Rose-Ackerman, "Kleptocracy and Reform in African regimes: Theory and examples" in Hope 
and Chikulu (eds. ), n. 22, ch. 3. 
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theories cannot explain the corruption that takes place in developed democracies and 
there is conflicting evidence on whether non-democratic societies are more corrupt that 
democratic ones. 25 In fact it is claimed that democratic societies may create an 
atmosphere more conducive to corrupt activity, as "... democratic society encourages 
wheeling and dealing and give and take. They support negotiation and persuasion. This 
can mean some persons back into committing technical violations without the intention to 
commit a crime... [fror elected officials, the line between political contributions and 
buying favours and extortion can be thin. "26 
Where corruption is blamed on the personalities in government, this removes the 
responsibility for individual actions from public officials and places it with the 
leadership. Whilst a corrupt leadership may invariably reproduce itself, 27 even in the most 
corrupt of regimes, public servants retain the responsibility for their actions in deciding 
whether to be corrupt. 
Social explanations for corruption 
Corruption might be considered to be an anthropological problem28 or a consequence of 
the failings inherent in the organisation of society, such as a failure of capitalism 29 The 
argument is that corruption comes into play where market forces are unable to efficiently 
allocate resources, and ensures that opportunities are allocated to the highest bidder. 30 
Whilst in an inefficient society, corruption might ensure that opportunities are given to 
those who desire them the most, the argument fails to realise that political participation, 
state resources and opportunities are not private property and should not be for sale. 
Furthermore, if corruption is used as the means to distribute resources intended for the 
25 Doig and Theobald; Andvig et al, n. 18, ch. 4.2 and 6.2; Treisman, "The causes of corruption: a cross 
national study" (2000) 76 J. P. E. 399-457. 26 Marx, "When the guards guard themselves: Undercover tactics turned inwards" (1992) 2 P. & S. 166. 27 Windsor et at, "Multilateral Cooperation to Combat Corruption: Normative Regimes Despite Mixed 
Motives and diverse values" (2000) 33 C. I. L. J. 731,757. 
28 Sissener, Anthropological Perspectives on Corruption (2001); Andvig et at, n. 25, ch. 5.4. 29 Blomstrom and Hettne, Development Theory in Transition (1984); Pfaff, "A pathological mutation in 
capitalism", International Herald Tribune, 9/09/02. 
30 Rose-Ackerman, 1999, ch. 2. 
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greater good, the re-distribution of those resources will reflect the increased costs of 
obtaining them, which will adversely affect society as a whole. 31 
From the above explanations into the causes of corruption, it can be seen that none of the 
above concepts are sufficient to explain the complex nature of corruption. Rather, it is 
suggested that corruption can only be explained by taking all factors into account, the 
political, the economic and the social. 
As regards the effects of corruption, it is surprising to find that scholars are not in 
universal agreement on the effects of corruption. One school opines that corruption is 
intrinsically bad because it undermines the legitimacy of governments and increases 
public spending without an increase in public welfare. 32 Most writers agree that the end 
result of corruption where it is systemic is an adverse effect on development as the state 
becomes incapable of meeting basic needs or sustaining economic development. 33 The 
effect of corruption on development has been illustrated by studies showing that 
corruption or the opportunity to obtain bribes can affect the allocation of public spending 
and lead to large unnecessary projects given priority over health and education. 4 
Corruption can also have very direct effects on public welfare. For instance, if one 
considers the allocation of a hypothetical water distribution contract to a supplier who 
was able to bribe public officials to obtain the contract, the provision of water to the end- 
consumer will either reflect the increased costs to obtain the contract, or will be provided 
at a sub-standard quality, to recoup these costs. Even if the quality of the water is 
31 Witting, "A Framework for balancing business and accountability within public procurement" (2001) 3 
P. P. L. R. 139-164 [Witting]. 
32 Mauro, "Corruption and Growth" (1995) 110 Q. J. E. 681, provides empirical evidence of the link between 
increased corruption and reduced gross domestic product. Ward, Corruption, Development and Inequality: 
Soft Touch or Hard Graft (1989), 170; Rose-Ackerman, 1999, ch. 1 33 Khan, "Top Down or bottom up? The spread of systemic corruption in the Third world, " (Dec. 2001); 
Kofele- Kale, 105-107; Frisch, "The Effects of corruption on development" (1996) 158 The Courier ACP- 
EU, 68-70; Gray & Kaufman, "Corruption and Development" (1998) F. & D. 7-10; Heineman & Heimann, 
"The Long War Against Corruption" (2006) 85 F. A. 75. 
34 Mauro, "The effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment and Government Expenditure: A cross 
Country analysis" in Kimberly (ed. ) Corruption and the Global Economy (1997); Tanzi, "Corruption 
around the world: Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures" (1998) 45 (4) IMF Staff Papers 559; Soreide, 
ch. 2. 
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unaffected, the supplier may not be the most efficient or cost-effective, leading to a waste 
of public funds. 
Other studies into the effects of corruption have revealed that it reduces private 
investment, foreign direct investment and the rate of economic growth, 35 as it acts as a tax 
on foreign direct investment thereby reducing real capital flows. 36 Corruption further 
disrupts democracy and the citizenry's right to political participation; 37 if one considers 
that where a public agent alters his decision-making on the receipt of a bribe, he is 
denying the right of other people to participate in that process, and subverting democracy 
by flouting formal processes. 
In addition, corruption can have fatal and disastrous consequences, especially in the 
construction context. For instance, in Egypt in 2007, a building collapsed killing several 
people. 38 Similarly, in India in 2010,65 people were killed when a building collapsed. 39 
These tragedies were blamed on corruption and lax enforcement of building regulations. 
On the other hand, some scholars believe that a limited amount of corruption can be 
beneficial if it succeeds in making markets more efficient and aiding in the allocation of 
scarce resources. 0 The problem with this reasoning, however, is in defining and 
imposing the `limits' of this corruption. In a study into the telecommunications sector in 
India, Rashid argued that bribes to obtain a telephone line began as price discrimination 
among customers in an egalitarian system, but quickly degenerated into extortion against 
35 Mauro, n. 32,700-704. 
36 Rubin, "A convergence of 1996 and 1997 global efforts to curb corruption and bribery in international 
business transactions: The legal implications of the OECD recommendations and Convention for the 
United States, Germany and Switzerland" (1988) 14 A. U. I. L. R. 257,315; Wei, "How taxing is corruption 
on international investors? " NBER Working Paper 6030 (1997). 
37 Donaldson, The Ethics of International Business (1989), 89-94. 
38 See httv: //www. msnbc. msn. conVid/22432355/ns/world news-mideast n africa/t/corrupt-work- 
b larced-egypt-bui lding-col lapse/ 
39 http: //www. allvoices. com/contributed-news/7345623-the-worst-disaster-of-building-collapse-in-delhi- 
killing 60-people 
40 Nye, 419-422; Huntington, "Modernization and Development" in Ekpo (ed. ) Bureaucratic Corruption in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: Towards a search for causes and consequences (1979); Leff, "Economic development 
through bureaucratic corruption" in Ekpo (ed. ) ibid; Olsen & Torsvik, "Collusion and Renegotiation in 
hierarchies: A case of beneficial corruption, " (1998) 39 I. E. R. 413-438. 
15 
customers that impeded service so the officials in charge could obtain larger bribes. 41 
Whether or not there is evidence to suggest that corruption can be beneficial for 
economic development, 42 the majority of scholars affirm the undesirable effects and 
consequences of corruption. 3 This thesis is also premised on the view that corruption is 
detrimental to growth and development. 
1.3 Measures to address corruption 
The measures to address corruption range from national laws and guidelines to 
international and multilateral binding instruments. This section will analyse national and 
major international anti-corruption measures to put procurement disqualifications into 
context and show that they are only one of the many approaches that may be used against 
corruption. 
1.3.1 Domestic measures against corruption. 
1.3.1.1 Introduction 
There are different measures a government may adopt against corruption. These can be 
classified into administrative, regulatory, and social measures. Administrative measures 
are measures which may not be specifically required by legislation, but which are 
permitted under the exercise of executive discretion. Regulatory tools are the obligatory 
measures, which must be imposed where corrupt activity is found to have occurred, 
4' Rashid, "Public utilities in egalitarian LDC's: the role of bribery in achieving pareto efficiency", (1981) 
34 K. I. R. S. S. 448-455. 
42 Nye, 419-422. 
43 Klitgaard, 1988. 
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including requirements to impose penal and civil sanctions. Social tools encompass the 
societal ridicule, shame and infamy that attend corrupt activity where it is exposed. 
These categories are not exclusive and administrative and regulatory measures will 
frequently overlap where legislation. authorises the use of an administrative measure 
against corruption. In addition, social tools may accompany the use of regulatory and 
administrative measures. 
1.3.1.2 Administrative tools 
Administrative tools against corruption are measures implemented under the exercise of 
official discretion. These may include restrictions on obtaining government patronage, 
licenses, approvals and permits placed upon corrupt persons. An example is a denial of 
registration as a company, where the proposer has bankruptcies, criminal or fraudulent 
convictions against him. 44 Administrative tools also include measures that deny corrupt 
suppliers access to government contracts, which is the subject matter of this thesis. Such 
measures may also include measures, which deny potential suppliers registration on 
qualification lists for public contracts. 45 
Other administrative measures are increased levels of public sector financial 
management, viz., accounting and audit requirements. These requirements are on the rise, 
as financial controls become an important part of public sector reform and consequently, 
an important part of corruption control. 46 Public sector financial management seeks 
accountability in terms of results, and not just in terms of the process. 7 Specifically, the 
44 TMC Asser. 
45 Xanthaki, "First Pillar Analysis" in White, 2000. 
46 Power, "Evaluating the Audit Explosion" (2003) 25 Law & Policy 185; Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996, 
ch. 9. 
47 Hood, "The new public management in the 1980's: Variations on a theme" (1995) 20 (2-3) A. O. S. 93- 
100. 
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purpose of such audits is to ensure that imbalances or areas of leakage in public finances 
are identified and properly addressed. 48 
The increased supervision of public officials is another anti-corruption tool. This can be 
implemented through series of approvals necessary before major decisions can be taken 
and implemented. Supervision of public officials is closely tied to restricting the levels of 
discretion available to public agents, which some jurisdictions consider a necessary 
component of corruption control. 9 
1.3.1.3 Regulatory tools 
Regulatory measures include the legislation or regulations that a government may adopt 
against corruption. This includes legal prohibitions against corruption and criminal and 
civil penalties and forfeitures directed both at the public and private sector. For instance, 
a corrupt public official in addition to a fine or custodial sentence that may be imposed 
during a criminal trial may invariably also lose his employment and in some jurisdictions, 
forfeit his pension and related benefits. 5° 
1.3.1.4 Social Tools 
Social measures against corruption are those elements of disapprobation, such as the 
shame, ridicule and disgrace that follows the exposition of corrupt activity. Social tools 
against corruption are rarely used as primary instruments against corruption, since they 
are informal and unorganised mechanisms. Nevertheless, they might follow the use of 
regulatory tools, where the press sensationalises corruption scandals and exposes the 
parties involved in a criminal trial. However, the tool may be used in the absence of 
criminal convictions. For instance, the UK Parliamentary expenses scandal which 
48 Walsh, "Creating a competitive culture in the public service: the role of audits and other reviews" (1995) 
54 (3) A. J. P. A. 325. 
49 Kelman, 1990, ch. 1; Gray, Anti-Corruption in Transition 2: Corruption in Enterprise-State Interactions 
in Europe and Central Asia 1999-2002 (2004), 11. 
50 Becker and Stigler, "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and Compensation of Enforcers" (1974) 3 J. L. S 1. 
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dominated the UK media in 2009 led to public outrage and the resignation of some 
members of Parliament. Similarly, in the Philippines in the early 1970's, government 
officials who were found to be corrupt had their details published in national media. This 
amounted to a disgrace that was considered so serious, some officials committed 
suicide. 51 
Social tools may also accompany the use of administrative measures where for instance, 
it becomes publicly known that a firm has been excluded from government contracts as a 
result of corruption and this affects its ability to obtain business from other sectors, or its 
share price. 12 
1.3.2 International measures against corruption. 
1.3.2.1 Introduction 
International measures against corruption have gained prominence in the last two 
decades. These measures can be divided into binding international instruments such as 
treaties and Conventions and soft law instruments such as OECD recommendations, 53 
United Nations and General Assembly resolutions and declarations, 54 and non-binding 
instruments from the EU. 55 Technical assistance programmes56 (mainly directed at 
51 Klitgaard 1988, ch. 3. 
52 Gonzalez V. Freeman, 334 F2. d 570,574 (D. C. Cit. 1964). 
53 OECD Recommendation of the Council on Bribery in International Business Transactions 33 I. L. M. 
1389; OECD Recommendation of the Council on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public 
Officials 35 I. L. M. 1311; OECD Revised Recommendation of the Council on combating Bribery in 
International Business Transactions 36 I. L. M. 1016; OECD Recommendation of the Council on Guidelines 
for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service (2003); OECD Recommendation of the Council on 
Enhancing Integrity in Public Procurement [C (2008) 105]. 
54 UN General Assembly Resolution 51/59 on Action against corruption and the International Code of 
Conduct for Public Officials A/RES/51/59; UN Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International 
Commercial Transactions A/Res/51/191; General Assembly Resolution 55/61 on An effective international 
legal instrument against corruption A/RES/55/61. 
s5 Communication from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament on a Union Policy 
Against Corruption COM (97) 0192; Communication from the Commission to the Council and European 
Parliament on a Comprehensive EU Policy Against Corruption COM (2003) 0317; Action Plan to Combat 
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developing and transition economies) and `naming and shaming' corrupt nationss7 may 
also be used against corruption. For depth of analysis, this thesis will focus on the 
international/multilateral binding instruments against corruption, which are regarded as 
the most important in terms of their geographical significance and number of 
ratifications/accessions. 
The starting point for any discussion of international or multilateral attempts at 
combating corruption is usually the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) 58 
Whilst this is a piece of domestic legislation, it is accepted as the genesis of 
extraterritorial attempts at controlling corruption and it provided the impetus for 
multilateral measures to criminalise overseas bribery. 59 
1.3.2.2 The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials6° had an 
interesting legislative history. 61 After the enactment of the FCPA, it became apparent to 
the US government that without international cooperation it could not solve the problem 
of international corruption. Instead, the FCPA was criticised for harming US interests by 
Organised crime [1997] O. J. C251/1; Resolution on the Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament on a Union policy against Corruption [1998] O. J. C328/46. 56 Technical assistance is provided by the EU (through SIGMA, PHARE), the OECD, the United Nations 
and the World Bank. 
57 The Corruption Perceptions Index, the Bribe Payers index and the Global Corruption Barometer are 
compiled by Transparency International. See httD: //www. trans2arencv. grg 
58 Pub. L. No. 95-213,91 Stat 1494. 
59 Posadas, "Combating Corruption under international law" (2000) 10 D. J. I. L 345; Tarullo, "The limits of 
institutional design: Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention" (2004) 44 V. J. I. L 665; Windsor et 
at, n. 27,731. 
60 37 I. L. M. 1 (1997). 
61 George et al, "The 1998 OECD Convention: An Impetus for Worldwide Changes in attitudes toward 
Corruption in Business Transactions" (2000) 37 A. B. L. J. 485; Rubin, n. 36,257; Nesbitt, "Transnational 
Bribery of Foreign Officials: A new threat to the future of democracy" (1998) 31 V. J. T. L. 1273; Nicholls, 
"The Myth of Anti-Bribery Law as Transnational Intrusion" (2000) 33 C. J. I. L. 627; Hudson and Pierros, 
"The hard graft of tacking corruption in international business transactions: Progress in international 
cooperation and the OECD Convention" (1998) 32 (2) J. W. T. 77-102; Salbu, "A delicate balance: 
Legislation, Institutional Change and Transnational Bribery" (2000) 33 C. I. L. J. 657; Jennings, "Public 
Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of International Corruption Conventions and United States Law", (2001) 18 A. J. I. C. L. 793. 
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making it difficult for US firms to obtain foreign business, as non-US firms who were 
willing to pay bribes now had an advantage over their US competitors. 2 To mitigate this, 
the government put pressure on its peers at the OECD63 and was able to convince them 
that bribery hindered international trade- leading to the adoption of an OECD 
Recommendation criminalising overseas bribery in 199464 
This Recommendation was followed by the Convention, which entered into force in 
1999. The Convention obliges states to prevent their citizens from bribing foreign 
officials, but does not address the taking of bribes by those foreign officials. There are 
three major obligations imposed by the Convention: first, Art.! obliges signatories to: 
"take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence under 
its law for any person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other 
advantage 
... 
to a foreign public official for that official or for a third party, in order that 
the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in 
order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of 
international business. "
This obligation is supported by subsequent articles providing for appropriate criminal and 
civil sanctions against firms guilty of foreign bribery. 65 The second obligation imposed 
by the Convention is aimed at preventing accounting and financial recording mechanisms 
that disguise foreign bribes. Member States are obliged to punish such accounting 
malpractices by effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties. 6 The third obligation is 
for State parties to provide mutual legal assistance to each other, in investigating relevant 
cases, 67 including the possibility of extradition where necessary. 68 
The OECD monitors compliance with the Convention through a process of peer-reviews 
of anti-corruption legislation adopted by State parties. The process also includes a formal 
62 Tarullo, n. 59; Windsor et al, n. 59,748. 
63 Posadas, n. 59,377-379. 
64 33 I. L. M. 1389 (1994). 
65 Art. 3 (1). 
6Art. 8. 
67 Art. 9 (1). 
68 Art. 10. 
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evaluation procedure by the OECD and an examination into the enforcement mechanism 
of State parties, to assess the effectiveness of State parties anti-corruption legislation. 69 
The OECD has focused on ensuring that the administrative and legislative mechanisms 
necessary to implement the Convention are in place in signatory States. While many 
commentators view the Convention as a positive step, most are of the view that the 
Convention has not been as successful in combating international bribery, as it would 
have been hoped. 70 This is due in part to the major loopholes in the Convention, which 
are that it excludes passive bribery (bribe-taking) and `small facilitation payments' from 
its ambit'' as well as similar lacunae in the implementing legislation of State parties. 72 
Also, because the Convention is not a model for legislation, but a set of guidelines 
mandating a broad outcome, it does not "require uniformity or changes in the 
fundamental principles of a Party's legal system". 73 As a result, State parties are not 
required to do much more than criminalise foreign bribery in order to have complied with 
the Convention. 74 Coupled with a weak implementation mechanism, the Convention's 
success may be found in the harmonisation of a set of norms on foreign bribery and not 
much more. 75 The shortcomings of the Convention led to the adoption in 2009 of a 
Recommendation for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, which suggests further measures to combat 
international bribery. 76 
69 Corr & Lawler, "Damned if you do, damned if you don't? The OECD Convention and the Globalisation 
of anti-bribery measures" (1999) 32 V. J. T. L 1249,1319-1324. 
70 Miller, "`No more this for that? ' The effect of the OECD Convention on Combating bribery of foreign 
public officials in international business transactions" (2000) 8 C. J. I. C. L. 139; Calberg, "A truly level 
playing field for international business: Improving the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery using 
clear standards" (2003) 26 B. C. I. C. L. R. 95; Tarullo, n. 59; Carrington, "Enforcing International Corrupt 
Practices Law" (2010) 32 M. J. I. L. 129. 
" OECD, Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of Officials in International Business 
Transactions, OECD Negotiating Conference, 1. Available at www. oecd. org 
72 Miller, n. 70,150-158; Heifetz, "Japan's Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Weaker 
and Less Effective that the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act" (2002) 11 P. R. L. P. J. 209. 
73 OECD, Commentaries n. 71,2. 74 Ala'l, "The Legacy of Geographical Morality and Colonialism: A Historical Assessment of the Current 
Crusade Against Corruption" (2000) 33 V. J. T. L. 877,923-924. 
73 Ala'l, ibid., 928. 
76 See also OECD Recommendation on Tax Measures for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, 2009. 
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1.3.2.3 The Organisation of American States Corruption Convention 
The OAS is a regional organisation of western hemisphere states. The path to a 
multilateral anti-corruption Convention began in 1994 at the Miami Summit, where the 
adopted Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action77 made the link between effective 
democracy and the eradication of corruption. As a result of the commitments in the Plan 
of Action, OAS Member States adopted the Inter-American Convention against 
Corruption, 78 which took effect in 1997. 
The Convention follows the same pattern of the criminalisation of overseas bribery in the 
OECD Convention. 79 However, the Inter-American Convention is broader in scope than 
the OECD Convention in that it addresses the demand and the supply side of corruption 
and applies where a corrupt act was committed in a state party, and where the act has 
effects in a state party. 8° Presumably, an effect may include where a firm from a state 
party was denied a contract because the firm refused to give a bribe. However, it is not 
clear how this might be addressed by the Convention. 
The Convention also contains measures necessary to prevent corruption, " and provides 
for the implementation in national systems of measures to prevent corruption in 
government activities, including, but not limited to the tax system, the procurement 
system82 and the civil service. It also provides for the creation of mechanisms that will 
support good accounting practices within firms as a means of detecting corrupt acts 
where they occur. 83 
" Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan of action 34 I. L. M 808 (1995). 
78 35 ILM 724 (1996). 
79 Low et al., "The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption: A comparison with the United States 
FCPA" (1998) 38 V. J. I. L. 243. 
80 Art, IV. 
81 Art. III. 
82 Art. IIl (5) & (6). 
83 Art. II1(8). 
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The Convention contains a series of mandatory multilateral obligations. These include a 
commitment to extradite persons found to have committed acts of corruption, 84 affording 
mutual assistance in preventive, investigative and enforcement efforts, 85 including 
assistance in the seizure and forfeiture of assets. 86 
Unlike the OECD Convention, there is no monitoring or compliance mechanism, leaving 
implementation to the discretion of state parties. Another feature of the Inter-American 
Convention, which does not have parallels in the OECD Convention is that some of the 
offences in the Inter-American Convention are subject to the Constitution and 
fundamental principles of the State party. Thus a State party may refrain from 
criminalising those offences in question if it feels they are incompatible with its legal 
system. 87 
1.3.2.4 The European Conventions 
The anti-corruption instruments in Europe differ in rationale from the other regional 
conventions against corruption. Thus, while the Inter-American and the African 
Convention locate corruption as a barrier to democracy, economic growth and 
development, the European Conventions endeavor to protect Union finances, and seek, in 
conformity with the purpose behind the Union, the closer integration of the internal 
market. 
The major European Conventions against corruption are those which were adopted by the 
European Union, viz., the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities 
Financial Interests and its Protocols and Convention on the Fight against Corruption 
Involving Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States of the 
EU, and the conventions adopted by the Council of Europe against corruption, viz., one 
" Art. XIII. 
85 Art. XIV. 
96 Art. XV. 
87 Art. VIII. 
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mandating criminal penalties for corruption and the other specifying civil remedies for 
the victims of corruption. 
The Convention on the Protection the European Communities financial interests (PFI 
Convention) and its Protocols 
The PFI Convention88 was passed to thwart the misappropriation of Union finances and 
criminalise through domestic law, actions which adversely affect European revenue. The 
Convention is designed to criminalise any act which leads to the misapplication or 
wrongful retention of Union funds and it ensures that business leaders can be made liable 
for the actions of their subordinates where the action constitutes a fraud affecting the 
EU's financial interests. 
The Protocols to the Convention elaborate the scope of the Convention. The First 
Protocol89 defines the terms `official' and active and passive corruption for the purposes 
of the Convention and the Second Protocol90 provides for the liability of legal persons, 
confiscation of corruptly derived proceeds and cooperation between EU Member States 
and the Commission for the purpose of protecting the Union's financial interests. 
The Convention on the fight against Corruption involving officials of the European 
Communities or officials of Member States of the EU 
This Convention91 is intended to criminalise `active' and `passive' corruption by public 
officials of Member States or officials of EU institutions. Similar to the PFI Convention, 
it provides for the criminal liability of business heads, in so far as a person under their 
authority committed the corrupt act and the person was acting on behalf of the business. 
The Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 
88 [1995) O. J. C316/49. 
89 [1996) O. J. C313. 
90 [19971 O. J. C221. 
91 [1997) O. J. Cl 95/1. 
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The Council of Europe has adopted two anti-corruption Conventions- one requiring State 
Parties to criminalise acts of corruption within their borders and the other specifying for 
the provision of civil remedies to the victims of corruption. 
The Criminal Law Convention on Corruption92 entered into force in 2002. The 
Convention has a broader sphere of application than the EU driven instruments, having 
been ratified by several states outside the EU. 93 The Convention is more comprehensive 
than the OECD and the Inter-American Conventions, obliging State Parties to criminalise 
a wide range of offences, including, but not limited to the active and passive corruption of 
national, foreign and international officials, 94 active and passive corruption of national, 
foreign and supranational parliaments and courts, trading in influence and laundering of 
the proceeds of corruption. 95 The Convention also addresses private-sector bribery" and 
obliges State parties to cooperate with each other in the areas of extradition, 97 
investigation and enforcement. 98 
Ratification of the Convention implies automatic submission to the Group of States 
against Corruption (GRECO), 99 which monitors the compliance of State parties to the 
Council of Europe's Corruption Conventions by means of a system of mutual evaluation 
and peer pressure. ' 00 
The Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption 
The Civil Law Convention on Corruption1°' entered into force in 2003 and has also been 
ratified by non-members of the EU. 102 The Convention is aimed at providing civil 
92 ETS No. 173,38 I. L. M 505 (1999). 
93 http: //conventions coe. int/treaty/Commun/ChercheSig. asp? NT=173&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG 
94 Chapter II Council of Europe Criminal law Convention. 
9s ibid. 
96 Art. 7,8. 
97 Art. 27. 
98 Art. 21,26. 
99 Art. 24. 
10° See htto: //www. Rreco. coe. int 
101 ETS No 174. 
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remedies for citizens of State parties who have suffered damage as a result of corruption 
and obtain compensation where appropriate. 103 State parties are obliged to provide a 
private right of action for full compensation against persons who have committed or 
authorised acts of corruption or failed to prevent them from occurring. '04 It also provides 
for State liability for acts of corruption committed by public officials. los As with the 
Criminal Law Convention, the Civil Law Convention obliges State parties to cooperate 
with each other in the fight against corruption106 and compliance is also monitored by 
GRECO. 107 
1.3.2.5 The African Convention on Corruption 
The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating corruption1°8 entered into 
force in 2006. The Convention aims to promote and strengthen measures to prevent and 
combat corruption in Africa. This includes cooperation in respect of anti-corruption 
measures and the harmonisation of anti-corruption policies and legislation among State 
parties. 109 
The Convention is similar to the Inter-American Convention in its thrust as it is believed 
that corruption undermines political stability and socio-economic development in 
Africa. 110 The objectives of the Convention include promoting socio-economic 
development by removing obstacles to the enjoyment of economic, social, cultural, civil 
and political rights. "' It thus has a slightly different objective than the OECD 
102 See http"//conventions coe int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSigasp? NT=174&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG 
103 Art. 1,3. 
104 Art. 3,4. 
105 Art. 5. 
106 Art. 13, 
107 Art. 14. 
'08 43 I. L. M 5; Udombana, "Fighting Corruption Seriously? Africa's Anti-Corruption Convention" (2003) 7 
S. J. I. C. L. 447. 
109 Art. 2. 
10 Osinbajo, "Human Rights, Economic Development and the Corruption Factor" in Zeleza and 
McConnaughay (eds. ) Human Rights, the Rule of Law and Development in Africa (2004). 
111 Art. 2. 
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Convention, which is designed to eradicate bribery in international business, or the EU's 
PFI Convention, which is aimed at protecting EU revenue. 
The African Convention applies to the giving or receiving of a bribe or other benefit and 
the diversion of public funds or state property. 112 The Convention also applies to private 
sector corruption. 113 State parties are also enjoined to criminalize conspiracy, the 
concealment of fraudulently obtained proceeds, 114 the laundering of corruptly obtained 
property' 15 and illicit enrichment, ' 16 while seeking to protect whistleblowers. 117 
The Convention includes a commitment that State parties will require public officials to 
declare their assets at the inception and conclusion of their period in public service and 
requires State parties to ensure transparency in public procurement. Like the other 
Conventions, there are provisions relating to international cooperation, mutual assistance 
and extradition. "$ The Convention also provides for the establishment of a monitoring 
mechanism, through the Advisory Board on Corruption within the African Union, which 
promotes the adoption of anti-corruption legislation in State Parties, and reports to the 
Executive Council of the African Union on progress made to comply with the 
Convention. 119 
1.3.2.6 The United Nations Convention against corruption 
The United Nations Convention is the only truly international instrument against 
corruption, being open to all members of the United Nations. 120 The Convention came 
112 Art. 4. 
113 Art. 4 (e) and (f), Art. 11. 
114 Art. 4 (1) (h). 
"s Art. 6. 
116 Art. 8. 
117 Art. 5. 
18 Arts. 15-19. 
19 Art. 22. 
120 It is also the most widely adopted: Carr, "The United Nations Convention on Corruption: Making a real 
difference to the quality of life of millions? " (2006) 3 M. I. J. L. C. L. 3. 
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into force in 2005. It is very ambitious in its scope'2' and covers four main issues: the 
prevention of corruption; 122 the criminalization of corruption; '23 international 
cooperation124 and asset recovery. '25 
The Convention's methods for preventing corruption include the development of anti- 
corruption policies and the establishment of an anti-corruption agency. The Convention 
imposes a commitment on State parties to maintain an educated and well-trained civil 
service, and touches on measures necessary to establish transparent and competitive 
procurement systems as well as measures necessary to secure the integrity of the 
judiciary. In providing for the criminalisation of corruption, the Convention casts its net 
wide to include public sector corruption, the bribery of foreign public officials and 
officials of international organisations, private sector corruption, diversion of public 
funds, or anything of value entrusted to a public official. The Convention also 
criminalises trading in influence and private sector embezzlement. 
In relation to international cooperation on corruption matters, the Convention calls for the 
mutual extradition of offenders, and extends the requirement of cooperation to include the 
transfer of sentenced persons or criminal proceedings from the territory of one State party 
to another, as well as the `widest measure' of mutual legal assistance. 
Under the asset recovery provisions of the Convention, State parties are enjoined to 
afford each other the widest measure of cooperation and assistance in detecting the 
existence of corruptly obtained proceeds and permitting each other to directly recover 
assets by means of civil action. 
Unfortunately, the Convention's monitoring and compliance provisions are sadly 
lacking. 126 The Convention provides for a Conference of the State parties to the 
121 Carr, "Fighting Corruption Through the United Nations Convention on Corruption 2003: A global 
solution to a global problem" (2005) 11 (1) I. T. L. R. 24. 
122 Chapter II. 
123 Chapter III. 
124 Chapter IV. 
125 Chapter V. 
126 Webb, "The United Nations Convention against corruption: Global achievement or missed 
opportunity? " (2005) 8 J. I. E. L. 191,218-223. 
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Convention, 127 which is aimed at improving "the capacity of and cooperation between 
State Parties" to achieve the objectives of the Convention and review its implementation. 
1.4 Public Procurement and corruption. 
1.4.1 Introduction 
This section will discuss the susceptibility of public procurement to corruption, the kind 
of corrupt activity that occurs in public procurement and the particular measures that 
procurement regulation utilises in order to combat corruption to give an indication of how 
procurement-related anti-corruption measures overlap and impact each other. 
1.4.2 The incidence of corruption in public procurement 
From the above, it can be seen that most international anti-corruption conventions require 
the maintenance of transparent, competitive and efficient procurement systems as part of 
the measures to address corruption. This is because public procurement as a sphere of 
government activity is one of the areas in which bureaucratic corruption manifests. Public 
procurement is susceptible to corruption128 due partly to the large sums involved, the 
(usually) non-commercial nature of procuring entities, the nature of the relationship 
between the decision-maker and the public body, 129 the measures of unsupervised 
discretion, bureaucratic rules and budgets that may not be tied to specified goals as well 
as non-performance related pay and low pay. Public procurement also presents the 
opportunity for corruption because of the asymmetry of information between the public 
127 Art. 63. 
128 Soreide; Kelman, 1990; Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996, ch. 8. 
'29 European Parliament Directorate General for Research Working Paper, Measures to prevent corruption 
in EU Member states, Legal Affairs Series JURI 101 EN 03-1998, (Annex: Combating Corruption in public 
procurement contracts). 
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official and his principal- i. e. the government. As the public official holds more 
information about the procurement process and the procurement market, the official is 
able to use this knowledge to his advantage by manipulating the procurement process, 
should he choose to do so. 
The incidence of corruption within government procurement is well documented in 
Europe130 and in economies where there is little regulation and non-transparency. 131 
1.4.3 The common types of corrupt activity in public procurement 
As was discussed in ch. 1.2, corruption is usually characterised from the standpoint of the 
public or the private sector. Similarly, procurement corruption can take the form of public 
or private corruption. 132 Public corruption is that which involves public officials and is 
generally that which moves from a private individual (the supplier) to the public official 
responsible for taking procurement decisions. This corruption will frequently take the 
form of bribes or other inducements granted to the public official to influence the 
exercise of his discretion. In public procurement, the public official may improperly 
exercise his discretion in deciding which firms to invite for tender, or by emphasising or 
designing evaluation criteria that favours a preferred company. 133 Improper exercises of 
discretion may also occur where a procurement official decides to split a large contract 
into several small contracts that fall below legislative thresholds for complying with 
certain procedural requirements, ' 34 so as to circumvent the requirement for publication of 
130 Pontarollo, "Regulatory Aspects and the problem of Corruption in public procurement in Italy" (1995) 5 
P. P. L. R. 201; Hors, "Shedding Light on Corrupt Practices in Public Procurement" (2003) 5 P. P. L. R. 
NA101. 
131 Nichols et a], "Corruption as a Pan-Cultural Phenomenon: An Empirical Study in Countries at opposite 
ends of the former Soviet Empire" (2004) 39 T. I. L. J. 215-250; Earle, "Bribery and Corruption in Eastern 
Europe, the Baltic States and the Commonwealth of Independent States: What is to be done? " (2000) 33 
C. I. L. J. 483-512; Jingbin, "Public Procurement in China: The way Forward" (2001) 4 P. P. L. R. 207; Oko, 
"Subverting the Scourge of Corruption in Nigeria: A Reform Prospectus" (2002) 34 N. Y. U. J. L. & P. 397. 
132 Key, "Techniques of Political Graft" in Heidenheimer (ed. ), Political Corruption (1970), 46-48. 
13' Rose-Ackerman, 1999,64; Soreide, ch. 3. 
134 Arts 
.7&8 Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works 
contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] O. J. L134/114 [hereafter PSD] and 
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the tender in the required medium135 in order to favour a preferred supplier. Other 
benefits that a supplier may seek include the avoidance of a government-imposed cost or 
requirement such as fees, taxes, or production of various documents. 136 
Another way in which public corruption manifests in public procurement is through auto- 
corruption. This type of public corruption may not always involve another individual and 
occurs when a public official wrongly secures for himself or an associate, the privileges, 
which rightly belong to the public, ' 37 by bypassing or manipulating the formal procedures 
necessary for the award of these privileges. 138 This type of corruption might manifest 
where conflicts of interest139 cause an official to corruptly favour the company in which 
he is interested, '40 or where an official uses a dummy corporation to hide awards 
involving personal interest. Public corruption is arguably the most pervasive type of 
corruption that occurs in public procurement141 and is one reason behind the 
criminalisation of the bribery of foreign public officials in the major anti-corruption 
instruments examined above. 
The second type of corruption that occurs in public procurement is private corruption, 
which manifests as collusion, price-fixing, maintenance of cartels or other uncompetitive 
practices committed by suppliers, which prevent the government from obtaining value for 
money. 142 While this kind of corruption falls outside the scope of this thesis, it is 
Arts. 16 & 17 of Directive 2004/17/EC coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the 
water, energy, transport and postal services sectors 2004] O. J. L134/1 [hereafter UD]. 
135 Bueb and Ehlermann-Cache, "Inventory of Mechanisms to Disguise Corruption in the Bidding Process 
and Some Tools for Prevention and Detection" in OECD (ed. ) Fighting Corruption and Promoting 
Integrity in Public Procurement (2005). 
136 Tanzi, n. 34. 
137 Key, n. 132,46-48. An example given by Tanzi, above is where a public official has a facility such as an 
airport built in his small hometown 
138 From a broad definitional perspective, auto-corruption will include embezzlement. 
'39 OECD, Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Public Sector, (2001), 2; Arrowsmith, Linarelli and 
Wallace, Regulating Public Procurement: National and International Perspectives (2000), 39-40 
[Arrowsmith, Linarelli & Wallace]. 
140 Priess, "Distortions of Competition in Tender Proceedings: How to deal with Conflicts of interest 
(Family ties, business links and cross-representation of contracting authority officials and bidders) and the 
involvement of project consultants" (2002) 11 P. P. L. R. 153,154-155 [Priess, 2002] 
141 Measures to Prevent Corruption in EU Member States: Combating corruption in public procurement 
contracts (European Parliament Directorate General for Research Legal Affairs Series Juri 101 EN 03- 
1998); Soreide, ch. 2. 
142 Klitgaard, 1988, Ch. 6 
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important to mention that they form a part of the activities that could be targeted under 
national or international procurement regulation. 
1.4.4 Measures used in procurement regulation to fight corruption 
1.4.4.1 Introduction 
Most procurement regulation contains measures directed at preventing corruption in 
public procurement. These measures can again be divided into administrative, regulatory 
and social measures. The measures included in procurement legislation against corruption 
might not be explicitly directed at corruption- such as requirements for transparency, '43 
open competition and increased accountability in government contracts, 144 but others 
might be directly concerned with ensuring that an environment exits where corruption 
cannot thrive. As was mentioned in ch. 1.3.1, administrative measures are measures which 
are permitted under the exercise of executive discretion; regulatory tools are obligatory 
measures, which must be imposed where corruption occurs and social tools encompass 
the societal ridicule, shame and infamy that may follow public revelations of corrupt 
activity. Again, the above categorizations are not exclusive and will frequently overlap. 
1.4.4.2 Administrative measures 
As mentioned above, administrative tools against corruption encompass discretionary 
measures implemented by a public official. In public procurement, these may include 
denying corrupt persons access to government contracts. Such denials may be temporary 
or permanent. Similar measures, which have the effect of denying access to government 
143 Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 7.12 
144 Hansen, "Limits of Competition: Accountability in government contracting" (2003) 112 Y. L. J. 2465. 
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contracts, are those, which deny corrupt persons registration on qualifying lists for 
government contracts. '45 
Other administrative/ regulatory measures directed towards suppliers include the use of 
`integrity pacts' or the extraction of a commitment from a supplier not to engage in 
corrupt activities, which is obtained during the procurement process. These might extend 
beyond a commitment not to bribe, and include commitments not to collude with 
competitors. Similar undertakings include those, which are currently utilised by the 
World Bank under which a bidder for a Bank-financed contract undertakes to comply 
with the Borrower country's anti-corruption 146 
In relation to public officials, administrative measures aimed at protecting the 
government against conflicts of interest are procedures, which provide for the rotation of 
officials to prevent the formation of corrupt relationships. Other administrative/regulatory 
measures include those requiring officials to declare their assets at the inception and 
termination of public office, and those requiring the disclosure of public officials business 
interests in order to ensure neutrality and impartiality. '47 
As mentioned in ch. 1.3.1.2 above, other administrative measures against corruption 
include the creation of various approval mechanisms within a government agency. In 
public procurement, these may include requirements for various levels of approval before 
a public contract is awarded. Another administrative measure is the reliance on a division 
that ensures that prices paid by the government are fair and reflect market rates. 
145 Xanthaki, n. 45. 
146 Para. 1.17, Guidelines: Procurement for Goods, Works and non-consulting services under IBRD Loans 
and IDA Credits and Grants by World Bank Borrowers (Jan. 2011) [hereafter BPG]. 
147 Priess, 2002,156.; Fairclough Building Ltd v Borough Council of Port Talbot (1992) 62 B. L. R 86. 
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1.4.4.3 Regulatory measures 
Regulatory measures against corruption in procurement regulation are those, which are 
mandatorily imposed through legislation. In public procurement, the most obvious of 
these are criminal sanctions for bribes. Although the prohibitions against bribery may not 
be situated within the procurement legislation, it is usually a criminal offence for a public 
official to accept bribes or other inducements in the exercise of his public function. The 
prohibition against bribery is frequently accompanied by severe punishments including 
custodial sentences. 
As mentioned above, conflicts of interest may frequently be targeted through 
administrative procedures, but it is not uncommon for legislative intervention to exist to 
prevent such conflicts. 148 Such legislation may require the official with an interest in the 
contract to disclose such an interest as soon as possible and take no part in the contract 
award procedure. '49 
In relation to suppliers, mandatory legislative provisions which blacklist or disqualify 
from public contracts, suppliers who are seen as unethical or corrupt'5° and conversely, 
provisions which `white-list' or grant access to public contracts to firms who can prove 
they meet minimum ethical requirements and have sound internal management practices 
are some of the measures which could be integrated into procurement legislation. 
It was stated above that there are other regulatory measures, which are not solely directed 
towards corruption in procurement but serve to create an environment where corruption 
cannot thrive. These include the requirements for procurement transparency, open 
competition and best value. Transparency in public procurement is often touted as one of 
the goals of a procurement system 
, 
15' and is usually a mandatory requirement in regulated 
148 Priess, 2002; Arrowsmith, Linarelli & Wallace, ch. 2. 
149 S49 (1) of the UK Local Government Act 1972; Art. 6 of the Portuguese Law Decree No. 59/99 and 
Art. 11 Law Decree No. 197/99; 18 U. S. C 208 (US); Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996,50-53. 
'50 Art 45 PSD. 
'-5' C-324/98 Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v Telekom Austria [2000] E. C. R. 1-10745, 
paras. 60 & 61, as well as being an express obligation on contracting authorities. Art. 2 PSD. See also 
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procurement systems. 152 Transparency suggests that the procurement procedure is 
conducted in an open and impartial manner and that the parties to the process are aware 
of information on specific procurements' 53 and that all participants in the process are 
subject to the rules applicable to the process. According to Arrowsmith, transparency also 
includes the presence of rules-based decision making that limits discretion which may 
prevent concealed discrimination. '54 As unjustified or illegal discrimination is at the heart 
of corruption in public procurement, it is clear that a transparent procurement system can 
prevent corruption where the rules that define the procurement process and the 
opportunities for contracting are publicly available and applied, making it difficult to 
conceal improper practices. ' 55 
The requirement for open competition156 is also one of the pillars of a developed 
procurement system. 157 Open competition supports anti-corruption efforts by ensuring 
that all qualified suppliers have access to available contracts and limits the scope for 
corruption-induced favouritism. Open competition removes the restrictions to 
participation created against non-corrupt suppliers and is supported by a transparent 
regime. 
Best value is the third regulatory obligation, which may support anti-corruption measures. 
Best value, also termed `value for money' is a policy goal to obtain the best bargain with 
the public's money. 158 Best value is not synonymous with lowest price as quality or life- 
cycle considerations may mean the cheapest products do not necessarily provide the best 
value. Best value can be achieved through the other regulatory provisions discussed 
above. For instance, the requirement for competition supports best value as a competitive 
Schooner, 2002,103,105; Kinsey "Transparency in Government Procurement: An international consensus" 
(2004) 34 P. C. L. J. 155. 
152 Art. 2 PSD. 
153 Arrowsmith, "Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement" (1998) 
I. C. L. Q. 793,796. 
154 Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 3.9. 
155 Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 3 & ch. 7.12. 
156 See US Competition in Contract Act, 1984 Pub. L. No. 98-369; Recital 2, PSD; Arrowsmith, 2005, 
ch. 3.10. 
157 Schooner, 2002,105. 
158 Schooner, 2002,108. 
36 
environment ensures that the government has a `pool' of suppliers to chose from and will 
pay a competitive price and avoid monopolistic prices. 159 Transparency also supports best 
value by promoting open competition and making it clear when the government has not 
obtained value for money. The relationship between best value and anti-corruption 
provisions is that where contracts are awarded as a result of corrupt activity, this will 
have adverse implications for best value, since corruption stifles competition and the 
costs of corruption may be passed onto the government as discussed in ch. 1.2 above. 
However, it should be noted that in some cases, there could be conflict between the 
requirements for best value and anti-corruption measures. This may occur where anti- 
corruption mechanisms are expensive to implement and cause transactional inefficiencies 
in the procurement process. 160 
1.4.4.4 Social measures 
As discussed above, social measures are rarely used as the primary tools against 
corruption. In public procurement regulation, social tools may attend the use of 
administrative and regulatory measures. For instance, where a supplier has been 
convicted of, or otherwise involved in corruption, the infamy that results from such a 
conviction where it is published in the media will frequently lead to a loss of business and 
may in some cases signal the end for that company. Likewise, where a firm is disqualified 
from public contracts as a result of corruption, such a firm may find that its tarnished 
reputation makes it difficult for it to obtain business elsewhere. 161 
's9 Beviglia- Zampetti, "The UNCITRAL Model law on procurement of goods, construction, services" in 
Hoekman & Mavrodis (eds. ) Law and Policy in Public Purchasing: The WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement (1997), ch. 15. 
160 Anechiarico and Jacobs, 1995,143; Schooner, 2002,108; Arrowsmith, Linarelli & Wallace, 28-3 1. 
161 Canni, "Shoot first, ask questions later: An examination and critique of suspension and debarment 
provisions under the FAR, including a discussion of the mandatory disclosure rule, the IBM suspension and 
other noteworthy developments" (2009) 38 P. C. L. J. 547,603 [Canni]; Gonzalez v Freeman n. 52. 
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1.5 The use of disqualifications in public procurement 
Government suppliers may be denied access to public contracts for committing various 
infringements or offences. Such measures are variously referred to as disqualification, 
debarment, exclusion, suspension, rejection or blacklisting. These terms may be used 
interchangeably, with their meanings dependent on the jurisdiction in which they are 
being used. 162 Such measures are defined by Schooner as administrative remedies 
available to a government that prevent suppliers from obtaining new government 
contracts, or acquiring extensions to existing contracts, for alleged breaches of law or 
ethics. '63 
This thesis will use the term `disqualification' to refer to the measures that will be 
discussed in this thesis. First, the term will refer to measures, which deny a supplier 
access to public contracts for a set period of time. Disqualifications which apply for a set 
period of time are used in most jurisdictions and may apply to a wide range of offences or 
behaviour, which may not be related to a particular procurement, such as corruption, 
organised crime, drug offences, money laundering, fraud and tax offences. Because such 
disqualifications affect a supplier for a specified period of time, they are also described as 
being general or not being contract-specific, since the effect of the measure is not limited 
to one contract. 
Second, the term `disqualification' will be used to refer to the one-off exclusion of a 
supplier from a particular procurement process, without any implications beyond that 
particular procurement process. This kind of disqualification is contract specific, in the 
sense that the measure is directed at one particular contract. In the jurisdictions, this kind 
of disqualification is normally, but not exclusively used to deny a supplier access to a 
contract for offences committed in relation to the particular procurement process. 
However such disqualifications may also apply to offences or issues that are not related 
162 For instance, the US and the World Bank refer to disqualifications as `debarments' or `suspension' 
depending on the length of the disqualification. In the EU, the terminology is `exclusion' or ` blacklisting'. 
163 Schooner, "The Paper Tiger Stirs: Rethinking Exclusion and Debarment" (2004) 5 P. P. L. R. 211,212- 
213 [Schooner, 2004]. 
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to the particular procurement. This may include where the supplier is unable to meet 
financial or technical criteria or where the supplier's past professional integrity is in 
question, which may point to its being unable to satisfactorily perform the contract. 
In some cases, a supplier may be disqualified from a particular contract as the procuring 
authority implements a general disqualification decision taken against the supplier by 
another entity. This is the case in jurisdictions such as the US, the World Bank and South 
Africa where lists of suppliers disqualified for a period of time are available for perusal 
by procuring authorities to ensure contracts are not awarded to such disqualified 
suppliers. It is also possible for the legislation to require the disqualification of certain 
persons and procuring authorities implement this requirement in particular contracts as is 
the case in the EU/UK. 
The term disqualification is used to refer to both kinds of measures in this thesis as they 
only differ in relation to their consequences and time limits. 
Disqualification may be mandatory or discretionary. A mandatory measure is one in 
which the legislation or policy requires the disqualification of a supplier once the 
supplier has committed a specified offence. Here, the disqualifying entity does not have a 
discretion not to impose the measure, but may still retain a discretion in relation to some 
aspects in implementing the measure such as determining whether the offence was 
committed (where the measure is not based on a conviction), the length of the 
disqualification and which persons should be disqualified. 
A discretionary measure is a measure where there is a general rule that suppliers who 
have committed certain offences may be disqualified, but the disqualifying entity retains 
the discretion in deciding whether the measure is appropriate in any case and retains 
discretion to decide all aspects in relation to implementing the measure. The distinction 
between a mandatory and a discretionary measure lies in the nature of and the limits to 
the discretion of the disqualifying entity. 
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There are different ways in which a measure may fall to be described as mandatory or 
discretionary. First, a measure may be mandatory because the law requires that all 
suppliers who have committed the offence must be disqualified for a stated period of time 
or a general disqualification measure imposed by a central authority must be 
implemented by individual procuring authorities. This is the approach under the South 
African regulations and in the World Bank. It should be noted that a measure may be 
referred to as being mandatory, but is in reality discretionary in its operation because 
although the legislation requires the disqualification of suppliers from public contracts 
for certain offences, individual procuring authorities may exercise a measure of discretion 
in deciding whether to utilise `public interest' exceptions to award a contract to a 
convicted/guilty supplier. This is the situation in the EU/UK, where the provisions are 
referred to in the literature and in this thesis as being mandatory, although the provisions 
allow procuring authorities the discretion to utilise limited public interest derogations to 
circumvent the disqualification provisions. 
Second, a measure may be discretionary because the law provides that suppliers who 
have committed certain offences may be denied access to contracts for a stated period of 
time. A measure will also be regarded as discretionary where the legislation gives a 
central entity the discretion to disqualify a supplier for an offence, and once this is done, 
individual contracting authorities also have discretion to disqualify that supplier from 
particular procurements. This approach is found within the EU/UK, the US and in South 
Africa under the Corruption Act. 
Whether a measure is regarded as mandatory or discretionary will depend on legislative 
provisions and the degree of discretion left to the disqualifying entity. 
Disqualification measures may be triggered by three situations. First, they may be 
implemented for past violations of law, ethics or anti-corruption norms that may be 
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unrelated to public procurement. 164 This is the approach adopted by the US, the EU, the 
UK and the World Bank. Thus, as will be seen in chs. 2 and 3, in the US, a supplier could 
be disqualified from contracts if he has obtained a conviction or a civil judgment for 
embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, falsification of records, tax evasion and receiving 
stolen property. 165 Likewise, the EU and the UK require contracting authorities to 
disqualify from public contracts, suppliers who have been convicted of corruption, 
participating in a criminal organisation, fraud or money laundering. 166 
Secondly, disqualification could be used to deny a supplier access to a particular 
procurement for a breach of the rules of that process. This type of disqualification is 
permitted in South Africa and under World Bank guidelines, wherein if a supplier acted 
corruptly during a procurement process, he is excluded from further participating in the 
process. 167 
Third, a supplier could be disqualified from future contracts for past procurement 
violations. This type of disqualification is utilised by the US, the World Bank and South 
Africa. 
There are several rationales behind the use of disqualifications in public procurement. 
First, disqualifications which target general (or non-procurement) violations such as 
corruption may support the anti-corruption policies of government and can be viewed as a 
political statement168 that indicates a government's lack of tolerance for corruption. 169 
However, anti-corruption policies are not the only policies that disqualification may 
support, and disqualification may support a government's tax, competition, social 
164 The use of procurement regulations to disqualify suppliers for non-procurement related improprieties 
has been criticized 
-Yukins, "Suspension and Debarment: Rethinking the Process" (2004) 5 P. P. L. R. 255, 
256 [Yukins, 2004]. 
165 FAR 9.406-2. 
'66 Art. 45 PSD. 
167 Para. 1.16 (b) BPG. 
168 Schooner, "Suspensions are Just a Sideshow" (1 May 2002) available at www. govexec. com 
169 Schooner, 2004,216. 
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security and environmental policies. 170 This rationale will be referred to as the policy 
rationale 
Secondly, disqualification could be punitive, '7' and may act as a deterrent against 
breaches of anti-corruption legislation by increasing the economic costs of corruption, 
because in addition to the immediate detrimental financial effect on the disqualified 
supplier, the disqualification can damage the reputation of the firm, affecting its ability to 
obtain business from other sectors. 172 This is one of the attractions of disqualification as 
an anti-corruption tool- the attendant infamy entails a more severe and lasting impact, 
especially where the disqualification is published. Disqualification may be regarded as 
punitive if it is tied to the objectives of deterrence or retribution, and is imposed as a 
result of the suppliers past conduct, without regard to his present integrity. ' 73 This will be 
referred to as the punitive and deterrent rationale. 
Thirdly, disqualification could be directed towards maintaining the integrity of the 
procurement process and protect the government by ensuring it only transacts with 
responsible suppliers, thereby safeguarding public funds as contracting authorities are 
prevented from entering into business with an unreliable supplier, evidenced by that 
supplier's lack of business integrity. This will be referred to as the protective rationale. 
There are two issues related to the rationale for disqualification in a jurisdiction that are 
not addressed by the legislation requiring disqualification. The first is whether and to 
what extent disqualification offends the rule against double jeopardy, especially where 
disqualification follows the receipt of a conviction for an offence and the second is 
whether disqualification is ever disproportionate to the purpose behind the 
disqualification regime. 
170 Arrowsmith, Priess and Friton, "Self-Cleaning- An Emerging Concept in EC Procurement Law? In 
Punder, Priess & Arrowsmith, Self-Cleaning in Public Procurement Law (2009) [Punder, Priess & 
Arrowsmith]. 
171 Ibid. See also Kramer, "Awarding Contracts to Suspended and Debarred Firms: Are Stricter Rules 
Necessary? " (2005) 34 (3) P. C. L. J. 539,543 [Kramer]. 
172 "Federal Ban Does not Hurt WorldCom Much", Washington Post, (24.10.03), pg. El 
13 Tomko & Weinberg, "After the Fall: Conviction, Debarment and Double Jeopardy" (1992) 21 P. C. L. J. 
355,363-365 [Tomko & Weinberg]. 
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In relation to the rule against double jeopardy, all the jurisdictions have similar 
prohibitions against multiple punishments for the same offence. In the EU, this rule (ne 
bis in idem) is a fundamental aspect of EU law174 and where there is "the threefold 
condition of identity of the facts, unity of offender and unity of the legal interest 
protected 
... 
the same person cannot be sanctioned more than once for a single unlawful 
course of conduct designed to protect the same legal asset. " 175 Thus, it is possible to 
argue that a disqualification following a conviction may amount to more than one 
sanction for the same offence. However, in Tokai Carbon176 the claimant challenged its 
prosecution in the EU on the basis that it had already been prosecuted in the US and 
Canada for the same price-fixing offence and this would offend the double jeopardy rule. 
The Court of First Instance held that the ne bis in idem principle did not apply in the 
circumstances as "the procedures conducted and penalties imposed by the Commission 
on the one hand and the United States and Canadian authorities on the other clearly did 
not pursue the same ends. The aim of the first was to preserve undistorted competition 
within the European Union or the EEA, whereas the aim of the second was to protect the 
United States or the Canadian market... 
. 
The application of the principle ne bis in idem is 
subject not only to the infringements and the persons sanctioned being the same, but also 
to the unity of the legal right being protected. " 177 
By way of analogy, it may be the case that disqualification may not offend the rule 
against double jeopardy in the EU, because as is discussed in ch. 2.2.3, the policy and 
protective purpose behind disqualification in the EU differ from the retributive/deterrent 
purpose behind criminal convictions. 
174 Gutmann v Commission of the European Atomic Energy Community (18/65 R) [1966] E. C. R. 135; Art. 4, 
Protocol 7, European Convention on Human Rights. 
'" C-204/00 P Aalborg Portland A/S v Commission [2004] E. C. R. 1-123 at [338]. 
16 T-236/01 Tokai Carbon Co Ltd v Commission [2004] E. C. R. 11-1181. 
177 Tokai Carbon, ibid, para. 134. 
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The UK also adopts a common law178 prohibition against being tried or punished for the 
same offence more than once, subject to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which relaxes the 
rule in relation to specified serious crimes. In Borders (UK) v Commissioner of Police of 
the Metropolis, 179 it was held that where punitive damages had been awarded against the 
respondent in addition to a confiscation order, this did not offend the double jeopardy rule 
as "there was no duplication of penalty. "180 Although the decision in this case has been 
criticised, 181 it suggests, similar to the EU approach, that where multiple penalties for the 
same offence do not have the same purpose, there may be no breach of the double 
jeopardy rule. Thus, it is again possible to argue that a mandatory disqualification 
following a conviction may not strictly offend the double jeopardy rule since the policy 
rationale for disqualification in the UK differs from the rationales for criminal 
penalties. 1 82 
A similar approach is adopted by the US183 and the scope of the rule against double 
jeopardy extends to a prohibition against multiple punishments for the same offence. ' ' 
Thus, where a supplier has been convicted and disqualified it is possible to argue that in 
reality, the supplier is faced with multiple punishments for the same offence- even if the 
disqualification is not intended to be punitive. 185 The court in US v Halper held that "a 
defendant who had already been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected 
to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not be fairly 
characterised as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution. " 186 Thus, since the 
purpose of disqualification in the US is protective and not remedial, it may be the case 
that disqualification offends the rule against double jeopardy. On the other hand, the 
'"$ Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England Book IV (1800), ch. 26,355-336; Law Commission: 
Double Jeopardy- A summary (Consultation Paper 156,2001). 
179 [2005] EWCA Civ. 197. 
180 Ibid. para. 17. 
18' Cunnington, "The border between compensation, restitution and punishment" [2006) L. Q. R. 382. 
182 Zaibert, Punishment and Retribution (2006), chs. 1-3; Golash, Case against Punishment: Retribution, 
Crime Prevention and the Law (2005) chs. 1,2 & 7; Easton & Piper, Sentencing and Punishment: The 
Quest for Justice 2'' ed. (2008). 
3 Thomas, Double Jeopardy: The History, The Law (1998), chs. I &2 [Thomas]. 
'a' United States v Halper 490 U. S. 435 (1989). See however, Bowen Poulin, "Double Jeopardy and 
multiple punishment: Cutting the Gordian Knot" (2006) 77 U. Colo. L. R 595. 
185 In Halper ibid. at 448, it was held that civil sanctions may constitute a punishment for the purposes of 
the double jeopardy rule. 
186 Halper, ibid. 
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courts have also held that if an action, (such as disqualification) which appears to be 
punitive, is related to a legitimate non-punitive goal 187 such as the protection of public 
finances or maintaining the integrity of the procurement process188 then the action will 
not be regarded as punitive so as to offend the double jeopardy rule. 
Similar to the other jurisdictions, South African law also recognises a rule against double 
jeopardy in the criminal and civil context. In the employment context, it has been held 
that an employee may not be dismissed or further sanctioned for an offence for which the 
employee has already been punished or acquitted. 189 If this approach is carried into the 
procurement context, it is arguable that a supplier ought not to be further sanctioned by 
disqualification under South African procurement law if the supplier has already been 
convicted for corruption. However, in South Africa, the judicial disqualifications under 
the Corruption Act may not offend the rule against double jeopardy because the double 
jeopardy rule does not "limit legislative authority to define punishment. "' 90 As such, a 
disqualification order imposed alongside other criminal penalties by a court may not 
amount to a multiple punishment so as to offend the rule against double jeopardy as the 
rule cannot be used to limit the sentences in a single trial. 191 
Whether a jurisdiction is under an obligation to consider the disproportionate effect of 
disqualification on a supplier is also tied to the rationales for disqualification in that 
jurisdiction. However, none of the jurisdictions address this issue, as will be discussed 
further in ch. 7 in the context of the termination of existing contracts for disqualification. 
In the context of the EU, it was held in Michaniki, that in accordance with the principle of 
proportionality, a disqualification regime must not go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve its objectives. 192 
187 Bell v Wolfish, 441 U. S 520.539 (1979). 188 Brown Constr. Trades v U. S 23 Cl. Ct. 214 (1991). 189 BMW (SA) (Pty)(Ltd) v Van Der Walt (2000) 21 I. L. J. 113 (LAC); SA Transport and Allied Workers Union on behalf of Finca v Old Mutual Life Assurance Co (SA) Ltd & Anor (2006) 27 I. L. J. 1204 (LC). 190 Poulin, n. 184 at 597. 191 [bid, 598. 
192 C-213/07 Michaniki AE v Ethniko Simvoulio Radiotileorasis [2008] E. C. R. 1-9999, para. 47-49 [Michaniki]; Opinion of AG Maduro in Michaniki, para. 34 [2008] E. C. R. 1-9999; C-21/03 and C-34/03 Fabricom South Africa v Etat Belge [2005] E. C. R. 1-1559, para. 34. 
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It is thus suggested that even where disqualification is held not to offend the double 
jeopardy rule, the disproportionate effect of disqualification on a supplier should mean 
that disqualification should only be utilised where it is absolutely necessary to fulfil 
policy objectives that were not met by the conviction, where relevant. 
The use of disqualification as an anti-corruption tool in public procurement raises several 
practical and conceptual difficulties, many of which will be examined in this thesis. In 
spite of the difficulties attending the use of disqualifications, however, there appears to be 
no sign that it will be rejected as an anti-corruption tool partly because it is attractive to 
governments- as the costs of the action are hidden within the procurement process, and 
the decision to include anti-corruption measures such as disqualification within 
procurement criteria may be made without domestic legislative approval. 193 Further, the 
use of disqualification as an anti-corruption device in public procurement is on the 
increase and disqualification is now a part of some international instruments. For 
example, the revised WTO GPA text recommends the disqualification of suppliers who 
have committed serious offences or show a lack of commercial integrity'94 and the OECD 
Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business 
Transactions 195 recommends that OECD Members should disqualify firms that have 
bribed a foreign public official from domestic public contracts. 196 
193 Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 19.3. 
194 Art. VIII (3) GPA. 
'95 36 I. L. M. 1016 (1997). 
'% Art. VI (ii). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REGULATION, ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY AND 
DISQUALIFICATION 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will give a brief introduction to public procurement regulation in the 
jurisdictions under study, examine their anti-corruption policies and outline the 
approaches to and the purpose behind disqualification in the jurisdictions. 
2.2 The European Union 
2.2.1 Public procurement regulation in the EU 
The European Union (EU) is a complex organisation that `houses' what was previously 
referred to as the European Communities. These Communities were the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) which was created by a 1951 treaty that expired in 2002; 
the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) which was renamed the European Community (EC) in 1993, both of 
which entered into existence in 1958.1 The initial goal of the EC was to establish a 
common market and an economic and monetary union amongst Member States. The EU 
was created by the Treaty of Maastricht2 in 1992 to bring about closer integration 
amongst Member States. It added new fields of activity to the existing Communities but 
did not replace them. In 2007, however, the Treaty of Lisbon was passed in which the EU 
replaced and became the successor to the EC and together with EURATOM constitutes 
' See generally, Craig & de Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 4t' ed. (2007) [Craig & de Burca, 
2007]. 
2 [1993] O. J. L293/61. 
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the `first pillar' of the EU's organisational structure under the umbrella of the EU. 3 The 
Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in December 2009. 
The EU has regulated public procurement in Member States since 1964.5 In 1971 and 
1977, two directives were passed to coordinate the public procurement of public works 
and public supplies. 6 Member States were required to implement the directives into 
national law and in doing so, prevent discrimination in public procurement. 7 However, 
the lack of proper implementation meant the directives were not achieving their purpose, 8 
and the Commission proposed to extend and amend the directives. The existing directives 
were initially amended and later, new directives were adopted to consolidate the existing 
legislation1° and incorporate the utility sector into the procurement regime, " as well as to 
provide enforcement legislation for the breach of the procurement directives. 12 
Increasingly, the obligations in the directives have become stricter, diminishing Member 
States' discretion in relation to domestic procurement procedures and policy. 13 
The main aim of EU procurement regulation is to create an internal market by prohibiting 
discrimination between Member States in awarding government contracts, removing 
restrictions on access to those markets, and providing for transparency in contract award 
3 Arrowsmith (ed. ), EU Public Procurement Law: An Introduction (2010), ch. 1. 
4 Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community [2007] O. J. C306/1 [TFEU]. 
5 Directive 64/427 [1964] O. J. 117/1863; Directive 64/428 [1964] O. J. 117/1871 and Directive 64/429 
[1964] O. J. 117/1880; Trepte, Public Procurement in the EU: A Practitioner's Guide (2007), ch. 1 [Trepte, 
2007]; Weiss, Public procurement in the European Community (1993), ch. 1; Martin, The EC procurement 
rules: A critical analysis (1996), ch. 1. 6 Directive 71/305 [1971] O. J. L185/1; Directive 77/62 [1977] O. J. L13/1. 
Recital 2 Directive 71/305; C-31/87 Beentes [1988] E. C. R. 4635 at 4657. See Trybus, "Improving the 
efficiency of public procurement systems in the context of the European Union enlargement process" 
(2006) 35 (3) P. C. L. J. 409-415. 
8 COM (1984) 717, COM (1984) 747, COM (1986) 375; White Paper on Completing the Internal Market 
COM (1985) 310 final; WS Atkins Consultants, The Cost of Non-Europe in public sector procurement in 
The cost of non-Europe, Basic findings, Vol. 5, (1988). 
9 Directive 89/440 O. J. 1989 L210/1 amending Directive 71/305 (works) and Directive 88/295 amending 
Directive 77/62 (supplies). 
10 Directive 93/36/EEC [1993] O. J. L199/1 (supplies); Directive 93/37/EEC [1993] O. J. L199/54 (works); 
Directive 92/50/EEC [1992] O. J. L209/1 (services). 
11 Directive 90/531 [1990] O. J. L297/1 as amended by Directive 93/38 [1993] O. J. L199/84. 
12 Directive 89/665 [1989] O. J. L395/33 (public sector remedies), Directive 92/13 [1992] O. J. L76/14 
(utilities remedies). 
13 Arrowsmith, 2005,133; Arrowsmith, "The Past and Future Evolution of EC Procurement Law: From 
framework to Common code? " (2006) 35 (3) P. C. L. J. 337,352-353. 
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procedures to ensure that discriminatory practices cannot be concealed. 14 EU regulation 
of public procurement thus aims to secure the non-discrimination provisions of the 
Treaty. 15 
In 2004, the EU adopted two new procurement directives, namely Directive 2004/18/EC 
on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply 
contracts and public service contracts16 and Directive 2004/17/EC coordinating the 
procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal 
services sectors. " These are the directives currently in force, which will be examined in 
this thesis. 
The aims of the directives were to modernise the legislation in response to recent 
procurement developments18 and simplify the regime by consolidating the rules on the 
public sector (previously contained in three separate directives) into a single instrument, 
which Member States had to implement by 31st January 2006.19 Member States had to 
amend existing legislation or pass new legislation to comply with the directives. The 
major changes introduced by the directives include a general exemption from the rules 
applicable to utilities for entities, which operate in competitive markets- reflecting the 
liberalisation of that sector20 and the introduction of new award procedures, 2' providing 
greater flexibility in relation to complex contracts and electronic procurement. 
14 Arrowsmith, "The Past and Future Evolution of EC Procurement Law: From framework to Common 
code? " (2006) 35 (3) P. C. L. J. 337. 
15 Art. 18,28,34,49 TFEU. 
16 [2004] O. J. L134/114. 
17 [2004] O. J. L 134/1; Arrowsmith, 2005, chs. 15 & 16. 
18 Arrowsmith, "An assessment of the new legislative package on public procurement" (2004) 41 C. M. L. R. 
1277,1278. 
19 Art. 80 (PSD), Art. 71 (UD). Trybus & Medina, "Unfinished business: The State of Implementation of the 
new EC public procurement directives in the Member States on February 1,2007" (2007) 16 (4) P. P. L. R. 
NA89-97. 
20 Art. 30(l) (UD). 
21 Competitive dialogue in Art. 29 (PSD); framework contracts in Art. 32 (PSD) & Art. 14 (UD); electronic 
auctions in Art. 54 (PSD) & Art. 56 (UD); dynamic purchasing systems in Art. 33 (PSD) & Art. 15 (UD). 
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2.2.2 The EU's policy against corruption 
The EU's anti-corruption programme gained momentum in the last two decades, in 
parallel with increasingly firm international action against corruption. EU policy on 
corruption has three interrelated but distinct objectives. Initially, the policy was directed 
at protecting Union finances, 22 in partial response to the corruption that appeared to 
characterise EU institutions. 23 However, corruption control has expanded in scope and is 
now an integral part of EU internal and external trade policies and countries, which 
obtain aid or trade concessions from the EU must undertake domestic anti-corruption 
reform. 24 The second objective of EU anti-corruption policy is to provide EU citizens 
with a high level of safety in an area of freedom, security and justice, devoid of criminal 
activity, corruption, fraud, terrorism etc. The power to act against corruption is derived 
from Art. 4 of the Treaty, under which the EU and Member States share competence over 
matters relating to freedom, security and justice. 
The third rationale for EU anti-corruption measures, relates to the liberalisation of the 
internal market, 25 and although there is no explicit Treaty provision linking the 
elimination of corruption to market integration, corruption is at variance with the 
principles of non-discrimination and free competition advocated by the single market. 26 
The elimination of corruption facilitates competition by ensuring that corrupt practices do 
22 Art. 325 TFEU; Convention drawn up on the basis of Art. K. 3 of the Treaty of the European Union on the 
Protection of the European Communities' Financial Interests [1995] O. J. C316/49 and Protocols; Council 
Regulation (EC, Euratom) 2988/95 of December 18,1995 on the Protection of the Communities Financial 
Interests [19951 O. J. L312/1. 
23 Committee of Independent Experts, First Report regarding allegations of fraud, mismanagement and 
nepotism in the European Commission, (March 15,1999). 
24 Cotonou Partnership Agreement 2000/483/EC [2000] O. J. L317/3; Opinion of the Economic and Social 
committee on "Development aid, good governance and the role of socio-economic interest groups" [1997] 
O. J. C287/44. 
25 Resolution on the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
a Union policy against Corruption. [1998] O. J. C328/46. 26 Ferola, "Anti-Bribery Measures in the European Union: A Comparison with the Italian Legal Order" (2000) 28 I. J. L. I 512; Joint Action 98/742/JHA of December 22,1998 adopted by the Council on the basis 
of Article K. 3 TEU on Corruption in the Private Sector [1998] O. J. L358/2; Council Framework Decision 
2003/568/JHA 
of July 22,2003 on Combating Corruption in the private sector [2003] O. J. L192/54. 
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not interfere with the transparent and open conduct of trade. 7 In a free market, corruption 
might have cross-border implications, leading to the "contagion of corruption"28 where 
Member States which would not normally condone corruption, do so, in order to compete 
for business with countries that ignore such practices. Corruption also increases the costs 
of economic activity thereby reducing the optimal use of resources in the EU. 29 
The link between procurement regulation and EU anti-corruption goals takes the 
following form: first, the EU finances several large projects within and outside Europe 
and must protect its investments by ensuring the absence of corruption therein. Second, 
protecting EU finances and providing EU citizens with an area of freedom, security and 
justice necessitates a comprehensive policy targeting corruption in the sphere of public 
finance, including public procurement. 30 Third, the adoption of measures to address 
corruption may be justified by the adverse impact that corruption may have on the 
internal market, as described above. In addition, because open public procurement may 
lead to increased opportunities for corruption, as corrupt elements may have access to the 
public procurement markets in other Member States31 where they may not be known to 
be corrupt, the EU has an interest in ensuring that procurement regulation reduces the 
scope for corruption that may arise from opening up markets across borders. 
2.2.3 Disqualification in the EU 
The disqualification of suppliers from public contracts in the EU is not a new concept. 
EU procurement directives have historically contained provisions allowing Member 
States to exclude suppliers from public contracts for reasons ranging from legal violations 
27 Ferola, ibid., 515. 
28 Caiden and Dwivedi, "Official Ethics and Corruption" in Caiden (ed. ) Where Corruption Lives (2001), 
245. 
29 Ades and di Tella, "Rents, Competition and Corruption" (1999) 89 (4) A. E. R. 982; `Report on 
Combating Corruption in Europe' The European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal 
Affairs, Economic and Political Corruption in Europe, Doc A4-0314/95. 
30 Action Plan against Organised Crime, Pt. II. 
31 Stefanou, "Databases as a means of combating organised crime within the EU" (2010) 17(1) J. F. C. 100. 
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to professional infringements. 32 The previous directives contained provisions, giving 
Member States a measure of discretion in deciding whether or not to utilize 
disqualifications in public procurement in support of their own polices, 33 and also 
permitted Member States to disqualify a supplier who was bankrupt or being wound up; 
had not fulfilled obligations in relation to social security and tax payments; was guilty of 
serious misrepresentation in the procurement context or was convicted of an offence 
regarding his professional conduct. 34 This provided the possibility to disqualify a supplier 
for offences which might have been related to his profession, 35 which may have included 
corruption offences, but could also have included breaches of offences relating to tax 
liability, breaches of employment and immigration requirements and breaches of 
environmental legislation. The previous directives also permitted the disqualification of a 
supplier guilty of grave professional misconduct, 36 possibly permitting disqualification 
for corruption and other offences in the absence of a conviction, 37 and also permitting 
disqualification for breaches of professional norms. It should be noted that these 
provisions permit procuring authorities to disqualify suppliers both for past offences and 
possibly present offences or offences committed within the specific procurement process. 
These provisions remain in essentially the same form in the current directives, which 
provide in Art. 45 (2) PSD that: 
"Any economic operator may be excluded from participation in a contract where that 
economic operator: 
(c) has been convicted by a judgment which has the force of res judicata in accordance 
with the legal provisions of the country of any offence concerning his professional 
conduct; 
(d) has been guilty of grave professional misconduct proven by any means which the 
contracting authorities can demonstrate... " 
32 Art. 20, Directive 77/62/EC [1977] O. J. L013/15 (supplies). 
33 Art. 20 (1) Directive 93/36/EEC n. 10. The relevant provisions in the three previous public sector 
procurement directives are identical. Art. 31 Council Directive 93/38/EEC n. 1 1; Piselli, 267. 
° Art. 20(1) Directive 93/36/EEC. 
35 Piselli, 272. 
36 Art. 20(1)(d) Directive 93/36/EEC. 
37 C-71/92 Commission v Spain [1993] E. C. R. 1-5923; Priess and Pitschas, "Secondary Policy Criteria and 
their compatibility with EC and WTO Procurement Law: The case of the German scientology declaration, " 
(2000) 4 P. P. L. R. 171,175. 
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The current directives took a novel approach to disqualification. Apart from retaining the 
options for Member States to disqualify suppliers at their discretion, discussed above, 38 
the directives introduced a new element into the disqualification regime by making it 
mandatory for procuring authorities in the EU to disqualify from public contracts, firms 
convicted of various offences. Thus, the directives provide in Art. 45 (1) that: 
"Any candidate or tenderer who has been the subject of a conviction by final judgement 
of which the contracting authority is aware for one or more of the reasons listed below 
shall be excluded from participation in a public contract: 
(a) participation in a criminal organisation as defined in Article 2 (1) of Council Joint 
Action 98/733/JHA; 
(b) corruption, as defined in Article 3 of the Council Act of 26 May 1997 and Article 3 of 
Council Joint Action 98/742/JHA respectively; 
(c) fraud within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention relating to the protection of 
the financial interests of the European Communities; 
(d) money laundering as defined in Article 1 of Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 
1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering. 39 
Member states shall specify, in accordance with their national laws and having regard for 
Community law, the implementing conditions for this paragraph. They may provide for a 
derogation from the requirement referred to in the first subparagraph for overriding 
requirements in the general interest. " 
The provisions on disqualification fall into two categories- the discretionary 
disqualifications wherein procuring authorities are permitted to disqualify suppliers who 
are convicted or guilty of various professional infringements and the mandatory 
disqualifications where procuring authorities are required to disqualify suppliers who 
have been convicted of committing the listed offences. Both types of disqualifications 
will be considered in this thesis. 
The mandatory disqualifications for serious criminal offences are intended to support the 
EU's policy against crime. This policy is aimed at protecting the internal market from 
38 Art. 45(2) PSD and Art. 54(4) UD. 
39 Directive 91/308/EEC on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering, [1991] O. J. L166/77 which is mentioned in Art. 45(1)(d) has been repealed and replaced by 
Directive 2005/60/EC on the Prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering and terrorist financing [2005] O. J. L309/15. 
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criminal activity and blocking the legal loopholes arising from the incongruities between 
the criminal justice systems of Member States, which are exploited by criminals. 0 Other 
aims of the policy are the desire for harmonisation and coherence in tackling criminal 
activity with a European dimension. This is especially relevant in the public procurement 
arena where the reduction of trade barriers may allow criminal elements access to the 
procurement systems of Member States. 
The mandatory disqualification for corruption, and to an extent, the disqualifications for 
fraud, and money laundering, support the EU's policy against corruption by 
strengthening the Union's `arsenal of means' against corruption; 41 by protecting Union 
finances from corruption; preventing the adverse effect that corruption can have on the 
internal market and public procurement42 since corruption necessarily entails 
discrimination on unlawful grounds; preventing the cross-border corruption that can 
occur in liberalised markets and protecting EU projects in Member States from 
corruption 43 
From the above, it may be inferred that the rationales for disqualification in the EU 
appear to fall within both the policy and the protective rationales as discussed in ch. 1.5, 
since these disqualifications support EU policy against serious crimes and protect the EU 
budget from being lost through corruption. As is discussed in the context of South Africa 
below, although disqualification in some jurisdictions is intended to be punitive, it has 
been argued by Arrowsmith et al that the disqualifications in the EU are not intended to 
have a punitive purpose 44 
40 Ferola, "The Fight Against organised Crime in Europe: Building an area of freedom, security and justice 
in the EU" (2002) 30 I. J. L. I. 53-54; Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, The prevention of crime in the European Union: Reflection on common guidelines and 
proposals for Community financial support COM (2000) 786 Final. 
4' Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on he coordination of the 
procedures for the award of public supply contracts, public service contracts and public works contracts 
COM (2000) 275 final/2. Explanatory Memorandum, 33. 
42 Trepte, 2007,338. 
43 Williams, 2006. 
44 Arrowsmith, Priess and Friton, "Self-Cleaning- An Emerging Concept in EC Procurement Law? In 
Punder, Priess & Arrowsmith (ed. ) Self-Cleaning in Public Procurement Law (2009) [Punder, Priess & 
Arrowsmith]. 
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It should be noted that the discretionary and the mandatory disqualifications are not tied 
to the ability of the contractor to perform, 45 and there are specific provisions which assess 
reliability by assessing the contractors financial standing, 46 technical or professional 
ability47 and past contract performance. 48 In relation to criteria assessing reliability and 
capability, the EU directives provide that such criteria are relevant in so far as they relate 
to the contract. 9 Thus a procuring authority may not specify either qualification or award 
criteria that is unconnected with the contract50 or is unconnected with the objectives 
s' sought to be achieved by the procuring authority. 
In relation to the discretionary and possibly the mandatory disqualifications, opinion is 
divided as to whether the disqualifications also serve the purpose of assessing the 
reliability of the supplier. In La Cascina, Advocate General Maduro opined that 
discretionary exclusions in Italian law which excluded firms that had not complied with 
tax and social security obligations were intended to ensure the reliability and solvency of 
suppliers as well ensuring that a level playing field was maintained between suppliers 52 
This argument may also be made in relation to the mandatory disqualifications as a 
supplier who has been convicted of corruption, fraud or money laundering may not be 
reliable. 
It appears however, that the EU directives consider the disqualifications for the serious 
criminal offences as conceptually distinct from the other selection criteria, as Art. 44 (1) 
PSD provides for the checking of the performance (financial etc) criteria of those who 
have not been excluded under the mandatory exclusions. 53 Trepte also suggests that the 
as Arrowsmith, "Application of the EC Treaty and directives to horizontal policies: A critical review" in 
Arrowsmith and Kunzlik (eds. ); Priess, European Public Procurement Law (2000), 44-45. 
46 Art. 47 PSD. 
47 Art. 48 PSD. 
48 Art. 48 (2) (a) (i) PSD. 
49 Art. 44 (2) PSD. 
50 C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland v Helsinki [2002] E. C. R. I-7213. 
51 C-448/01 EVN and Wienstrom v Austria [2004] 1 C. M. L. R. 22. 
52 C-226/04 La Cascina [2006] E. C. R. I-1347, para. 24. 
53 Arrowsmith, 2005,748. 
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disqualifications relate to `eligibility' and not `capability'54 as conditions of eligibility do 
not depend on the ability of the contractor to perform the contract, since they determine 
whether or not the contractor may be permitted to bid for the contract regardless of his 
abilities. 55 His view is shared by Piselli, who asserts that exclusions for criminal 
convictions are not limited to the ability of the contractor to perform the contract, as if 
this were the case, the grounds for exclusion would have been incorporated into the 
provisions concerning financial and technical standing. 56 
If indeed the disqualifications for serious criminal offences represent a separate and 
independent category of qualification criteria, they do not need to be tied to the 
contractor's ability to perform and may legitimately be directed at achieving other 
objectives, such as protecting the EU from the cross-border effects of serious crime. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the offences for which the discretionary and the 
mandatory disqualifications may be imposed in the EU relate to general and procurement 
related offences. A similar position obtains in the UK, the US and the World Bank, 
although South Africa disqualifies suppliers solely for procurement related offences. 
2.3 The United Kingdom 
2.3.1 Public procurement regulation in the UK 
As mentioned in ch. 2.2.1 above, EU Member States are under an obligation to implement 
EU legislation. As a result of this obligation, the UK's public procurement system has 
undergone several changes in response to the changing nature of EU regulation of public 
procurement. Traditionally, UK procurement was not regulated through a strict legal 
54 Trepte, Regulating Procurement: Understanding the Ends and Means of Public Procurement Regulation 
(2004), 195,317 [Trepte, 2004]. 
S Trepte, 2007,321. 
56 Piselli, 273. 
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regime57 and informal direction on UK public procurement policy was the responsibility 
of the Treasury; 58 procurement being regulated mainly through administrative 
instruments. 59 However, since 1991, the UK has adopted a more formal approach to 
procurement regulation in response to increasingly stringent EU regulation on public 
procurement. 0 
Before the unification of procurement regulation brought about by the EU procurement 
instruments, procurement regulation in the UK occurred at the local and central 
government levels6' and although there were differences in the regulation of procurement 
at these levels, the underlying principles remained similar. 62 
The formal regulation of public procurement at the local government level can be traced 
to the attempts by the Conservative Government63 to reduce the size of the public sector 
and introduce greater competition and efficiency into local government procurement 64 
This was done through an initiative known as Compulsory Competitive Tendering 
(CCT)65 which was designed to ensure that local authorities would directly provide 
certain services only if they could do so competitively. Where this was not possible, local 
authorities were required to contract-out the provision of these services. 66 The CCT 
regime and implementing legislation67 was repealed by the Labour Government as it was 
found to be problematic, inflexible and created tension between suppliers and local 
57 Turpin, Government Procurement and Contracts (1989) chs. 1-4; Vincent-Jones, The New Public 
Contracting: Regulation. Responsiveness, Relationality (2006), 13-16; Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 2. 
58 Turpin, ibid., 61. 
59 Arrowsmith, 2006,89. 
60 See generally, Trybus & Craig, "Public Contracts: England and Wales" in Nogouellou and Stelkens 
(eds. ), Comparative Law on Public Contracts Treatise (2010), 339-366. 
61 Badcoe, "Best Value- A New Approach in the UK" in Arrowsmith and Trybus (eds. ) Public 
Procurement: The Continuing Revolution (2003). 
62 Arrowsmith 2005, ch. 2; Badcoe, "The National Procurement Strategy for Local Government" (2004) 6 
P. P. L. R. NA181-192. 
63 1979-1997. 
64 Badoce, n. 62, NA 182. 
6s Gosling, The effects of Compulsory Competitive Tendering and European law on Local authorities 
L2001), chs. 1-3. 
Badcoe, "Best Value- An overview of the United Kingdom Government's policy for the provision and 
procurement of local authority services" (2001) 2 P. P. L. R. 63-81. 
Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980, Local Government Act 1988. 
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authorities 68 CCT was replaced with the Best Value initiative, 69 under which local 
authorities are required to "secure continuous improvement in the way in which its 
functions are exercised, having regard to a combination of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness. "70 Although the Best Value initiative is important to local government 
procurement, it has implications that extend beyond procurement and seeks to provide 
improved performance and value for money in the delivery of all local government 
services. 7' 
Whilst the Best Value initiative was directed at local government, central government 
procurement also underwent reform. 72 At central level, a policy of increasing competition 
in central government procurement was supported by the Deregulation and Contracting 
Out Act 1994, which permitted the contracting out of both local and central government 
functions, although central government decisions to contract out are to be determined on 
a case-by-case basis. 73 
In 1995, the publication of a government White Paper on procurement74 led to changes in 
central procurement. Following the White Paper, a government study was commissioned, 
which sought increased efficiency in central procurement, 75 through the increased use of 
electronic procurement, electronic payment of invoices, increased collaboration between 
departments, the increased use of central procurement agencies and the development of a 
professional procurement workforce in central government. The White Paper led to a 
review of central government civil procurement, in light of the government's efficiency 
objectives. 76 This review recommended the harmonisation of procurement strategy, 
procedures and standards and the creation of a central organisation responsible for 
68 Badcoe, n. 66,63-68; Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 2; Entwistle and Martin, "From Competition to Collaboration 
in public service delivery: A new agenda for research" (2005) 83 P. A. 233-242. 
69 Modernising Local Government- Improving Local Services through Best Value (March 1998). See 
Martin, "Implementing best value: local public services in transition" (2000) 78 P. A. 209- 227. 
70 S3 (1) Local Government Act 1999. 
" Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 2.8. 
72 Arrowsmith, 2005 ch. 2.13. 
73 12 Guiding principles in using market testing and contracting out issued by the Chancellor (1997). 
74 Setting New Standards: The Government's procurement strategy (Cm 2840 May 1995). 
75 HM Treasury, Efficiency in Civil Government Procurement (July 1998). 
76 Gershon, Review of Civil Procurement in central government (April 1999). 
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pp, 
coordinating procurement policy and promoting best practice in public procurement. This 
organisation, the Office of Government Commerce (OGC), is now responsible for issuing 
policy advice and direction on public procurement, as well as information and training on 
EU procurement regulation. "Since the 2008 global financial crises, the UK government 
has sought to increase efficiency and transparency in public procurement as a means of 
obtaining better value. 78 
Apart from domestic policies and legislation on procurement, the largest influence on UK 
procurement is EU procurement regulation. Some of the implications of the EU 
procurement directives for UK procurement occur in the context of procedures, the 
requirements of publication of contracts, transparency and the increase in the range of 
bodies whose procurement is subject to regulation 79 The EU directives prescribe the 
framework of procedures for the award of public contracts but do not give policy 
direction on public procurement to Member States. However, in prescribing the 
procedures for contract awards and the judicial interpretation of the directives by the 
Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), 80 EU policies on public procurement are implemented 
in Member States. It has been suggested that there is often tension between the goals of 
EU procurement regulation and the goals of Member States, 81 and this tension may at 
times be irreconcilable leading to an unwillingness by Member States to fully implement 
EU procurement legislation. 82 
77 www. ogc. gov. uk. Arrowsmith 2006,86; Norris, "The Gershon Review: A Driver for Reform at the heart 
of central government procurement" (1999) 6 P. P. L. R. CS 177- 180. 
'a Smith, "The UK government's operational efficiency programme: Collaborative procurement report" 
(2010) 1 P. P. L. R. NA22; Henty & Manning, "The public sector transparency agenda" (2011) P. P. L. R. 
NA45. 
79 Arrowsmith, "The Entity Coverage of the EC procurement directives and UK regulations: A review" (2004) 2 P. P. L. R. 59. 
80 Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 3.50-3.55. 81 Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 2.10, ch. 3.10-3.11,3.50-3.55; Arrowsmith, "The EC procurement directives, 
national procurement policies and better governance: the case for a new approach" (2002) 27 (1) E. L. R. 3. 
82 Braun, "Strict compliance versus commercial reality: the practical application of EC public procurement 
law to the UK's private finance initiative" (2003) 9 E. L. J. 575. 
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The previous UK procurement regulations83 were repealed, when the current set were 
implemented in 2006. The UK's approach to the implementation of the directives is 
through detailed legislative implementation, 84 wherein the content of the directives are 
reproduced in binding regulations, albeit in a slightly reworded and restructured form. 85 
As a result, the UK procurement regulations are very similar to the EU directives, 
although there are a few areas where the UK clarified the provisions in the directives. 86 
The benefits of the UK's approach to implementation, apart from the clarification 
provided by a detailed text, is that the procurement regulations avoid errors in 
transposition87 and avoid any "super-equivalence which risks being at odds with the 
meaning of the Directive. 48 However, the disadvantages of the UK's approach are that 
the UK regulations fail to translate the implied obligations in the directives and retain the 
ambiguities that exist in the directives. 89 
2.3.2 The UK's policy against corruption 
The UK's anti-corruption policy can be said to have three strands. First, the policy is 
concerned with domestic corruption, although the government's policy against domestic 
corruption is subsumed within a broader policy against crime. Prior to 2010, legislative 
prohibitions against corruption existed in three statutes: the Public Bodies Corrupt 
Practices Act 1889, the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, and the Prevention of 
Corruption Act 1916.90 Together, the three statutes criminalised bribery in the public and 
private sectors. In 2010, the Bribery Act was passed which repealed these statutes and 
83 Public Works Contracts Regulations S. I. 1991/2680, Public Services Contracts Regulations S. I. 
1993/3228, Public Supply Contracts Regulations S. I. 1995/201. 
84 Arrowsmith, "Legal Techniques for Implementing Directives: A case study of public procurement" in 
Craig and Harlow (eds. ) Lawmaking in the European Union (1998), 497. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 3.42. 
87 Arrowsmith, 2006,90. 
88 OGC, Regulatory Impact Assessment- Public Contracts Regulations 2006. Available at www. ogc. gov. uk 
89 Arrowsmith, 2005 ch. 3.42. 
90 Collectively cited as the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889-1916. 
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consolidated the prohibitions against public and private corruption and foreign bribery91 
The Bribery Act criminalises the giving or receiving of a bribe as an inducement for a 
person to do or refrain from doing anything in the exercise of his public functions, in 
connection with a business or in the course of his employment. 92 
Apart from the statutory offences, there exists the common law offence of bribery, which 
applies to public bribery93 and is defined as the "receiving or offering any undue reward 
by or to any person whatsoever, in a public office, in order to influence his behaviour in 
office, and incline him to act contrary to the known rules of honesty and integrity. "94 
In addition to the criminal prohibitions against corruption, public officials are also subject 
to codes of conduct95 and regulations prohibiting conflicts of interest, which are designed 
to maintain certain ethical standards amongst employees. 
The second strand of the UK's anti-corruption policy is directed at corruption in 
developing countries. The thrust of this policy is to ensure corruption does not lead to a 
waste of financial aid and probity and transparency are apparent in countries that receive 
UK aid. 96 In addition, the UK government is keen to ensure that corruption does not 
undermine development efforts in these countries, as it is believed that corruption can 
have an adverse effect on the functioning of governments and economies. 97 Another 
driver behind the government's interest in corruption in developing countries is a 2006 
report that revealed the UK's complicity in the corruption that occurs in Africa. In 98 
91 The Act came into force in July 2011. See Warin, Falconer & Diamant, "The British are coming!: Britain 
changes its law on foreign bribery and joins the international fight against corruption" (2010) 46 T. I. L. J. 1. 
92 See S. 1 to 4. 
93 Rv Whitaker [1914] 3 K. B. 1283,1296. 
94 Turrner (ed. ), Russell on Crime (1964), 381. 
95 General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (2006); Civil Service Code (June 2006); Ministerial 
Code (July 2007); Local Authorities (Model Code of Conduct) (England) Order 2007 S. I. 2007/1159; Code 
of Conduct for Members of Parliament (2005) HC 251; House of Lords Code of Conduct (March 2002); 
Code of Conduct for NHS managers (October 2002). 
96 Elliott, "Brown tells African leaders: Make corruption history or lose confidence of Western donors", 
The Guardian, May 23,2006. 
97 Joint Committee on the Draft Corruption Bill, `Draft Corruption Bill: Report and Evidence' (HL (2002- 
03) Paper 157, HC (2002-03) 705) 81-82. 
98 All Africa Parliamentary Group, The other side of the coin: the UK and corruption in Africa (March 
2006). 
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response to this report, the UK government reiterated its commitment to tackle 
international corruption through various measures including the introduction of new anti- 
corruption legislation and the establishment of an international taskforce to investigate 
international corruption, including money laundering by corrupt politicians from 
developing countries. 99 
The third strand of the UK's anti-corruption policy is related to the anti-corruption policy 
in developing countries and is aimed at reducing corruption in international business, 
especially where this involves UK firms engaging in corruption to obtain public contracts 
in developing countries. Corruption in international business was initially criminalised 
through the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which gave effect to the UK's 
obligations under the OECD Convention. The corruption provisions of the Act were 
however repealed by the Bribery Act, which criminalises the bribery of foreign officials 
and officials of international organisations. '°° 
2.3.3 Disqualification in the UK 
Disqualification is not an unknown concept in UK public procurement, and was 
historically used in limited contexts to secure compliance with various government 
policies. 10' In implementing the previous edition of the EU procurement directives, 
discretionary disqualifications for breaches of various norms were permitted under the 
previous UK procurement regulations. Under these regulations, suppliers could have been 
disqualified from public contracts for a conviction for a criminal offence relating to the 
99 Government Response to Africa corruption report- http: //www. pm. gov. uk/output/Pagg9717. asp; Prime 
Minister announces crackdown on international corruption, as part of Gleneagles implementation plan. 
Available at http: //www. dfid. gov. uk/news/files/pressreleases/anticorruption-champion. asp 
10° S6. 
101 Bercusson, Fair Wages Resolutions (1978); Carr, New Roads to Equality: Contract Compliance for the 
United Kingdom (1987); McCrudden, 2007. 
62 
contractors professional conduct, or because the contractor had committed an act of grave 
professional misconduct. ' 02 
The previous regulations reproduced almost verbatim, the corresponding provisions in 
the previous edition of the EU procurement directives. However, there is little empirical 
information available on the extent to which these disqualifications were utilised under 
the previous procurement regime, 103 and whether indeed these discretionary 
disqualifications were ever used against contractors convicted or guilty of corruption. 
These discretionary disqualifications have been retained in the current version of the UK 
procurement regulations104 in the same form as under the previous regulations. Thus, the 
current regulations provide that a procuring authority may treat as ineligible or decide not 
to select a supplier on the grounds that the supplier has been convicted of a criminal 
offence relating to the conduct of his business or profession or has committed an act of 
grave misconduct in the course of his business or profession. 105 As was discussed above 
in the context of the EU, these discretionary provisions may be relied on to disqualify a 
supplier from a procurement process where that supplier commits an act of corruption 
within that procurement process. 
Apart from the discretionary disqualifications, the current UK procurement regulations 
contain, like the EU directives, mandatory disqualifications for serious criminal offences, 
which are intended to implement the provisions in the EU procurement directives. 
However, the UK regulations reworded the offences to fit within the existing scheme of 
the relevant criminal offences in the UK. Regulation 23 of the PCR provides: 
"Subject to paragraph (2), a contracting authority shall treat as ineligible and shall not 
select an economic operator in accordance with these Regulations if the contracting 
authority has actual knowledge that the economic operator or its directors or any other 
102 Reg. 14, Public Works Contracts Regulations 1991, S. I. 1991/2680; Reg. 14, Public Supply Contracts 
Regulations 1995, S. I. 1995/201; Reg. 14, Public Services Contracts Regulations 1993, S. I. 1993/3228; 
Utilities Contracts Regulations 1996, S. I. 1996/2911. 
'03 Piselli. 
104 Reg. 23 (4) Public Contract Regulations 2006/5 as amended by the Public Contracts (Amendment) 
Regulations 2009/2992. [hereafter PCR]. 
105 Reg. 23 (4) (d) and (e) PCR. 
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person who has powers of representation, decision or control of the economic operator 
has been convicted of any of the following offences- 
(a) conspiracy within the meaning of section 1 of the Criminal Law Act 1977(... ) where 
that conspiracy relates to participation in a criminal organisation as defined in Article 
2(1) of Council Joint Action 98/733/JHA(... ); 
(b) corruption within the meaning of section 1 of the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 
1889 or section 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906; 
(c) the offence of bribery; 
(d) fraud, where the offence relates to fraud affecting the financial interests of the 
European Communities as defined by Article 1 of the Convention relating to the 
protection of the financial interests of the European Union, within the meaning of- 
(i) the offence of cheating the Revenue; 
(ii) the offence of conspiracy to defraud; 
(iii) fraud or theft within the meaning of the Theft Act 1968(... ) and the Theft 
Act 1978(... ); 
(iv) fraudulent trading within the meaning of section 458 of the Companies Act 1985(... ); (v) defrauding the Customs within the meaning of the Customs and Excise Management 
Act 1979(... ) and the Value Added Tax Act 1994(... ); 
(vi) an offence in connection with taxation in the European Community within the 
meaning of section 71 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993(... ); or (vii) destroying, defacing or concealing of documents or procuring the extension of a 
valuable security within the meaning of section 20 of the Theft Act 1968; (e) money laundering within the meaning of the Money Laundering Regulations 
2003(... ) 
(f) any other offence within the meaning of Article 45 (1) of the Public Sector Directive 
as defined by the national law of any relevant State. " 
The mandatory disqualifications for serious criminal offences were included in the UK 
regulations in compliance with the EU procurement directives. Thus, the rationales for 
the use of disqualifications in the UK are similar to the rationales behind their inclusion 
in the EU directives. 106 These rationales were identified in ch. 2.2.3 as supporting the 
EU's policy against serious crime, strengthening the EU's `arsenal of means' against 
these offences; preventing the adverse effect that fraud and corruption can have on the 
internal market and public procurement; 107 and protecting EU projects in Member States 
from fraud and corruption, while denying organised criminal syndicates access to these 
projects and preventing such projects from being used for money laundering purposes. 108 
106 Williams, "The mandatory contractor exclusions for serious criminal offences in UK public 
Procurement" (2009) 15 (3) E. P. L 429 [Williams, 2009]. 
07 Trepte, 2007,338. 
108 Williams, 2006. 
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Thus, the rationales for disqualification in the UK are policy related, as discussed in ch. 1, 
in that the disqualification provisions are aimed at giving effect to the EU directives, and 
in doing so, the UK disqualifications also meet the protective rationale of protecting the 
EU budget from crime as discussed in the context of the EU disqualifications in ch. 2.2.3. 
In relation to whether the disqualifications in the UK relate to the capability or ability of 
the supplier to perform, in relation to the discretionary disqualifications for offences 
committed in the conduct of the supplier's business, the disqualifications may be directed 
at the ability of the supplier to perform. However, in relation to the mandatory 
disqualifications for serious criminal offences, the UK regulations suggest that the 
disqualification relates to eligibility and not capability, as the opening paragraph of 
Regulation 23 provides that a contractor convicted of the relevant offences shall be 
`ineligible' to obtain a public contract. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the offences for which the discretionary and 
mandatory disqualifications may be imposed in the UK relate to general as well as 
procurement related offences. This is the position in the EU, the US and the World Bank, 
although South Africa disqualifies suppliers solely for procurement related offences. 
2.4 The United States 
2.4.1 Public procurement regulation in the United States 
In contrast with the UK, but similar to the position in South Africa, the US adopts a 
highly regulated and formal approach to procurement regulation, which relies on legally 
binding rules in order to achieve procurement objectives. 109 US procurement is 
decentralised and occurs at three levels- the federal, state and local level, but this thesis 
109 Cibinic & Nash, Formation of Government Contracts (1998), 1 [Cibinic & Nash, 1998]; Thai & 
Drabkin, "US federal government procurement: structure, process and current issues" in Knight, Harland, 
Telgen, et al (eds. ) Public Procurement: International Cases and Commentary (2007), 89. 
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will concentrate on federal procurement regulation. Procurement regulation at the federal 
level is governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and for some strategic 
federal agencies; there are agency-specific procurement regulations, which are modelled 
on the FAR. Procurement regulation at the state level is governed by state-specific 
legislation. 
The regulation of public procurement was historically driven by the needs of military 
procurement, with the first formal procurement regulations issued by Congress in 1777. 
These regulations were aimed at organising the purchasing and issue of military supplies 
and preventing fraud by requiring procurement officials to record information on all 
purchases and issues, appraise themselves of market prices and give a bond to Congress 
for the "faithful performance of their duties". 11° 
The genesis of the modern US procurement system is traceable to the passage of two acts 
intended to standardise and streamline public procurement procedures. " Streamlining 
procurement was accompanied by an anti-fraud element and the Truth in Negotiations 
Act 196212 required contractors to submit certifiable cost and pricing data to the 
government. Procurement reform 113 coincided with judicial pronouncements giving 
procurement regulations the force of law, 114 which meant that aggrieved contractors had 
the right to pursue litigation where procuring officials breached the regulations. 
In 1969, the government established the Commission on Government Contracting, which 
scrutinised federal procurement and recommended a uniform system of procurement 
regulations under the auspices of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP). I IS In 
1983, the OFPP drafted the FAR, which was intended to be a uniform set of regulations 
10 Nagle, A History of Government Contracting (1999), 33-34 [Nagle]. 
111 Armed Services Procurement Act 1947 10 U. S. C. § 2301; Federal Property and Administrative Services 
Act 1949 41 U. S. C. § 251. 
112 Pub. L 87-653; 10 U. S. C. 2306a 
113 Nagle, ch. 22; Koffsky, "Coming to Terms with Bureaucratic Ethics" (1995) 11 J. L. & P. 235. 
114 Paul V United States 371 U. S. 245 (1963); G. L. Christian & Assocs. v United States 312 F. 2d 418 (Ct. Cl 
1963). 
115 Nagle, 488; Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act Pub. L. No. 93-400, §3 (b), 88 Stat. 796 (1974). 
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for government procurement, 116 although supplementary regulations could be issued by 
federal agencies. This led to a similar problem that the FAR was designed to solve, 
namely, an over-burdening of the system with multiple regulations. "? This was not the 
only problem with procurement and in 1983 a scandal erupted over government contract 
prices, which were much higher than market prices. This scandal led to the Competition 
in Contracting Act 1984,118 designed to ensure that the government obtained the best 
value in its procurements. ' 19 Another scandal over defence procurement120 in 1988 led to 
the Procurement Integrity Act 1988,121 which increased the range of punitive measures 
against the improper disclosure of contract information. 122 This was closely followed by 
the Ethics Reform Act 1990.123 
In 1993, President Clinton committed himself to a program of procurement reform124 as 
part of his campaign to reinvent government. The FAR was remodelled125 to grant 
procurement officials more discretion, 126 include past performance in evaluation criteria 
and make procurement more flexible and innovative. 127 The passage of two new statutes - 
the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994128 and the Federal Acquisition Reform 
Act 1996129 sought to streamline the federal procurement system. 130 In the new 
116 Keyes, Government Contracts in a Nutshell (2004), 2- 3. 
117 Keyes ibid., 3; Schwartz, "Regulation and Deregulation in Public Procurement Law Reform in the 
United States" in Piga and Thai (eds. ) Advancing Public Procurement: Practices, Innovation and 
Knowledge-sharing (2006), 177,179. 
118 10 U. S. C § 2306; Kelman, 1990,14. 
119 Nagle, ch. 23. 
120 Greenspun, "1988 Amendments to the Federal Procurement Policy Act: Did the "Ill Wind" bring an 
Impractical Overreaction that may run Afoul of the Constitution? " (1990) 19 P. C. L. J. 393; Dietrich, "The 
potential for criminal liability in government contracting: A closer look at the Procurement Integrity Act" 
(2005) 34 P. C. L. J. 521. 
121 41 U. S. C. § 423. 
"22 Donaldson, "Section 6 of the Office of Federal Policy and Procurement Act 1988: A new ethical 
standard in government conduct? " (1990) 20 C. L. R. 421; Wallick, Wellington and Howe, "Procurement 
Integrity: Pondering some Imponderables" (1990) 19 P. C. L. J. 349. 
123 Pub. L. No. 101-280,104 Stat. 149. 
124 Kelman, Unleashing Change: A study of organizational renewal in government (2006), 18-21 [Kelman, 
2006]. 
125 9 Fed. Reg. 26,772 (1994). 
126 Schwartz, n. 117,178. 
127 Nagle, 513. 
128 Pub. L No 103-355,108 Stat. 3243. 
129 Pub. L No104-106,110 Stat. 186,642. 
130 Pegnato, "Assessing federal procurement reform: Has the pendulum stopped swinging? " (2003) 3 
J. O. P. P. 145. 
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millennium, the government's goal has been to increase efficiency, 131 avoid fraud, '32 
increase decision-making based on `best-value, ' foster better relationships between the 
government and the private sector133 and since the global financial crisis- to use 
procurement as a means of stimulating the economy, 134 whilst still reducing waste in 
public procurement by increasing competition. 135 
2.4.2 The United States' policy against corruption 
The US adopts a multi-level policy against corruption. First the US is concerned about 
corruption in the conduct of international business. 136 This is evidenced by the existence 
of the renowned Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 which was the first piece of 
domestic legislation to criminalise the bribery of foreign public officials, 137 and as 
discussed in ch. 1 gave the impetus to the passage of the OECD Convention. The US 
government believes that such corruption hurts businesses by raising transaction costs 
and the risks of doing business and is keen to ensure that US firms are not adversely 
131 Lucyshyn, "Market Based Government: Lessons Learnt from Five Cases" in Piga and Thai (eds. ), n. 117, 117-138; Berrios, "Government Contracts and Contractor Behaviour" (2006) 63 J. B. E. 119-130,121; Utt, 
"Competitive Contracting: An avenue for improvement" (2004) F. S. J. 41-46; Schooner, "Fear of Oversight: The fundamental failure of business-like government" (2001) 50 A. U. L. R. 627,674; Schooner, 
"Model Behaviour? Anecdotal evidence between evolving commercial public procurement practices and 
trade policy" (2003) 9 (1) I. T. L & R. 4-13. 
132 Stanek, "Gotta have faith: Why the new contractor ethics rules miss the mark" (2009) 38 P. C. L. J. 427; 
McCue, Buffington & Howel, "The fraud/red tape dilemma in public procurement: A study of US state and 
local governments" in Knight, Harland, Telgen, et al (eds. ), n. 109,247. 
133 Kelman, "Remaking Federal procurement" (2002) 31 P. C. L. J. 581,602-610 [Kelman, 2002]. 
X34 Conway, "Emerging Trends in International, federal and state and local government procurement in an 
era of global economic stimulus funding" (2010) 32 U. H. L. R. 29. 
'35 Conway, ibid., 34-35. 
136 George W. Bush, Message to the Senate of the United States, 27 October 2005. Available at 
http: //www. whitehouse. gov; Bantekas, "Corruption as an International Crime and Crime against 
Humanity" (2006) 4 J. I. C. J. 466. 
137 Koehler, "The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate year of the decade of its resurgence" (2010) 43 I. L. R. 389; Bixby, "The Lion Awakes: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977-2010" (2010) 12 
S. D. LL. J, 89; Goldbarg, "The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Structural Corruption (2000) 18 B. U. I. L. J 
273; Nesbitt, "Transnational Bribery of Foreign Officials: A new threat to the future of democracy" (1998) 
31 V. J. T. L. 1273; Nicholls, "The Myth of Anti-Bribery Law as Transnational Intrusion" (2000) 33 C. J. I. L. 
627; Hudson and Pieros, "The hard graft of tacking corruption in international business transactions: 
Progress in international cooperation and the OECD Convention" (1998) 32 (2) J. W. T. 77-102; Salbu, "A 
delicate balance: Legislation, Institutional Change and Transnational Bribery", (2000) 33 C. I. L. J. 657; 
Jennings, "Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of International Corruption Conventions and United 
States Law", (2001) 18 A. J. I. C. L. 793. 
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affected by corruption in international business- one of the reasons behind the US 
championing of instruments like the OECD Convention and the UN Corruption 
Convention. 138 
Second, and similar to the UK, the US is committed to the fight against corruption in 
developing nations. To combat corruption in developing nations, the US passed the 
International Anti-Corruption and Good Governance Act 2000 designed to "ensure that 
United States assistance programs promote good governance by assisting other countries 
to combat corruption throughout society and to improve transparency and accountability 
at all levels of government and throughout the private sector. "139 The drivers behind US 
policy are the desire to foster and encourage growth and development in developing 
countries, as it is accepted that corruption stifles this growth 140 and a desire that foreign 
aid is used for its intended purpose. As such, aid monies are increasingly tied to the 
improved responsibility of developing countries. 14' The US is also keen to ensure that 
corruption does not have a destabilising effect on new or transition economies and 
democracies, especially as there is evidence to suggest that corruption fosters the growth 
of organised criminal organisations. '42 
The Bush administration was particularly vocal in the fight against corruption, backing its 
rhetoric with legislative intervention and U. S dollars. For instance, in 2002, the 
Millennium Challenge Account was created to provide development assistance to 
countries meeting anti-corruption and other governance criteria. 143 Other legislative 
initiatives are the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act 2001, '44 which entitles the Treasury to withhold 10% of its funding to 
international financial institutions if the Secretary of the Treasury is not satisfied that the 
138 Nesbitt, n. 137; Nicholls, n. 137; Hudson and Pieros, n. 137; Salbu, n. 137; Jennings, n. 137. 
139 Preamble, Pub. L. 106-309. 
140 Mauro, "Corruption and Growth" (1995) 110 Q. J. E. 681. 
141 Statement of President Bush, International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, 2002. 
142 UN Office of Drugs and Crime, Results of a Pilot Survey of Forty selected organized criminal groups in 
sixteen countries (2002). 
143 Radelet, "Will the Millennium challenge account be different? " (2003) 26 (2) T. W. Q. 171-187. 144 Public Law 106-429 § 588. 
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institution is taking steps "to establish an independent fraud and corruption investigative 
organisation or office. " 
Thirdly, the US is concerned about corruption on the domestic plane. '45 The legislative 
arena is replete with instruments designed to protect the public purse from corruption, 
fraud and mismanagement. '46 However, since September 11,2001 the threat of terrorism 
also drives the government's efforts to tackle domestic corruption, as it is believed that 
corruption and money laundering may be used by terrorist groups for the furtherance of 
their aims and anti-corruption efforts have taken on a new "sense of urgency" as a 
result. 147 
2.4.3 Disqualification in the United States 
The United States has used disqualification in some form since 1928148 and utilises two 
kinds of disqualification measures against corrupt suppliers in public procurement. These 
are referred to in the FAR as suspension and debarment. Debarment is disqualification 
from public contracts for a specified period of time, usually no more than three years, 149 
while a suspension is a temporary measure, '50 lasting no longer than 12 months (or 18 
months if an Assistant Attorney-General requests an extension). 15' As discussed in ch. 1, 
both measures will be referred to in this thesis as `disqualification' and will be examined 
together since they operate in the same way, except in relation to length and certain 
procedural requirements. 
gas Warren, "What does Corruption means in a democracy? " (2004) 48 (2) A. J. P. S. 328-343. 
146 For a compilation of these statutes go to 
http: //www. uso, ee. eov/laws regs/odf/comp fed ethics laws. pdf 
147 Brandolino, Director for Anticorruption and Governance Initiatives; Bureau of International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement Affairs, `The United States and International Anti-Corruption Efforts' (Jan.! 2003). 
Available at www. state. gov 148 Gantt & Panzer, "The Government Blacklist: Debarment and Suspension of Bidders on Government 
Contracts" (1957) 25 G. W. L. R. 175,185. 
149 FAR 9.406-4. 
150 FAR 9.407-4. 
151 FAR 9.407-1. 
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In the US, disqualification may occur for the breaches of various norms. Similar to what 
obtains in the EU and the UK, disqualification in the US is generally directed at past 
violations of law or ethics that may be unrelated to public procurement, 152 but a supplier 
could also be disqualified for past procurement related violations153 or violations 
committed in the specific procurement process. 
The rationale behind disqualification in the US is primarily protective as defined in ch. I. 
54 lss This rationale finds support in the jurisprudence' and the legislation. The federal 
procurement statutes provide that public contracts may only be awarded to `responsible' 
contractors. 156 This requirement is incorporated into the FAR, 157 which requires a 
procuring officer to make an affirmative determination of the responsibility of the 
contractor before awarding a contract. 158 Responsibility covers factors such as financial, 
technical and integrity criteria as well as past contract performance. 159 Where a 
determination of responsibility cannot be made, the procuring officer must make a 
determination of non-responsibility, 160 which precludes the contractor from obtaining a 
contract in the specific instance. Contracting with a responsible contractor ensures that 
government resources are used to obtain contractually described goods and services, ' 61 as 
a responsible contractor may be more likely to comply with the procurement agreement. 
The relationship between a determination of non-responsibility and disqualification is 
that the determination may often be the genesis of disqualification proceedings against a 
supplier. 
A second rationale behind the use of disqualification is policy related, similar to the 
position in the EU and the UK, and disqualifications in the US may indicate the 
152 See FAR 9.406-2 and Yukins, 2004,256. 
154 
153 Schooner, 2004,214. 
s4 Roemer 
v Hoffman 419 F. Supp. 130 (DDC 1976). iss FAR 9.402; Kramer, 539. 1 
57 
10 USC § 2305 (c) and 41 USC § 253 (b). 
158 
FAR 9.103 (a). 
159 
FAR 9.103 (b). This thesis will not examine the law and practice relating to responsibility. FAR 9.104-1. 
. 60 FAR 9.103 (b). 161 Schooner, 2004,212-213. 
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government's lack of tolerance for corruption and fraud, 162 and thereby maintain public 
trust in the procurement system. 163 As discussed in ch. 2.4.1, a number of corruption 
scandals in US procurement led to various measures against procurement corruption. 
Disqualification further reinforces the government policy against corruption. 
Thirdly, although the courts and the FAR indicate that disqualification is not intended to 
be punitive, 164 and is designed to protect the government from the risk of dealing with 
non-responsible contractors, 165 the effects of a disqualification' 66 may have such far- 
reaching consequences on a contractor that it amounts to a "corporate death penalty" 167 
and may thus be sufficient to act as a deterrent against the breaches of the norms that call 
for disqualification. 
As will be seen in later chapters, the non-punitive nature of the US disqualification 
policy informs its implementation, as disqualification is discretionary and is imposed for 
limited periods where the evidence suggests that the government will be at risk from 
contracting with a supplier. Unlike the EU, the UK and South Africa, there are no 
provisions for mandatory disqualifications in the federal procurement context. 
The provisions relating to disqualification in US procurement are found in sub-part 9.4 of 
the FAR. Disqualification may be imposed for several offences and the FAR provides in 
9.406-2 that a procuring authority official may disqualify: 
"(a) A contractor for a conviction of or a civil judgment for 
(1) Commission of fraud or a criminal offense in connection with- 
162 Madsen, "The Government's Debarment process: out of step with current ethical standards" (2004) 5 
P. P. L. R. 252,253; McCollough, "Government contract suspension and debarment: what every contractor 
needs to know" (2004) 5 P. P. L. R. 240,241-242, Yukins, 2004,255. 
163 Schooner, 2004,216-217; Gansler, "A Vision of the government as a world class buyer: major 
procurement issues for the coming decade" in Abramson & Harris III (eds. ) The Procurement Revolution 
(2003), 15. 
164 Bae v Shalala, 44 F. 3d 489 (7t' Cir. 1995), United States v Bizzell, 921 F. 2d 263 (101' Cir. 1990). 
165 Kramer, 543. 
'66 In Gonzalez v Freeman, 334 F2. d 570,574 (D. C. Cir. 1964), the impact of disqualification was stated to 
be a loss of bank credit, adverse impact on price of shares, `loss of face' in the business community and the 
loss of profits from the business denied as a result of the disqualification. See also Fischer v RTC, 59 F3. d 
1344 (D. C. Cir. 1995). 
167 Schooner, 2004,214; McCollough. n. 162,240-244. 
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(i) Obtaining; (ii) Attempting to obtain; or (iii) Performing a public contract or 
subcontract. 
(2) Violation of Federal or State antitrust statutes relating to the submission of offers; 
(3) Commission of embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, falsification or destruction of 
records, making false statements, tax evasion, violating federal criminal tax laws or 
receiving stolen property; 
(4) Intentionally affixing a label bearing a "Made in America" inscription (or any 
inscription having the same meaning) to a product sold in or shipped to the United States 
or its outlying areas, when the product was not made in the United States or its outlying 
areas (see Section 202 of the Defense Production Act (Public Law 102-558)); 
(5) Commission of any other offense indicating a lack of business integrity or business 
honesty that seriously and directly affects the present responsibility of a Government 
contractor or subcontractor. 
(b)(1) A contractor, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, for- 
(i) Violation of the terms of a Government contract or subcontract so serious as to justify 
debarment, such as- 
(A) Wilful failure to perform in accordance with the terms of one or more contracts; or 
(B) A history of failure to perform, or of unsatisfactory performance of, one or more 
contracts. 
(ii) Violations of the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 (Pub. L. 100-690), as indicated 
by- 
(A) Failure to comply with the requirements of the clause at 52.223-6, Drug-Free 
Workplace; or 
(B) Such a number of contractor employees convicted of violations of criminal drug 
statutes occurring in the workplace as to indicate that the contractor has failed to make a 
good faith effort to provide a drug-free workplace (see 23.504). 
(iii) Intentionally affixing a label bearing a "Made in America" inscription (or any 
inscription having the same meaning) to a product sold in or shipped to the United States 
or its outlying areas, when the product was not made in the United States or its outlying 
areas (see Section 202 of the Defense Production Act (Public Law 102-558)). 
(iv) Commission of an unfair trade practice as defined in 9.403 (see Section 201 of the 
Defense Production Act (Pub. L. 102-558)). 
(v) Delinquent Federal taxes in an amount that exceeds $3,000 (... ) 
(vi) Knowing failure by a principal, until 3 years after final payment on any 
Government contract awarded to the contractor, to timely disclose to the Government, in 
connection with the award, performance, or closeout of the contract or a subcontract 
thereunder, credible evidence of- 
(A) Violation of Federal criminal law involving fraud, conflict of interest, bribery, or 
gratuity violations found in Title 18 of the United States Code; 
(B) Violation of the civil False Claims Act (31 U. S. C. 3729-3733); or 
(C) Significant overpayment(s) on the contract, other than overpayments resulting from 
contract financing payments as defined in 32.001. 
(2) A contractor, based on a determination by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the 
Attorney General of the United States, that the contractor is not in compliance with 
Immigration and Nationality Act employment provisions (see Executive Order 12989, as 
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amended by Executive Order 13286). Such determination is not reviewable in the 
debarment proceedings. 
(c) A contractor or subcontractor based on any other cause of so serious or compelling a 
nature that it affects the present responsibility of the contractor or subcontractor. " 
The offences that may lead to a temporary disqualification (suspension) are almost 
identical, except that such a disqualification may be imposed "upon adequate evidence" 
of the commission of the offences. In addition, such a disqualification may not be 
imposed for a breach of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 
The US disqualifications are tied both to the eligibility and the capability of the 
contractor. As discussed, a disqualification may follow a determination of non- 
responsibility, which indicates that the contractor's ability to perform the contract will be 
adversely affected by its inability to meet the standards for responsibility. However, 
because other procuring authorities are required not to contract with a supplier who has 
been disqualified, disqualification also affects a supplier's eligibility for future contracts. 
Finally, the offences for which disqualification may be imposed the US relate to general 
as well as procurement related offences. As mentioned, this is the position in the EU, the 
UK and the World Bank although South Africa disqualifies suppliers solely for 
procurement related offences. 
2.5 The World Bank 
2.5.1 Procurement regulation in the World Bank 
The World Bank funds capital-intensive projects in developing countries, which are 
implemented through procurements in these countries. By its Articles of Agreement, 168 
the Bank is required to ensure that loan proceeds are used for their intended purpose, with 
168 IBRD Articles of Agreement 2 LINTS 134, as amended by 606 UNTS 294. 
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due regard to considerations of economy and efficiency. 169 The Articles also prohibit the 
Bank from taking political or non-economic considerations into account10 or interfering 
in the political affairs of its members. '7' This raised a quandary for the Bank in deciding 
how to ensure that the disbursement of loan proceeds through project procurements is 
conducted in an open, transparent and competitive manner in countries that might have 
weak public administration systems, or lax public procurement regulation, without 
interfering with the Borrower's internal administration. To circumvent this problem, the 
Bank made it a condition of its finance that project procurement is done according to 
Bank procurement guidelines. 172 Although the procurement process is subject to Bank 
rules, the process is managed by the Borrower, with the Bank merely taking a supervisory 
role to ensure that the process is properly conducted. 173 
The first formal direction on Bank procurement was issued in 1964, which contained the 
procedures to be used by Bank staff in conducting international competitive bidding 
(ICB). 174 These initial documents have undergone significant revision over the years, "to 
reflect the Bank's changing membership, changes in the field of procurement and in the 
Bank's own lending procedures". 175 In relation to corruption control, the most significant 
review of Bank procurement procedures occurred in 1996 when the Bank introduced a 
new paragraph dealing with fraud and corruption in Bank-funded procurements. ' 76 This 
paragraph established the Bank's intention to disqualify corrupt firms from Bank- 
financed contracts and also contained a clause permitting Borrower's to include a `no- 
bribery' pledge in bid documentation. The paragraph on corruption was revised in 2004 
to include collusion and coercive practices in the list of prohibited activities, "' grant the 
'69 Art III S5 (b) IBRD Articles of Agreement. 
10 Ibid. 
171 Art. IV S 10. 
12 Para. 1.1 BPG. 
13 Arrowsmith, Linarelli & Wallace, 137. 
14 Hunja, "Recent Revisions to the World Bank's Procurement and Consultant Selection Guidelines" 
(1996) 6 P. P. L. R. 217,218. 
'7s Ibid. 
16 Para. 1.16 BPG. 
177 Para. 1.16 BPG. 
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Bank contractual access to bid and contract documentation, 178 and the power to audit the 
accounts of suppliers. 179 Again in 2006, the procurement guidelines were revised to 
include ` obstructive practices' as part of the definition of fraud and corruption and extend 
Bank sanctions to offences committed outside the procurement context, but still within 
Bank projects. 180 The most recent revision to the procurement guidelines occurred in 
2011 when the Bank introduced a provision prohibiting conflicts of interest in Bank 
projects. 181 
The Bank's procurement guidelines are quite detailed, providing procedural requirements 
relating to bidding procedures, splitting of contracts, advertising, and the qualification of 
bidders. They also provide information on the nature of tender documentation, bid 
evaluation, payment methods and contract award procedures. The emphasis in the 
guidelines is on the need for economy and efficiency in the procurement process, and 
promoting competition, transparency and encouraging local industry. ' 82 The guidelines 
require the use of ICB within certain parameters183 and thresholds as defined in the Loan 
Agreement between the Bank and the Borrower. ICB means that procurements are 
advertised internationally and are open to persons beyond the Borrower country. 
It was previously thought that in future, the Bank's procurement guidelines may have 
become less important to Bank-funded procurements as the Bank between 2008 and 2011 
conducted a pilot to examine the possibility of increasing its reliance on country 
procurement systems for Bank-funded contracts) Country procurement systems would 
have been required to meet a test of `equivalence' with the guidelines and the guidelines 
would still be used where a country system was not sufficiently developed to be used for 
'78 Bentchikou, "The World Bank Sanctions Process" in OECD (ed. ) Fighting Corruption and Promoting 
Integrity in Public Procurement (2005), 241. 
179 Para. 1.16 BPG. 
180 Williams, "World Bank introduces new measures to reduce fraud and corruption in Bank-financed 
projects and the administration of Bank loans" (2007) 16 (5) P. P. L. R. NA 152-157 [Williams, 2007c]. 
g' Para. 1.6 & 1.7 BPG. 
'82 Para. 1.2 BPG. 
183 Para. 1.2 BPG. 
184 Para. 3.20 BPG; World Bank, Detailed Methodology for Procurement Country Systems Piloting 
Program. Available at http //siteresources. worldbank. org/INTPROCUREMENT/Resources/CS- 
ConsultationsDocument. doc 
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Bank-funded projects. 185 However, the pilot was not very successful and very few Bank 
Borrowers were able to meet the stringent requirements of the Bank in the pilot. 
2.5.2 The World Bank's anti-corruption policy 
The Bank's concern with corruption as a developmental issue emerged with the 
assumption of James Wolfensohn to the Presidency of the Bank in 1995.186 Before then, 
the Bank was resolute in not taking measures against corruption, 187 especially beyond the 
projects it financed. However, it was always clear that growth and development were 
directly correlated with corruption, '88 and the Bank was criticised for its attitude towards 
corruption in Borrower countries. According to a former Bank Legal Counsel, "as the 
world's major development finance institution and the coordinator of foreign aid to many 
of its members, the Bank cannot realistically ignore issues which significantly influence 
the effective flow and appropriate use of external resources in its borrowing countries. "189 
The growing prominence of corruption in economic, political and developmental 
discourse190 as a development inhibitor led the Bank to eventually adopt a 
comprehensive, multi-pronged policy against corruption. 
18$ Palas & Wood "The World Bank's Use of Country Systems in Procurement: A good idea gone bad? " 
(2009) 27 D. P. R. 215. 
'86 Shihata, "Corruption: A General Review with and emphasis on the Role of the World Bank" (1997) 15 
D. J. I. L. 451,475; Wallace-Bruce, "Corruption and Competitiveness in Global Business: The dawn of a new 
era" (2000) 24 M. U. L. R. 349,362. 
187 Wolfensohn, "Corruption Impedes Development--and Hurts the Poor" (1998) 25(4) I. J. G. A. 1. 
188 Mauro, "The effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment and Government Expenditure: A cross 
Country analysis" in Elliott (ed. ), Corruption and the Global Economy (1997). 
189 Shihata, n. 186,476. 
190 Termed the `corruption eruption'. The term was first used by Mois6s Naim, "The Corruption Eruption" 
(1995) 2 B. J. W. A. 245; Pierros & Hudson, n. 137,79 ; Hess & Dunfee, "Fighting Corruption, A Principled 
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For the purpose of its anti-corruption policy, the Bank adopted a definition of corruption, 
which is now widely used in anti-corruption discourse. 19' The Bank defines corruption as 
the "abuse of public office for private gain". 192 This definition is broad enough to cover 
acts like bribery, theft of state assets, fraud, nepotism, the misallocation of government 
benefits and other forms of bureaucratic corruption. 193 
The Bank has since inception disbursed over $745 billion as development finance 194 and 
is thus "exposed to significant operational risk for fraud and corruption. "195 Within the 
Bank's Articles of Association, there is no express provision requiring the Bank to take 
measures against corruption in Bank-financed projects. For many years, this, and the 
provisions prohibiting the Bank from interfering in, or being influenced by the internal 
affairs of a Borrower country were cited for why the Bank did not take action against 
corruption in Borrower countries and within Bank projects. 196 The Articles however also 
provide that the Bank shall ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used only for the 
purposes for which the loan is granted. ' 97 When the Bank eventually decided to face the 
problem of corruption, this provision was interpreted as being broad enough to grant 
legitimacy to the Bank's anti-corruption efforts. 198 
Approach- the C2 principles" (2000) 33 C. I. L. J. 593; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Nichols, "Regulating 
Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and Fragmentation" (1999) 24 Y. J. I. L. 257; Williams & 
Beare, "The Business of Bribery: Globalisation, Economic Liberalisation and the Problem of Corruption" 
(1999) 32 C. L. & S. C. 115-146. 
19' Kaufman, "Corruption: The Facts" (1997) 107 F. P. 114-13 1; Johnston, "The search for definitions: the 
vitality of politics and the issue of corruption" (1996) 48 (3) I. S. S. J. 321-335; Warren, n. 145. 
" World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank (1997) [hereafter 
Helping Countries, 1997], 8. 
193 Ibid., 9-10. 
'94 Figures for both IDA and IBRD lending. See World Bank, Annual Report2010. 
193 Chanda, "The Effectiveness of the World Bank's Anti-Corruption Efforts: Current Legal and Structural 
Obstacles and Uncertainties" (2004) 32 D. J. I. L & P. 315,316. 
196 Helping Countries 1997; Thornburgh et al, Report to Shengman Zhang Managing Director and 
Chairman of the Oversight Committee on Fraud and Corruption, The World Bank Concerning Mechanisms 
to Address Problems of Fraud and Corruption, (2000), 8-9 [hereafter, Thornburgh Report]; Shihata, n. 186, 
474. 
197Art. llIS5. 
198 Chanda, n. 195,349. 
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The Bank's anti-corruption policy stems from a desire to ensure that Bank funds are 
utilised for the purposes for which they were granted, as required by the Articles of 
Agreement and also from the realisation that ineffective lending harms development and 
has severe consequences for citizens in Borrower countries. 199 In desiring the proper 
expenditure of Bank funds, the Bank was responding to widespread criticism against its 
complicit role in corruption in Borrower countries such as Russia, 200 Indonesia, 201 
Kenya202 and Bangladesh. 203 To ensure that Bank loans were not lost to corruption, the 
Bank took steps to ensure transparency in its procurement procedures and revised its 
procurement guidelines to make corruption a ground for excluding a tender, disqualifying 
a contractor or cancelling a loan to a Borrower country. Other measures introduced to 
curb corruption included capacity building assistance to Borrower countries204 and the 
suspension of further loans in countries where corruption is found to be endemic. 205 
An examination of Bank's policy against corruption in its projects reveals four main 
strategies. The first is to ensure that the procurement process contains preventive and 
punitive elements against corruption. The Bank's policy of disqualifying corrupt 
contractors assists in executing both these elements. Secondly, the Bank ensures that the 
pre-approval stage of loans and projects is rigorous and contains input from all interested 
parties. 206 Thirdly, measures are taken to ensure that institutionally, the Bank is 
199 Winters, "Criminal Debt" in Pincus & Winters (eds. ) Reinventing the World Bank (2002), 120; Mauro, 
n. 188; Gray & Kaufman, "Corruption & Development" (1998) F&D. 7. 
200 Stiglitz, Globalisation and its Discontents (2002), ch. 5. 
201 Levinson, "Living Dangerously: ' Indonesia and the reality of the global economic system" (1998) 7 
J. O. L. & P. 425; Winters, Power in Motion: Capital Mobility in the Indonesian State (1996). 
202 Kibwana and Wanjala, The Anatomy of Corruption in Kenya: Legal, Political, and Socio-economic 
Perspectives (1996). 
203 Tucker, "A Critical Analysis of the procurement procedures of the World Bank" in Arrowsmith and 
Davies (eds. ) Public Procurement: Global Revolution, (1998), 153-155. 
204 Rose-Ackerman, 1999,112; OECD DAC Network on Governance, Synthesis of Lessons Learned of 
Donor Practices infighting Corruption (2003). 
205 The Bank has in the past suspended loans on projects in Indonesia (September 1999), Kenya (January 
2006), Chad (January 2006), Uzbekistan (March 2006), Cambodia (June 2006). See 
www. brettonwoodsuroiect. ora 206 World Bank Operational Directive (OD) 14.70. See Schlemmer-Schulte, "The impact of civil society on 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World trade organisation: The case of the World 
Bank" (2001) 2 ILSA J. I. & C. L. 399. 
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corruption free. 207 Finally, the Bank has improved auditing and supervision requirements 
in its projects. 208 
A few comments may be made about the success of the Bank's anti-corruption measures. 
It was estimated by Bank staff that about 30% of Bank funds has been lost to corruption 
since the Bank began lending. 209 However, evidence suggests that many Bank-financed 
projects are still subject to corruption and that approximately 10-15% of contract value 
goes into bribery. 210 If these figures can be taken as an indication of the effect that Bank 
anti-corruption efforts have had, it may be assumed that Bank efforts have only had a 
limited impact in reducing corruption in its projects. 
The limited success of past Bank anti-corruption initiatives led to further strategies for 
tackling corruption 21 1 and the Bank introduced a system to minimise the risk of 
corruption in its projects through the use of anti-corruption teams who work to protect the 
projects from corruption, develop anti-corruption strategies and strengthen procurement 
systems. 212 These reforms were designed to provide a more holistic approach to 
corruption control, by the Bank taking a more integrated and proactive approach to the 
institutional reform of Borrower country procurement systems, as well as controlling the 
risks of corruption in Bank-funded projects, by targeting the demand and supply side of 
corruption in these projects. 
2.5.3 Disqualification in the World Bank 
The Bank uses two kinds of disqualification measures against corrupt suppliers. These 
are termed `rejection' and `debarment'. Rejection is the exclusion of a contractor's bid 
207 World Bank Staff Rules, Rule 3.01. 
208 World Bank Operational Policy Statement 10.02. 
209 Winters, n. 199,102 & 111. 
210 Hobbs, "Corruption in World Bank financed projects: Why Bribery is a Tolerated Anathema" (DESTIN 
Working Papers, 2005), 24-29. Available at www. lse. ac. uk. [Hobbs]. 
211 World Bank, Strengthening Bank Group Engagement on Governance and Anti-Corruption (2006). 
Available at www. worldbank. org 212 Ibid. 
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from a particular procurement process, while debarment is the disqualification of a 
contractor from Bank contracts for a specified period of time. For the purposes of this 
thesis, the term `disqualification' will refer to both measures since the only differences 
between them are the long-term consequences and procedural differences. 
The Bank's procurement guidelines provide in paragraph 1.16 that: 
"It is the Bank's policy to require that Borrower's (including beneficiaries of Bank 
loans), bidders, suppliers, contractors and their agents (whether declared or not), sub- 
contractors, sub-consultants, service providers or suppliers and any personnel thereof 
observe the highest standards of ethics during the procurement and execution of Bank- 
financed contracts. In pursuance of this policy, the Bank: 
(a) defines for the purposes of this provision, the terms set forth below as follows: (i) "corrupt practice" is the offering, giving, receiving or soliciting, directly or indirectly, 
of anything of value to influence improperly the actions of another party. (ii) "fraudulent practice" is any act or omission, including a misrepresentation, that 
knowingly or recklessly misleads, or attempts to mislead, a party to obtain a financial or 
other benefit or to avoid an obligation. 
(iii) "collusive practice" is an arrangement between two or more parties designed to 
achieve an improper purpose, including to influence improperly the actions of another 
party. 
(iv) "coercive practice" is impairing or harming, or threatening to impair or harm, 
directly or indirectly, any party or the property of the party to influence improperly the 
actions of a party. (v) an "obstructive practice" is 
(aa) deliberately destroying, falsifying, altering or concealing of evidence material to the 
investigation or making false statements to investigators in order to materially impede a 
Bank investigation into allegations of a corrupt, fraudulent, coercive or collusive practice; 
and/or threatening, harassing or intimidating any party to prevent it from disclosing its 
knowledge of matters relevant to the investigation or from pursuing the investigation, or (bb) acts intended to materially impede the exercise of the Bank's contractual rights of 
audit or access to information... 
(b) will reject a proposal for award if it determines that the bidder recommended for 
award or any of its personnel or agents or its sub-consultants or sub-contractors, service 
providers, suppliers and/or their employees has, directly or indirectly, engaged in corrupt, 
fraudulent, collusive, coercive or obstructive practices in competing for the contract in 
question;... 
(d) will sanction a firm or individual, at any time in accordance with the Banks prevailing 
sanctions procedures including by publicly declaring such firm or individual ineligible, 
either indefinitely or for a stated period of time: (i) to be awarded a Bank-financed 
81 
contract and (ii) to be nominated a sub-contractor, consultant, supplier or service provider 
of an otherwise eligible firm being awarded a Bank-financed contract... " 
The Bank's disqualification policy is directed at persons who commit breaches of the 
Bank's anti-corruption provisions in Bank-funded projects, irrespective of whether the 
offences were committed in the procurement context. Disqualifying contractors for non- 
procurement related offences is also the approach of the EU, the UK and the US. 
The rationale behind the Bank's disqualification policy is three-fold. The first rationale is 
protective, similar to what obtains in the US and the EU. Thus, disqualification is 
intended to protect the Bank's funds in accordance with the prescripts of its Articles of 
Agreement by ensuring that its funds are not lost to fraud and corruption. 213 Secondly, 
disqualification has a policy rationale as it is intended to support the Bank's anti- 
corruption policy by indicating its willingness to sanction corruption. 214 Thirdly, 
disqualification is intended to have a deterrent rationale, 215 because as discussed in the 
context of the US above, disqualification from Bank contracts increases the economic 
costs of corruption, because the disqualified supplier loses the potential to compete for 
future Bank-financed contracts, and also because where the disqualification is published, 
as is current Bank practice, this can damage the reputation of the firm, affecting its ability 
to obtain business from other sectors. 
The Bank's disqualification policy is tied to the eligibility and not the capability of the 
supplier as Bank contracts cannot be awarded to a supplier that has been disqualified, 
irrespective of the supplier's capabilities216 
213 Thornburgh et al., Report Concerning the Debarment Processes of the World Bank, (2002), 33,61 
[Report Concerning Debarment Process]. 
214 Report Concerning Debarment Process, 61; Art-1, S 1.01 World Bank Sanctions Procedures 2014 
[WBSP]. 
215 World Bank Sanctioning Guidelines. Available at 
http"//siteresources worldbank org[EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/WorldBankSanctioningGuidelines pdf 
216 Para. 1.10 BPG. 
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2.6 South Africa 
2.6.1 Public procurement regulation in South Africa 
Similar to the position in the US, South Africa also adopts a highly regulated and formal 
approach to public procurement, which utilises Constitutional provisions as well as 
binding legislation and regulations to achieve procurement objectives. Similar to the UK, 
procurement regulation occurs at the federal level and the provincial/local level. 217 
The regulation of procurement in South Africa has an interesting socio-political history. 
During the apartheid regime, public procurement was used to protect the interests of the 
minority of large white-owned enterprises218 and discriminated against small, medium 
and black-owned businesses. In particular, "tender procedures were complicated and 
favoured large firms to the detriment of small emerging firms. "219 At the federal level, 
procurement was regulated by the State Tender Board Act 1968220 and the regulations 
made there under, which required all federal procurement to be conducted through the 
State Tender Board. The centralisation of procurement was important in protecting the 
interests of white-owned businesses. This provision has now been repealed to require 
procurement to be conducted through the accounting officers of government 
departments. 221 
At the demise of apartheid, it was determined that public procurement would be utilised 
to democratise the economy and provide employment and business opportunities for 
marginalized and disadvantaged individuals and communities, commonly referred to as 
217 Bolton, The Law of Government Procurement in South Africa (2007), ch. 3 [Bolton, 2007]. 
218 Rogerson, "Pro-Poor Local Economic Development in South Africa: The Application of Public 
Procurement" (2004) 15 (2) U. F. 180,181. 
219 World Bank, "Public and private sector procurement programmes and their contribution to emerging 
enterprises in South Africa" (Report prepared for the Workshop on Small, Medium and Micro Enterprise 
Development and Financing, 3 Nov. 1994); Sharp et al, Assessment of Public Sector Procurement to Small, 
Medium and Micro-Enterprises (1999). 
220 Act 86 of 1968. 221 Amended State Tender Board Regulations, (GG 7836,5 December 2003). 
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`target groups'. 222 Significant reform was required for this and the government initially 
implemented interim measures within the existing legislative framework, 223 and issued a 
Green Paper224 setting out the required legislative and policy changes. 
The major proposals of the Green Paper on using public procurement to democratise the 
economy and create access to opportunities to persons previously disadvantaged by the 
system have been implemented through legislation. However there is conflicting 
evidence on whether the procurement system has been successful in meeting the Green 
Paper's objectives especially in relation to granting access to the target groups, de- 
racialising patterns of business ownership and stimulating economic growth by creating 
employment opportunities. 225 
The importance of procurement to the democratic government in South Africa can be 
seen in the fact that the basic principles on which the procurement system was to be 
based were given constitutional status. Thus, S 217 (1) of the Constitution provides that: 
"When an organ of state in the national, provincial or local sphere of government, or any 
other institution identified in national legislation, contracts for goods or services, it must 
do so in accordance with a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and 
cost-effective. " 
The requirement for a system that is `fair and equitable' can be interpreted, in the context 
of South Africa's political history 226 as requiring the adoption of a system without 
222 Manchidi & Harmond, "Targeted Procurement in the Republic of South Africa: An Independent 
Assessment" (Report for the Dept. of Public Works, the Development Bank of Southern Africa and the 
International Labour Organisation, 2002). Available at www. ilo. org 
223 Public Sector Procurement Reform in South Africa: Interim Strategies- A 10 point plan (29 November, 
1995). 
224 Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform (GG 17928,14 April, 1997). [Green Paper]. 
225 Some of the problems that have arisen within the procurement system are `fronting' or the use of 
fictitious black persons so that a white-owned company qualifies for targeted procurement; the rise of `fly 
by night' tenderer's who submit unsustainable bids; and the lack of access to credit for emerging 
contractors. See Nqcobo, "Fronting only moves the process backwards" The Cape Times, (15.10.03); 
Rogerson, "The Impact of the South African Governments SMME programmes- A ten year review 1994- 
2004" (2004) 21 (5) D. S. A. 765. 
226 Currie and de Waal, The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005), 156. 
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discrimination and unjustifiable preferences. 227 The Constitution also requires the 
procurement system to be `transparent'. Transparency has been interpreted as requiring 
publicised contracts; disclosure of the rules governing procurement in general and 
governing specific procurements; rule-based decision making and opportunities for 
verification and enforcement 
. 
228 It has been suggested that constitutional provisions on 
transparency are a response to the culture of secrecy in the apartheid regime, which was 
used to restrict the access of black South Africans to economic opportunities. 29 
The principles of competition and cost-effectiveness in the Constitution complement each 
other. Competition suggests that a sufficient number of suppliers should be invited to 
tender for available contracts, ensuring the government does not pay uncompetitive 
prices. Competition supports anti-corruption efforts, in that if qualified suppliers have 
access to available contracts, this will limit the scope for corruption-induced awards and 
remove the restrictions to participation created against non-corrupt suppliers. Cost- 
effectiveness can be interpreted as the obligation to obtain value for money. 230 It means 
that procuring entities should at all times seek to obtain the best bargain and the most 
advantageous contractual terms, 231 and procurement procedures should be transactionally 
efficient. 232 
S 217 (2) of the South African Constitution provides that government bodies may use 
preferential procurement policies to protect or advance disadvantaged groups, giving 
227 Bolton, 2007, ch. 3; Government of the Republic of South Africa: General Procurement Guidelines. 
Available at www. treasurv. aov. za 
228 Arrowsmith, 2005 ch. 7.12; Arrowsmith, "Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Transparency in 
Government Procurement" (1998) 47 (4) I. C. L. Q. 793,796; Evenett & Hoekman, "Transparency in 
Procurement Regimes: What Can we expect from International Trade Agreements" in Arrowsmith & 
Trybus (eds. ), Public Procurement: The Continuing Revolution (2002). 
229 Watermeyer, "Transparency within the South African public procurement system" in Hoekman (ed. ) 
Unpacking Transparency in Government Procurement (2004), 173. 
230 Schooner, 2002,105. 
231 Beviglia-Zampetti, "The UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction, Services" in 
Hoekman & Mavrodis (eds. ) Law and Policy in Public Purchasing: The WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement (1997), ch. 15. 
232 Arrowsmith, Linarelli & Wallace, 31-32. 
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constitutional legitimacy to using the procurement system to empower the groups 
disadvantaged under apartheid. 233 
Apart from constitutional provisions, there are several statutes concerned with 
procurement regulation. First, the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) and the 
Regulations thereto aim to regulate public financial management, ensure that government 
revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities are properly managed and secure transparency 
and accountability in government departments. 234 The PFMA is important to the 
functioning of public procuring entities as it lays the ground-rules for public financial 
transactions and obliges public bodies to maintain appropriate procurement systems. 235 
The regulations to the PFMA provide detailed instructions on the implementation of the 
PFMA, by providing for competitive procurement methods and advertising 
requirements. 236 
Second, the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 2000 (PPPFA) and the 
Regulations237 thereto provide the framework within which government departments may 
implement a preferential procurement policy238 and provides that in adopting such a 
policy, agencies must use a points system to determine whether bids meet contract 
criteria. 239 
Finally, the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 2003 (BBBEEA)240 
provides the general legislative framework for the economic empowerment of black 
233 Bolton, "The use of government procurement as an instrument of policy" (2004) 121 (3) S. A. L. J. 619; 
Bolton, "Government Procurement as a Policy tool in South Africa" (2006) 6 (3) J. O. P. P. 193; Bolton, "An 
analysis of the preferential procurement legislation in South Africa" (2007) 3 P. P. L. R. 36. 
234 S2 Public Finance Management Act I of 1999 (GG 19814,2 March 1999) [hereafter PFMA]; PFMA 
Regulations (GG 22219,9 April, 2001, as amended by GG 23463,25 May, 2002); [hereafter PFMA 
regulations]. 
235S38(1). 
236 Reg. 16. A6.3. 
237 The Preferential procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 (GG 20854,3 February 2000) [hereafter 
PPPFA]; PPPFA Regulations (GG 22549,10 August 2001) [hereafter PPPFA regulations]. The regulations 
are being redrafted. See Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 2000: Draft Preferential 
Procurement Regulations 2009 (GG 32489,14 August 2009). 
238 See articles cited at n. 218, n. 219 & n. 222. 
239 S2 PPPFA. 
240 Act 53 of 2003 (GG 25899,9 January 2004) [BBBEEA]. 
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South Africans 241 In public procurement, the Act provides the basis for the preferential 
treatment of black South Africans. The Act is implemented through Codes of Good 
Practice on Black Economic Empowerment, which describe how public bodies may 
effect black economic empowerment in their activities. Where a code has been issued, 
every organ of state and public entity must take it into account in developing and 
implementing a preferential procurement policy. 242 
2.6.2 South Africa's anti-corruption policy 
South Africa's anti-corruption policy is part of a broader policy against crime 243 Unlike 
the UK and the US, South African anti-corruption policy is mainly concerned with 
domestic corruption, and not with corruption in other countries or in international 
business. In South Africa, it is considered that public sector corruption and economic 
crimes contribute to organised crime and promote "a sense of lawlessness"244 in society. 
Thus the policy is aimed at eradicating corruption in the public and private spheres and 
particularly within public procurement. 
Within the broader anti-crime strategy, measures against corruption include the 
establishment of codes of conduct for businesses and government in relation to white- 
collar crime and corruption245 and the implementation of legislation to restrict money 
laundering. 246 The anti-corruption policy adopts a multi-pronged approach to the 
eradication of corruption, with corruption control viewed as the joint responsibility of the 
government and civil society. 247 
241 St. 
242 S10 (b) BBBEEA. 
243 National Crime Prevention Strategy (Department of Safety and Security, 22 May 1996). 
244 Pillar 2.4, National Crime Prevention Strategy. 
245 Code of Conduct for the Public Service (GG 5947,10 June, 1997), Code of Conduct for all parties 
engaged in Construction procurement (GG 25656,31 October, 2003). 
246 Pillar 2.4 National Crime Prevention Strategy. 
247 Ch. 8 National Crime Prevention Strategy and South African Civil Society Workshop- Civil Society 
Taking Corruption Seriously (21 March, 2005, Pretoria). 
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A number of initiatives have been adopted to implement the anti-corruption policy. In 
respect of public sector corruption, the government issued the Public Service Anti- 
Corruption Strategy. 248 The Strategy is the primary policy document on public sector 
corruption and provides a coherent and integrated approach to combating public sector 
corruption, through prevention, investigation, prosecution and public participation 
initiatives. 
Pursuant to the Strategy, the government consolidated the legislative framework on 
corruption through the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act. 249 In 
accordance with the Strategy, the Act disqualifies corrupt firms from obtaining 
government contracts and in line with the Strategy, the PFMA requires the maintenance 
of a procurement system that includes sufficient controls to eliminate the risk of 
corruption. 
Whilst the anti-corruption policy is for the greater part concerned with the elimination of 
public corruption, it is also concerned with fighting private sector corruption, although 
the eradication of private sector corruption has not received the same attention as public 
sector corruption. 50 
2.6.3 Disqualification in South Africa 
Disqualification in South Africa is in part a legislative response to the Anti-Corruption 
Strategy discussed above. Like the EU and UK, South Africa utilises both mandatory and 
discretionary measures against corrupt suppliers. The provisions on disqualification are 
found in three legislative instruments. The Corruption Act and the PPPFA regulations 
provide for discretionary disqualifications and the PFMA regulations provide for both 
discretionary and mandatory disqualifications. 
248 Available at www. dpsa. gov. za 
249 Act 12 of 2004 (Government Gazette 26311,28 April 2004), [Corruption Act]; Sibanda, "The South 
African Corruption Law and bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions: A 
comparative analysis" (2005) 1 S. A. C. J. 1. 250 South African Civil Society Workshop, n. 247. 
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As has already been mentioned, South Africa differs from the EU, the UK and the US in 
that disqualification is triggered by the commission of procurement related offences 
whilst in the other jurisdictions, disqualification may be imposed for general as well as 
procurement related corruption offences. 
In South Africa, there is a lack of clarity on the rationales for disqualification. As stated 
in ch. 1.5, disqualification may be regarded as punitive if it is tied to the objectives of 
deterrence or retribution, and is imposed as a result of the contractors past conduct. 5' 
Whilst there has been no clear statement as to the purpose of disqualifications it is 
suggested that the South African disqualifications are intended to be punitive. 252 Three 
reasons tend towards this conclusion. First, under the Corruption Act, disqualification is 
imposed at the same time as criminal sanctions, which are punitive in nature. Second, 
none of the disqualification provisions under the Corruption Act, the PFMA regulations 
and the PPPFA regulations permit the possibility of derogating from the disqualification 
once it is imposed. Third, disqualifications are not tied to the capability of the supplier 
and do not depend on the supplier's ability to perform the contract. 
The relevant provisions on disqualification are found in section 12,13 & 28 of the 
Corruption Act, Regulation 16 of the PFMA Regulations and Regulation 15 of the 
PPPFA regulations. 
Section 12 of the Corruption Act provides: 
"(1) Any person who, directly or indirectly- 
(a) accepts or agrees or offers to accept any gratification from any other person, whether 
for the benefit of himself or herself or for the benefit of that other person or of another 
person; or 
(b) gives or agrees or offers to give to any other person any gratification, whether for the 
benefit of that other person or for the benefit of another person, 
(i) in order to improperly influence, in any way- 
251 Tomko & Weinberg, 363-365. 
252 Williams, "The use of exclusions for corruption in developing country procurement: The case of 
South Africa" (2007) 51 (1) J. A. L. I, 12 [Williams, 2007b]. 
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(aa) the promotion, execution or procurement of any contract with a public body, private 
organisation, corporate body or any other organisation or institution; or (bb) the fixing of the price, consideration or other moneys stipulated or otherwise 
provided for in any such contract; or (ii) as a reward for acting as contemplated in paragraph (a), is guilty of the offence of 
corrupt activities relating to contracts. " 
Section 13 of the Corruption Act provides: 
"(1) Any person who, directly or indirectly, accepts or agrees or offers to accept any 
gratification from any other person, whether for the benefit of himself or herself or for the 
benefit of another person, as- 
(a) an inducement to, personally or by influencing any other person so to act- (i) award a tender, in relation to a contract for performing any work, providing any 
service, supplying any article, material or substance or performing any other act, to a 
particular person; or 
(ii) upon an invitation to tender for such contract, make a tender for that contract which 
has as its aim to cause the tenderee to accept a particular tender; or (iii) withdraw a tender made by him or her for such contract; or (b) a reward for acting as contemplated in paragraph (a)(i) (ii) or (iii), is guilty of the 
offence of corrupt activities relating to procuring and withdrawal of tenders. (2) Any person who, directly or indirectly- 
(a) gives or agrees or offers to give any gratification to any other person, whether for the benefit of that other person or the benefit of another person, as- (i) an inducement to, personally or by influencing any other person so to act, award a 
tender, in relation to a contract for performing any work, providing any service, 
supplying any article, material or substance or performing any other act, to a particular 
person; or 
(ii) a reward for acting as contemplated in subparagraph (i); or (b) with the intent to obtain a tender in relation to a contract for performing any work, 
providing any service, supplying any article, material or substance or performing any 
other act, gives or agrees or offers to give any gratification to any person who has made a 
tender in relation to that contract, whether for the benefit of that tenderer or for the 
benefit of any other person, as- 
(i) an inducement to withdraw the tender; or 
(ii) a reward for withdrawing or having withdrawn the tender, is guilty of the offence of 
corrupt activities relating to procuring and withdrawal of tenders. " 
Section 28 of the Corruption Act provides: 
"(1) (a) A court convicting a person of an offence contemplated in section 12 or 13, may, 
in addition to imposing any sentence contemplated in section 26, issue an order that- 
(i) the particulars of the convicted person; (ii) the conviction and sentence; and 
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(iii) any other order of the court consequent hereupon, be endorsed on the Register. 
(b) If the person so convicted is an enterprise, the court may also issue an order that- 
(i) the particulars of that enterprise; (ii) the particulars of any partner, manager, director or other person, who wholly or partly 
exercises or may exercise control over that enterprise and who was involved in the 
offence concerned or who knows or ought reasonably to have known or suspected that 
the enterprise committed the offence concerned; and (iii) the conviction, sentence and any other order of the court consequent thereupon, be 
endorsed on the Register. 
(c) The court may also issue an order contemplated in paragraph (a) in respect of- 
(i) any other enterprise owned or controlled by the person so convicted; or 
(ii) the particulars of any partner, manager, director or other person, who wholly or partly 
exercises or may exercise control over such other enterprise, and which- 
(aa) enterprise, partner, manager, director or other person was involved in the 
offence concerned; or (bb) partner, manager, director or other person knew or ought reasonably to have known 
or suspected that such other enterprise was involved in the offence concerned. 
(d) Whenever the Register is endorsed as contemplated in paragraph (a), (b) or (c), the 
endorsement applies, unless the court directs otherwise, to every enterprise to be 
established in the future, and which enterprise will be wholly or partly controlled or 
owned by the person or enterprise so convicted or endorsed, and the Registrar must, in 
respect of every such enterprise, endorse the Register accordingly. 
(2) Where a court has issued an order under subsection (1), the registrar or clerk of such 
court must forthwith forward the court order to the Registrar and the Registrar must 
forthwith endorse the Register accordingly. 
(3) (a) Where the Register has been endorsed in terms of subsection (2), in addition to 
any other legal action, the following restrictions may or must, as the case may be, be 
imposed; 
(i) The National Treasury may terminate any agreement with the person or enterprise 
referred to in subsection (1)(a) or (b): Provided that- 
(aa) in considering the termination of an agreement, the National Treasury must take into 
account, among others, the following factors, namely- 
(aaa) the extent and duration of the agreement concerned; 
(bbb) whether it is likely to conclude a similar agreement with another person or 
enterprise within a specific time frame; (ccc) the extent to which the agreement has been executed; 
(ddd) the urgency of the services to be delivered or supplied in terms of the agreement; 
(eee) whether extreme costs will follow such termination; and 
(ffJ) any other factor which, in the opinion of the National Treasury, may impact on the 
termination of the agreement; and 
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(bb) if that agreement involves any purchasing authority or Government Department, 
such restriction may only be imposed after consultation with the purchasing authority or 
Government Department concerned; 
(ii) the National Treasury must determine the period (which period may not be less than 
five years or more than 10 years) for which the particulars of the convicted person or the 
enterprise referred to in subsection (1)(a), (b), (c) or (d) must remain in the Register and 
during such period no offer in respect of any agreement from a person or enterprise 
referred to in that subsection may be considered by the National Treasury; or 
(iii) during the period determined in subparagraph (ii), the National Treasury, the 
purchasing authority or any Government Department must- 
(aa) ignore any offer tendered by a person or enterprise referred to in subsection (1)(a), 
(b), (c) or (d); or 
(bb) disqualify any person or enterprise referred to subsection (1)(a), (b), (c)or (d), from 
making any offer or obtaining any agreement relating to the procurement of a specific 
supply or service. 
(b) A restriction imposed under paragraph (a) only comes into effect after any appeal 
against the conviction or sentence or both has been finalised by the court: Provided that if 
the appeal court sets aside, varies or amends the order referred to in subsection (1), the 
National Treasury must, if necessary, amend the restrictions imposed under paragraph (a) 
accordingly. 
(c) Where the National Treasury has terminated an agreement in terms of paragraph (a)(i), it may, in addition to any other legal remedy, recover from the person or enterprise 
any damages- 
(i) incurred or sustained by the State as a result of the tender process or the conclusion of 
the agreement; or 
(ii) which the State may suffer by having to make less favourable arrangements 
thereafter. 
(4) The National Treasury- 
(a) may at any time vary or rescind any restriction imposed under subsection (3)(a (i) or 
(ii); and 
(b) must, when the period determined in terms of subsection (3)(a) (ii) expires, remove 
the particulars of the person or enterprise concerned, from the Register. 
(5) When the National Treasury imposes a restriction under subsection (3)(a)(i) or (ii), or 
amends or rescinds such a restriction, it must within 14 days in writing notify- 
(a) the person whose particulars have been so endorsed; 
(b) any purchasing authority on which it may decide; and 
(c) all Government departments, of any resolution or decision relative to such restriction 
or the amendment or rescinding thereof, and request such authorities and departments to 
take similar steps. 
(6) (a) Any person whose particulars, conviction and sentence have been endorsed on the 
Register as contemplated in this section and who has been notified as contemplated in 
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subsection (5)(a), must in any subsequent agreement or tender process involving the 
State, disclose such endorsement, conviction and sentence. (b) Any person who fails to comply with paragraph (a), is guilty of an offence. " 
Reg 16A9.1 of the PFMA regulations provides: 
"The accounting officer or accounting authority must 
- (e) reject a proposal for the award of a contract if the recommended bidder has committed 
a corrupt or fraudulent act in competing for the particular contract. " 
Reg 16A9.2 (a) provides 
"The accounting officer or accounting authority 
- (a) may disregard the bid of any bidder if that bidder, or any of its directors 
- (i) have abused the institution's supply chain management system 
(ii) have committed fraud or any other improper conduct in relation to such system; or (iii) have failed to perform on any previous contract... " 
Reg 15 of the PPPFA regulations provides: 
"(1)An organ of state must, upon detecting that a preference in terms of the Act and these 
regulations has been obtained on a fraudulent basis, or any specified goals are not 
attained in the performance of the contract, act against the person awarded the contract. 
(2)An organ of state may, in addition to any other remedy it may have against the person 
contemplated in sub-regulations (1)... 
(d) restrict the contractor, its shareholders and directors from obtaining business from 
any organ of state for a period not exceeding 10 years. " 
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CHAPTER THREE 
OFFENCES AND CONVICTIONS FOR DISQUALIFICATION 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will examine the offences, which may lead to disqualification in the 
jurisdictions and whether criminal convictions for corruption are required for 
disqualification. Where disqualification is made on the basis of a conviction, the 
disqualification may be imposed by the court as a part of any sentences imposed 
following the conviction- as occurs in South Africa, but more commonly, the decision is 
made by the procuring authority on the receipt of evidence of the conviction as is the case 
in the US, the EU and the UK. 
Also discussed in this chapter is whether a supplier will be disqualified where he has 
received a foreign conviction for corruption. This issue will become more important as 
countries open up their procurement markets to suppliers from other countries through 
agreements like the WTO Government Procurement Agreement. ' 
3.2 The European Union 
3.2.1 Offences for disqualification. 
As discussed in ch. 2, the EU adopts discretionary and mandatory disqualifications against 
suppliers guilty of certain offences. In relation to the discretionary measures, a supplier 
Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 20. 
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may be disqualified where he has been convicted of "any offence concerning his 
professional conduct" or where he is "guilty of grave professional misconduct. " Offences 
for professional misconduct cover a broad category of offences, which "relate to the 
manner in which the provider carries out his profession or business. "Z Although 
corruption is not specifically mentioned here, professional misconduct offences will 
include breaches of anti-corruption and other norms or legislation, where these breaches 
occurred in the context of the business or profession. As was discussed in ch. 2, these can 
relate to past offences or offences committed within an ongoing procurement process. 
Also a supplier involved in breaches of environmental legislation; 3 non-compliance with 
legislative provisions on the equal treatment of workers; 4 tax evasion; insider trading or 
who acts in an anti-competitive manner5 may be guilty of professional misconduct and 
liable to disqualification on those grounds. Professional misconduct would also include 
breaches of professional codes of conduct, where these exist. Whilst there cannot be an 
exhaustive definition of professional misconduct, as this would depend on the type and 
nature of the profession concerned, it has been suggested that the discretionary 
disqualifications offer the possibility to disqualify suppliers for corruption offences. 
In relation to the mandatory disqualifications, the corruption offence requiring 
disqualification is specified in Art. 45 of the PSD as: 
(b) corruption, as defined in Article 3 of the Council Act of 26 May 1997... and Article 3 
of Council Joint Action 98/742/JHA... respectively... 
The definitions of corruption incorporated into Art. 45 are: 
(i) Article 3 of Council Act of 26 May 1997 
-the Convention on the fight against 
corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member states 
of the EU7 defines active corruption as "... the deliberate action of whosoever promises or 
gives, directly or through an intermediary, an advantage of any kind whatsoever to an 
2 Piselli, 272. 
3 Preamble 43 PSD. 
Ibid. 
5 Piselli, 272. 
6 Piselli, 274. 
[ 1997] O. J. C 195/1. 
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official for himself or for a third party for him to act or refrain from acting in accordance 
with his duty or in the exercise of his functions in breach of his official duties... " 
(ii) Article 3 (1) of Council Joint Action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article 
K. 3 of the Treaty on European Union on corruption in the private sector8 provides "the 
deliberate action of whosoever promises, offers or gives, directly or through an 
intermediary, an undue advantage of any kind whatsoever to a person, for himself or for a 
third party, in the course of the business activities of that person in order that the person 
should perform or refrain from performing an act, in breach of his duties, shall constitute 
active corruption in the private sector". 
These corruption offences cover both private and public sector corruption. However, for 
all the jurisdictions, this thesis will focus on public sector corruption, as defined in ch. 1.2. 
The definition of public sector corruption in the Convention against corruption involving 
officials of the EU or officials of Member States appears to be limited to corruption that 
involves public officials from the EU and Member States. This is because `official' is 
defined in Art. 1 of that Convention as "any Community or national official, including 
any national official of another Member State". This may mean that the mandatory 
disqualification provisions may be very narrow in their application as the provisions may 
be interpreted as meaning that where a supplier has been convicted of corruption 
involving officials of non-EU countries, such a supplier ought not to be disqualified 
under the procurement directives. However, it should be noted that the definition of 
corruption adopted by Member States may go beyond what is specified in the EU 
directives to include corruption involving officials outside the EU. Thus, as will be seen 
below in the context of the UK, the offence of corruption for which a supplier may be 
disqualified under the UK procurement regulations includes corruption involving foreign 
(i. e. non-EU) officials. 
8 [1998] O. J. L358/2. 
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3.2.2 Disqualifying on the basis of convictions 
In the EU, a discretionary disqualification from public contracts may be imposed under 
Art. 45 (2) (c) PSD where the supplier has been convicted by a "judgment which has the 
force of res judicata". Res judicata is not defined by the directives and the issue is further 
complicated by the fact that the provisions on the mandatory disqualifications for 
corruption provide that disqualification is required where the supplier "has been the 
subject of a conviction by final judgment"9 for a relevant offence. 
It is not clear what is meant by `final judgment' and it may be the case that Member 
States have the flexibility to determine what amounts to a `final judgment' for the 
purposes of the disqualification provisions. However, this may lead to differences in the 
treatment of convicted suppliers in the Member States, dependent on whether the 
conviction is considered under national law to have been ordered in a final judgment. 10 
The recitals to the public sector directives indicate that a final judgment is one that has 
the force of res judicata. " This does not however provide any more clarity on the 
meaning of `final judgment' as there are differences in the meaning of `res judicata' in 
Member States. For instance, in the UK, a `res judicata' is a decision pronounced by a 
court or tribunal with jurisdiction over the parties, which disposes of the issues litigated, 
so that those issues may no longer be re-litigated between the same parties, even though 
the judgment may still be subject to an appeal. 12 However, some Member States interpret 
a `final judgment' as one that can no longer be subject to an appeal. 13 
9 Art. 45 (1) PSD. 
10 Presidency Working Document, (Working Party on Public Procurement) Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works 
contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts. DG C II, Brussels 18 October 2001, SN 
3663/01 (MAP). Reproduced in Hebly (ed) European Public Procurement: Legislative History of the 
'Classic' directive (2007), 1130. [Hebly, 2007]. 
"Recital 43. 
12 Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol 16, para. 974. 
13 Piselli, 271. 
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The preparatory documents to the directives initially provided for disqualification where 
there was a conviction by way of `definitive judgment' for the relevant offences. '4 
However, this was changed in subsequent revisions to the proposals. A definitive 
judgment may be understood as one excluding interlocutory or interim orders. However, 
the proposals to the procurement directives and the other preparatory documents are not 
clear as to what substantive changes, if any, were intended to be reflected by the change 
in the nomenclature from `definitive judgment' to `final judgment'. 
There are two benefits which arise from requiring convictions for disqualification. First, 
the conviction provides the disqualified firm with a measure of procedural safeguards, 
since the firm's guilt would have been established beyond a reasonable doubt at the 
criminal trial. Secondly, the requirement for a conviction reduces (but does not 
eliminate) 15 the investigative burden on a procuring authority, since the convicting court 
would have dealt with all matters of evidence and proof. However, the requirement for a 
conviction may limit the effectiveness of disqualification in the Member States. This is 
because convictions for corruption are notably rare especially the conviction of legal 
persons16 and where disqualifications are dependent on such convictions, there may be 
few disqualifications from public contracts for corruption. 
In relation to the discretionary disqualifications for grave professional misconduct under 
Art. 45 (2) (d) PSD, a conviction is not required and a supplier may be disqualified once 
the procuring authority can prove the misconduct by any means, which the procuring 
authority "can demonstrate. " 
Presumably, the procuring authority will be able to prove and demonstrate the 
misconduct where a professional body has determined that the misconduct occurred. 
Whether evidence short of this, such as a charge laid by a public prosecutor or media 
reports may be used to prove professional misconduct remains to be seen. The EU may 
14 Art. 46, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Co-ordination of 
procedures for the award of public supply contracts, public service contracts and public works contracts. [20011 O. J. C/029E. 
15 See ch. 5 below. 
16 Nicholls, Daniel, Polaine & Hatchard, Corruption and Misuse of Public ice 1s` ed. (2006), 40-43. This 
issue is discussed further in ch. 6. 
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adopt a position similar to the US, where temporary disqualifications may be imposed 
where a supplier has committed a relevant offence, and this is evidenced by the 
commencement of investigations or litigation against the supplier, but he has not received 
a conviction or a civil judgment, because investigations into the alleged offence or 
litigation are still pending. 
3.2.3. The status of foreign convictions 
The EU directives are silent as to whether disqualification is required under the 
mandatory provisions where a conviction has been obtained from outside the EU. Foreign 
convictions may be relevant in two circumstances. First, an EU supplier may have 
obtained a conviction in a non-EU Member State. For instance, a multinational German 
firm- Lahmeyer International GmbH was convicted of bribery in Lesotho in 2003.17 
Another EU firm- ABB Vetco Gray (UK) Ltd was convicted in 2004 of offering bribes to 
Nigerian public officials in a Houston court. 18 The issue is whether such firms convicted 
of corruption outside the EU are eligible to tender for a contract governed by the EU 
procurement directives. 
As was discussed in ch. 3.2.1, the definition of public sector corruption imported into the 
EU directives relates to corruption involving EU officials, or officials of Member States 
and this may mean that suppliers may not be disqualified on the basis of corruption 
convictions obtained outside the EU. 
If this is the right interpretation of the EU provisions, limiting disqualification to 
convictions obtained in the EU, may not aid the EU in fully meeting the objectives of the 
disqualification regime as discussed in ch. 2, since corrupt EU suppliers who have been 
" McCormick & Paterson, "The threat posed by transnational political corruption to global commercial and 
development banking" (2006) J. F. C. 183,185-186; Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 
(2005), ch. 2; Williams, 2007c. 18 United States v. ABB Vetco Gray, Inc. and ABB Vetco Gray UK, Ltd. (Case No. 04-CR-279-01) (S. D. Tex. July 2004). See ABB Vetco Gray and ABB Vetco Gray (UK) plead guilty to foreign bribery charges. 
Available at hftv: //www. usdoi. tzov/ona/ r/2004/July/04 crm 465. htm 
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convicted of corruption involving non-EU officials may not face disqualification. 
Although the corruption offences imported into the EU directives may give rise to this 
conclusion, as will be seen in the context of the UK below, whether a supplier is 
disqualified for foreign corruption will ultimately depend on the definitions of corruption 
in a Member State's procurement legislation. 
Secondly, foreign convictions may be relevant where a third country supplier that has 
access to EU contracts has received a conviction in its own country. 19 In such cases the 
EU procurement directives are unclear as to whether such a conviction will lead to the 
disqualification of the third country supplier from EU contracts, given the narrow 
definition of corruption in the EU directives discussed above. It is submitted, however, 
that where a third country supplier is granted access to EU procurement, through the 
WTO GPA for instance, then in relation to such suppliers, Member States are required to 
treat that supplier no less favourably than they treat suppliers from other Member 
States. 20 In doing so, such a supplier must take the benefit as well as the burden of EU 
procurement legislation and will be required to submit to the same eligibility criteria as 
EU suppliers. 21 Consequently, where it is revealed that the supplier has been convicted of 
a relevant offence, the supplier ought to be disqualified as it would be inappropriate for a 
convicted supplier from a third country to be permitted to tender for a contract, in 
circumstances where an EU supplier would not be permitted. As stated, the obligations 
under trade agreements granting access to EU procurement markets such as the GPA are 
to treat third country nationals no less favourably, but not better than EU nationals. 22 
One issue that arises in relation to foreign convictions is whether a procuring authority in 
a Member State has the discretion to disregard a foreign conviction where there is 
19 Dischendorfer, "Third country access to public procurement in the community: the case of companies 
and nationals from central and eastern European countries" (2003) P. P. L. R. 256; Davies, "Government 
Procurement" in Lester & Mercurio (eds. ) Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements: Commentary & 
Analysis (2009). 
20 Recital 7 PSD; Art. 5, PSD; Art. II1, WTO GPA. 
21 Art. VIII, WTO GPA. 
22 Art. III (1), WTO GPA. 
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evidence that the trial lacked basic procedural fairness. 23 This may become a real issue as 
the EU expands to admit countries where the rule of law may still be in its infancy. 24 
In relation to the discretionary provisions, the EU directives are similarly silent on the 
issue of foreign convictions. However, as most aspects of these provisions are 
discretionary, it is left to the disqualifying entity to determine whether foreign 
convictions will be taken into account. 
3.3. The UK 
3.3.1 Offences for disqualification 
As discussed in ch. 2, the offences that would lead to disqualification from UK public 
contracts are based on the provisions of the EU procurement directives, but the offences 
were expanded to fit the scheme of relevant offences in the UK. As is the case under the 
EU directives, the offences for disqualification in the UK are similarly divided into 
offences for which disqualification is discretionary and offences that will lead to a 
mandatory disqualification. 
As mentioned, this thesis will focus on the offence of public sector corruption as 
discussed in ch. 1. In relation to the mandatory disqualifications, the corruption offences 
for which disqualification is required are listed in Regulation 23 (1) of the PCR as: 
(b) corruption within the meaning of section I of the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 
1889 or section 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906; 
(c) the offence of bribery... 
23 English courts do not recognise judgments obtained in a manner contrary to natural justice or contrary to 
public policy or obtained by fraud- Clarkson & Hill, The Conflict of Laws 3`d ed. (2006), 151-153. 
Procuring authorities may have to do the same. 24 Simidjiyska, "From Milosevic's reign to the European Union: Serbia and Montenegro's Stabilization and 
Association Agreement" (2007) 21 T. I. & C. L. J. 147; de Bürca, "Beyond the Charter: How Enlargement 
has enlarged the Human Rights Policy of the European Union" (2004) 27 F. I. L. J. 679. 
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(f) any other offence within the meaning of Article 45 (1) of the Public Sector Directive 
as defined by the national law of any relevant State. " 
As discussed in ch. 2, the Bribery Act 2010 repealed the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices 
Act and the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is expected that the UK regulations will be 
amended to incorporate the definition of corruption in the Bribery Act. The Bribery Act 
provides in sections 1&2: 
"(1) A person (P) is guilty of an offence where P offers, promises or gives a financial or 
other advantage to another person, and P intends the advantage to induce a person to 
perform improperly a relevant function or activity, or to reward a person for the improper 
performance of such a function or activity. 
(2) A person (P) is guilty of an offence where P offers, promises or gives a financial or 
other advantage to another person, and P knows or believes that the acceptance of the 
advantage would itself constitute the improper performance of a relevant function or 
activity. " 
The Bribery Act thus prohibits active and passive bribery in the public and private 
sectors. The other offence of bribery mentioned in Reg. 23 (c) above appears to refer to 
the separate common law offence of bribery, discussed in ch. 2.3.2, as any other 
interpretation would be tautology. Common law bribery is defined as "receiving or 
offering any undue reward by or to any person whatsoever, in a public office, in order to 
influence his behaviour in office, and incline him to act contrary to the known rules of 
honesty and integrity". 25 
Reg. 23 (f) brings within the disqualifications, convictions for comparable offences in EU 
and other relevant states even though the precise definitions will naturally differ. This 
provision suggests that suppliers will be disqualified for the relevant offences even if they 
were convicted outside the UK. A relevant state has been defined in the regulations as a 
Member State, but includes the non-Member States of Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway. 26 
25 Turrner (ed. ) Russell on Crime, (1964), 381. 26 Reg. 4 (4). 
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The corruption offences in the UK regulations are broader than the offences within the 
EU directives, as corruption is not limited to corruption involving officials of EU 
institutions or other Member States. The offences in the UK procurement regulations also 
cover corruption involving foreign public officials, since the statutory definitions of 
corruption in the Bribery Act27 and the common law offence of bribery imported into the 
procurement regulations both cover offences committed overseas. 
In relation to the discretionary disqualifications, the UK regulations provide in Reg. 23 (4) 
PCR that: 
"... a contracting authority may treat an economic operator as ineligible or decide not to 
select an economic operator... on one or more of the following grounds, namely that the 
economic operator- 
(d) has been convicted of a criminal offence relating to the conduct of his business or 
profession; 
(e) has committed an act of grave misconduct in the course of his business or profession. " 
As discussed in the context of the EU directives, offences in relation to the conduct of a 
business or a profession may include breaches of regulatory legislation governing the 
conduct of business and breaches of professional norms including integrity norms. Thus 
discretionary disqualification in the UK may be imposed for corruption committed in the 
course of a business and professional misconduct involving corruption. 
3.3.2 Disqualifying on the basis of convictions 
Like the EU procurement directives, a discretionary disqualification in the UK may be 
imposed for a conviction for an offence committed in the conduct of a business or 
profession. In relation to the mandatory disqualifications, a supplier will be disqualified 
for a conviction for statutory corruption or the common law offence of bribery. Unlike 
the EU directives, however, the UK procurement regulations do not refer to a final 
27 S6 Bribery Act 2010. See Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance (2011). 
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judgment, since, as mentioned in ch. 3.2.2, under English law all judgments given by a 
court which disposes of the issues litigated is regarded as a final judgment, whether or not 
the judgment may still be made the subject of an appeal. 28 
As was discussed in the context of the EU in ch. 3.2.2 above, although the requirement for 
a conviction provides the disqualified firm with procedural safeguards, the rarity of 
corruption convictions, especially in relation to legal persons may limit the effectiveness 
of disqualification measures based on convictions in the UK. 
Two cases illustrate the difficulties of prosecuting and convicting for corruption in 
general and legal persons in particular. In 2004, the Serious Frauds Office (responsible 
for the investigation of serious fraud and corruption allegations) commenced an 
investigation into the activities of BAE Systems. 29 BAE was investigated for bribing 
Saudi public officials in order to secure defence contracts in Saudi Arabia. In spite of the 
evidence surrounding BAE's complicity in the corruption allegations, including 
admissions by former BAE staff, the investigations were terminated in 2006. Thus, BAE 
was never tried and consequently never convicted of corruption in the UK. 
In 2008, the managing director of a security firm was convicted of giving bribes to 
Ugandan officials to secure lucrative public contracts. 30 The charge was laid against the 
managing director of the company, and not the company itself, and this was justified by 
the head of the prosecuting authority on the basis that "[c]ompanies themselves are not 
fraudulent it is individuals within organisations who are committing the crime. " 31 This 
case illustrates that prosecutors may find it easier to prosecute and obtain convictions 
against individuals even if the corruption was committed for a firm to obtain government 
contracts. 
28 Halsbury's, n. 12. 29 Williams, "The BAE/Saudi Al-Yamamah Contracts: Implications in Law and Public procurement" (2008) 57 (1) I. C. L. Q. 200 [Williams, 2008]. 
30 Rv Tumukunde & Tobiasen (unrep. 2008); Lewis and Evans, "Ugandan is jailed in UK bribery 
crackdown", The Guardian (23.9.08). Available at http: //www. guardian. co. uk/uk/2008/sep/23/ukcrime. law 31 Colin Cowan, Head of the Overseas Anti-Corruption Unit, within the Metropolitan Police Force. See 
httn: //business timesonline co uk/tol/business/law/article4832416. ece 
104 
In relation to the commission of an act of grave misconduct, the UK procurement 
regulations do not require the supplier to have been convicted and do not require the 
procuring authority to be able to prove this misconduct, as is required by the EU 
directives. Thus, as will be discussed further in ch. 5, the kinds of evidence that will 
suffice for this disqualification may depend on the circumstances and the information 
available to a procuring authority. It may be the case as discussed in the context of the 
EU directives that a determination of misconduct made by a relevant professional body 
may be relied on by a procuring authority to disqualify a supplier. 
3.3.3 The status of foreign convictions 
Similar to the EU directives, the UK procurement regulations are not explicit on whether 
a mandatory disqualification is required for relevant foreign convictions. As discussed in 
the context of the EU in ch. 3.2.3, foreign convictions may have been omitted from the 
EU directives but it is not clear whether Member States will adopt a similar approach. 
Foreign convictions may be relevant in the UK in three ways. First, an EU based firm 
may have obtained a corruption conviction from within the EU. In such cases however, a 
UK procuring authority will disqualify such firms based on Reg. 23 (f), which provides 
for disqualification for "any other offence within the meaning of Art. 45 (1) of the Public 
Sector Directive as defined by the national law of any relevant State. " 
Secondly, an EU based firm may have obtained a conviction outside the EU, such as that 
obtained by Lahmeyer (a German firm) from a Lesotho court in 2003 or a UK firm, or a 
UK subsidiary of a multinational corporation may have received a corruption conviction 
outside the EU, as happened in the case of ABB Vetco Gray (UK) convicted in the US as 
discussed in ch. 3.2.3. Thirdly, a supplier from a third country wishing to participate in a 
UK public contract may have received a conviction outside the EU. 
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The lack of clarity on this issue in the EU procurement directives and the differences in 
the definition of corruption between the EU and the UK means that in analysing the 
status of foreign convictions for the purposes of the mandatory disqualifications, recourse 
may be had to UK law. Under the common law, the UK does not generally enforce 
foreign criminal judgments. This rule was expressed in Huntingdon v Attrill, 32 where the 
court found that: 
"[t]he rule has its foundation in the well-recognised principle that crimes, including in 
that term all breaches of public law punishable by pecuniary mulct or otherwise, at the 
instance of the State Government, or of some one representing the public, are local in this 
sense, that they are only cognizable and punishable in the country where they were 
committed. Accordingly no proceeding, even in the shape of a civil suit, which has for its 
object the enforcement by the State, whether directly or indirectly, of punishment 
imposed for such breaches by the lexfori, ought to be admitted in the Courts of any other 
country. " 
This rule was further applied in United States v Inkley, 33 where the US government was 
not allowed to enforce a default criminal judgment against the defendant in a UK court. 
Although these cases refer to the enforcement of foreign penal sanctions in the UK, it is 
not clear whether similar reasoning will apply to the recognition of foreign convictions 
for disqualification purposes. In some cases, UK courts take foreign convictions into 
account as evidence of the character of an accused where it is relevant to the matters 
before the court. 34 This information may be used in sentencing an offender who has 
committed a crime in the UK. Apart from this, foreign convictions may also be relevant 
for purposes such as immigration, for disqualification from obtaining a driver's licence or 
becoming a director of a company. 35 Thus, it is arguable by way of analogy that foreign 
convictions may also be relevant for the purpose of disqualification from UK public 
contracts. 
32 [1893] A. C. 150. 
33 [1989] Q. B. 255. 
'a 5101 (1) (d) Criminal Justice Act 2003; Rv Kordasinski (Leszek) [2007] 1 Cr. App. R. 17. 
35 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
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Some support for this interpretation may be found in the OGC Guidance on the 
mandatory disqualifications. 36 Although the UK regulations do not mention foreign 
convictions, the OGC Guidance provides that a procuring authority should disqualify a 
supplier that has received a relevant conviction, whether that supplier is from a EU 
Member State, a country which is a signatory to the GPA or a third country. 37 Although 
this does not answer the question whether the convictions received by these suppliers 
were obtained from outside the EU, it appears that a reliance on foreign convictions (i. e. 
convictions obtained outside the EU) is implied by the OGC Guidance. This is because 
requiring UK procuring authorities to disqualify suppliers from third countries must be 
interpreted as a possibility that that these suppliers may have received the conviction in 
those countries. 
The discretionary disqualification provisions are also silent as to whether foreign 
convictions may be taken into account and as was discussed in the context of the EU, this 
may be an indication that this issue has been left to the discretion of the disqualifying 
entity. 
3.4 The United States 
3.4.1 Offences for disqualification 
As discussed in ch. 2, disqualification in the US is discretionary and a supplier may be 
disqualified from government contracts for various procurement and non-procurement 
related offences38 and the commission of any offence indicating a lack of business 
integrity or business honesty affecting the present responsibility of the contractor. 39 
36 OGC Guidance on the mandatory exclusion of economic operators in the 2006 procurement regulations 
(March 2009) [OGC Guidance]. 
37 Para. 3. 
38 FAR 9.407-2 (a) (1)- (7). 
39 FAR 9.407-2 (a) (7). 
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As stated in the context of the other jurisdictions, this thesis will focus on those offences 
that may broadly be defined as public sector corruption as defined in ch. I. Accordingly, 
the relevant US offences are: 
i. Offences committed in obtaining, attempting to obtain, or performing a public contract 
or subcontract. ° For a supplier to be disqualified for these offences, the supplier has to 
have received a conviction or a civil judgment, but may be temporarily disqualified from 
public contracts where there is evidence that this offence was committed, without the 
necessity for a conviction. This head of offences may be used to disqualify a supplier for 
a corruption offence committed in obtaining, attempting to obtain or performing a public 
contract. 
ii. The offence of bribery, 41 whether the offence was committed in the procurement 
context or not. For a longer lasting disqualification, the supplier needs to have been 
convicted or obtained a civil judgment for the offence, but may be temporarily 
disqualified in the absence of a conviction. 2 
iii. Any offence indicating a lack of business integrity or honesty that seriously and 
directly affects the present responsibility of such contractor. 43 For longer lasting 
disqualifications, a conviction or a civil judgment needs to have been obtained but a 
supplier may be temporarily disqualified for these offences without a conviction. 
iv. Any other cause of a serious and compelling nature that it affects the present 
responsibility of the contractor " Under this offence, a conviction is not required for 
either the temporary or longer lasting disqualification. There is no indication of the kinds 
of conduct that will fall under this provision and it has been argued that it can relate to 
both contractual performance and integrity issues. 45 It has also been suggested that this 
40 FAR 406-2 (a) (1). 
41 FAR 9.406-2 (a) (3). 
42 TS Generalbau GmbH, Comp. Gen. Dec. B-246034,92-1 CPD 1189. 
43 FAR 9.406-2 (a) (5). 
as FAR 9.406-2 (c). 
45 Cibinic & Nash, 1998,464. 
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catch-all-phrase may be used as the basis of disqualification for conduct that is neither 
criminal nor related to government contracting. 46 
3.4.2 Disqualifying on the basis of a conviction 
As can be seen from ch. 3.4.1, a supplier may be disqualified where it has obtained a 
criminal conviction or a civil judgment for a relevant offence. A conviction is defined by 
the regulations as a judgment or conviction for a criminal offence by any court of 
competent jurisdiction, whether entered upon a verdict or a plea, and includes a 
conviction entered upon a plea of nolo contendere. 47 A civil judgment is defined as a 
judgment or a finding of a civil offence by a court of competent jurisdiction. 48 
As discussed in the context of the EU in ch. 3.2.2, the requirement for a conviction 
reduces the investigative burden on the disqualifying official and ensures that the 
disqualifying official can be assured that the evidence of the facts giving rise to the 
offence has been thoroughly tested in a competent court. In the US, where an uncontested 
plea (nolo contendere) may give rise to a conviction, procuring authorities in some cases, 
require independent evidence to establish the facts of the alleged criminal offence 49 
In the US, unlike the position in the EU and the UK, disqualification is not an automatic 
consequence of the receipt of a conviction for corruption. 50 Disqualification is at the 
discretion of the procurement official and it is not regarded as appropriate to disqualify 
where the offence was not serious or where there are strong mitigating factors in favour 
of the suppliers' 
46 Shaw, "Access to Information: the key challenge to a credible suspension and debarment programme" 
(2004) 5 P. P. L. R. 230,232. 
47 FAR 2.4.1. A plea of nolo contendere is a plea entered by a defendant that does not explicitly admit guilt, 
but subjects the defendant to punishment, while allowing denial of the alleged facts in other proceedings. 
48 FAR 9.403. 
49 Cibinic & Nash, 1998,462. 
50 Cibinic & Nash, 1998,457. 
51 FAR 9.406 (1) (a). 
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Apart from disqualifying on the basis of convictions, a supplier may be temporarily 
disqualified (suspended) where it has committed a relevant offence but has not received a 
conviction or a civil judgment, either because investigations into the alleged offence or 
litigation is still pending against the contractor. Thus, the US incorporates an element of 
proportionality into the disqualification system by requiring a conviction or a civil 
judgment for longer lasting disqualifications and not requiring them for temporary 
disqualifications. In both cases, however, the disqualification may only be imposed where 
it is necessary to protect the government. 52 
3.4.3 The status of foreign convictions 
Like the EU, UK and South Africa, the US regulations are silent as to the status of 
foreign convictions and it is unclear whether a conviction obtained outside the US may 
lead to disqualification from US public contracts, although it appears that US 
jurisprudence is against such an interpretation. 
In Small v US. 53 the Supreme Court held that the phrase "convicted in any court" 
contained in a statute54 prohibiting a person who had been convicted in any court of a 
crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year from possessing firearms related 
to domestic and not foreign convictions. The Court argued that it is appropriate to assume 
that US Congress has domestic, not foreign concerns in mind when it writes statutes, 
since foreign convictions can involve conduct that is not criminal under US law. The 
Supreme Court also opined that the statute's context and language did not suggest any 
reach beyond domestic convictions. 
Although Small related to a breach of a criminal statute, the Supreme Court did not 
expressly limit its decision to criminal statutes. Further, the disqualification from 
possessing firearms in Small may be compared to disqualification from government 
52 FAR 9.407-1 (2). 
53 544 U. S 385 (2005). 
5418 U. S. C. § 922(g)(l). 
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contracts for a criminal conviction, except that unlike the disqualification that Small was 
subject to, procurement disqualifications are not mandatory in the US. It is thus arguable 
that a similar interpretation may apply to foreign corruption convictions for the purpose 
of disqualification. In the first place, this will obviate the need for disqualifying officials 
in the US to compare whether the foreign conviction is for a relevant offence as defined 
by the FAR. 55 Secondly, a disqualifying official would not have to consider the issue of 
whether the foreign conviction included the necessary protections and procedural 
safeguards for the offender. Thirdly, as argued by the Court in Small, the language and 
the context of the FAR do not suggest any reach beyond domestic convictions. 
3.5 The World Bank 
3.5.1 Offences for disqualification 
The World Bank adopts an approach similar to the US and disqualification is 
discretionary and may be imposed at the option of the Bank. The Bank's procurement 
guidelines list the offences that may lead to disqualification, which includes offences 
committed in Bank-projects in the non-procurement context. 56 The corruption offence 
that may lead to disqualification is defined as: 
(i) "corrupt practice" is the offering, giving, receiving or soliciting, directly or indirectly, 
of anything of value to influence improperly the actions of another party. 57 
"Corrupt practice" comprises of active and passive bribery. Bribery in international 
transactions58 and particularly in the execution of infrastructure projects59 is a serious 
55 Small n. 53,385-387. 56 Williams, 2007c. 
57 Para. 1.16 BPG. 
58 Salbu, "Transnational Bribery: The Big Questions", (2001) 21 J. I. L. B. 435; Salbu, "A Delicate Balance: 
Legislation, Institutional Change, and Transnational Bribery", (2000) 33 C. I. L. J. 657; Salbu, "Are 
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problem for the Bank, and is regarded as the most pernicious kind of corruption that 
exists in international development projects. 0 It is thus not surprising that the 
procurement guidelines attach sanctions to bribery in the first place. 
The Bank's definition of corrupt practice is similar to the definition of corruption stated 
in ch. 1 of this thesis. In the definition of the offence by in the Bank, the motive of the 
offender is important, and the actions must be directed at securing a particular outcome. 
By focusing on motive, the offences are able to cross cultural boundaries and circumvent 
arguments relating to the cultural specificity of the nature of corruption. 61 
3.5.2 Disqualifying on the basis of convictions 
The Bank conducts its own investigations into allegations of corruption and does not rely 
on domestic prosecutions or take corruption convictions into account for the purposes of 
its disqualification procedures. Unlike some domestic jurisdictions, the Bank does not 
require suppliers to supply information on the existence of previous convictions during 
the procurement process. 
Although the Bank does not generally use corruption convictions as the basis of 
disqualification, a corruption conviction in relation to a Bank-financed project may be the 
basis for an investigation. On one occasion, a firm that had been through the Bank's 
Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable and Desirable International Policy Goal Under the Global 
Conditions of the Late Twentieth Century? " (1999) 24 Y. M. L. 223. 
59 Weihen, Transparency and corruption on building large dams (1999), 14. Available at www. dams. org.; 
World Bank, Infrastructure: Lessons from the Last two decades of Bank Engagement Discussion Paper 
(2006. ), 41-42. Available at www. worldbank. org. 
60 Hobbs, 23. 
61 Treisman, "The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study" J. P. E. 401 (2000); Harms, "Holding 
Public Officials Accountable in the International Realm: A new multi-layered strategy to combat 
corruption" (2000) 33 C. I. L. J. 159; Smith, "Kinship and Corruption in Contemporary Nigeria" (2001) 66 
(3) Ethnos 344-364; Kim & Kim, 549-580. Cf Kaufman, "Anti-Corruption within a broader developmental 
and governance perspective- Some lessons from empirics and experience". Statement to the High Level 
Political Signing Conference for the United Nations Convention against Corruption in Mexico, 9-11 
December 2003. Available at www. worldbank. org; Kennedy, "The International Anti-Corruption 
Campaign" (1999) 14 C. M. L. 465; Elliott, "Corruption as an International policy problem: Overview and 
Recommendations" in Elliott (ed. ) Corruption and the Global Economy (1997), 175,177. 
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disqualification process and emerged with a determination that there was insufficient 
evidence to disqualify it, was later convicted in a domestic court of corruption in relation 
to a Bank-financed project. 62 The Bank then re-opened its investigation, and with the 
evidence that emerged at trial, disqualified the firm 63 This case illustrates that some of 
the limitations the Bank faces in investigating accused firms, such as not being able to 
compel the production of relevant documents or witnesses, 64 may lead to an approach that 
increasingly utilizes relevant corruption convictions in the disqualification process. 
3.5.3 The status of foreign convictions 
As the Bank is an institution, without a legal system of its own, it is incorrect to talk 
about foreign convictions- as all convictions that the Bank may rely on in disqualification 
proceedings will be foreign in the sense of being outside the Bank's internal investigative 
process. 
As discussed in ch. 3.5.2 above, the Bank is able to rely on domestic corruption 
convictions to establish the grounds for disqualification from Bank-financed contracts. 
Another issue that may lead to increased relevance of domestic corruption convictions is 
the 2010 agreement between international financial institutions to cooperate and enforce 
each other's disqualification measures. 65 This cooperation may lead to a greater use by 
the Bank of external investigations, disqualification decisions, penalties and possibly 
convictions in the Bank's disqualification process. 66 
62 Williams, 2007c. 
63 Williams, 2007c; Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Sanctions Acres International Ltd 
(23/7/2004). 
64 Report Concerning Debarment Process, 17. 
65 Nwogwugwu, "Towards the Harmonisation of International Procurement Policies and Practices" (2005) 
3 P. P. L. R. 131; International Financial Institutions Anti-Corruption Task Force: Uniform Framework for 
Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption (September 2006); World Bank, Mutual Enforcement of 
Debarment Decisions among multilateral development banks (March 2010). 66 World Bank, Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions among multilateral development banks 
para. 30. 
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3.6 South Africa 
3.6.1 Offences for disqualification 
As mentioned in ch. 2, there are three South African statutes, which provide for the 
disqualification of corrupt contractors. 
3.6.1.1 Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 
The Corruption Act contains the most detailed provisions on disqualification from public 
contracts for corruption offences. The relevant provisions are in s 28 (1) which provides 
that where a court is convicting a person of the relevant offences it may also issue an 
order that the particulars of the convicted person, the conviction and the sentence be 
endorsed on the Register for Tender Defaulters. 7 This Register contains information on 
firms disqualified from government contracts, is managed by the National Treasury and 
available electronically. 
Under the Act, disqualification is a sanction solely against procurement related offences 
and there are two offences that could lead to disqualification. The first is "corrupt 
activities in relation to contracts". This covers situations where a person accepts or agrees 
to accept, offers or agrees to offer any gratification in order to influence in any way, the 
promotion, execution or procurement of a contract with a public entity, 68 and covers 
bribery in public contracting. The second offence is "corrupt activities in the procuring 
and withdrawal of tenders". This offence relates to situations where a person offers, 
agrees or accepts any gratification as an inducement to, or in order to influence another 
67 S28 (1) (a) & 29. 
68 S12. 
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person to award a tender, make a tender or withdraw a tender for a contract69 and may 
cover bribery and collusion in public contracts. 
The offences for which a supplier may be disqualified under the Corruption Act are 
concerned with violations of the procurement system and disqualifications do not operate 
against general or non-procurement related corruption. This might result in the 
disqualifications not being wholly effective in combating public corruption, as they will 
only affect persons who have been convicted of procurement related corruption and who 
are government suppliers but where a government supplier is convicted of non- 
procurement corruption, that person will not be disqualified from government contracts. 
The South African approach thus unwittingly elevates procurement corruption above 
other forms of public corruption. 
Some of the offences requiring disqualification under the Corruption Act correspond to 
the offence of public sector corruption as defined in ch. 1 of this thesis, where this 
corruption occurs in the procurement context. 
3.6.1.2 Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act Regulations 
The PPPFA Regulations provide for the disqualification of fraudulent or corrupt suppliers 
from government contracts, where the fraud/corruption relates to the PPPFA. Under the 
regulations, where an `organ of state' detects that a preference under the PPPFA has been 
fraudulently obtained, it must restrict the contractor, its shareholders and directors from 
obtaining business from any organ of state for a period not exceeding 10 years. 70 
The offence leading to disqualification under the PPPFA regulations is the use of a 
fraudulently obtained preference in bidding for a public contract. The use of fraudulent 
means to obtain the preferences that may bolster a tender has been documented 
69 S13. 
70 Reg. 15 (2) (d). 
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elsewhere. 7' The most pervasive method of fraudulently obtaining such preferences is 
`fronting' or the use of fictitious or tokenistic persons from the groups previously 
discriminated against (target groups) in bidding for a public contract. This may occur, for 
instance where black people (who are subject to preferences in South African 
procurement) are signed up as fictitious shareholders in a `white' owned company. 72 
The offences that may lead to disqualification under the PPPFA regulations may extend 
in some cases beyond the definition of corruption as discussed in ch. 1. However, where 
the preference is obtained through bribery it will correspond to the definition of public 
sector corruption given in ch. 1. 
3.6.1.3 Public Finance Management Act Regulations 
The PFMA regulations provide for two offences that will lead to disqualification. The 
first offence, which will lead to a mandatory disqualification, is where "... the 
recommended bidder has committed a corrupt or fraudulent act in competing for the 
particular contract. "73 Here, the accounting officer of a government department must 
disqualify the supplier by rejecting the proposal for the award of a contract. Such acts 
will include bribery, `fronting', collusion and misrepresentation in the submission of 
tenders74 and may overlap in some cases with the offences leading to disqualification 
under the Corruption Act and the PPPFA regulations. 
The second offence that may lead to a discretionary disqualification is where "the bidder 
or any of its directors have committed fraud or other improper conduct in relation to the 
procuring entity's supply chain management system. "75 This covers a broader set of 
offences than the Corruption Act or the PPPFA regulations, being a prohibited activity in 
'1 Bolton, 2007, ch. 10. 
72 Bolton, 2007,294. 
73 Reg. 16A9.1 (e). 
74 Bolton, "The exclusion of contractors from government contract awards" (2006) 10 (1) L. D. D. 25. 75 Reg. 16A9.2 (a) (ii). 
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the entire supply chain management system and extends to prohibited conduct in 
procurement planning, contract implementation and execution. Thus, a supplier who 
provides false qualification documentation; mismanages a contract; fraudulently provides 
substandard/non-compliant goods to save costs; engages in collusion or other anti- 
competitive conduct; or submits a tender that is below costs in order to increase the 
contract price once he has obtained the contract, 76 might be guilty of an offence in 
relation to the procuring entity's supply chain management system. 
Where these offences occur, the accounting officer of a public entity may at his 
discretion, disqualify the supplier from a particular contract by disregarding his bid. 
3.6.2 Disqualifying on the basis of convictions 
As may be seen from the above, in South Africa, a criminal conviction for corruption is 
only required where disqualification is imposed under the Corruption Act. 
The PPPFA Regulations do not indicate whether a conviction is necessary for 
disqualification, but a textual interpretation of the regulations does not support the 
requirement for a conviction. The Regulations provide that the procuring entity may 
disqualify a supplier where it detects the use of a fraudulently obtained preference. 
Although a procuring entity may detect the fraud through the existence of a conviction, it 
is likely to be the case that where there is any doubt or suspicion as to the existence of the 
preferences claimed by the supplier, this will trigger the requirement to disqualify the 
supplier. 
If a conviction is not necessary under the PPPFA regulations, then the issues that arise 
include determining what procedure will be used in making the decision to disqualify; 
ensuring that the procuring entity guarantees procedural fairness in making the decision; 
76 Cibinic & Nash, 1998, chs. 7 & 8; Arrowsmith, Linarelli & Wallace, 699-701. 
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and the adoption of a standardized approach to avoid the adoption of different criteria for 
disqualification by various procuring authorities. These issues will be discussed in ch. 4. 
Similar to the PPPFA regulations, the PFMA Regulations do not require a conviction as a 
condition precedent to disqualification. Under the mandatory disqualification provisions, 
the disqualification is triggered by fraud or corruption in competing for a particular 
contract, and is directed at impropriety in the specific procurement procedure, and not 
past procurement violations. In relation to the discretionary disqualifications, although 
the offences are not limited to the particular procurement procedure, it appears as though 
there is no requirement for convictions as a public official may disqualify a supplier who 
has engaged in fraud or other `improper conduct'. Whilst fraud could be proven through 
the existence of a conviction, improper conduct may not, as such an offence does not 
exist in South African law. What will thus be required to establish proof of this conduct, 
and indeed what will amount to this improper conduct has been left by the regulations to 
the discretion of the public official. 
3.6.3 The status of foreign convictions 
Similar to the disqualification provisions in the EU, the UK, and the US, none of the 
South African provisions mention the status of foreign convictions. It appears that foreign 
convictions are not relevant in South Africa as under the Corruption Act, disqualification 
is imposed by the courts as part of the punishment imposed for an offence committed 
under the Corruption Act, as decided by the South African High Court. Further, foreign 
convictions are not relevant under the PPPFA and the PFMA regulations, as they do not 
require any convictions, foreign or otherwise before a disqualification is imposed. 
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3.7 Analysis 
From the above discussions, it can be seen that there are a number of divergent 
approaches to the requirement that a conviction should precede disqualification and to the 
use of foreign convictions for disqualification. This section will examine the issues raised 
by these divergent approaches and examine which approach might be more appropriate. 
3.7.1 Requirement for convictions 
As stated, there are different approaches to the issue of whether convictions are required 
for disqualification. In the EU and in the context of the UK regulations implementing the 
EU directives, convictions are required for the mandatory disqualifications for corruption 
and the other serious criminal offences and the discretionary disqualification for an 
offence relating to the conduct of a business or a profession. The US generally requires 
convictions for longer lasting disqualifications, but does not require convictions for 
temporary disqualifications. The World Bank does not require convictions at all, but has 
on occasion utilised a conviction as the basis of disqualification proceedings against a 
contractor. In South Africa, convictions are only relevant where the disqualification 
relates to offences under the Corruption Act. 
Where convictions are required for corruption, the supplier would invariably have had the 
advantage of all the procedural safeguards of a criminal prosecution, in the sense that he 
would have had an opportunity to be heard and to examine and defend the allegations 
made against him. A conviction further implies that the offender's guilt is not in doubt. 
This is the main benefit of requiring convictions for disqualification. 
On the other hand, corruption allegations are notoriously difficult to prosecute leading to 
a dearth of such convictions, especially in relation to legal persons. As a result, where 
disqualification is based on a conviction, the lack of convictions may make the 
disqualification measure ineffective in practice. A comparison may be made between the 
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World Bank and the US which do not require convictions for disqualification (temporary 
disqualifications in the US) and South Africa (under the Corruption Act) which 
disqualifies on the basis of convictions. 
In the World Bank and the US, disqualifications are fairly common-place and follow 
investigations once there has been the receipt of incriminating information. Under the 
South African Corruption Act, which requires convictions for disqualification, there have 
been only two disqualifications since 2004 when the Act came into force. " Although 
South Africa has had a much shorter experience of disqualification legislation than either 
the US or the World Bank, this may still allude to the absence of relevant corruption 
convictions. 
Whilst there are merits to requiring convictions as a condition precedent to 
disqualification, it is submitted that this requirement will reduce the effectiveness of 
disqualification as an anti-corruption tool. Therefore, it might be preferable for an 
approach that relies on indictments and compelling evidence, as is the case in the US and 
the World Bank. However, where convictions are not required, adequate safeguards must 
be required to ensure that disqualification is justified and the disqualification measure is 
not abused. Thus, as is discussed further in ch. 4, the evidence relied on must be 
compelling, the supplier ought to be made aware of the existence of the evidence and 
should also be given an opportunity to respond to the allegations that will form the basis 
of the disqualification. 
For instance, in the World Bank where convictions are not required, the Bank gives 
suppliers the opportunity to respond to the allegations of corruption for which the 
supplier may be disqualified. Similarly, in the US, where a conviction is not required, the 
disqualification is normally made on the basis of an indictment and the supplier is given 
an opportunity to respond to the allegations against him. This is examined in ch. 4. 
77 As at 30 April 2011. 
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3.7.2 The issue of foreign convictions 
It was shown that none of the jurisdictions, except the UK, in the form of the OGC 
Guidance document made explicit references to the position of foreign convictions, with 
the jurisprudence of the US being against an interpretation that favours reliance on 
foreign convictions for disqualification. 
However, recognising foreign corruption convictions for disqualification would increase 
the effectiveness and possibly the deterrent effect of disqualification. The harmonisation 
of corruption offences as achieved through the major corruption conventions discussed in 
ch. 1 mean that some of the barriers against the recognition of foreign convictions 
highlighted by the US Supreme Court in Small, such as different definitions of offences 
and the criminalisation of different kinds of conduct are not as relevant in relation to 
corruption offences. As discussed in ch. l, the major conventions against corruption 
criminalise the bribery of foreign public officials, the domestic public officials, and 
employees of international organisations and have adopted similar definitions of the 
offence of corruption. Thus, there will be few disparities in the definitions of offences as 
well as the kinds of conduct criminalised by countries that have ratified these 
instruments. 
Although most jurisdictions are against the enforcement of the penal laws of other states 
as discussed above, it is submitted that states ought to recognise foreign corruption 
convictions for the purpose of disqualification. There are several rationales for this. First, 
recognising foreign corruption convictions for the purpose of disqualification would not 
amount to an enforcement of the foreign country's penal laws unless that country 
requires and imposes disqualification at the time of conviction as part of the penalties 
imposed for a corruption conviction. There are already instances, as discussed above 
where countries rely on foreign convictions for various other kinds of disqualifications, 
and disqualification from public contracts will simply operate in addition to those 
instances. 
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Secondly, a refusal to recognise foreign corruption convictions for disqualification 
purposes may be criticised on public policy grounds. This is because disqualifying 
domestic suppliers from public contracts in circumstances where a supplier with a foreign 
corruption conviction would not be disqualified sends a message that foreign corruption 
is more tolerable than domestic corruption and will lead to differences in the treatment of 
domestic and (possibly) foreign suppliers. This issue has already arisen in the context of a 
responsibility determination in the US, where a procuring authority held a supplier to be 
responsible despite the supplier's contravention of Japanese bid-rigging regulations on 
the basis that bid-rigging is common in Japan and therefore not regarded as serious. In an 
action for judicial review, the court held that the authority's determination was "arbitrary 
and capricious. s78 Thirdly, recognising foreign convictions may increase the 
effectiveness of the disqualification measure, as it may be the case that the threat of 
disqualification in another country may be more serious for a multinational corporation 
than disqualification at home. 
As will be discussed further in ch. 5, a major issue that arises with the recognition of 
foreign convictions for disqualification purposes is how a procuring authority in one 
country may discover the existence of such convictions. Where information on 
convictions is publicly available, it may be possible for procuring authorities to obtain 
this information, but such information is generally not publicly available, and it may be 
difficult for a procuring authority to obtain this information, in the absence of cooperation 
from the authorities of the country where the conviction was obtained. In 2008, the UK 
government highlighted this difficulty when it revealed that it was unable to check the 
foreign criminal records of employed airport `airside' workers. 79 In the US case discussed 
above, the contractor was not initially required to reveal details of its foreign violations, 
although the procuring official still declared the supplier responsible after he had 
obtained information on the bid-rigging offences. 80 
78 Watts-Healy Tibbits A JV v United States 82 Fed. Cl. 614 (2008). 
79 Lords Hansard Text 15 May 2008, available at http: //www. parliament. the-stationery- 
ofce. co uk/pa/1d200708/ldhansrd/text/80515-0002. htm; Hope and Millward, "Foreign criminals work at 
airports unchecked" The Telegraph, (8.05.08). 
80 Watts-Healy, n. 78. 
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A related issue is whether procuring authorities are in any event under a duty to discover 
the existence of any convictions, whether foreign or domestic, where convictions are 
required for disqualification. This issue is dealt with in ch. 5, and it will be seen that none 
of the jurisdictions impose a requirement on procuring authorities to conduct 
investigations to discover the existence of convictions. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PROCEDURAL ISSUES AFFECTING DISQUALIFICATION 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine and compare in detail the procedural issues that 
arise from the use of disqualification, the approaches the jurisdictions have adopted to 
these issues, and whether these approaches are appropriate. 
First, the chapter will examine the procedure for disqualifying suppliers in the 
jurisdictions. The focus is on the procedural requirements for disqualifying, including 
notice of the disqualification to a supplier; opportunity to make representations; notice 
of the factors that are relevant to the disqualifying entity's decision; whether the 
supplier is given reasons for its disqualification as well as whether the procedures are 
fair and transparent and are thus able to give rise to disqualification decisions that are 
fair, reasonable, transparent, non-discriminatory and justified by the available 
evidence. 
In many jurisdictions, the legislation is silent as to whether procedural safeguards 
must accompany the disqualification process and in such cases, the disqualification 
process may be conducted according to the requirements of administrative law. Where 
this is the case, administrative law will be examined to determine how the issue of 
procedure may be approached. The chapter will examine whether the procedures for 
disqualification in the jurisdictions are in alignment with the transparency objectives 
of public procurement regulation discussed in ch. 1 and are sufficient to ensure that the 
disqualification system fulfils its purpose in each jurisdiction. The chapter will also 
suggest what improvements may be made in relation to procedural issues in a 
jurisdiction where there are perceived shortcomings. The issue of procedure is 
important as it determines what rights a supplier may have to challenge the decision to 
disqualify it. 
The second issue discussed in this chapter is the time limits for disqualification. Time 
limits are relevant to the fairness of the measures and may be tied to the rationales 
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behind disqualification in the jurisdictions as discussed in ch. 2. Time limits are 
important in different ways depending on the nature of the measure in question: they 
may be relevant to determining when an offence or conviction ceases to be relevant 
for the purposes of disqualification and to the length of a disqualification. 
The third issue considered by this chapter is the types of entities used to disqualify a 
supplier and the scope of a disqualification i. e. whether a disqualification imposed by 
one entity affects other entities. A disqualifying entity may be a procuring authority, 
an external administrative body, a court or the legislature, to a limited extent. The 
type of disqualifying entity affects the nature of the decisions that the entity can take. 
The decision to disqualify involves many different elements and in some cases, 
elements of the decision may be split between different disqualifying entities. 
In terms of the kinds of decisions that an entity may take, these decisions may be 
understood as different points on the continuum of disqualification. For instance, 
where legislation imposes a mandatory disqualification on corrupt suppliers, the 
procuring authority may simply be required to decide if there is a relevant conviction 
or offence and disqualify once this is established. At the other end of the continuum a 
procuring authority may have to make more involved decisions. For instance, in cases 
where the procuring authority has a discretion in deciding whether to disqualify, the 
authority may be required to decide if the offence was committed and a case for 
disqualification exists, or if there are mitigating circumstances making 
disqualification inappropriate in the particular instance. In between these two 
extremes, the legislation may also grant procuring authorities the discretion to 
derogate from or waive a mandatory requirement to disqualify. 
4.2 Procedure for disqualifying 
4.2.1 Introduction 
This section focuses on the procedural requirements for the disqualification decision 
to ensure that the decision is substantively fair. The procedural requirements are 
125 
examined by reference to the different stages of the disqualification decision. The 
chapter will split the decision to disqualify into several procedural stages and examine 
the procedural requirements governing each stage of the disqualification process. In 
some of the jurisdictions, the legislation is silent on the procedural requirements for 
disqualification and the procedures depend on the discretion of the disqualifying 
entity. Where the legislation is silent, the courts or the general law on administrative 
decision-making may provide disqualifying entities with a framework for the 
procedural requirements. In other jurisdictions, the legislation has provided detailed 
procedural requirements for each stage of the disqualification process. 
The section will also examine whether the procedures for disqualification in the 
jurisdictions may be regarded as fair and transparent. 
4.2.2 The stages of the disqualification process and accompanying procedural 
requirements 
The decision to disqualify a supplier may be split into several procedural stages and 
each separate stage of the decision to disqualify may be made by one entity or may be 
split between different entities. The stages of disqualification decision-making 
adopted in this chapter are not finite, but the stages are chosen because they are 
general to most disqualification systems and the proposed sequence of the stages is 
adopted for convenience, as in practice some of the stages may overlap. 
The first stage of a disqualification determination is deciding whether a relevant 
offence has been committed. The procedures relevant at this stage depend on whether 
the disqualification is linked to a conviction. At the second stage, the disqualifying 
entity may need to decide whether to inform the supplier of its proposed 
disqualification and invite the supplier to make representations to the entity. 
Procedural requirements relevant at this stage will include the timing and the 
sufficiency of the notice, and the availability of and extent to which the supplier may 
make representations. 
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At the third stage of a disqualification decision and depending on the discretion 
available to the entity, the entity may need to consider whether disqualification is 
justifiable on the basis of the available evidence, or whether there are other factors 
such as `rehabilitation measures' that mean that the supplier ought not to be 
disqualified despite the existence of a conviction/offence. Rehabilitation measures are 
discussed in ch. 8. The relevant procedures here include whether the supplier is given 
notice of the factors that the entity takes into account in deciding to disqualify and 
how the disqualifying entity determines whether disqualification should be waived. 
Fourthly, an entity may decide whether to give a supplier notice of the disqualification 
decision including the reasons on which the decision is based. The procedural 
requirements here may include rules on the sufficiency and adequacy of the notice 
informing the supplier that it has been disqualified (including information on which 
aspects of the supplier's business are affected and how long the disqualification will 
last) as well rules on the availability of a duty to give reasons. 
4.2.2.1 Has a relevant offence been committed? 
In deciding whether an offence warranting disqualification has been committed, the 
disqualifying entity has to decide whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
the supplier committed the offence. As stated, this stage of the disqualification 
decision is tied to whether a conviction is required for disqualification. Where a 
conviction is required for disqualification, deciding that an offence was committed 
may be simple, where the disqualifying entity is able to obtain conclusive information 
from police or judicial databases. In such cases, the disqualifying entity may have two 
options 
- 
to either itself obtain the information on the conviction from national 
databases of criminal records or to require proposed suppliers to provide certification 
on previous convictions. Where disqualification is tied to an offence for professional 
misconduct, it may be possible for the disqualifying entity to obtain information on 
the supplier's past conduct from relevant organisations. Where disqualification is for 
an offence committed in an ongoing procurement procedure, the disqualifying entity 
may obtain evidence of the offence from the relevant participants in the procurement 
process. 
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The procedural requirements for this stage of the disqualification decision include the 
process for obtaining information on offences, such as the procedure used to approach 
relevant organisations which maintain databases of criminal records or information on 
professional offences. These procedures are not concerned with the investigative 
powers of a disqualifying entity, which is covered in ch. 5, but rather deal with 
whether an entity has procedures in place to access the information on relevant 
offences. Despite the importance of this information to the disqualification 
determination, not all jurisdictions are explicit on the procedure for obtaining this 
information by a disqualifying entity. 
In relation to the mandatory and the discretionary disqualifications, the EU 
procurement directives suggest that disqualifying entities may obtain information on 
convictions or offences from suppliers and where they have further doubts to apply to 
competent authorities, such as judicial or administrative authorities to obtain 
information on the supplier. ' The EU has also provided a list of the authorities that are 
competent to provide this information in Member States. ' Where the disqualification 
is tied to a conviction, the information obtained from national databases on criminal 
convictions ought to be determinative of whether an offence has been committed. 
The EU procurement directives do not provide disqualifying entities with any special 
procedure or format for approaching these competent authorities and the procedure is 
left to the discretion of the disqualifying entity or the requirements of the competent 
authority. 
In implementing the EU directives, the UK regulations did not go further than the 
directives and also suggest that in relation to the mandatory disqualifications, a 
procuring authority may ask suppliers to provide the necessary information and may 
further apply to a competent authority to obtain details of convictions 4 Although the 
regulations are silent on the procedure for obtaining this information, the OGC 
guidance suggests that a procuring authority should ask suppliers in a pre- 
qualification questionnaire or an invitation to tender to state whether they have been 
1 Art. 45 (1) PSD. 
2 See http: //ec. europa. eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/2004_18/index_en. htm 3 Medina, 2008. 
4 Reg. 23 (3) PCR. 
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convicted of a relevant offence. 5 The OGC Guidance also suggests the wording that 
UK procuring authorities may use in requesting this information from suppliers. 
Where the procuring authority is not satisfied with the information provided by a 
supplier, the disqualifying entity also has the option of obtaining information on 
convictions from the Criminal Records Bureau or Disclosure (Scotland).? Whilst the 
OGC Guidance is not legally binding, in the absence of other direction, it is likely to 
be relied upon by procuring authorities. 
A similar approach is adopted in relation to the discretionary disqualifications and the 
UK regulations suggest that the procuring authority may ask a supplier to provide 
documentation proving he has not committed any of the relevant offences and further 
lists the kinds of documentation that is conclusive evidence in relation to some of the 
offences. 8 This approach may be useful in obtaining information on past offences and 
offences committed in the specific procedure. Whilst there is no mentioned procedure 
for this, it is likely that the procedure used to obtain information on convictions will 
be adopted by procuring authorities in relation to offences. 
In obtaining information on convictions, the US adopts a similar approach to the EU 
and the UK. The FAR provides that information on convictions or offences may be 
requested from suppliers or be voluntarily submitted by suppliers. 9 In the US, the 
procedure for obtaining this information is subsumed within the process of obtaining 
information on the supplier's capability to perform the contract and responsibility-'O 
Where a US procuring authority is disqualifying a supplier on the basis of a 
disqualification previously imposed by another entity, the procuring authority is 
required to examine the Excluded Parties List System (EPLS), " which is a database 
of disqualified suppliers12 and to reject the bid of any supplier that has been listed. 13 
5 Para. 3 OGC Guidance. 
6 Para. 3.3 OGC Guidance. 
7 Para. 5 OGC Guidance; Williams, 2009,440. 
8 Reg. 23 (5) PCR. 
9 FAR 9.105-1; FAR 9.103 (c); Cibinic & Nash, 1998,441. 
10 FAR 9.104-6. Procuring authorities are required to consult the Federal Awardee Performance and 
Integrity Information System (FAPIIS), which contains comprehensive information on suppliers. 
Cibinic & Nash, 1998,441; Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996, ch. 8. 
1' FAR 9.404 & 9.405. 
12 See http: //www. epls. gov/ 13 FAR 9.405 (d). 
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Where disqualification is not based on a conviction and the disqualifying entity has a 
discretion in deciding whether an offence was committed, sufficient procedures for 
obtaining this information may be required to ensure that a supplier is not disqualified 
on the basis of insufficient evidence or "mere suspicion, unfounded allegation or 
error". 14 Thus apart from obtaining information from suppliers and the FAPIIS 
database, suppliers are also required to submit certifications that they have not 
committed any acts that impact their responsibility and could lead to disqualification. 
This is similar to the EU/UK approach, which requires suppliers to provide a 
declaration stating they have not committed any of the relevant offences that may lead 
to a discretionary disqualification not based on a conviction. 15 
In the US, where there is a dispute over the facts in cases where the disqualification is 
not based on a conviction, a disqualifying official may refer the matter to another 
official for findings of fact and the disqualifying official is required to prepare written 
findings of fact in such cases. 16 No other jurisdiction requires the disqualifying entity 
to prepare a written record as part of the process to determine if an offence was 
committed. 
In the World Bank, the process of determining if an offence has been committed is 
within the discretion of the official that conducts the disqualification process- the 
Evaluations Officer (EO). Allegations of fraud and corruption in Bank-funded 
projects are first referred to the Bank's Department of Institutional Integrity (INT), 
which investigates whether an offence that may lead to disqualification has occurred. 
Once the INT completes its investigation it refers the evidence to the EO17 who 
examines this evidence decides if it supports a finding that the supplier engaged in 
corruption. 
In relation to the Bank's one-off disqualification, determining whether an offence was 
committed is the function of the Bank's Task Manager, who approves the Borrower's 
decision to award the contract to a particular supplier through a "no-objection 
14 Transco Security v Freeman 454 U. S. 820 (1981). 15 Art-45 (3) PSD; Reg. 23 (5) (c) PCR. 
16 FAR 9.406-3 (d). 
17 Art. II WBSP. 
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notice. s18 Where the Task Manager is aware of corrupt activity in competing for the 
contract, and the Borrower proposes to award the contract to the corrupt bidder, the 
Bank may refuse to assent to the award of the contract to this bidder and thus 
disqualify the bidder. However, there is no process by which the Task Manager 
decides that an offence was committed and he has sole discretion in managing the 
process. The procedures for disqualification in such cases are subsumed within the 
Bank's procedures for the prior review of contracts. 19 
South Africa does not provide any information on how a disqualifying entity may 
obtain information on offences under the PPPFA and PFMA regulations. This applies 
in relation to the one-off disqualifications and the disqualifications that deny a 
supplier access to contracts more generally. Where disqualification is imposed by a 
court under the Corruption Act, to determine if a supplier has been disqualified, 
procuring authorities are required to examine the internet-based Register of Tender 
Defaulters20 which is a database of disqualified firms similar to the US EPLS. 
4.2.2.2 Giving the supplier notice of a proposed disqualification and an 
opportunity to make representations 
Informing a supplier about the proposed disqualification and giving the supplier the 
opportunity to be heard or make representations is a fundamental aspect of the notion 
of procedural fairness. 21 As is discussed further below in ch. 4.2.3.1 on the content of 
procedural fairness, adequate notice to the supplier about the proposed 
disqualification should enable the supplier answer the allegations against it. Such 
notice should contain information that disqualification is being contemplated against 
the supplier and the basis for the disqualification. A supplier should also be informed 
at this stage whether and in what form it may make representations to the 
disqualifying entity. 
1s Appendix 1, para. 2 BPG. 19 Appendix 1, para. 2; Williams, 2007a, 290-291. 20 httn: //www. treasurvog v 72/publications/other/Register%20for%20Tender%20Defaulters pdf Z' Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedures: A study ofAdministrative Procedures (1997), chs. 5 &6 [Galligan]. 
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Permitting a supplier to make representations to the disqualifying entity will improve 
the quality of the disqualification decision22 but the nature and extent of such 
representations would vary depending on the discretion available to the disqualifying 
entity and the kind of disqualification measure. 23 Thus, where disqualification is 
mandatory, is based on a conviction, and there are no factual questions to be 
answered, although notice and an opportunity to make representations may be ideal, 
they may not be required in practice as a relevant conviction may serve as sufficient 
notice to the supplier that it will be denied public contracts. In such cases, 
representations will only be valuable to assist the disqualifying entity to determine if 
there are factors necessitating a waiver, where the disqualifying entity possesses 
discretion to waive the requirement to disqualify. Where the disqualifying entity 
possesses a larger measure of discretion on the continuum of disqualification, notice 
and representations should form an integral part of the disqualification decision. 
However, the kind of hearing afforded the supplier may be limited by whether the 
disqualification measure is a one-off measure designed to affect one contract or 
whether the disqualification is a general decision that will affect the suppliers access 
to contracts for a period of time. 24 
In jurisdictions such as the US and World Bank, notice and the opportunity to be 
heard is an express requirement in the regulations. This may in part be due to the fact 
that convictions are not necessarily required for disqualification. However, in the EU, 
UK and South Africa, the disqualifying entity has discretion in these matters although 
in these jurisdictions, the discretion of the disqualifying entity is likely to be 
constrained by administrative law rules on decision-making by public bodies. 
In the EU, the procurement directives are silent on whether notice of a proposed 
disqualification is required and whether a supplier will be given an opportunity to be 
heard. This was intended to give Member States the discretion to adopt procedures 
that conform to national models of administrative decision making and the EU 
expected Member States to fill the lacunae in the directives by adopting relevant 
22 Arrowsmith, Government Procurement and Judicial Review (1988), 164 [Arrowsmith, 1988]. 
23 Lloyd v McMahon [ 1987] A. C. 625 per Lord Bridge, 702; Arrowsmith, 1988,166. 24 Arrowsmith, 1988, ch. 8. 
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procedures, 25 which would meet certain procedural and substantive standards26 and 
comply with EU principles of equal treatment, 27 non-discrimination 28 and 
transparency. 29 It is also possible that national procedures would be expected to 
comply with the EU principle that a person whose interests will be adversely affected 
by the decision of a public authority has a right to be heard. 30 
Where a Member State has not adopted procedures that provide for notice and the 
opportunity to make representations, this does not mean that disqualifying entities in 
such states are free from this obligation. In La Cascina, which dealt with the 
discretionary disqualifications, the CJEU held that the principles of transparency and 
equal treatment, which govern the procedures for the award of public contracts, 
require that the substantive and procedural conditions concerning participation in a 
contract be clearly defined in advance. 31 One way of ensuring that suppliers are aware 
of the conditions for their participation in (or disqualification from) a contract is to 
give a supplier notice of an intention to disqualify it from a contract and the basis for 
its disqualification. 
In implementing the EU directives, the UK procurement regulations are also silent on 
the issue of notice and representations. However, apart from the fact that UK public 
bodies must comply with EU principles as discussed above, UK administrative law 
also requires procedural fairness as a general rule in administrative decision-making, 32 
which may include advance notice of the case against a person and the right to be 
heard. 33 In disqualification cases, the form of the notice and the formality of the 
hearing should be sufficient for a proper determination of the case, 34 with due regard 
to considerations of economy and efficiency in the procurement process. 35 
25 Williams, 2006,732; C-226/04, La Cascina [2006] E. C. R. 1-1347. 
26 Craig, EU Administrative Law (2006), 270. 
27 C-243/89 Commission v Denmark (Storebaelt case) [1993] E. C. R. 1-3353; C-87/94 Commission v 
Belgium (Walloonia Buses) [1996] E. C. R. 1-2043. 
28 C-16/98 Commission v France [20001 E. C. R. I-8315. 29 T-203/96 Embassy Limousines v European Parliament [1998] E. C. R. 11-4239; C-324/98 Telaustria 
[2000] E. C. R. I-10745. 
30 C- 17/74 Transocean Marine Paint v Commission [1974] E. C. R. 1063, para. 15; T-450/93 Lisrestal v 
Commission [1994] E. C. R. II-1177; C-32/95 Commission vLisrestal [1996] E. C. R. II-3773 para. 59. 
" La Cascina, para. 32. 32 Council of the Civil Service Unions V. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A. C. 3 74. 
33 Kanda v Government of Malaya [ 1962] A. C. 322 per Lord Denning. 34 Haoucher V Minister of State for Immigration (1990) 93 A. L. R. 51. 35 Arrowsmith, 1988,165-166. 
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Where disqualification is discretionary and is not based on a conviction, a right to be 
heard is a necessary component of the proper exercise of the disqualifying entity's 
discretion as this will ensure the disqualifying official considers relevant information 
which may not be known to the official36 and will ensure that the official does not 
abuse his discretion by failing to take relevant considerations into account 37 Thus, 
whilst administrative law suggests that a hearing may be appropriate in these cases, 
the form of that hearing is left to the discretion of the procuring authority. 38 
In the UK, the cases that have dealt with the removal of suppliers from an approved 
list of tenderers under statutory provisions may give an indication into how the issue 
of notice and hearing in disqualification decisions may be approached, bearing in 
mind that these cases concerned a general exclusion from contracts similar to the 
mandatory disqualification provisions. In cases of general exclusion, a more involved 
hearing may be appropriate compared to one-off disqualification situations. Thus, in R 
v Enfield London Borough Council ex p. Unwin, 39 a supplier was removed from the 
local authority's approved list of suppliers without being given notice of this action or 
a chance to answer the allegations levelled against it. It was held that the local 
authority was required to give the supplier notice of the allegations and a chance to 
respond and the authority had acted unfairly in not doing so. 40 In other contexts, 
administrators have also been required to give notice of adverse decisions to affected 
persons. Thus, in Abbey Mine Ltd v The Coal Authority, 41 which dealt with the denial 
of a coal-mine licence, it was held that fairness required that "an applicant be told the 
substance of the decision-maker's concerns about his own case. " 
Although the procurement regulations do not indicate whether a notice of a proposed 
disqualification is required, it seems likely that by analogy with the courts approach in 
similar situations, UK procuring authorities may be required to give a supplier notice 
of the proposed disqualification and rights of representation depending on the context 
of the disqualification where the measure is not based on a conviction. 
36 Galligan, 266. 
37 Prescott v Birmingham Corporation [ 1955] Ch. 210. 38 Galligan, 186; Board of Education v Rice [1911] A. C. 179 per Lord Loreburn. 
39 [1989] C. O. D. 466. 
40 Ibid. per Lord Glidewell. 41 [2008] EWCA Civ. 353. 
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As mentioned above, in the US, the giving of notice to a supplier proposed for 
disqualification is elaborated within the legislation, 42 although there are differences in 
approach depending on the length of the disqualification, and the notice requirement 
is tailored to reflect the seriousness of the measure. For longer disqualifications, 
procuring authorities are required to send a supplier and named related persons a 
notice of proposed disqualification including the reasons for the disqualification, and 
the sections of the FAR on which the proposed disqualification is based. 43 This notice 
should also inform the supplier of the effect of a disqualification 
- 
which is that the 
supplier will be listed in the EPLS 
- 
the database of disqualified firms as well as 
information regarding the procuring authority's disqualification procedures. This 
notice gives the supplier 30 days within which to respond and guarantees the supplier 
the right to submit representations in writing. 44 The US courts have also affirmed that 
disqualification must be accompanied by notice to the contractor and an opportunity 
to be heard45 and notices should be sufficient to enable the supplier adequately rebut 
the allegations 46 
In relation to the shorter disqualifications in the US, where the disqualification is 
based on an indictment, notice from the procuring authority is not required as the 
indictment is deemed to constitute sufficient notice of the disqualification to the 
supplier. 47 Where the disqualification is not based on an indictment, procuring 
authorities have a duty to provide a supplier with notice of the fact that the supplier 
has been suspended and an opportunity to make representations by appearing with 
counsel. 48 However, a hearing will be denied where the US Department of Justice 
decides that a hearing will prejudice contemplated or pending legal proceedings. 49 
42 FAR 9.406-3. 
43 FAR 9.406-3 (c). 
44 FAR 9.406-3 (b). 
as Gonzalez v Freeman 334 F. 2d 570 (DC Cir. 1964). 46 Transco Security v Freeman, n. 14,323; Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 
314 (1949); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v Craft, 436 U. S. 1 (1978). 
a' SDA Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-253355,93-2 CPD ¶ 132. 
ag FAR 9.407-3 (b) (2). 
49 FAR 9.407-3 (c). 
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The differing notice and hearing requirements in the US may be because the shorter 
disqualifications may have less of an adverse effect on suppliers50 since they generally 
last for no longer than 12 months and also, because where a shorter disqualification is 
based on allegations of wrongdoing, the government may need to protect the secrecy 
of an investigation. 51 In addition, the shorter disqualifications give the procuring 
authority the ability to quickly disqualify people with which it does not wish to deal. 52 
The World Bank adopts a similar approach to notifying suppliers as the US. As 
mentioned earlier, once the Evaluations Officer is convinced that the supplier engaged 
in corruption, he issues a notice of disqualification proceedings to the firm, giving it 
30 days to explain in writing why it should not be temporarily disqualified from future 
Bank contracts pending the final outcome of the proceedings. 53 In relation to the one- 
off disqualification, a supplier is not entitled to a hearing on the Bank's decision to 
disqualify it. However, if a supplier complains about the Bank's refusal to issue a "no- 
objection" notice, the Bank's Regional Procurement Adviser may suspend the award 
of the contract until the complaints are dealt with, 54 and this may give a disqualified 
bidder an opportunity to be heard. 
In relation to the South African system, for the non judicial disqualifications, the 
legislative provisions are silent on the issue of a notice and a hearing. However, 
public authorities are required in carrying out their public functions to comply with 
the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA), 55 which guarantees a minimum 
level of procedural fairness to persons affected by administrative decisions. As South 
African jurisprudence has determined that all aspects of the procurement process 
amount to `administrative action' within S1 of PAJA, 56 the decision to disqualify a 
supplier must accord with the procedural standards under PAJA. S3 (2) specifically 
50 Horne Bros Inc. v Laird, 463 F. 2d 1268,1270 (D. C. Cir 1972). S' Transco Security n. 14,324 and Horne Bros Inc. ibid; Gordon, "Suspension and Debarment from 
Federal Programs" (1994) 23 P. C. L. J. 573,591. 
52 Canni. 
33 Art. II, S 2.02 WBSP. 
54 Appendix 3, para. 13 BPG; Williams, 2007a, 294. 
ss Act 3 of 2000 [hereafter PAJA]. 56 ABBM Printing and Publishing (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd 1998 (2) SA 109 (W) 117G-H; Nextcom (Pty) Ltd v Funde NO and others 2000 (4) SA 491 (T) 504G-J; Grinaker LTA Ltd and another v Tender 
Board (Mpumalanga) and others (2002) 3 All SA 336 (T) para. 32; Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson 
NO and Others 2003 (2) SA 460 (SCA) para. 5. 
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provides that a person affected by administrative action is entitled to notice of the 
proposed administrative action and an opportunity to be heard. 
In the disqualification context, the South African courts have interpreted the 
provisions of PAJA as requiring a disqualifying entity to give the supplier adequate 
written notice of the nature and purpose of the disqualification and a reasonable 
opportunity to make representations. 57 Where this is not done, the courts have shown 
a willingness to nullify disqualification decisions. In Supersonic Tours, 58 the State 
Tender Board disqualified the applicant and its directors from public contracts for ten 
years, without allowing the applicant to make any representations on the allegations 
against it. The High Court held that the PAJA was not complied with and ordered that 
the decision to disqualify the applicant be set aside. The attitude of procuring 
authorities to giving a supplier the opportunity to be heard as illustrated by this case 
may underlie the need for the legislation on disqualification to expressly include the 
requirements for notice and an opportunity to make representations as is done in the 
US. 
4.2.2.3 Deciding if disqualification is justifiable on the available evidence 
Deciding whether disqualification is justifiable on the available evidence is the core of 
the disqualification decision, and the justification determines whether the decision to 
disqualify is fair. A fundamental aspect of the exercise of public power is that it must 
not be exercised in a manner that is arbitrary or irrational. 59 This section considers 
whether the decision to disqualify is justifiable in relation to the reasons given for the 
disqualification. In other words, is there a logical connection between the 
disqualification and the reasons adduced for the disqualification? Justifying a decision 
is described as a process of showing the facts and the standards to be applied and then 
demonstrating the reasoning process by which the standards were applied to the 
facts. 60 This is a substantive as well as a procedural issue, since the justifiability (or 
S' Supersonic Tours (Pty) Ltd v State Tender Board [2007] J. O. L 19891 (T) affd, Chairman State 
Tender Board v Supersonic Tours (Pty) Ltd 2008 (6) SA 220 (SCA). 58 Supersonic Tours ibid. 
59 Arrowsmith, 1988,194. 
60 Galligan, 430. 
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validity) of the disqualification depends on the substantive reasons on which the 
disqualification is based. 
The procedural issues that arise at this stage include whether the supplier is furnished 
with the factors (the standards) that the disqualifying entity will take into account in 
deciding to disqualify and the procedures that the entity uses to decide whether it will 
waive the disqualification. 
Deciding if disqualification is justifiable is closely linked to the trigger for 
disqualification (a conviction or otherwise) and the discretion available to the 
disqualifying entity. If the disqualification is mandatory and based on a conviction, 
the procuring authority's discretion is limited and procedures will be limited to 
deciding if the disqualification will be waived, where the entity has the discretion to 
do so. However, where the disqualification gives the entity discretion in deciding 
whether an offence was committed and whether it will waive the disqualification, the 
entity may need to apply procedures to ensuring that its decision to disqualify is 
justifiable on the basis of the available evidence and the supplier is aware of the 
factors (or standards) that will be applied to its case. 
Where a disqualifying entity is permitted to waive disqualification or take 
rehabilitation measures into account, procedures may be necessary to decide whether 
a waiver is appropriate or rehabilitation measures are sufficient for the supplier to 
avoid a disqualification. For instance, how will the disqualifying entity request 
evidence of the rehabilitation measures from the supplier? The procedures here will 
be affected by the level of discretion that the disqualifying entity possesses in taking 
rehabilitation measures into account. 
It should be noted that this stage of the disqualification decision may in practice 
overlap with the previous stage on notice and representations, since most jurisdictions 
contemplate that notice of the proposed disqualification should give the supplier 
information on the factors to be taken into account in disqualifying the supplier, if the 
supplier is going to be able to make tangible representations. It is also likely that this 
stage may overlap in practice with the last stage of the disqualification decision 
discussed below- giving the supplier reasons for the decision to disqualify it. 
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However, because of the importance of this stage of the disqualification decision, it 
will be treated as a distinct stage of the disqualification process. 
There are two factors that are relevant to this stage of disqualification. The first is the 
weight of evidence and/or the factors that are relevant for a supplier to be 
disqualified- or to avoid disqualification and the second is whether the supplier knows 
these factors. 
Where disqualification is triggered by a conviction, as is the case in the EU, UK, the 
US and South Africa, the issue of the weight of the evidence required for 
disqualification and to an extent, the factors to be taken into account are met by the 
conviction. However, where disqualification is not based on a conviction, the weight 
of evidence required to disqualify is of great importance and the supplier needs to be 
aware of the factors relevant to the disqualifying entity's decision-making. 
In relation to the discretionary disqualifications in the EU, the weight of evidence 
required for disqualification is either a conviction for an offence relating to 
professional misconduct or being `guilty' of professional misconduct. 61 Where a 
conviction is not required, the directives are silent on the factors that are to be taken 
into account in deciding to disqualify and what weight of evidence is required for 
disqualification. As discussed above, the EU expected Member States to adopt 
procedures for disqualification, which would comply with EU administrative law 
principles that the decisions of public bodies ought to be justifiable. 62 In HI, 63 
Advocate-General Tizzano suggested that the procedures under the EU procurement 
directives must always be interpreted in a manner that guarantees transparency and 
thus cannot be interpreted as having limits, which leave stages or phases of the 
procedures uncovered. The case of La Cascina is also relevant to the obligation on 
EU procuring authorities to give suppliers information on the factors to be taken into 
account and to ensure that the decision to disqualify is justifiable. In this case it was 
held that the procedural and substantive factors relevant to disqualification ought to 
61 Art. 45 (2) (c) & (d) PSD. 
62 C-97/91 Borelli v Commission [1992] E. C. R. 1-6313, para. 14; C-1/99 Kofrsa Italia [2001] E. C. R. I- 
207, para. 46; C-226/99 Siples [2001 ] E. C. R. I-277, para. 17. 63 C-92/00 HI [2002] E. C. R. 1-5553, para. 21. 
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"be determined with absolute certainty and made public in order that the persons 
concerned may know exactly the procedural requirements... "ý 
Thus case law from the CJEU suggests that procuring authorities may be required to 
give suppliers information on the factors to be taken into account in deciding to 
disqualify and further, the decision to disqualify ought to be justifiable, in keeping 
with the principle of transparency. 
The UK regulations followed a similar approach as the EU in not specifying whether 
a procuring authority is required to give suppliers information on the factors relevant 
to a disqualification decision (where the disqualification is not based on a conviction) 
or whether the decision to disqualify must be justifiable. Apart from the fact that UK 
procuring authorities will be required to abide by EU law as discussed above, UK 
jurisprudence also provides information on the approach that entities are expected to 
adopt. By law, the decisions of public bodies must not be unreasonable, 65 arbitrary or 
reached without sufficient evidence. 66 In Rv Bristol City Council ex p. DL Barrett, 67 
where the supplier was removed from an approved list of tenderers, the court held that 
the procuring authority's decision was not justifiable as the decision did not "stand up 
to critical scrutiny. "68 Thus, the exercise of the entity's discretion must be based on 
justifiable evidence and where this is not the case, as is discussed in ch. 9 on remedies, 
the decision to disqualify may be litigated in the High Court 
, 
69 and may be subject to 
judicial review70 in certain circumstances. 7' 
64 La Cascina, n. 25, para. 32. 
65 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corp. [1948] K. B. 223. 
66 Gavaghan v Secretary of State for the Environment (1989) 60 P&C. R. 515. 67 [2001] 3 L. G. L. R 11. 
68 Per Jackson J, para. 66. 69 Reg. 47 PCR. 
70 Bailey, "Judicial Review and Contracting Decisions" (2007) 3 P. L 444-463; Bailey, "Judicial 
Review and the public procurement regulations" (2005) 6 P. P. L. R. 29; R (on the application of 
Cookson & Clegg) v Ministry of Defence [2005] EWCA Civ. 811; Lewis, Judicial Remedies in Public 
Law, (2009), ch. 4 [Lewis]. 71 Judicial review will be available where there has been fraud, corruption, or bad faith in decision- 
making. See R (on the application of Menai Collect Ltd & North West Commercial Services Ltd) v 
Dept. Of Constitutional Affairs [2006] EWHC Admin. 724; Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity 
Corporation of New Zealand [1994] 1 W. L. R. 521, Rv Lord Chancellors Department ex p. Hibbit & 
Saunders [1993] C. O. D. 326, Rv Legal Aid Board ex p. Donn & Co [1994] 3 All E. R. 1; Bailey, 
(2007), n. 70,446. 
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In the US, where disqualification is not made on the basis of a conviction, the 
legislation is clear on the weight to be given to the evidence and the factors to be 
taken into account in disqualifying a supplier for the decision to be regarded as 
justifiable. In such cases, disqualification may only be made on the basis of an 
indictment against the supplier or on the basis of "adequate evidence, , 72 which is 
defined as "information sufficient to support the belief that a particular act or 
omission has occurred. "73 US jurisprudence has also described ` adequate evidence' as 
a "minimal standard of proof'74 and has likened it to the probable cause necessary for 
an arrest, a search warrant, or a preliminary hearing, which must be more than 
uncorroborated suspicion or accusation. 75 
The FAR suggests that in assessing the adequacy of the evidence, agencies should 
consider factors such as the availability and credibility of the information, whether 
important allegations are corroborated and what inferences may reasonably be 
drawn. 76 This assessment should include an examination of basic documents such as 
contracts, inspection reports, and correspondence. 
In the World Bank, where the Evaluations Officer issues a letter of disqualification to 
a supplier and the supplier does not contest the allegations, the EO imposes an 
appropriate sanction. If the supplier contests the allegations, the matter proceeds to the 
Sanctions Board, which has to decide whether it is "more likely than not" that the 
respondent committed the alleged offences. 77 This standard is interpreted as a 
preponderance of evidence that the supplier committed the offence. 78 The factors to 
be taken into account in disqualifying suppliers would have been included in the 
notice of disqualification and it is where these are contested that the supplier is given 
a right to appear before the Sanctions Board. 79 In relation to the Bank's one-off 
disqualification process, there is no indication as to what factors will be taken into 
account, or whether the disqualification has to be justifiable. 
72 FAR 9.407-2 (b) & (c ). 
73 FAR 2.101. 
741n the matter of Frank Lagrua HUDBCA No. 95-G-141-D25. 
's Transco Security v Freeman, n. 14. 
76 FAR 9.407 (1) (b). 
77 Art. VI1I, s8.01, WBSP. 
78 Art. VIII, s8.02 WBSP. 79 Art. VI, WBSP. 
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In South Africa, the PAJA gives the courts the power to examine the legality, 
reasonableness and fairness of administrative decisions. 80 A decision that is lawful, 
reasonable and fair is one that will be regarded as justifiable. In National & Overseas 
Modular Construction v Tender Board, 81 the court held that the decision of the Tender 
Board to reject a tender was not justifiable on the basis of the reasons given. 
Similarly, in Kawari Wholesalers v MEC: Dept. of Health82 where a procuring 
authority based its decision not to award a contract on factors that were not brought to 
the applicant's notice, the court held that the decision was not justifiable on the basis 
of the reasons given for the decision. 83 
Thus, the courts have shown that at least in relation to the consideration of tenders, 
procuring authorities must give suppliers the factors to be taken into account in 
deciding to reject a tender and must also ensure that the decision to reject a tender can 
be justified on the basis of the reasons given for the rejection. Where this is not the 
case, the courts may set aside the decision. It is likely that similar considerations may 
apply in the disqualification context, since all aspects of the procurement process are 
subject to similar procedural requirements. 
In relation to whether a procedure exists for a disqualifying entity to take into account 
rehabilitation measures or other factors that will mean that the supplier will avoid 
disqualification, not all the jurisdictions are clear on whether disqualifying entities 
have a discretion to waive disqualification. 84 Where the legislation gives a 
disqualifying entity the discretion to waive disqualification, the legislation is silent on 
the procedures for implementing such waivers. This is the case where such waivers 
are based on the existence of facts that make disqualification inappropriate- such as 
rehabilitation measures implemented by a supplier, and where such waivers are based 
on a policy rationale such as national security. 
In relation to the EU and the UK, future interpretation by the CJEU as illustrated by 
the courts approach in La Cascina may mean that EU procuring authorities will be 
80 S6 (2) PAJA. 
81 1999 (1) SA 701. 
82 [2008] ZANWHC 12. 
83 Grinaker LTA v Tender Board (Mpumalanga) (2002) 3 All SA 336. 84 Waivers are dealt with in ch. 8. 
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required to adopt suitable procedures in relation to waivers. The US adopts a similar 
approach to the EU and UK. Whilst the US regulations state some of the factors to be 
taken into account in waiving disqualification, there is no established procedure for 
doing so. 85 The discretion of procuring authorities in waiving disqualification in the 
US is however constrained by the fact that the decision may only be made by the head 
of the procuring authority and this power cannot be delegated. 86 In the World Bank 
there is no possibility for a Borrower's agency to waive a disqualification imposed by 
the Bank. 87 The South African legislation is silent on whether procuring authorities 
may waive disqualification but it appears they do not have the power to do so. 88 
4.2.2.4 Giving reasons for the decision to disqualify 
The giving of reasons for a decision is defined as explaining the basis on which a 
decision is made and justifying that basis by reference to a set of standards. 89 In the 
disqualification context, the detail of the reasons may vary depending on whether the 
measure is imposed on the basis of a conviction or other evidence. Where 
disqualification is not based on a conviction, the reasons for the decision should be 
spelt with sufficient clarity so the supplier understands the basis for the decision and 
can appeal the decision where possible. The giving of reasons has two purposes- it 
ensures the decision was properly made and provides a basis upon which the decision 
may be evaluated or challenged. The giving of reasons may improve the decision- 
making process by concentrating the decision-maker's mind on the right questions; 
prove to the applicant that this was the case; show that the issues have been 
conscientiously addressed and how the result has been reached; or alternatively alert 
the applicant to a justiciable flaw in the process. 90 
As discussed, the giving of reasons is closely tied to the requirement that the decision 
should be justifiable and some writers define the giving of reasons to include the 
83 Bednar (ed. ), The Practitioner's Guide to Suspension & Debarment (2002), ch. IV [Bednar]. 
86 FAR 23.506 (e). 
87 Appendix 1, para. 8 BPG. 
'g Williams, 2007b, 24. 
89 Galligan, 429. 
90 Rv Higher Education Funding Council, ex parte Institute of Dental Surgery [1994] 1 All E. R. 651, 
665, per Sedley J. Failure to give reasons may make judicial review impossible- Rv The Mayor and 
Commonalty and Citizens of the City of London ez parte Matson [1996] C. O. D. 161. 
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validity of those reasons. 91 In truth, these two stages of the disqualification process 
are intricately linked, as a reason that is unjustifiable or does not provide any 
indication as to why a decision was taken may not amount to a `reason' in law. 92 This 
section will use reasons to mean the satisfactory rationalisation for a disqualification 
by reference to a prior determined standard. What is satisfactory will depend on the 
administrative culture, the procedural requirements in a given jurisdiction and the 
particular context and nature of the disqualification. 
There are two approaches adopted by the jurisdictions in relation to the requirement to 
give reasons. The first approach is for the legislation to require a disqualifying entity 
to furnish the supplier with a notice containing information on the disqualification 
including the reasons on which the disqualification is based. The second approach is 
for the legislation to be silent on this aspect of the procedure but in such jurisdictions, 
a duty to furnish reasons may be required by administrative law rules that require 
reasons where a public body takes a decision that affects a private interest. 93 
In the jurisdictions under study, the UK, US and World Bank adopt the first approach. 
In the UK, the procurement regulations go further than the EU directives and require 
procuring authorities to notify suppliers of their disqualification from public 
contracts. 94 Under the common law, where reasons are required in administrative 
decision-making based on a statutory scheme, 95 the obligation is to give appropriate 
and reasonable reasons having regard to the circumstances of the case. In cases 
analogous to disqualification (where there was a statutory duty to give reasons) the 
courts have required that the reasons be valid and sufficient. 97 Similar to the UK, the 
US FAR requires a disqualifying entity to give a supplier notice of its disqualification 
including reasons for the disqualification98 and where administrative action has been 
91 Galligan, 430. 
92 R (on the application of Asha Foundation) v Millennium Commission [2003] EWCA Civ. 88, 
para. 24. 
3 Galligan, 431. 
94 Reg. 29A PCR. 
95 R (on the application of Hasan) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2008] EWCA Civ. 
1312; Rv Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parse Doody [1994] 1 A. C. 53I; Rv Civil 
Service Appeal Board ex parse Cunningham [19921 I. C. R. 816; Rv Higher Education Funding Council 
ex parte Institute of Dental Surgery [ 1994] 1 W. L. R. 242,255. 96 Millennium Commission n. 92, para. 24. 97 Rv Bristol City Council ex p. DL Barrett n. 67. 98 FAR 9.406-3 (e); 9.407-3 (c). 
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challenged, US courts have held that discretionary decisions by administrators should 
be supported by reasoned opinions. 99 
In the World Bank, a requirement of giving reasons for disqualification is implied in 
the Bank's disqualification process. As mentioned above, once the Evaluations 
Officer examines the evidence obtained by the INT and decides that the offence was 
committed, the EO sends a notice to the supplier giving it 30 days to explain why it 
should not be temporarily disqualified from Bank contracts on the basis of the 
available evidence. This notice gives the supplier the evidence for which it is to be 
disqualified, which are the reasons for the proposed disqualification. In relation to the 
one-off disqualifications, a supplier is entitled to an explanation from the Borrower in 
writing or at a debriefing meeting. '°° However, where the supplier is not satisfied with 
the reasons or the explanation from the Borrower, in cases where it is disqualified for 
corruption, the supplier may request a meeting with the Bank's Regional Procurement 
Adviser. 101 
The EU and South Africa adopt the second approach to furnishing reasons and the 
legislation is silent as to whether such a requirement exists. As discussed earlier, in 
the EU, this silence can be understood from the perspective that specifying a 
requirement to give notice and furnish reasons may have been unduly prescriptive and 
Member States were expected to fill the lacunae in the directives by adopting relevant 
procedures for disqualification. 102 EU administrative law imposes a duty on public 
authorities to give reasons for their decisions as a precursor to effective judicial 
review, 103 where the measure affects the exercise of a fundamental right conferred by 
the Treaty. 104 The EU procurement directives also impose an obligation on procuring 
authorities, where requested to quickly inform unsuccessful tenderers on the reasons 
for which they were unsuccessful in relation to a public contract. 105 Although this 
obligation does not specifically refer to the disqualification context, it is broad enough 
99 Environmental Defense Fund v Ruckelshaus 439 F. 2d 584 (D. C. Cir. 1971). 
10° Para 2.65 BPG. 
101 Appendix 3 para. 15 BPG. 102 Williams, 2006,732; La Cascina, n. 25. 
103 C-222/86 UNECTEF v Heylens [1987] E. C. R. 4097; A-G Fennelly in C-70/95 Sodemare SA v 
Regione Lombardia [1997] E. C. R. 1-3395 para. 17; Anthony, UK Public Law and European Law 
(2002), 125-130. 
1°4 Sodemare n. 103, para. 19. 105 Art. 41 PSD. 
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to be interpreted as extending to any situation in which a supplier has been 
unsuccessful in the context of a public contract. Coupled with the EU legal duty to 
give reasons, it is arguable that Member States will be expected to furnish suppliers 
with reasons in the disqualification context. 
South Africa adopts a similar approach to the EU and the regulations on 
disqualification are silent as to the giving of notice of a disqualification and the 
furnishing of reasons. However, as discussed above, the PAJA gives all persons the 
right to receive written reasons where a person's rights are adversely affected by 
administrative action. 106 Where reasons for an administrative decision have not been 
given in the disqualification context, the courts have been willing overturn the 
decision. 1 07 
4.2.3 Are disqualification procedures fair and transparent? 
4.2.3.1 Are disqualification procedures fair? 
By whichever name it is known- whether `procedural fairness, ' `natural justice' or 
`due process, ' 108 it is generally accepted that procedural fairness imposes two 
obligations on decision-makers: the obligation to give a fair hearing and the obligation 
not to be biased in decision-making. This section will examine what is necessary in 
the disqualification context to ensure that disqualification procedures meet the fair 
hearing aspect of procedural fairness. As a starting point, one may agree with the UK 
Supreme Court that fairness will often require that a person who may be adversely 
affected by the decision will have an opportunity to make representations either 
before the decision is taken with a view to producing a favourable result; or after it is 
taken, with a view to procuring its modification; or both. 109 The US courts have also 
stated that "basic fairness" requires an opportunity to be heard in the disqualification 
context. ' 10 Ensuring procedural fairness is important as it is regarded as a precursor to 
106 S5. 
107 Supersonic Tours, n. 57. 108 Galligan, chs. 5 & 6. 
109 Per Lord Mustill in Doody, n. 95. 10 Gonzalez v Freeman, n. 45. 
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substantive fairness since procedures define the conditions within which substantive 
rules may be properly and fairly applied. "' 
Several arguments can be advanced on what the fair hearing aspect of fairness 
requires in the context of disqualification measures. At one extreme, one may 
advocate that fairness requires an adversarial type hearing- giving the supplier the 
opportunity to submit evidence and appear with counsel. At the other end, the need to 
prevent disruption and delay to a procurement process (where a procuring authority is 
the disqualifying entity) may mean that no hearing should be provided to the supplier 
in disqualification cases. A middle ground is suggested by Arrowsmith who asserts 
that the requirement of fairness should be tailored to suit the kind of disqualification 
decision. 
The first kind of disqualification decision identified by Arrowsmith are those 
decisions to generally deny a supplier access to public contracts- such as the kind of 
disqualification under the mandatory provisions in the EU/UK and the 
disqualifications in the US, World Bank and the South African Corruption Act and 
PPPFA regulations. The second kind of decision is one to deny a supplier access to a 
particular contract- without implications beyond that contract- such as a decision to 
deny a particular contract for breaches of the particular procurement process. 
Although it is likely that a general disqualification decision will affect subsequent 
individual contract awards, Arrowsmith suggests that a hearing should always be 
provided in the making of general disqualification decisions, but the nature or extent 
of the hearing should depend on the consequences of the disqualification for the 
supplier. In relation to disqualifications limited to individual contract awards, a 
hearing may be available, depending on whether the hearing will cause delays to the 
procurement process and the consequences of the disqualification for the supplier-' 12 
Support for this view is found in the work of Galligan, who suggests that the 
procedural requirements for administrative decision-making should depend on the 
interests at stake. ' 13 
111 Galligan, 54-56 & 316. 
112 Arrowsmith, 1988,166-170. 
113 Galligan, 234. 
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It is suggested that one more factor may be added to determine the availability and 
nature of a hearing in disqualification cases. Thus, the nature of a hearing- whether 
oral or written should depend not only on the kind of disqualification measure, the 
consequences of the disqualification or the interests at stake, but also on the discretion 
that is available to the disqualifying entity. "4 Thus, the nature and availability of a 
hearing should be defined by the nature of the decision-making power and the 
consequence for the affected person. This will mean that there will be very limited 
rights to a hearing where the disqualification does not entail the exercise of discretion 
by the disqualifying entity' 15 and the disqualification is limited to a specific contract. 
For instance where disqualification is mandatory and is based on a conviction, the 
only discretion exercised by the disqualifying entity may be in relation to derogations 
from the disqualification requirement, where permitted. In the EU and UK, the 
mandatory disqualifications permit derogations in limited public interest 
circumstances. Except in the case of rehabilitation measures, these circumstances are 
generally considered from the viewpoint of the procuring authority and as such, a 
supplier may not always be able to provide relevant information on whether it meets 
the public interest exceptions in reference to the needs of the procuring authority. As 
Arrowsmith suggested, the case for a hearing is stronger where the supplier is in a 
good position to supply relevant information, and this may not always be the case in 
relation to the waivers. 
Where the disqualification decision entails more discretion on the part of the 
disqualifying entity, fairness should require that a hearing is required and here 
Arrowsmith's suggestions that the extent of the hearing should depend on the 
consequences of the decision becomes pertinent. The approach of Arrowsmith is 
already used in jurisdictions like the US and the World Bank where longer 
disqualifications come with a statutory requirement for a full adversarial hearing and 
the shorter/one-off disqualifications do not. ' 16 
14 Council of the Civil Service Unions n. 32; Arrowsmith, "Judicial Review and the Contractual Powers 
of Public Authorities" (1990) L. Q. R. 277,283. 
15 Cf. Arrowsmith, "Judicial Review of public procurement: The recent decisions in the National 
Lottery case and Rv Bristol City Council ex p. DL Barrett" (2001) P. P. L. R. NA41. 
116 ATL Inc v United States 736 F. 2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
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If this approach is applied to the discretionary disqualifications in the EU, UK and 
South Africa, suppliers proposed for disqualification ought to be given a right to 
present information rebutting the allegations against them. This may take the form of 
written submissions within specified time limits to avoid delays to the procurement 
process, or a fuller and possibly oral hearing where the decision to disqualify is made 
outside the procurement process. 
4.2.3.2 Are disqualification procedures transparent? 
Transparency is a goal of public procurement117 and a goal of administrative process 
more generally. "8 As an aspect of disqualification procedures, transparency is tied to 
non-discriminatory procedures and the giving of reasons for disqualification 
decisions. 
Transparency in public procurement has been classified into four distinct but 
interrelated aspects-119 Three of these aspects are particularly relevant to the 
disqualification process- publicity for the rules governing the disqualification process; 
rule-based decision-making that limits discretion; and opportunities for verification 
and enforcement through the giving of reasons for the disqualification. 120 To ensure 
transparency in the disqualification process and transparent disqualification decisions 
it is necessary to ensure that the factors for disqualification are clearly specified and 
known to suppliers and that the disqualification is justified by reference to these 
factors and that suppliers are given reasons for the disqualification decision. 
In the jurisdictions, the absence of clearly defined procedures for disqualification 
especially in the context of the EU, the UK and South Africa mean that the 
disqualification procedures fall short of the requirements of transparency. In the EU, 
this issue has been partly clarified by the case of La Cascina, but there is still no 
clarity on how much detail on procedures Member States are required to provide in 
their legislation implementing the disqualifications. Further clarification from the 
"' Arrowsmith, 2005,127-128 & Ch. 7; Arrowsmith, Linarelli & Wallace, ch. 2; Arrowsmith, "Towards 
a Multilateral Agreement on Transparency in Public Procurement" (1998) 47 (4) I. C. L. Q. 793. 118 Lord Mustill in Doody, n. 95. 119 Arrowsmith, 2005,127-128. 
120 Ibid. 
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CJEU on the structure and the limits of Member States discretion in managing the 
disqualification process is required and such clarification will invariably lead to better 
disqualification decisions. In addition, the lack of transparency within the EU 
disqualification system may mean that procuring authorities in Member States may 
not come to consistent disqualification decisions leading to the discriminatory 
treatment of suppliers. 
In Member States like the UK, the absence of clearly defined, transparent procedures 
may be counter to the EU transparency principle121 and the procurement directives, 122 
but also to the express provisions of the disqualification rule requiring Member States 
to specify the conditions for disqualification. 123 As stated, the CJEU in La Cascina 
has demonstrated a requirement for transparent procedures in the disqualification 
context and a Member State that has not included clearly defined and transparent 
procedures for disqualification in its implementing legislation, may be regarded in 
future by the CJEU to be in breach of its transparency obligations. 
Similar comments may be made about the South African system. Whilst the PAJA 
provides a framework within which administrative procedures should be established, 
the omission in the legislation on disqualifications to establish clear and transparent 
conditions for disqualifications has meant that procuring authorities have also not 
adopted transparent procedures for disqualification. 124 In South Africa, transparency 
in public procurement has been given constitutional status and procuring authorities 
are thus under a constitutional obligation to ensure transparency in disqualification 
procedures. 125 
In addition, in the UK and South Africa where procuring authorities use defined 
procedures for other aspects of the procurement process, it is possible that this may 
121 C-470/99 Universale-Bau & Ors [2002] E. C. R. 1-11617; Tomkins, "Transparency and the 
Emergence of a European administrative law" (2000) 19 Y. B. E. L. 217; Peers, From Maastricht to 
Laeken: The political agenda of openness and transparency in the EU in Deckmyn (ed. ), Increasing 
Transparency in the European Union (2002); Braun, "A Matter of Principle(s)-the Treatment of 
Contracts failing outside the Scope of the Public Procurement Directives" (2000) 9 P. P. L. R. 39; 
Brown, "Seeing Through Transparency: the European Court's Case Law on the requirement to 
Advertise Public Contracts and Concessions under the EC Treaty" (2007) 16 P. P. L. R. 1. 
122 Art. 2 PSD. 
123 Art. 45 PSD. 
124 Supersonic Tours, n. 57. 125 S217 (1) South African Constitution; Bolton, 2007, ch. 3. 
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create a (procedural) legitimate expectation126 on the part of suppliers that clear 
procedures for disqualification will be followed and there would be no arbitrary 
disqualification of suppliers. 127 
The US and the World Bank are the only jurisdictions where the procedures for 
disqualification are fairly transparent at least in relation to general disqualification 
measures. In relation to the World Bank one-off disqualifications, the procedures, 
being subsumed within the process for prior review of contracts are not clearly 
defined and a supplier would be required to understand the procedure for prior review 
for it to understand the disqualification process. 
It is suggested that the other jurisdictions may wish to adopt an approach where 
transparent disqualification procedures in the sense of the availability and publicity of 
the rules governing the disqualification process is provided to suppliers. However, as 
discussed in the context of fairness, whilst procedures for disqualification should 
always be available, the extent128 and the detail of these requirements may vary '29 
depending on the nature of the measure; the trigger for the measure (whether based on 
a conviction); the nature of the disqualifying entity (whether a procuring authority or 
otherwise) and the stage of the procurement process during which the measure is 
being considered. 130 Thus, the procedural rules for measures that are triggered by a 
conviction and are implemented by a procuring authority during the procurement 
process may not need to be as detailed as measures not triggered by a conviction and 
imposed outside the procurement process. 
126 Council of the Civil Service Unions n. 32 per Lord Fraser; Knight, "Expectations in transition: recent 
developments in legitimate expectations" [2009] P. L. 15; Sales & Steyn, "Legitimate expectations in 
English public law: an analysis" [2004] P. L. 564,566; Arrowsmith, "Legitimate expectations and 
judicial review in contract award procedures: A note on Rv The Lord Chancellor ex p. Hibbit v 
Sanders" (1993) 4 P. P. L. R. CS104; Allan, Constitutional Justice (2001), 130; Bolton 2007, chs. 2&6. 
127 Hutfield v Board of the Fort Saskatchewan General Hospital District No. 98 (1986) A. L. R. 256; 
Jones, "A comment on Legitimate Expectations and the duty to give reasons in administrative law" 
(1987) 25 A. LR 512. 
128 Per Tucker LJ in Russell v Duke of Norfolk [1949] 1 All E. R. 109,118; Arrowsmith 1988, ch. 8. 
'29 Rv National Lottery Commission ex p. Camelot [2001 ] E. M. L. R 3. 130 Shapiro & Levy, "Government Benefits and the rule of law: towards a standards based theory of due 
process" (2005) 57 A. L. R 107,110; Arrowsmith, 1988,166-167. 
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4.3 Time limits for disqualification 
As stated in the introduction, this chapter will also consider the time limits for 
disqualification. Clear and appropriate time limits give credence to the rationale 
behind disqualification and ensure that the measure is reasonable and proportionate to 
the offence committed; as an excessively long disqualification may be regarded as 
disproportionate, especially where a supplier has already been convicted for a relevant 
offence. Excessive time limits may also call into question the reasonableness of the 
disqualification, which may be grounds for judicial review. 
Time limits are relevant to disqualification decisions in two ways- first, time limits are 
relevant where the disqualification is based on a conviction or offence to determine 
when the conviction or offence ceases to be relevant for the purposes of 
disqualification. This issue is not addressed in the jurisdictions and it is likely that the 
issue will be dealt with by rehabilitative statutes or other national provisions on the 
non-disclosure of convictions. Secondly, time limits are relevant to the length of 
disqualification where the measure is intended to operate for a specified period of 
time. In most jurisdictions, legislative standards prescribe what this period should be, 
whilst also giving the disqualifying entity a measure of flexibility. The two ways in 
which time limits are relevant to disqualification are interlinked as the time limit for 
the relevance of a conviction may invariably spell the length of a disqualification. 
4.3.1 Time limits in the EU and the UK 
In relation to the mandatory disqualifications in the EU, the directives do not indicate 
the length of the disqualification or when an offence ceases to be relevant for 
disqualification purposes, which was left to the discretion of Member States. 
However, as will be seen from the UK, not all Member States have provided time 
limits for disqualification and this approach has unfortunately led to differences in the 
time limits specified by Member States, which may lead to differences in the 
treatment of suppliers in the EU. 131 It will be seen that some of the other jurisdictions 
131 Medina, 2008. 
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provide for either maximum time limits for disqualification (US) or for both minimum 
and maximum time limits for disqualification (South Africa). 
Although the EU directives do not mention when a relevant conviction would cease to 
be relevant for disqualification purposes, the initial proposals on the public sector 
directive provided that disqualification would apply to convictions obtained in the 
five-year period preceding contract award procedures. 132 However, this reference to 
time limits disappeared from the directives as adopted, as some Member States felt 
that a mandatory five-year disqualification period was too long. 133 The preparatory 
documents on the directives also required Member States to specify the "maximum 
length of time prior to the start of the contract award procedure during which account 
must be taken of the conviction. "134This requirement was also deleted from the 
directives as adopted and substituted with the general provision in the present text 
which requires Member States to specify in accordance with national law, the 
implementing conditions for the disqualifications. The reasons behind this substitution 
are however not clear from the preparatory documents. 135 
Member States thus have the discretion to decide on the length of disqualification 
and/or when a conviction ceases to be relevant. Some Member States have adopted 
the five-year rule present in initial proposals and others have left the issue to be 
determined under national rules relating to the disclosure and relevance of 
convictions. 136 However, the absence of EU guidelines on this issue may mean that 
the same conviction might be treated differently in Member States, where differences 
exist in national rules on the non-disclosure of convictions. 137 The absence of a time 
132 Art. 46 (1), Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
coordination of procedures for the award of public supply contracts, public service contracts and public 
works contracts [2001] O. J. C29E/11. 133 Council of the EU, Brussels, 19/10/2000 (31.10) SN4075/00 Presidency Document. Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the co-ordination of procedures for the 
award of public supply contracts, public service contracts and public works contracts. Reproduced in 
Hebly, 2007,1109. 
134 Proposal for a directive of the European parliament and of the council on the coordination of 
procedures for the award of public supply contracts, public service contracts and public works 
contracts, DG C II, SN 2325/1/01/Rev 1 (MAP) Working document, Brussels, 31 May 2001. The 
various Member States have different approaches to this issue. See Medina, 2008. 
15 Outcome of Proceedings from Working Party on Public Procurement, 22/02/2002. Reproduced in 
Hebly, 2007,1139. 
16 Medina, 2008. 137 Annex, White paper on exchanges of information on convictions and the effect of such convictions in the EU COM(2005) 10 final. 
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limit for disqualification in the EU may also call into question the proportionality 138 
and the fairness of the disqualification measure in certain contexts. For instance, 
should a procuring authority disqualify a supplier for convictions obtained in the 5,10 
or 20 years prior to the contract award procedure? Disproportionate time limits may 
also go against the non-punitive rationale for the mandatory disqualifications in the 
EU. 
Time limits are also relevant to the discretionary disqualifications, and the EU 
directives are similarly silent here. However, the CJEU has provided guidance as to 
the importance of time limits in relation to the discretionary disqualifications, which 
principles may also apply to the mandatory disqualifications. Thus, in La Cascina, it 
was held that one of the factors which need to be clearly defined is the time limits for 
when the supplier ought to be in compliance with his obligations. 139 In this case, 
suppliers were disqualified from the procurement procedure on the grounds that they 
were in breach of social security and tax obligations and they challenged the 
disqualification on the basis that the breaches had subsequently been regularised. The 
questions put to the CJEU included whether persons who were not in compliance with 
the relevant obligations, but who could show that they would comply with those 
obligations before the contract was awarded could be permitted to participate in the 
procurement procedure. In other words, at which point in time did suppliers need to 
have complied with their obligations under the relevant legislation? The CJEU 
refused to be prescriptive about the time when the relevant obligations should have 
been met, preferring to leave this to national discretion, but stated that irrespective of 
the approach adopted by national legislation, the time limits for when the supplier 
ought to be in compliance with its obligations and other requirements for 
disqualification should be clearly defined and made public in the interests of 
transparency and equal treatment. 140 It is arguable by extension that the CJEU may 
also require Member States to set clear time limits for the mandatory 
disqualifications. 
138 In C-213/07 Michaniki [2008] E. C. R. 1-9999, A-G Maduro stressed the requirement of 
proportionality in exclusion measures. 39 La Cascina, n. 25, para. 31-32. 140Ibid. 
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In implementing the EU directives, the UK did not go any further on this point than 
the detail in the directives and did not indicate time limits for both the mandatory and 
the discretionary disqualifications. As the issue was left to Member States discretion, 
it would have been preferable for the UK regulations to specify clear time limits. By 
not specifying limits, the UK may run counter to future CJEU interpretation of the 
mandatory disqualifications, as evidenced by the CJEU's approach to requiring 
clearly defined time limits for discretionary disqualifications in La Cascina. 
Although the UK regulations are silent as to the time limits for disqualification or 
when a conviction ceases to be relevant, the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 
provides this information in relation to criminal offences. Under this Act, certain 
convictions become `spent' and do not need to be admitted by the offender after a 
period of time known as the `rehabilitation period. ' The `rehabilitation period' 
depends on the type of sentence given and not the offence committed and custodial 
sentences of more than two and a half years can never become spent. 141 In the 
disqualification context, procuring authorities may feel bound to disqualify a supplier 
with a corruption conviction that can never be spent, meaning such a person may in 
reality be permanently denied access to public contracts. 
The extreme consequences of this possibility were illustrated in R (on the application 
of A) vB Council, 142 where the applicant was an independent bus driver employed by 
a firm, which provided school transport to a local authority. In response to Council 
requirements, all drivers were assessed to ensure that they did not have convictions 
precluding them from working with children. The applicant had been convicted of 
very serious violence offences 30 years previously, and the convictions could never 
become spent. As a result, the applicant was denied employment on the school 
transport subcontracts. In an application for judicial review, the court held that the 
Council had rightly exercised its discretion and dismissed the application. This case 
illustrates the difficulties that could be faced by a supplier convicted of an offence that 
could never become spent, even if the supplier had not committed any offence for an 
extended period as occurred in this case. 
141 S5 (1) Rehabilitation of Offenders Act. The penalty for corruption on indictment under s 11 of the 
Bribery Act is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or a fine or both. 
142 [2007] EWHC 1529. 
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While it seems clear that a supplier will be disqualified for an unspent conviction, 
since such a conviction must be disclosed where information on convictions is 
requested, there is little clarity on the status of a spent conviction. It must be noted 
that information on convictions obtainable from the Criminal Records Bureau may 
include information on spent convictions and it is not clear whether a procuring 
authority in the UK will have to disqualify a supplier on the basis of a spent 
conviction under the mandatory provisions. 
Apart from the adverse effects that an unspent conviction may have on a supplier, the 
absence of any time limits on disqualification may call into question the 
proportionality of a disqualification. However, if disqualification is challenged by a 
supplier before the CJEU, two outcomes are possible: first the CJEU may imply a 
certain minimum period for disqualification, or indicate when disqualification is 
regarded as too brief- in order to increase the effectiveness of the provisions. 
Secondly, specific direction from the CJEU on this issue may lead the EU to include a 
specific period for disqualification 
- 
either a uniform period or, at the very least, a 
minimum period 
- 
in future revisions of procurement legislation. '43 
4.3.2 Time limits in the US 
The US FAR specifies the lengths for both the shorter and longer disqualifications. 
The shorter disqualifications are imposed to protect the government pending the 
completion of an investigation or legal proceedings against a 144 and cannot 
last longer than 12 months, 145 unless an extension is requested or legal proceedings 
against the supplier are underway, in which case, the shorter disqualification will last 
as long as the legal proceedings. The strict imposition of a time limit for the shorter 
disqualification where there are no legal proceedings reinforces its purpose as a non- 
punitive remedy that is directed at protecting the government. In relation to the longer 
disqualifications, a disqualifying official has a measure of flexibility in determining 
143 Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 19.84. 
144 FAR 9.407-4 (a). 
145 FAR 9.407-4 (b). 
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the length of the disqualification, which shall be commensurate with the seriousness 
of the offence but should generally not exceed three years. 146 
The absence of a mandatory minimum period for disqualification reflects the fact that 
disqualification is not intended to be punitive, 147 but should last for as long as is 
required to protect the government from the erring supplier. The US disqualifications 
also take into account the proportionality of the measure, and the disqualifying 
official is permitted to extend the disqualification where necessary to protect the 
government's interest, 148 but may also reduce the period of a disqualification at the 
suppliers request, where new material comes to light, or a conviction or civil 
judgment on which the disqualification is based is quashed, or there is a bona fide 
change in the ownership or management of the supplier, or the causes for 
disqualification have been eliminated or for any other reason that is appropriate. 149 
4.3.3 Time limits in the World Bank 
The World Bank adopts a similar approach to the US and disqualification by the Bank 
is imposed for a defined period of time. 150 The current approach in which the Bank 
disqualifies for a set period of time is a result of evolution within the Bank, but at the 
inception of the Bank's disqualification process, most disqualifications were issued 
for an indefinite period, 151 and between 1999, when the first disqualification was 
imposed and 2001, all the firms disqualified by the Bank were disqualified 
permanently. 1 52 However, the Bank subsequently relaxed the severity of these 
sanctions and since 2010, requires in most cases, a three-year disqualification as the 
base sanction for all misconduct. '53 
In determining the length of a disqualification, the World Bank adopts a similar 
approach to the US and the Sanctions Board may take various mitigating or 
146 FAR 9.406-4 (a). 
147 Gordon, n. 51,589. 
148 FAR 9.406-4 (b); S. A. F. E. Export Corp. 65 Comp. Gen. 530 (B-222308), 86-1 CPD ¶ 413. 
149 FAR 9.406-4 (c ). 
1S0 Para. 1.16 (d) BPG; Art. IX WBSP. 
's' Thornburgh Report, 58. 
152 List of Debarred Firms. Available at www. worldbank. org 
153 Art. 1 World Bank Sanctioning Guidelines (2010). 
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aggravating factors into account, including the severity of the misconduct; the 
magnitude of the harm caused; interference in the investigation; past history of 
misconduct; cooperation in the investigation; and any other factor. '54 
Finally, it must be noted that the Bank imposes limits on the period within which an 
offence should have been committed and the Bank will not disqualify a supplier 
where an offence was committed within a contract that was executed more than ten 
years previously. 155 
4.3.4 Time limits in South Africa 
In South Africa, the length of the disqualification is also specified in the legislation, 
and some of the South African provisions specify both minimum and maximum time 
limits. Requiring minimum time limits further reinforces the punitive rationale for 
disqualification in South Africa as discussed in ch. 2. 
The Corruption Act provides that the length of disqualification should be between 5 
and 10 years. 156 Under the Act, although it is the court that is empowered to 
disqualify, the power to determine the length of the disqualification is reserved to the 
National Treasury, 157 which also has the power to amend or vary the length of 
disqualification. 158 Unlike the US and World Bank provisions, the Corruption Act is 
silent on the factors to be taken into account in determining the length of 
disqualification or in deciding to amend the same. 
The South African PPPFA regulations like the US provisions provide for a maximum 
but no minimum time limit for disqualification, which is not to exceed 10 years. 1 59 
Similar to the Corruption Act, the regulations are also silent on the factors that need to 
be taken into account in determining the length of the disqualification and this has 
been left to the discretion of individual disqualifying entities. A consequence of the 
lack of a standardised approach to disqualification is that since the decision and the 
'54 Art. IX WBSP. 153 Art. IV WBSP. 
156 S28 (3) (a) (ii). 
's' S28 (3) (a) (ii). 
153 S28 (4) (a). 
159 Reg. 15 (2) (d) PPPFA. 
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criteria for disqualification are at the discretion of the procuring authority, this could 
lead to a situation where procuring authorities prescribe different time limits in similar 
cases. Such inconsistencies in application are not desirable and may open a procuring 
authority to a legal challenge to justify why suppliers have been subject to different 
time limits in similar circumstances. In addition, the potential discrimination that 
suppliers may be subject to may be unconstitutional. 160 
4.3.5 Time limits, proportionality, reasonableness, fairness and transparency 
As can be seen, the jurisdictions adopt differing approaches to the issue of time limits- 
with some jurisdictions specifying clear minimum or maximum time limits and others 
being silent on the issue. As mentioned earlier, time limits may affect the perception 
of a disqualification system as proportionate, reasonable, fair and transparent. To be 
regarded as proportionate, a disqualification system should not seek to penalise a 
supplier (unless the purpose of disqualification in the jurisdiction is punitive). 161 The 
length of disqualification should also not be longer than necessary to achieve the 
purpose of disqualification in the jurisdiction. Proportionality is thus tied to the 
circumstances requiring disqualification 
- 
whether the supplier has been previously 
sanctioned for the same offence and the rationale for the disqualification. To ensure 
proportionality, disqualification for criminal infringements must take into account 
previous penalties as well as the express or implied purpose of the disqualification 
system. A lack of proportionality in a disqualification decision may call into question 
the reasonableness of the disqualification decision and may be a ground for judicial 
review. 
In the EU and the UK where the legislation does not provide time limits for 
disqualification, this may lead to disproportionate disqualifications and 
disqualification decisions that go too far in achieving the policy rationale behind EU 
disqualifications as discussed in ch. 2. This was seen in the UK case of R (on the 
application of A) vB Council, 162 discussed above, where the applicant was 
160 S217 (1) South African Constitution. 
161 Tomko & Weinberg, 355. 
162 [2007] EWHC 1529. 
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disqualified from working as a subcontractor for offences committed 30 years prior to 
the contract award procedure. 
In South Africa, the issue of proportionality arises in relation to the excessive time 
limits for disqualification in some of the legislation. The PPPFA regulations and the 
Corruption Act both specify ten years as the maximum length for disqualification, 
with the Corruption Act further imposing a minimum time limit of five years. This is 
arguably an unduly long period of time, if one considers the approach in other 
jurisdictions- the EU procurement directives dropped the five-year time limit because 
Member States felt it was too long and the maximum limit in the US is three years. 
The emerging jurisprudence on disqualification in South Africa shows that procuring 
authorities appear to impose the maximum disqualification period on suppliers163 and 
do not use their discretion to impose shorter time limits. Although the South African 
disqualification system is punitive, these time limits may still be regarded as 
excessive and disproportionate. 
Time limits may also affect the fairness and transparency of disqualification. Where 
there are no clear time limits for disqualification, this may lead to decisions that may 
not be justified by reference to the offence or may lead to the different treatment of 
suppliers in similar cases. As discussed in ch. 4.2, transparency in public procurement 
requires publicity of the rules governing the procurement process. An aspect of 
transparency in the disqualification process is the presence of rules, which specify the 
time limits for disqualification or expressly link time limits to domestic rules on non- 
disclosure of convictions. Although domestic rehabilitative statutes may provide 
information on when convictions become spent or expunged from the record, it is 
suggested that this information ought to be included in legislative provisions on 
disqualification. This will increase transparency by ensuring that suppliers are aware 
of the requirements of the disqualification process, will ensure that there is uniformity 
in relation to time limits, reduce the scope for discriminatory decisions and ensure that 
the disqualification is relevant to the supplier's present status, especially when 
disqualification has a non-punitive rationale. 
163 Chairman, State Tender Board v Supersonic Tours (Pty) Ltd n. 57. 
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4.4 Disqualifying entities and the scope of disqualification 
4.4.1 Introduction 
The final issue considered by this chapter is the types of entities involved in the 
disqualification process and the scope of disqualification once imposed i. e. whether 
disqualification will apply to procuring authorities beyond the entity that disqualifies 
the supplier. 
There are four kinds of entities that may be used in the disqualification process: 
procuring authorities; administrative bodies; the courts and to a limited extent, the 
legislature. The nature of the disqualifying entity will affect the types of decisions that 
the disqualifying entity can take, the discretion available to the disqualifying entity 
and the limits of the disqualifying entities powers to bind other entities with a 
disqualification decision. 
In most jurisdictions, the different elements of a disqualification decision are split 
between different disqualifying entities. The stages of the disqualification process 
analysed in ch. 4.2 revealed the four substantive elements of a disqualification 
decision that need to be addressed by a disqualifying entity. The first is whether a 
supplier is guilty of having committed a relevant offence. The supplier's guilt may be 
determined by judicial process or a professional organisation exercising a judicial 
function, whilst a procuring authority considering disqualification will require proof 
of a conviction/offence. The second element of a disqualification decision is whether 
disqualification is justifiable on the basis of the supplier's guilt, or whether there are 
public interest factors or the supplier's rehabilitation, which make disqualification 
inappropriate in a particular circumstance. This may be determined by a court 
imposing disqualification as part of a sentence for corruption, by an administrative 
body or procuring authority. The legislature may also have specified in the law what 
public interest factors ought to be considered by the disqualifying entity. The third 
element of a disqualification decision is the length of the disqualification. This may 
also be determined by a court; an administrative body; a procuring authority or the 
legislature, where the law specifies the time limits for disqualification. The fourth 
element is the applicability of the disqualification to related persons. This may be 
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decided by the entity that imposes the disqualification or the lawmaker, where there is 
a legal or policy requirement to disqualify named related persons. 
It is also possible for all the elements of the decision to be determined by one entity 
such as a court or an administrative body and for individual procuring authorities to 
merely be required to give practical effect to the decision of this entity. In other cases, 
especially in relation to the decisions which involve policy considerations such as 
public interest waivers or the disqualification of related persons, it is also possible for 
the lawmaker to have enumerated the instances in which such waivers or 
disqualifications may be appropriate and for a disqualifying entity such as a procuring 
authority or administrative body to apply this policy to individual cases- giving 
different entities jurisdiction over one aspect of the decision. 
The issue of the scope of disqualification deals with whether once an entity has 
disqualified a supplier, other entities or procuring authorities may, or must also apply 
the disqualification decision. 
This section will examine which entities are charged with disqualifying suppliers, the 
appropriateness of such an entity and the kinds of decisions that the entity is able to 
take as part of the disqualification process as well as whether the disqualification 
decision of one entity is binding on other entities. 
4.4.2 Disqualifying entities 
4.4.2.1 Courts 
The role of the courts in the disqualification process is often limited to determining 
the guilt of a supplier for relevant offences. Where disqualification relates to an 
offence for professional misconduct, a professional organisation may perform a 
judicial function in determining the supplier's guilt. As an impartial institution, a 
court is the best forum for deciding whether a supplier is guilty of an offence since it 
has the power to obtain evidence and summon witnesses. 
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Apart from deciding whether an offence was committed, a court may also be charged 
with determining other elements in a disqualification decision. Thus, legislation may 
give a court power to disqualify a supplier as part of the sentence for the offence 
committed. Whilst a court may be competent to decide if disqualification is an 
appropriate sanction on a supplier, especially where disqualification is intended to be 
punitive, it is less clear if a court will be able to come to a satisfactory decision on the 
second element of the disqualification decision- which is deciding whether there are 
public interest or other factors making disqualification inappropriate. This is because 
a court may be unable to foretell the circumstances that will face procuring authorities 
that are required to apply the disqualification decision of the court. This element of 
the disqualification decision is best left to procuring authorities who are best able to 
determine their requirements in relation to a disqualified supplier. 
The third element of a disqualification decision is the length of the disqualification. 
This decision may be reserved to the courts where the court is given the power to 
disqualify corrupt suppliers. In such cases, a court may rely on the legislation on 
disqualification or general sentencing guidelines to determine an appropriate length of 
disqualification. 
The fourth element of a disqualification decision is determining the position of 
persons/firms related to the corrupt supplier. It is suggested that the courts may not be 
the appropriate forum for this decision unless the courts are willing to examine the 
networks of company ownership to ensure that that a related firm is not unduly 
prejudiced. 
Using the courts as the forum for disqualification has certain advantages- the 
disqualification process will benefit from the procedural safeguards that accompany 
criminal trials and investigations into the commission of the offence will be conducted 
by the prosecution, who may be more thorough than a procuring authority as they 
possess better investigatory tools and expertise. Also, domestic prosecutorial 
authorities may provide a central source of information on completed investigations, 
making the dissemination of this information much easier. Although the courts are not 
generally used as a disqualifying entity, the courts however have the power to review 
163 
the different aspects of a disqualification decision under their power of judicial review 
of administrative decisions. 
Where disqualification is triggered by a conviction or civil judgment, the courts or 
similar adjudicatory bodies will be used to determine if the supplier is guilty of the 
relevant offence. Thus in the EU a supplier will be disqualified under the mandatory 
disqualifications where he has been convicted "by final judgment" and under the 
discretionary disqualifications where he has been convicted "by a judgment which has 
the force of res judicata. "164 A similar approach applies in the UK, the US and in 
South Africa under the Corruption Act, and in these jurisdictions, a supplier also 
needs to have been convicted (or obtained a civil judgment) for disqualification to be 
considered against the supplier. 
In relation to determining the other elements of a disqualification 
- 
such as whether 
disqualification is appropriate in a given case, the length of disqualification and the 
position of related persons, none of the jurisdictions, except South Africa give the 
courts this power. In South Africa, the Corruption Act gives the courts the discretion 
to disqualify a supplier as part of the sanctions for procurement-related corruption 
offences, 165 and the courts also decide whether the disqualification will apply to 
persons and firms related to the corrupt supplier. 166 However, under the Corruption 
Act, the third element of a disqualification- determining the length of the 
disqualification is reserved to an administrative entity- the National Treasury. 167 
As discussed above, it is not clear whether the courts are the appropriate forum for 
determining most elements of the disqualification decision. In South Africa, the courts 
have exhibited an unwillingness to exercise their discretion to disqualify corrupt firms 
and between 2004 and April 2011, only two persons were disqualified under the 
Corruption Act. 
164 Art. 45 (1) & (2) PSD. 
'65 S28 (1). 
'66S28 (1). 
167 S28 (3). 
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4.4.2.2 Procuring authorities 
Procuring authorities are the most common forum for disqualification determinations 
and are the disqualifying entity in the EU, UK, US and under the South African 
PPPFA and PFMA regulations. In most jurisdictions, procuring authorities are given 
the power to decide on all the substantive elements of the disqualification decision, 
except, determining if the supplier is guilty of a criminal offence where 
disqualification is based on a conviction. 
Where disqualification is triggered by evidence short of a conviction, a procuring 
authority may be required to either decide or obtain sufficient proof that the supplier 
committed the offence. The ease by which a procuring authority will achieve this may 
depend on what is regarded as sufficient proof and how much time and resources a 
procuring authority devotes to obtaining this proof and the extent of the procuring 
authority's investigative powers. 
In relation to the first element of a disqualification decision 
- 
determining that an 
offence was committed; procuring authorities may not be the most appropriate forum 
for this as such decisions will normally involve a level of investigation for which the 
procuring authority may not have the expertise, time or resources to carry out 
efficiently. As is discussed in ch. 5, most procuring authorities have not been given 
express powers of investigation and are limited to disclosures by a supplier as proof 
that an offence was not committed. Also, where a procuring authority has to 
determine whether the supplier has committed a relevant offence, where the offence 
was committed against the procuring authority, such as where corruption occurs in an 
ongoing procurement procedure, this puts the procuring authority in a position where 
it may be contravening the rule against bias 168 since the procuring authority will be a 
person with an interest in the proceedings, whose participation may create the 
likelihood of bias. 169 
168 However, the US Supreme Court has held that combining investigative and adjudicative functions 
does not necessarily constitute a due process violation: Withrow v Larkin 412 U. S. 35,58 (1975). 
'69 Arrowsmith, 1988,173, argues that the rule against bias may not apply with the same force to 
administrative proceedings 
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In relation to the second element of a disqualification decision- deciding if 
disqualification is appropriate in a particular case, a procuring authority may be the 
most appropriate forum for this as a procuring authority will be able to determine 
whether disqualification is in its best interest. However, this is not true in all cases and 
where a supplier argues that disqualification is not warranted because it has 
eliminated the cause for disqualification, a procuring authority may not be able to 
satisfactorily decide if the supplier's rehabilitation is sufficient to avoid 
disqualification as the procuring authority may not fully appreciate the nuances of 
company law and ownership that may be presented by a supplier's rehabilitation. 
Thus, the procuring authority may find that its decision is challenged on the basis that 
its discretion has not been properly exercised because it is unable to sufficiently 
address the issues raised. 170 
The third element of a disqualification decision- determining the length of the 
disqualification is reserved by most jurisdictions to procuring authorities. Arguably a 
procuring authority is the most appropriate entity to make this decision, as the 
procuring authority will be able to decide how long the disqualification is required to 
protect itself from the corrupt supplier. 
The fourth element of the disqualification decision 
- 
determining the `fate' of related 
persons is also often left to the discretion of procuring authorities. The 
appropriateness of a procuring authority for taking this decision may depend on 
whether the supplier is well known to the procuring authority and/or whether the 
procuring authority is able to sufficiently devote resources to examining the 
relationships between the disqualified supplier and related persons. As has been 
detailed by Anechiarico and Jacobs, the expense of doing this may mean that it may 
not always be appropriate for a procuring authority to be involved in making this 
decision. 171 
The jurisdictions adopt different approaches to the taking of disqualification decisions 
by procuring authorities. In relation to the first element of disqualification- deciding if 
170 Padfield v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food [1968] A. C. 997 per Lord Upjohn; Pierce, 
"Judicial Review of agency actions in a period of diminishing agency resources" (1997) 49 A. L. R. 61. 
171 Anechiarico and Jacobs, 1995,162-172. 
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an offence has been committed, all the jurisdictions leave it to a procuring authority to 
decide if an offence was committed where a conviction is not required for 
disqualification. In the EU, a procuring authority is required under the discretionary 
disqualification provisions to disqualify a supplier who is "guilty 
... 
by any means 
which the procuring authority can demonstrate. "172 Similarly, in the UK, a procuring 
authority may disqualify a supplier who has "committed an act of grave 
misconduct... "173 In the US, a procuring authority may temporarily disqualify a 
supplier "upon adequate evidence... "174 and an indictment for a relevant offence 
constitutes "adequate evidence. "' 75 Under the South African PPPFA and PFMA 
regulations, a procuring authority may disqualify a supplier who has "committed" a 
relevant offence. 176 As is discussed further in ch. 5, apart from South Africa, the 
jurisdictions give an indication into the kind of evidence or proof that a procuring 
authority may rely on in deciding that an offence was committed. 
In relation to the second element of a disqualification decision- determining if 
disqualification is appropriate or if there are factors precluding disqualification in a 
particular case, this decision is also reserved to procuring authorities in the 
jurisdictions. Thus, the EU and UK reserve the power to decide if disqualification is 
appropriate to the procuring authority, which also determines if there are public 
interest considerations which mean the supplier should not be disqualified. Both the 
EU and the UK give a large measure of discretion to procuring authorities in relation 
to this decision as the law defines public interest in very broad terms. A similar 
approach is adopted by the US where a procuring authority may derogate from 
disqualifications imposed by other entities where there are compelling reasons for 
doing so. In South Africa, there is no possibility for procuring entities to derogate 
from a general disqualification that is imposed by the courts or another procuring 
authority. 
In jurisdictions where the disqualification is imposed by a central authority, the 
decisions of a procuring authority may be limited to determining where discretion 
172 Art. 45 (2) (d) PSD. 
173 Reg. 23 (4) (e). 
"' FAR 9.407-2 (a). 
175 FAR 9.407-2 (b). 
176 Reg. 5 PPPFA and Reg. 16. A9.1 PFMA. 
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exists, whether the authority should apply the disqualification decision. Where there is 
no discretion, a procuring authority will merely be required to give practical effect to 
the disqualification decision. This is the case in relation to disqualifications under the 
South African Corruption Act (imposed by the courts) and disqualifications in the 
World Bank (imposed by the EO/Sanctions Board). 
In relation to the third element of a disqualification decision- the length of the 
disqualification, there are differing approaches to this issue. In the EU, the UK, the 
US, and the South African PPPFA regulations, this issue has been left to the 
discretion of procuring authorities, who determine the time limits for disqualification 
within the limits set by law, where applicable. 
The fourth element of disqualification- the position of related persons is also usually 
reserved to procuring authorities, after the legislation may have determined what 
categories of related persons ought to be disqualified. In the EU, a procuring authority 
is required to disqualify "any candidate or tenderer" from public contracts, whilst the 
UK regulations provide that the procuring authority must disqualify "the economic 
operator or its directors or any other person who has powers of representation, 
decision or control of the economic operator. " Similarly, the US and the South 
African provisions provide that the procuring authority may also disqualify various 
persons and firms related to the disqualified supplier. "' The position of related 
persons is discussed in ch. 6. 
4.4.2.3 Administrative bodies 
Where administrative bodies are used to disqualify suppliers, the body may issue a 
general disqualification against a supplier, which individual procuring authorities may 
give effect to. As a forum for taking disqualification decisions, administrative bodies 
possess a number of advantages over the courts and procuring authorities. First, an 
administrative body may eliminate the delays to the procurement process that 
disqualification may cause where a procuring authority conducts the disqualification 
procedure within the procurement process. Secondly, an administrative body may lead 
177 FAR 9.406-5; Reg. 15 PPPFA and Reg. 16. A9 PFMA. 
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to the centralisation of expertise, which may eventually lead to quicker, fairer and 
more transparent decisions as the body learns from past mistakes and challenges to its 
decisions. Thirdly, an administrative body may serve as a central source of statistical 
information on disqualification, which may be used to analyse the efficacy of the 
disqualification regime. Fourthly, an administrative body will save the time and 
resources procuring authorities would have used in making multiple disqualification 
decisions over the same supplier in jurisdictions, which do not maintain central 
databases of disqualified firms. 
In spite of the advantages of an administrative body over the courts and procuring 
authorities, few jurisdictions utilise such bodies for disqualification and they are only 
used in limited contexts for some elements of the disqualification decision. 
In relation to the first element of a disqualification decision- determining the guilt of a 
supplier, an administrative body involved in disqualification may be required to 
conduct a judicial function and decide if an offence was committed or obtain 
information on the guilt of a supplier that has been established by a court or other 
entity. Where an administrative body performs a judicial function by establishing the 
guilt of a supplier, it may be necessary for the body to possess a certain level of 
investigative power. Such a body may also need to establish procedures to ensure 
fairness in its determination of the supplier's guilt. 
In relation to the second element of a disqualification decision- determining if 
disqualification is appropriate, similar arguments made in relation to the courts may 
be advanced and it is not clear whether an administrative body is the best forum for 
determining whether public interest concerns make disqualification inappropriate. As 
discussed in the context of courts, entities external to a procuring authority may be 
unable to foretell if derogating from a disqualification is in the best interests of a 
procuring authority in a particular case and the administrative body may not always 
be aware of the reasons why a procuring authority may need to contract with a 
supplier even though a cause for disqualification might exist. 
In relation to the third element of the disqualification decision- the length of the 
disqualification, an administrative body may be able to decide an appropriate length 
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for disqualification in order to protect the government from the corrupt supplier, or 
fulfil the government's policy in relation to disqualification. This is because an 
administrative body may possess a macro-understanding of the procurement system 
and can thus take appropriate decisions for the benefit of the system as a whole. 
Determining the fourth element in a disqualification decision- the position of related 
persons may be easier for an administrative entity than a procuring authority, 
especially where an administrative entity has disqualification as one of its main 
functions, as it may be able to devote parts of its budget to investigating the networks 
of company ownership relevant to the disqualification of related persons. 
As mentioned above, most of the jurisdictions do not rely on administrative bodies for 
disqualification. In relation to the first element of a disqualification decision- 
determining if an offence was committed, the only jurisdiction that uses an 
administrative entity to make this decision is the World Bank. As discussed in ch. 4.2, 
the Bank's INT determines whether an offence was committed. Although the Bank 
does not possess the same kind of investigative powers as national authorities, the 
Bank is able to rely on contractual provisions, which give the Bank access to the 
relevant documentation of suppliers. 178 
In respect of the second element of disqualification- determining if disqualification is 
appropriate, again, the World Bank relies on its Evaluations Officer to decide whether 
there are factors which mean the supplier should not be disqualified. Although the 
Bank does not take public interest considerations into account, the Bank may take 
mitigating factors into account and impose a lesser sanction on the supplier. 179 
Thirdly, in relation to the length of the disqualification, this power is again within the 
remit of the Evaluations Officer, within the limits provided by the Bank's sanctioning 
guidelines. The use of an administrative entity external to the procurement process for 
disqualification is due to the nature of Bank procurement, in that since the Bank does 
not conduct the procurement process for funded projects, it is unable to utilise 
procuring authorities to disqualify suppliers. South Africa also adopts an approach 
178 Para. 1.16 (e) BPG. 
179 Art. IX WBSP; Williams, 2007a, 299. 
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whereby in relation to disqualifications under the Corruption Act, it is an 
administrative entity- the National Treasury that determines the length of a 
disqualification. 1 so 
The fourth element in a disqualification decision- determining the position of related 
persons is again left to the Evaluations Officer in the World Bank context, whilst as 
discussed above; the other jurisdictions leave this to procuring authorities or the court 
under the South Africa Corruption Act. 
4.4.2.4 The legislature 
As a disqualifying entity, the legislature's role is limited to passing statutes that 
prescribe the framework for the disqualification process. These laws will in turn be 
interpreted and applied by other entities such as the courts, procuring authorities and 
administrative bodies. In the jurisdictions, the disqualification regime is governed to 
various extents by binding laws and regulations, which give different entities various 
measures of discretion over specific aspects of the disqualification process. 
Where parliament has issued legislation on disqualification, disqualifying entities are 
required to give practical effect to the law by disqualifying the suppliers identified as 
liable to disqualification by the law. The existence of clear laws governing the 
disqualification process promotes transparency, certainty and clarity in the 
disqualification system. 
In relation to the first element of a disqualification decision- determining the guilt of a 
supplier, the legislature's role is to enumerate the offences which may lead to 
disqualification and possibly the standard of proof required for such offences- either a 
conviction or a determination of guilt by another entity. This is the case in all the 
jurisdictions and the offences that may lead to disqualification are enumerated in the 
relevant laws. 
180 S28 (3) Corruption Act. 
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In relation to the second element of a disqualification decision- determining if 
disqualification is appropriate, again, the legislature's role is limited to specifying the 
public interest concerns or the factual situations such as the suppliers rehabilitation 
that make disqualification inappropriate in a particular case. In such situations, as 
discussed in ch. 8, clarity in the law is of the utmost importance to prevent such 
waivers from being abused. In the jurisdictions, however, this issue is one in which 
the most amount of discretion has been left to the other entities in the disqualification 
process. Thus, the US and the EU/UK all in broad terms state that a disqualifying 
entity may waive a requirement to disqualify where it is in the general interest or there 
are compelling reasons for doing so without going into further detail. Disqualifying 
entities thus have to determine and interpret the meaning of public interest within 
what they consider to be the limits of the law. 
In relation to the third element of the disqualification decision- the length of the 
disqualification, again, the lawmakers may prescribe either specific time limits for 
various offences, or give other disqualifying entities discretion to set limits within a 
prescribed minimum or maximum time limit as is the case in the US, World Bank and 
South Africa. 
The fourth element in a disqualification decision- the position of related persons may 
also be determined by the legislature, where it requires the disqualification of certain 
categories of related persons. As will be seen in ch. 6, the law on disqualification in all 
the jurisdictions specifies to differing extents, the related persons that are liable to be 
disqualified. 
4.4.3 The scope of disqualification 
The issue here is whether a disqualification is applicable beyond the entity that 
imposed the measure. A disqualification may affect other entities, or it may not have 
any effect beyond the entity that imposed the disqualification. Where disqualification 
is imposed by an administrative entity or a court, the disqualification may be applied 
by procuring authorities required to give practical effect to the decision of this entity. 
Where disqualification is imposed by a procuring authority, it is not in every case that 
other procuring authorities will be required to apply the disqualification decision. It 
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will be seen that not all the jurisdictions are clear as to whether a disqualification 
decision should be implemented by other entities. Thus, as will be seen, whilst the 
US, the World Bank and South Africa (Corruption Act & PPPFA Regulations) are 
clear that disqualification imposed by a relevant entity should be applied by other 
procuring entities, the EU and the UK provisions are silent on this issue. 
There are advantages and disadvantages to having a relatively wide scope of 
disqualification. First, extending disqualification to other entities may be necessary in 
certain contexts to secure the effectiveness of the disqualification measure and also 
because the increased opening of procurement markets due to the EU directives, the 
GPA and other trade agreements181 means that disqualification measures limited to 
one procuring authority or even one jurisdiction may have a limited impact. Second, 
extending disqualification may also be efficient in that resources are not wasted by 
other entities taking similar decisions over the same supplier. However, extending 
disqualification to a wide range of procuring authorities may be disproportionate to 
the aims sought to be achieved by a disqualification system, may be potentially 
devastating to suppliers and may turn a non-punitive disqualification into a punitive 
measure and reinforces the need for adequate procedural safeguards. 
Where disqualification is designed to affect other entities, two issues are raised- first, 
how do other entities discover that the supplier has been previously disqualified and 
second, what elements of the disqualification decision are left to the discretion of the 
non-disqualifying entity applying the disqualification? 
4.4.3.1 A requirement that disqualification be extended and discovering previous 
disqualifications 
The US, South Africa and the World Bank are clear on the fact that disqualification 
should be applied by entities beyond the disqualifying entity and also provide for how 
such procuring authorities discover the existence of previous disqualifications. 
'a' Davies, "Government Procurement" in Lester & Mercurio (eds. ) Bilateral and Regional Trade 
Agreements: Commentary and Analysis (2009). 
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The most common method of enabling entities to discover previous disqualifications 
is for a jurisdiction to create a database of disqualified firms, which will be examined 
by procuring authorities during the procurement process. Such a database may be 
open to the public at large, or may be restricted to procuring authorities. For instance, 
South Africa and the World Bank maintain internet-based databases that are open to 
the public. The US maintains a similar database that is also open to the public with 
sensitive information being restricted to procuring authorities. A jurisdiction will also 
have to provide for the management of the database, which includes recording the 
information on disqualifications and removing this information once the 
disqualification expires. 
In the US, the FAR provides that a disqualification shall be "effective throughout the 
executive branch of the government" unless the disqualification is waived by the head 
of an agency. 182 Thus, once a supplier is disqualified, all federal procuring authorities 
are obliged to abide by this decision. For other procuring authorities to discover the 
previous disqualification, the General Services Administration maintains an internet- 
based register of disqualified firms called the Excluded Parties List System (EPLS), 
which is publicly available. 183 
South Africa adopts a similar approach to disqualification under the Corruption Act. 
Both the Corruption Act184 and the PFMA regulations185 provide that all procuring 
authorities and government departments either ignore any tender made by a 
disqualified supplier or otherwise disqualify the supplier from accessing contracts in 
that procuring authority. This approach is made possible by the inclusion of the 
supplier's details in the `Register for Tender Defaulters', an internet-based database of 
disqualified suppliers that is maintained by the National Treasury. The PFMA 
regulations which apply to all national and provincial authorities oblige public bodies 
to consult the Register before awarding a contract to ensure that a bidder for a public 
contract has not been disqualified. 186 
182 FAR 9.407-1 (d); FAR 9.406-1 (c). 
183 FAR 9.404; 9.405 (a). 
'" S28 (3) (iii). 
'BS Reg. 16A9.1 (c) PFMA. 
'" Reg. 16A9.1 (c) PFMA. 
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The South African PPPFA regulations also require disqualifications to be 
implemented by a wide range of procuring authorities by providing that a procuring 
authority may disqualify a supplier from obtaining business from any `organ of state' 
for the duration of the disqualification. '87 `Organ of state' means a national or 
provincial department; a municipality; a constitutional institution; Parliament; a 
provincial legislature; and any other institution or category of institution included in 
the definition of `organ of state' in s 239 of the Constitution. 188 Thus, disqualifications 
under the PPPFA are required to be implemented by local, provincial and national 
authorities, constitutional institutions and perhaps, government parastatals. 189 
However, the regulations omit to provide for the listing of the supplier on the Register 
for Tender Defaulters, an omission, which may make extending the PPPFA 
disqualifications impracticable. 
The World Bank has adopted an approach similar to that of the US and South Africa. 
The diversity of the Bank's operations means that the procuring authorities that are 
required to abide by the Bank disqualification measures are located worldwide in 
Borrower countries. Once the Bank disqualifies a supplier, the fact and duration of the 
disqualification is listed on the Bank's `List of Debarred Firms', a publicly available 
database of disqualified firms, and any agency conducting procurement using Bank 
funds must examine this database to ensure that persons bidding for the contract have 
not been previously disqualified. 190 Where a previously disqualified firm tenders for a 
Bank contract, the Borrower or its agencies must inform the supplier that it is not 
eligible to tender for the contract. 191 
4.4.3.2 No clear requirement that disqualification be extended 
As mentioned above, the EU and UK provisions are both silent as to whether a 
disqualification imposed by one procuring authority will affect other procuring 
authorities. This issue is particularly important in the context of the EU where one of 
the purposes of disqualification is to prevent the cross-border effects of corruption as 
'g' Reg. 15 (2) (d) PPPFA. 
188 S1 PPPFA. 
1S9 Fidelity Springbok Security Services (Pty) Ltd v South Africa Post Office Ltd [2004] J. O. L. 13215 
(T); Bolton, 2007,268. 
190 Appendix 1, para. 8 BPG. 
191 Para. 1.8 BPG. 
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discussed in ch. 2. Although this issue is not addressed by the directives, it has been 
recognised that the increasing free movement within the EU requires greater exchange 
of disqualification information in the EU, 192 and there have been several attempts 
made towards measures that would eventually lead to coordination in disqualification 
matters. 193 
There are two issues that arise in the context of the EU- first is whether a conviction 
obtained in one Member State will lead to disqualification in another Member State 
and the second is whether a disqualification decision in one Member State will be 
applied by procuring authorities in other Member States. As discussed in ch. 2, based 
on the definition of corruption imported into the mandatory disqualification 
provisions, it appears that a procuring authority may disqualify for a conviction 
obtained in another Member State, if the procuring authority is able to obtain 
information on the conviction. 194 It is of course difficult for a procuring authority to 
determine whether a supplier has been convicted in another Member State, 195 
although there are various initiatives underway to improve the dissemination of 
criminal information in the EU as discussed in ch. 5. The European Commission has 
also provided assistance in the form of a list of the kind of documents relating to 
convictions that are issued by Member States and the names of the institutions that 
issue these documents' 96 and Member States are required to assist by designating the 
authorities competent to issue information on convictions. 197 
Although there is no information on whether a disqualification by one procuring 
authority in the EU should be applied by other procuring authorities, eliminating the 
necessity for the other procuring authority to come to a separate decision to disqualify 
the same supplier, it is suggested that once a procuring authority in one Member State 
192 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: 
Disqualifications arising from criminal convictions in the EU COM(2006) 73 final; Initiative of the 
Kingdom of Denmark with a view to adopting a Council Decision on increasing cooperation between 
European Union Member States with regard to disqualifications [2002] O. J. C223/17. 
193 Initiative of the Kingdom of Denmark ibid; White Paper on exchanges of information on 
convictions and the effect of such convictions in the EU, COM (2005) 10 final; Council Decision 
2005/876/JHA on the exchange of information extracted from the criminal record. 
194 Art. 45 (1) PSD. 
199 White Paper on exchanges of information on convictions and the effect of such convictions in the 
EU, COM (2005) 10 final. 
I% See http//ec europa. eu/internal market/publicnrocurement/2004 18/index en. htm 197 Art. 45 (4) PSD. 
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has disqualified a supplier, procuring authorities in other Member States are not 
bound by the disqualification decision. Thus, each EU procuring authority has a 
separate obligation to disqualify and this obligation is not diminished by the fact that 
the supplier may previously have been disqualified elsewhere. This is because the text 
of the mandatory provisions in the directives make disqualification mandatory upon a 
relevant conviction, not a relevant disqualification. 
In implementing the EU directives, the UK procurement regulations did not go much 
further than the text in the directives and whilst there is information on relying on 
convictions from other Member States, there is no information on the position of a 
disqualification from another Member State being applied by procuring authorities in 
the UK. Further, there is also no information on whether a disqualification by one UK 
procuring authority can be relied on by other UK procuring authorities. 
In relation to convictions, the UK regulations and the OGC Guidance, suggest that a 
UK procuring authority may disqualify a supplier for a conviction obtained in another 
EU Member State or third country. 198 The regulations state that where a supplier is 
based in another Member State, procuring authorities may apply to the competent 
authorities of that State for the relevant information. 199 However, it may be difficult 
without access to national databases of convicted firms or a central EU register of 
convicted firms for a procuring authority in the UK to access information on 
convictions obtained outside the UK, in the absence of cooperation from the 
authorities of the country where the conviction was obtained. As was discussed in 
ch. 3.7.2, the difficulty of obtaining information on convictions obtained in other 
Member States and third countries was highlighted in relation to the issue of checking 
the criminal records of foreign `airside' airport workers in the UK. 
In relation to the issue of a disqualification from one procuring authority in the UK 
being implemented by another procuring authority, the UK regulations are also silent 
on this issue, but the absence of a national register of disqualified firms leads to the 
conclusion that procuring authorities in the UK are not bound by the disqualification 
decisions of other UK procuring authorities. 
198 Reg. 23 (1) (f); OGC guidance, para. 3. 
199 Reg. 23 (3) PCR; Trepte, 2007,340. 
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If the EU and/or the UK decide to implement a system where a disqualification by 
one procuring authority affects other procuring authorities, two approaches are 
possible. First, since disqualification is tied to a conviction, the best approach would 
be to maintain a register of convicted suppliers. This register should be accessible to 
procuring authorities in Member States and should contain information on the period 
when the conviction will be spent in the jurisdiction where the conviction was 
obtained. Secondly, the EU could establish a system of notification of 
disqualifications. 200 This notification may be implemented through a website to which 
procuring authorities and the public may have access to201 and may have the same 
practical effect as a database of disqualified suppliers. The disadvantages of this 
approach however are that although disqualification by one procuring authority may 
signify that the supplier has been convicted of a relevant offence, the conviction may 
have become spent in the interim, thereby possibly ceasing to be relevant in some 
jurisdictions for disqualification purposes. The notification system would need to 
contain information on the conviction/offence for which the supplier was disqualified 
and when the conviction would become spent. 
4.4.3.3 The elements of the disqualification decision left to the non-disqualifying 
entity 
Where disqualification affects procuring authorities beyond the disqualifying entity, 
one issue that arises is determining whether such authorities have discretion to decide 
on any of the elements of the disqualification decision. Two approaches are possible- 
the non-disqualifying entity may be required to apply the disqualification decision in 
toto without being permitted to deviate from any elements of the decision or a 
procuring authority may be permitted to determine certain elements of the 
disqualification decision such as whether disqualification is inappropriate because of 
public interest concerns or the supplier's rehabilitation. Both approaches are utilised 
by the jurisdictions where disqualification is extended to other procuring authorities. 
200 Art. 3 of the Convention on Driving Disqualification [ 1998] O. J. C216/01 utilises such a notification 
system and the competent authorities where the disqualification was obtained are required to notify the 
authorities in the driver's state of residence. 201 Art. 2, Initiative of the Kingdom of Denmark n. 192. 
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For instance, in the US, although disqualification applies to all federal procuring 
authorities as discussed above, individual procuring authorities are still able to 
exercise discretion to decide if there are reasons making disqualification inappropriate 
for that authority. Under the FAR, the head of a procuring authority may contract with 
a disqualified supplier where there are "compelling reasons" for doing so. 202 This 
issue is discussed in ch. 8, but it suffices to say that US procuring authorities have 
discretion to derogate from the disqualification in limited contexts. 
South Africa and the World Bank both adopt a similar approach and there is no 
discretion for a procuring authority to derogate from a disqualification imposed by the 
disqualifying entity. In South Africa neither the Corruption Act nor the PPPFA 
regulations give procuring authorities the discretion to avoid a disqualification 
imposed by the court under the Corruption Act or a disqualifying entity under the 
PPPFA regulations. As was discussed earlier, the World Bank also does not permit 
procuring authorities in Borrower countries to derogate from a disqualification or vary 
it in any way. 
4.5 Analysis 
This chapter has examined the very complex procedural issues arising from 
disqualification. As can be seen from the forgoing discussion, legislative provisions 
on procedural issues in the disqualification context are lacking in some jurisdictions 
and this may affect the quality of disqualification decision-making and create 
problems in practice for entities implementing disqualification provisions. 
4.5.1 The existence of a clear procedure for disqualification 
It was seen that apart from the US and the World Bank, the other jurisdictions do not 
specify a procedure for disqualifying suppliers. In the context of the EU, it is 
important for clarity in the sense of minimum procedural requirements to ensure that 
the disqualification procedure in Member States meets EU requirements for 
202 FAR 9.406-1 (c). 
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transparency and fairness. As was seen from the jurisprudence, although domestic 
administrative law in Member States such as the UK require procedures for 
administrative decision making, disqualifying entities have not always conducted the 
disqualification process in accordance with these requirements by providing notice of 
a proposed disqualification and the factors on which disqualification is based; an 
opportunity to make representations and adequate reasons for the decision. Similarly, 
in South Africa, the available jurisprudence suggests that in some cases, despite the 
existence of the procedural requirements of the PAJA in relation to administrative 
decisions, disqualifying entities do not always meet these standards. 
The absence of clear rules for decision making in the disqualification context may 
affect the transparency of the measure and the ability of the disqualified supplier to 
challenge its disqualification. Clear rules are of grave importance in jurisdictions 
where disqualifications may be imposed in the absence of a conviction. It is thus 
suggested that at the very minimum, states should include in their legislation, rules on 
the giving of notice and an opportunity to make representations depending on the 
nature and context of the disqualification measure. 
4.5.2 Time limits 
As has been discussed, clear time limits for disqualification are absent in the 
jurisdictions excepting the US and World Bank. Although South Africa provides 
maximum time limits for disqualification under the PPPFA regulations, the lack of a 
standardised approach may lead to a situation where procuring entities prescribe 
different limits in similar cases. Similar criticisms may be made about the EU/UK 
mandatory disqualification provisions, in which there is a lack of clarity on the issue 
of time limits- both in the sense of when convictions cease to be relevant and the 
length of disqualification. Whilst the EU directives appear to have left the issue of 
time limits to the discretion of Member States, this approach will lead to differences 
in the treatment of suppliers in the different Member States and possibly also 
differences in the treatment of suppliers within the same state. Also, should Member 
States specify excessive time limits for disqualification this may go beyond the 
protective and policy rationales for the mandatory disqualifications in the EU. Whilst 
domestic statutes on the non-disclosure of offences may provide an indication of 
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when convictions cease to be relevant, procuring authorities may not be aware of the 
details of such statutes, especially where they are faced with suppliers from other 
Member States. To prevent the potential discrimination which EU suppliers may face 
in this regard, it is suggested that the EU adopts a coherent approach to the issue of 
time limits. It is suggested that the US approach which provides maximum but not 
minimum time limits (to give procuring entities some flexibility) and the World Bank 
approach that specifies a limitation period for offences that may lead to 
disqualification provides the necessary clarity and proportionality in this difficult 
aspect of the disqualification decision. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
INVESTIGATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
In ch. 4, the thesis examined procedural issues related to disqualification and in 
ch. 4.4.2.2 reflected on the appropriateness of a procuring entity as a disqualifying 
entity given the limitations that may be faced in determining whether an offence was 
committed. This chapter will consider in detail whether the disqualifying entity is 
required to conduct investigations into whether an offence was committed or a 
conviction exists; the extent of the entities investigative powers and the kind of 
evidence that may be relied on by a disqualifying entity. This chapter will focus on 
investigations conducted by a procuring authority or an administrative authority, and 
not the investigations conducted by the police where the disqualifying entity is a 
court. ' 
The purpose of an investigation is to obtain the information required to come to an 
appropriate decision to disqualify. The extent and limits of an investigation are 
informed by the legislative provisions on disqualification; the kinds of offences 
leading to disqualification; the nature of the disqualifying entity (a court, a procuring 
authority or an administrative entity); the kind of disqualification 
- 
whether a general 
disqualification or one limited to a specific award and whether the disqualification is 
tied to a conviction and the stage of the procurement process in which the decision to 
disqualify is taken. Where the measure is based on a conviction, investigations by a 
disqualifying entity are limited to discovering the existence of the conviction, but 
where the measure is not based on a conviction, the disqualifying entity may need to 
determine whether the supplier committed the relevant offence. Investigations may 
also be relevant to the issue of whether persons related to the corrupt supplier may 
also be disqualified. This issue will be further examined in ch. 6. 
Police investigative powers are very different in nature and in scope from the powers of a 
disqualifying entity and have been covered elsewhere. See Stelfox, Criminal Investigation: An 
Introduction to Principles and Practice (2009); Graham "Suspension of Contractors and ongoing 
criminal investigations for fraud: Looking for fairness from a tightrope of competing interests" (1984) 
14 P. C. L. J. 216. 
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5.2 The existence of a requirement or obligation to investigate 
Imposing an obligation on disqualifying entities to investigate is difficult because 
such an obligation could easily turn a discretionary disqualification into something 
more mandatory. It is thus not surprising that in the jurisdictions, there is no 
requirement to investigate the commission of relevant offences or the existence of 
relevant convictions for the purposes of disqualification. Whilst this approach is 
appropriate for the discretionary measures, it is less clear why mandatory measures 
are designed without an investigative requirement. 
This section will examine the requirement to investigate depending on whether the 
measure is tied to a conviction or not since the approach to investigations will differ 
depending on whether a conviction establishing the offence exists. 
5.2.1 The requirement to investigate for disqualification measures based on a 
conviction 
Where disqualification is based on a conviction, investigations by a procuring or 
administrative authority are limited to determining whether the supplier has been 
convicted for a relevant offence. This information may be obtainable from a judicial 
extract or a police or similar database. In the jurisdictions that utilise conviction-based 
measures (the EU, UK, US and South Africa) there is no obligation on disqualifying 
entities to discover the existence of a conviction. This is the approach, irrespective of 
whether the measure is discretionary or mandatory. 
In relation to discretionary measures, an obligation to investigate is unnecessary as the 
disqualifying entity retains the discretion to disqualify, and consequently, to 
investigate. However, in relation to mandatory measures, it is less clear why an 
obligation to investigate does not exist. In the EU and UK, the absence of an 
investigative obligation on procuring authorities in relation to the mandatory 
disqualification provisions has been criticised as anomalous and ambiguous, as 
although the requirement to disqualify is mandatory, procuring authorities are not 
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required to obtain the information necessary to disqualify. 2 This ambiguity can be 
traced to the preparatory documents3 on the directives, where several Member States 
expressed discomfort with the mandatory nature of the disqualifications. In response 
to these concerns, the Commission clarified that the obligation on Member States to 
disqualify convicted contractors was one of due diligence and not "an absolute 
obligation to achieve a result" and a procuring authority only had to show due 
diligence in investigating or verifying the situation of a supplier and the obligation to 
disqualify only arose where the procuring authority was informed of the conviction. 4 
Whilst one agrees that procuring authorities should not be under an obligation to 
"achieve a result", given the difficulties that procuring authorities may face in 
obtaining information on convictions as discussed in ch. 4.4.3.2, it has been suggested 
by Arrowsmith that the EU directives ought to be interpreted as imposing an 
obligation on procuring authorities to request information on convictions, 5 as without 
such an approach, the disqualifications may be ineffective in practice. However, even 
if the directives are interpreted as imposing an obligation on procuring authorities to 
request the necessary information from suppliers, it must be noted that where there are 
doubts over the information provided by a supplier, it will be extremely difficult for 
procuring authorities to verify information on convictions without measures to 
improve the ease of access to this information, especially in relation to convictions 
obtained in other Member States. 6 Although there have been attempts made to 
improve the access to this information through a harmonised system of the sharing of 
criminal information, 7 there is as yet no central registry from which procuring 
2 Trepte, 2007,339- 341. 
3 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the co-ordination of 
procedures for the award of public supply contracts, public service contracts and public works contracts 
10345/00 MAP 5 CODEC 550- COM(2000) 275 final, 26/10/2001. Reproduced in Hebly, 2007,1133. 
4 Progress report on the Proposal or a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
co-ordination of the procedures for the award of public supply contracts, public service contracts and 
public works contracts 10345/00 MAP 5 CODEC 550- COM(2000) 275 final 21/11/2001. Reproduced 
in Hebly, 2007,1134. See also Recital 43 PSD. 
s Arrowsmith, 2006,89. 
6 Jacobs & Blitsa, "Major "minor" progress under the Third Pillar: EU institution building in the 
sharing of criminal information" (2008) 8 C-K. J. I & C. L. 111. 
See Para. 45 (f), Action Plan of 3 December 1998 of the Council and the Commission on how best to 
implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and justice Point [1999] O. J. C 19/1; Conclusion 33-37 Tampere Special European Council on Justice and Home Affairs 
Matters (October 1999); Council Decision 2009/315/JHA on the organisation and content of the 
exchange of information extracted from criminal records between Member States [2009] O. J. L93/23; 
Council Decision 2009/316/JHA on the establishment of a European Criminal Records Information 
System [2009] O. J. 193/33; Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
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authorities in one Member State may obtain information on criminal convictions in 
another Member State. While Member States access to this information has been 
improved through harmonising the system of record keeping, the ultimate aim of the 
EU is to create a European Criminal Record (or register of convictions), where the 
details of persons convicted of criminal offences in Europe may be stored and used to 
fight crime in the EU. 8 However, serious challenges would have to be overcome 
before such a record can become a reality. These challenges have been detailed by 
Xanthaki and Stefanou and include the divergences in the definition of offences, the 
different approaches in recording the convictions of legal persons and recording 
offences committed by EU nationals overseas and divergences in the rehabilitation 
period of convictions in Member States. 9 
Where a jurisdiction requires disqualification to be applied to a wide range of entities 
as discussed in ch. 4.4.3, investigations will be relevant for those entities to obtain 
information on the prior disqualification. The simplest way of achieving this is for a 
procuring authority to consult a database of disqualified contractors where one exists. 
In the jurisdictions which maintain such a database, there is an obligation for 
procuring authorities to consult such databases and a corresponding obligation for a 
procuring authority not to award contracts to such listed, disqualified contractors. 
Thus, the US FAR provides that procuring authorities must ensure they do not award 
contracts to persons listed in the database of disqualified firms. 1° A similar approach 
is adopted by the World Bank and South Africa. The World Bank procurement 
guidelines provide that a Borrower must not award a contract to a disqualified 
supplier" and under the South African Corruption Act and PFMA regulations, 
procuring authorities must ignore tenders from disqualified contractors. 12 
Parliament- Mutual recognition of final judgments in criminal matters COM (2000) 0495 final; Council 
Decision 2005/876/JHA on the exchange of information extracted from the criminal record; 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on measures to be 
taken to combat terrorism and other forms of serious crime, in particular to improve exchanges of 
information; White paper on exchanges of information on convictions and the effect of such 
convictions in the EU COM(2005)10 final; Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
(2000). 
a Stefanou & Xanthaki, Towards a European Criminal Record (2008). 
9 Stefanou & Xanthaki, ibid., chs. 1 &2. 
10 FAR 9.404 (c) (7); 9.405 (d). 
" Para. 1.8 BPG. 
12 S28 (3) (iii); Reg. 16A9.1 (c) PFMA. 
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In these jurisdictions, the obligation placed on procuring authorities to examine these 
databases is not onerous as these databases are publicly accessible. It is instructive 
that none of the jurisdictions include any penalty in the legislation where a procuring 
authority fails to consult the database and awards a contract to a disqualified firm. In 
the US and South Africa, it is not clear what the consequence of a failure to consult 
the database and a corresponding award of a contract to a disqualified firm might be. 
In the US, the GAO has documented several instances where contracts were awarded 
to disqualified firms because procuring authorities failed to check the database of 
listed firms. 13 It is possible, however that such awards may be challenged by other 
suppliers, by way of analogy with the situations in which losing competitors have 
challenged affirmative determinations of responsibility against other suppliers. 14 
In the World Bank, a failure to consult the database by a Borrower and the proposed 
award of a contract to a disqualified firm would be caught by the Bank where the 
Bank is asked to assent to the proposed award of a contract by providing a no- 
objection notice. In such cases, the Bank will clearly not assent to the award of a 
contract to a disqualified firm. 
5.2.2 The requirement to investigate for disqualification measures not based on a 
conviction 
Where disqualification is not based on a conviction, the disqualifying entity is faced 
with potentially more involved investigations than merely confirming the existence of 
a relevant conviction and the disqualifying entity needs to be satisfied to an adequate 
standard that the supplier committed the offence. As stated, none of the jurisdictions 
provide for an obligation to investigate or the nature of such investigations. The 
potential for disqualification decisions based on insufficient evidence makes it 
preferable for a jurisdiction to establish a framework for investigations. Such a 
framework should include the procedure that a procuring authority may use to 
undertake investigations, the extent of the obligation to investigate, and the limits to 
the disqualifying entities investigative powers. This ought to be the case whether 
13 GAO, Suspended and debarred businesses and individuals improperly receive federal funds (GAO 
09-174 Feb. 2009). 
14 Watts-Healy A JV v United States 82 Fed. C1.614 (2008). 
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disqualification is for past offences or offences committed in the specific contract 
award procedure. 
In the EU, the discretionary disqualification provisions that are not based on a 
conviction are silent on the issue of an obligation to investigate. As mentioned earlier, 
this is understandable, given that procuring authorities possess discretion with respect 
to all decisions within the disqualification process. Whilst being silent on an 
obligation to investigate, the EU directives however give procuring authorities 
guidance on the nature of documents that may be relied on in seeking information on 
offences from contractors. ' 5 
In implementing the EU directives, the UK regulations clarified the obligation on 
procuring authorities in relation to the discretionary disqualifications by providing 
that a procuring authority "may require an economic operator to provide such 
information as it considers it needs to make the evaluation... " thus giving procuring 
authorities the power to request relevant documents from contractors in the conduct of 
investigations. 16 
In the US, procuring authorities are required to ensure that a contract is not awarded 
to a previously disqualified supplier, but since disqualification is discretionary, they 
are not under an obligation to investigate offences that could lead to disqualification. 17 
A similar approach is adopted by the World Bank and the South African provisions. 
In the Bank, the 1NT has the discretion to commence investigations into allegations of 
corruption in Bank-financed contracts, but is not under an obligation to do so. '8In 
South Africa, neither the PPPFA nor the PFMA regulations impose an obligation on 
procuring authorities to investigate whether a supplier has committed an offence that 
may lead to disqualification. 
15 Art. 45 (3) PSD. 
16 Reg. 23 (5). 
" FAR 9.406-1 (a); 9.407-1 (a). 
is Art. 11 WBSP. 
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5.3 The entity with the power to investigate and the extent of the entities powers 
Once it is determined whether a requirement to investigate exists, two further issues 
require consideration: identifying which entity has the power to investigate and 
determining the limits to the entity's investigative powers. The issue of identifying the 
investigating entity is not always directly addressed and it is often implied within the 
legislation that the disqualifying entity will conduct investigations. However, where 
the disqualifying entity is a procuring authority, it may not be competent to conduct 
the kinds of investigations required for disqualification, especially where it does not 
have powers to compel the production of relevant documents and evidence. 19 
In the EU and the UK, the legislation implies that the procuring authority will conduct 
the investigations by giving procuring authorities the discretion to request the 
necessary documents from the supplier. 20 In the US, the disqualifying official is 
expressly referred to as the person with the power to investigate. 21 For the non- 
judicial disqualifications in South Africa, the PFMA regulations designate the 
accounting officer within a procuring authority as the person who takes 
disqualification decisions and in the absence of any other information, it seems likely 
that the accounting officer may also be responsible for conducting investigations. The 
PPPFA regulations also appear to imply that the procuring authority will conduct 
investigations to determine if an offence was committed. 22 In the World Bank, 
investigations are conducted by the INT, which is the entity designated for this task. 23 
The extent or limits of the investigating entity's powers is not addressed by the 
legislation on disqualification. The extent of the investigative powers provided to a 
disqualifying entity depends on whether a conviction is required for disqualification 
and the nature of the disqualifying entity. Where disqualification is tied to a 
conviction, very limited investigative powers may be required as all the disqualifying 
entity needs to do is confirm a conviction exists, although this may not be so simple 
where the conviction was obtained overseas. In relation to the nature of the 
19 Moran, Pope & Doig, Debarment as an anti-corruption means: A review report (2004), ch. 5. 20 Art. 45 (1), (3) PSD; Reg. 23 (3) and (5) PCR. 
21 FAR 9.406-3 (a). 
22 Reg. 15 (1) PPPFA. 
23 Art. II WBSP. 
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disqualifying entity, where disqualification is a function of a judicial body, the powers 
of investigation will be those possessed by police/prosecutorial authorities. Where 
disqualification is the function of an external administrative body its investigative 
powers may be specified in the legislation establishing the body. Where the 
disqualifying entity is a procuring authority, the extent of the procuring authority's 
investigative powers may depend on the legislative provisions on disqualification and 
whether the procuring authority has been given express investigative powers. Where a 
procuring authority is not given express powers of investigation, it may not normally 
be competent or permitted to conduct investigations into the commission of offences 
unless this power is granted by legislation24 or the core functions of the procuring 
authority include investigations. 5 
Where a procuring authority is not given express powers to investigate, this does not 
mean that it will be unable to obtain the relevant information, as suppliers are 
generally required to submit documentation to prove their suitability for a particular 
contract. Where information on offences is required as a part of such documentation 
and is withheld or shows that an offence was committed, the supplier may not be 
eligible for the contract or may be disqualified. Where a disqualifying entity is not 
given express powers to investigate, it may also rely on voluntary disclosures by 
suppliers. Such disclosures reduce the investigative burden on procuring authorities26 
and as discussed in ch. 8, voluntary disclosures are a facet of the attempts to maintain 
integrity in public procurement in some jurisdictions. 7 
The jurisdictions adopt a similar approach to the extent or limits of the investigative 
powers of disqualifying entities and do not specify the extent or limits to investigative 
powers. This may be problematic, as a procuring authority may go too far in an 
attempt to gather information on a contractor's wrongdoing. For instance, in Cubic 
Corp. v Cheney, 28 the supplier was able to successfully challenge the manner in 
24 See generally, Kirk & Woodcock, Serious Fraud: Investigation & Trial, 3d ed. (2002); Sealy & 
Worthington, Cases & Materials in Company Law, 8s' ed. (2007), 595. 
25 For instance, authorities like the Revenue Department and Financial Services Authority in the UK 
are granted these powers in fulfilment of their core functions. 26 Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, "Overcoming Procedural Boundaries" (2008) V. L. R 79,122. 
27 Federal Acquisition Regulation; FAR Case 2007-006, Contractor Compliance Program and Integrity 
Reporting 72 Fed. Reg. 64019; Zierdt & Podgor, "Back against the wall- corporate deferred 
Prosecution through the lens of contract policing" (2009) 23 C. J. 34; Williams, 2007c. 
914 F. 2d 1501 (D. C. Cir 1990). 
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which the information relied on for disqualification was obtained, where the procuring 
authority relied on wire-tap evidence in disqualification proceedings. The court held 
that if an agency relied on wire-tap evidence in rendering a reviewable decision, the 
agency had to be prepared to defend the legality of that evidence. Providing limits on 
the investigative powers of a disqualifying entity would serve to prevent such abuses 
in the disqualification context. 
5.4 The nature and sources of information and evidence 
Although there may not be an obligation to investigate, all the jurisdictions, except 
South Africa specify the nature and kinds of evidence that can be relied on in 
disqualification decision-making. This is important as without guidance on what kind 
of information is appropriate, there is a danger that a disqualifying entity may rely on 
insufficient evidence or "mere suspicion, unfounded allegation or error" 29 or 
information that may not be reliable, leading to decisions that may not stand up to 
judicial scrutiny. 
In the EU, the directives list the kinds of information that may be relied on by 
procuring authorities to prove that a conviction exists against a contractor. 30 These are 
extracts from a judicial record; an equivalent document issued by a competent 
authority; a declaration on oath from the contractor; and a solemn declaration before a 
competent judicial or administrative authority or notary or competent professional or 
trade body in the contractor's country of origin. 31 
The adoption in 2009 of a EU Framework Decision32 on the exchange of criminal 
information may also assist procuring authorities in obtaining this information as 
Member States are under an obligation to designate a central authority for the 
dissemination of this information and have the option to include information on 
disqualifications arising from convictions. 33 Whether Member States will use this 
option to assist in the dissemination of information on the mandatory disqualifications 
29 Transco Security v Freeman 454 U. S. 820 (1981). 30 Art45 (3) PSD. 
31 Art. 45 (3) PSD. 
32 Council Decision 2009/315/JHA on the organisation and content of the exchange of information 
extracted from criminal records between Member States [2009] O. J. L93/23. 
33 Aft. 11. 
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remains to be seen. Whichever option is chosen, the CJEU has held in the context of 
the discretionary exclusions for non-compliance with social security and tax 
obligations, that the means of assessing a supplier's compliance with these obligations 
must not involve excessive administrative charges, complicate or delay the 
procurement process or be dissuasive to foreign suppliers. 4 
The UK regulations in implementing the directives adopted a similar approach as the 
directives and provide that the evidence that will suffice to prove the existence of a 
conviction include an extract from a judicial record, 35 a document issued by a relevant 
judicial or administrative authority, 36 and a declaration on oath made by the supplier 
37 before a competent authority, notary public or Commissioner for Oaths. This 
information may be requested from suppliers or the disqualifying entity may approach 
the relevant databases for information on the criminal record of the contractor. 38 
Although the UK regulations provide limited guidance on the kinds of information 
that will be sufficient, a clearer, more detailed approach would be preferable as such 
an approach would also create limits on the scope of the discretionary 
disqualifications. As discussed in ch. 2, these disqualifications are quite broad and may 
be used to disqualify a supplier for criminal and non-criminal offences without the 
requirement of a conviction. Without detailed guidance on what kinds of documents 
are required to prove these breaches and without the power or competence to 
investigate into the commission of offences, it may be very difficult in practice for a 
procuring authority to determine if a relevant offence has been committed for the 
purposes of the discretionary disqualifications. As will be seen below, similar 
arguments may be made in relation to the South African system, which does not 
provide any guidance to disqualifying entities on the nature and sources of appropriate 
information. 
The US and the World Bank provide more details on the nature of the information 
that could be used to come to a disqualification decision. The FAR lists sources of 
34 C-199/07 Commission v Hellenic Republic [2009] E. C. R. 1-10669; C-74/09 Batiments et Ponts 
Contruction & WISAG Producktionsservice v Berlaymont 2000 SA (unrep. 15.07.10). 
's Reg. 23 (5) (a) (i) PCR. 
36 Reg. 23 (5) (a) (ii) PCR. 
37 Reg. 23 (5) (c) PCR. 
38 Art. 45 (1) PSD; Reg. 23 (5) & (3) PCR. 
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information relevant for disqualification. These are the contractor's records and 
experience data, bid and proposal information, pre-qualification questionnaire replies, 
personnel information and other sources of information such as publications, suppliers, 
subcontractors, customers of the proposed contractor, financial institutions, 
government agencies and business and trade associations 39 Unlike the EU and UK, 
the sources of information listed include a wide-range of non-official sources. Similar 
to the EU and UK, however, this information may be furnished by the supplier at the 
request of the procuring authority, 40 or furnished voluntarily by the supplier to satisfy 
al the requirement that it is responsible. 
The World Bank procurement guidelines include a provision granting the Bank the 
right to require access to contractor's accounts, records, bid submission and contract 
performance documents and to permit these documents to be audited by the Bank. 42 
Another rare source of information for the Bank is domestic corruption convictions. 
However, as discussed in ch. 3, the Bank does not generally rely on domestic 
convictions as a basis for disqualifying contractors, and has done so in only one 
reported case 43 
The South African approach diverges from the approach of all the other jurisdictions 
and none of the South African provisions specify the kinds of information that could 
be relied on for disqualification. This means that disqualifying entities are not given 
any guidance on the strength or reliability of the information that may be used to 
disqualify. South Africa should have adopted an approach similar to the UK, where 
the disqualifying entity is given limited guidance on the kinds of evidence that would 
suffice. The South African approach may prove problematic in practice, especially 
where the disqualification is not based on a conviction, as it is possible that the 
disqualifying entity may disqualify on the basis of inadequate information or 
information which may not withstand judicial scrutiny. 
39 FAR 9.105-1 (c). 
40 Cibinic & Nash, 1998,441. 
41 FAR 9.103 (c ). 
42 Para. 1.16 BPG. 
43 Williams, 2007a. 
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5.5 Analysis 
This chapter examined whether disqualifying entities were under an obligation to 
obtain information relevant to disqualification in relation to mandatory provisions. It 
was seen that in the jurisdictions with mandatory provisions, there is no requirement 
to obtain information on convictions or offences, and this may hamper the 
effectiveness of such measures. It is submitted that if disqualification measures are to 
be effective, disqualifying entities should at the very least be obliged to ask suppliers 
to submit information on convictions. In the EU context, as the sharing of criminal 
information progresses, disqualifying entities may be able to approach the relevant 
authorities in various Member States to verify this information. It is important that the 
EU continues to develop the systems and processes for the sharing of this information 
as this will support the disqualification provisions and make them more effective. 
Another issue that requires further discussion is providing disqualifying entities with a 
framework for conducting investigations and express powers to investigate where 
disqualification is not tied to a conviction. This will ensure that disqualifying entities 
are able to obtain the necessary evidence to disqualify, but will not disqualify on the 
basis of inadequate evidence. In addition, the legislation on disqualification in the 
jurisdictions should also place clear limits on these powers of investigation. Such 
limits are especially important where a conviction is not required for disqualification 
to prevent abuses of the disqualification process. It was seen in the context of the US 
that it is possible for a disqualifying entity to abuse its powers of investigation in a 
desire to see a supplier disqualified. It is worth mentioning here that as discussed in 
ch. 4.4, the centralisation of disqualification through an administrative entity may also 
reduce the likelihood of such abuses as well as increase the effectiveness of a 
disqualification regime. 
Finally, it was seen that in jurisdictions in which disqualification is applied by entities 
beyond the disqualifying entity, there do not appear to be penalties where a procuring 
authority fails to consult a database of disqualified contractors and awards a contract 
to a disqualified contractor. This is anomalous and the lack of such penalties may also 
limit the effectiveness of disqualification provisions. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE DISQUALIFICATION OF PERSONS RELATED TO A CORRUPT 
SUPPLIER 
6.1 Introduction 
Disqualification is usually directed at the person that committed the offence or 
received the conviction or civil judgment for corruption (the primary supplier), who 
may be a legal or a natural person. In certain contexts, persons related to the 
disqualified primary supplier may also be disqualified, although they may not have 
been involved in the commission of the offence. Disqualifying related persons may 
assist in meeting the rationales for disqualification and may be necessary to ensure the 
effectiveness of the measure as it may be possible for the effects of disqualification to 
be avoided where a disqualified supplier is able to compete for public contracts 
through related entities, persons and subcontractors. ' Disqualifying related persons 
may also be useful in jurisdictions reluctant to attach criminal liability to corporate 
entities, as a corporate entity may be disqualified for a conviction obtained by natural 
persons connected to the firm. 2 Although a full discourse on corporate criminal 
liability is beyond the scope of this thesis, the difficulties of convicting corporations 
of corruption and the often civil settlements that corporations enter into in the context 
of corruption allegations make the disqualification of related persons an important 
aspect of ensuring the effectiveness of disqualification measures. 
A number of issues arise from the disqualification of related persons. First, a 
disqualifying entity will have to identify the related persons it wishes to disqualify. 
These persons may be determined by the legislation, or the disqualifying entity may 
exercise its discretion in this regard. Second, a disqualifying entity will need to 
determine the basis for the disqualification of related persons, which may be the 
related persons complicity in the commission of an offence or its association with the 
primary supplier. This basis will determine the limits of such disqualifications in a 
1 Anechiarico and Jacobs, 1995,162-172. 
2 Hamdani & Klement, "Corporate Crime & Deterrence" (2008) 61 S. L. R. 271 [Hamdani & Klement]. 
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jurisdiction. 3 The third issue is determining how to limit the practical problems of 
disqualifying related persons such as the expense and difficulties of investigating 
related persons; delays to the procurement process; ensuring that the disqualification 
of related persons is not disproportionate to the aims of the disqualification policy and 
providing adequate procedural safeguards to related persons. 
6.2 Rationales for disqualifying related persons 
The rationales justifying the disqualification of persons related to a corrupt primary 
supplier are essentially the same rationales behind a disqualification policy as 
discussed in ch. l. Thus, disqualifying related persons may be done for policy, 
protective or punitive/deterrent reasons. Where disqualification exists for policy 
reasons such as giving effect to the anti-corruption policies of the government, 
disqualifying related persons supports the government's policy to the extent that the 
government will avoid contracting with the corrupt supplier and persons related to 
him. 
Where disqualification is aimed at protecting the government from dealing with 
unscrupulous contractors, disqualifying related persons may ensure the government is 
protected should the primary supplier attempt to avoid the effects of its 
disqualification by obtaining public contracts through related entities. Similarly, 
where the purpose of disqualification is punitive, the disqualification of related 
persons gives maximum weight to the primary disqualification and reinforces the 
punitive nature of disqualification. 
Disqualifying related persons may also increase the effectiveness of a disqualification 
policy. Empirical evidence gathered by Anechiarico and Jacobs in relation to 
disqualification measures in New York, suggests that unless persons related to a 
disqualified primary supplier are disqualified, the primary supplier may continue to 
bid for public contracts under different corporate identities or through different 
officers or subcontractors. 4 Thus, if disqualification is to be effective, it may be 
3 Jacobs & Anechiarico, "Blacklisting Public Contractors as an anti-corruption and racketeering 
strategy" (1992) 11 C. J. E. 64,68. 4 Anechiarico and Jacobs, 1995,172. 
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necessary to disqualify the `alter-egos' of the disqualified primary supplier to prevent 
the primary supplier from using such entities to obtain public contracts. 5 Where the 
disqualification of related persons is intended to increase the effectiveness of the 
measure, the disqualification must be conducted in a way that is proportionate6 and 
does not result in "convicting and punishing"7 companies and their employees for 
offences that they have not committed. 8 
Disqualifying related persons may also be intended to secure equal treatment of 
contractors and increase transparency in public procurement. 9A level-playing field 
for contractors may be achieved where persons tainted by corruption because of their 
association with the primary supplier are denied access to public contracts. This will 
increase transparency in the disqualification system, since a disqualified primary 
supplier who may be financially dependent on or otherwise connected to another 
company, will be unable to use such companies to obtain public contracts. 
In the disqualification of related persons, care must be taken so that there is no 
overreach of the rationales behind disqualification, which may lead to "over 
breadth"10 in the legal regulation of public procurement. 
6.3 The related persons 
Related persons refer to natural and legal persons and three categories of related 
persons will be examined in this chapter: natural persons; connected companies- 
defined as sister, subsidiary and parent companies; and cooperating companies 
- 
defined as subcontractors and joint ventures. 
5 The GAO compiled evidence of firms avoiding disqualification through the use of new corporate 
identities- GAO, Suspended and debarred businesses and individuals improperly receive federal funds 
(GAO 09-174 Feb. 2009). 
6 Anechiarico, "Prosecution as Corruption Control: Paradigms of Public Integrity in Context" (2007) 
52 W. L. R 1415. 
Jacobs & Anechiarico, n. 3,65. 
8 Hamdani & Klement, 271- 274. 
9 See AG Maduro in C-213/07 Michaniki. 
10 Defined as a situation where "a legal prohibition sanctions behaviour outside the class of wrongdoing 
or harm-creation that the rule is designed to address. " Buell, "The upside of overbreadth" (2008) 83 
N. Y. U. L. R 1491. 
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The problems that are faced in disqualifying all categories of related persons are 
similar, but are not always anticipated by legislative provisions on disqualification 
and where anticipated, the problems are not amenable to simple solutions. First, the 
disqualifying entity has to identify the relevant related person. This may be difficult 
depending on the nature of the person in question- for instance it may be difficult to 
identify the parent company of a supplier, where that parent is a holding company 
whose shares are in turn held by unidentifiable beneficiaries. Second, it will be 
necessary to determine the basis of the related person's disqualification. This may be 
the complicity of the related person in the commission of the offence, the proximity 
between the related person and the primary supplier or the control exercised by the 
related person over the primary supplier and vice versa. The basis of the related 
person's disqualification may be specified or implied by the legislation, left to the 
discretion of the disqualifying entity, or left to be determined by the courts. Third, the 
disqualifying entity will have to determine whether the disqualification of a related 
person is warranted where the connection between the related person and the primary 
offender has been terminated. 
6.3.1 Natural persons 
Two scenarios are relevant where a natural person is involved in disqualification 
proceedings: a firm may be disqualified for the corrupt activity of a natural person and 
a natural person related to a firm may be disqualified for the corrupt activity of the 
firm. 
6.3.1.1 Disqualifying a firm for the corrupt activity of a natural person 
The disqualification of a firm for offences committed by natural persons is an 
important tool in ensuring the effectiveness of disqualification measures. This is 
particularly so where disqualification is based on a conviction in jurisdictions that 
recognise the criminal liability of corporations only in limited statutory contexts" or 
11 Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (2001); Stessens, "Corporate Criminal Liability: A 
comparative perspective" (1994) 43 I. C. L. Q. 493; Hetzer, "Corruption as Business Practice? Corporate 
Criminal Liability in the European Union" (2007) 3-4 E. J. C. C. L. & C. J. 383; Weigend, "Societas 
delinquere non potest? A German perspective" (2008) 6 J. I. C. J. 927; Ferguson, "Corruption and 
Corporate Criminal Liability" Paper presented at International Colloquium on Criminal Responsibility 
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not at all. Where a firm cannot be convicted of corruption, corrupt firms will avoid 
disqualification where a conviction is required. Even where criminal convictions 
against corporate entities are recognised, 12 convictions for corruption against 
corporations are notably rare, 13 which may mean that the disqualification of firms 
may have to be hinged on the conviction of a related natural person. Further, most 
corruption cases against firms result in civil and not criminal penalties, due in part to 
the difficulties of meeting the burden of proof and the leniency that is offered to firms 
who self-report and cooperate with prosecutors. 14 
There are a number of issues that arise in disqualifying a firm for the corrupt activity 
of a natural person. The first is determining the natural persons whose actions may 
lead to the disqualification of a firm. Identifying such persons may depend on the 
doctrine of corporate liability in the jurisdictions and as will be seen, two approaches 
are possible based either on the identification doctrine or the doctrine of vicarious 
liability (respondeat superior). Thus, such persons may be those with decision- 
making powers in the firm or persons who may be regarded as the `directing mind and 
will' of the firm, and whose actions are identified as the acts of the company as is the 
case in the UK. ' 5 However, in jurisdictions that adopt a respondeat superior doctrine 
of corporate criminal liability, such as the US and South Africa, or doctrines based on 
vicarious liability, the corrupt activity of any employee, irrespective of seniority may 
lead to the disqualification of the firm. 16 
However, it has been argued that approaches that penalise a corporation for the 
misconduct of employees irrespective of seniority may inversely reduce the incentives 
of Collective Legal, Entities, May 1998. Available at 
http: //www. icclr. law. ubc. ca/Pub lications/Reports/FergusonG. PDF 
12 Pinto & Evans, Corporate Criminal Liability, 2°d ed. (2008), chs. 2-4 [Pinto & Evans]. 
13 Nicholls, Daniel, Polaine & Hatchard, Corruption and Misuse of Public Office, I" ed. (2006), 40-43. 
14 SFO, Approach to overseas corruption (2009); Department of Justice, Principles for federal 
prosecution of business organisations (Revised 2008). 
15 Tesco Supermarket v Nattrass [1972] A. C. 153; Mignai & Gobert, "Corporate criminal 
responsibility: Some lessons from Italy" (2002) C. L. R. 619. For a corporation to be liable for 
corruption in the UK, the prosecution needs to prove that the official had the necessary status and 
authority to make his acts the acts of the company. See Rv Andrews-Weatherfoil Ltd (1972) 56 Cr. 
App. R. 31. See Pinto & Evans, 306. 
16 Standard Oil of Texas v United States 307 F. 2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962), where the misconduct of 
"menial" employees was imputed to the corporation. Green, "Punishing Corporations: The Food-Chain 
Schizophrenia in punitive damages and criminal law" (2008) 87 N. L. R. 197,199; Weigend, n. 11,933. 
Nana, "Corpoarate Criminal Liability in South Africa: The need to look beyond vicarious liability" 
(2011) 55 J. A. L. 86. 
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for the firm to monitor misconduct in the firm, since the firm will suffer regardless of 
the measures it takes to reduce misconduct. 17 Thus, it may be preferable for 
jurisdictions to adopt an approach that a firm may only be disqualified for the actions 
of decision-makers whose acts may be identified as the acts of the firm. As will be 
seen, this approach finds support in the legislative provisions on disqualification in 
the EU, the UK and South Africa. 
In determining whose actions should lead to the disqualification of a firm, it has been 
suggested that disqualifying officials should "distinguish between wrongdoing 
attributable to corporate policies or practices, or wrongdoing authorised by high-level 
corporate officials, from wrongdoing committed in blatant defiance of responsible 
corporate self-governance policies and practices" and disqualification should only 
occur in the first two instances. 18 
Where the disqualification of a firm for the corrupt activity of a natural person is 
proposed, a second issue is determining whether a firm should still be disqualified 
where the firm's connection with those persons has been terminated. 19 Three 
approaches are possible- (i) that the dismissal of the persons who carried out or 
authorised the corrupt acts eliminates the necessity for the disqualification of the firm. 
This approach is utilised in some jurisdictions as discussed in ch. 8. (ii) that the 
dismissal of the corrupt natural person may be insufficient to eliminate a culture of 
corruption, which may be endemic within the firm and as such the firm still ought to 
be disqualified20 and (iii) one could argue that where the natural person did not act for 
his own account and his actions were intended to benefit the firm, the firm should still 
be disqualified, even if the person's employment has been terminated. 
A third issue in the disqualification of firms for the offences of a natural person is 
whether such a disqualification should apply to firms that are yet to be established or 
controlled by the natural person. In other words, should disqualification apply to the 
" Hamdani & Klement, 271. 
's Bednar, "Emerging issues in suspension and debarment" (2004) 13 P. P. L. R. 223. 
19 Arrowsmith, Priess & Friton, "Self-Cleaning as a defence to exclusions for misconduct: An 
emerging concept in EC Public Procurement Law" (2009) 6 P. P. L. R. 257 [Arrowsmith, Priess & 
Friton]. 
20 Weigend, n. 11. 
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future business entities of the natural person? As will be seen, two of the jurisdictions 
extend disqualification to the future business entities of the natural person. 
The final issue that arises is determining the basis of the firm's disqualification. This 
may either be the firm's complicity in the offences committed by the natural person 
(or because the corrupt activity was intended to benefit the firm) or the level of 
control and/or decision-making power, which the natural person wields over the firm. 
Determining the decision-making power of a natural person may not be 
straightforward and a disqualifying entity may need to examine the organisational 
structure of a firm. 
The approach to these issues in the jurisdictions varies- some jurisdictions are silent, 
whilst others provide extensive rules on the issues. In the EU, the procurement 
directives are silent on the disqualification of a firm for an offence committed by a 
natural person and do not identify relevant natural persons or establish the basis for 
the disqualification of such persons. This omission relates to the mandatory and 
discretionary disqualifications. However, in relation to the mandatory 
disqualifications, the directives may possibly be interpreted as permitting the 
disqualification of a firm for the conviction of a natural person. This is because the 
text of the directives provides that in obtaining information on convictions, a 
procuring authority may obtain information relating to "legal and/or natural persons, 
including, if appropriate, company directors and any person having powers of 
representation, decision or control in respect of the candidate or tenderer". 21 This may 
mean that the convictions of these persons may lead to the disqualification of the firm. 
However, not all Member States are willing to disqualify a firm for the activity of 
natural persons and a study by Medina22 shows that only a few Member States 
legislation23 required the disqualification of a firm for the conviction of a natural 
person under their mandatory disqualification provisions. 
In relation to the discretionary disqualification provisions, as the directives omitted to 
mention the convictions of natural persons as was done in the mandatory provisions, 
21 Art. 45 (1) PSD. 
22 Medina, 2008. 
23 These are Austria, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the UK. 
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this may be an indication that the discretionary provisions do not contemplate that a 
firm can be disqualified for the offences of natural persons. Alternatively, it is 
possible that this issue has been left entirely to the discretion of Member States. 
Further, the nature of some of the offences under the discretionary provisions makes it 
appropriate that the EU did not adopt a blanket provision requiring extension of the 
disqualifications. 
Neither the EU directives nor the UK regulations address the situation where the 
cause for disqualification has been eliminated, such as where the employment of the 
natural person has been terminated. This issue is discussed in ch. 8, but it seems to be 
accepted as a general principle in the EU that this could lead to a firm avoiding 
disqualification altogether. 24 In addition, neither the EU directives nor the UK 
regulations address the issue of the disqualification of the future business entities of 
the natural person. This is legislated for by the South African Corruption Act, and 
may be informed by the punitive nature of South African disqualifications as 
discussed in ch. 2. In jurisdictions like the EU and the UK, which utilise 
disqualifications for policy and protective reasons, an approach that targets the future 
business activities of a natural person may be disproportionate to the aims of the 
disqualification policy. 
In transposing the directives, the UK regulations went slightly further that the EU 
directives and provide that a firm will be disqualified under the mandatory 
disqualification provisions where directors 25 or other persons with powers of 
representation, decision and control, have been convicted of corruption. 26 The OGC 
Guidance has interpreted this as including partners or senior managers in a firm. 27 
This approach accords with the common law identification doctrine of corporate 
liability, where a firm will be liable where its `directing mind and will' commit an 
offence. 28 However, a procuring authority may have the flexibility to adopt a wider 
definition of natural persons as the identification doctrine has been relaxed in some 
24 Arrowsmith, Priess & Friton. 
25 Directors are natural persons in UK law 
-s 155 Companies Act 2006. 26 Reg. 23 (1) PCR. 
27 OGC guidance para. 4.1; Williams, 2009,436. 
28 Tesco Supermarket v Nattrass n. 15. 
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judicial29 and statutory contexts, due to its narrow constraints 30 For instance, under 
the Bribery Act, a firm may be convicted of bribery where a person who performs 
services for or on behalf of the firm gives a bribe, even though the person is an agent, 
employee or subsidiary. 3 ' Thus, by way of analogy, a procuring authority may choose 
to interpret the regulations as permitting the disqualification of a firm where a person 
that is not the alter-ego32 of the company but one who represents the company such as 
an employee or agent has been convicted or is guilty of a relevant offence. In other 
words, a procuring authority may base disqualification on the vicarious liability of the 
firm for the actions of its employees or agents acting within the scope of their 
employment. Such an approach is supported by Meridien, where the court denied the 
existence of an absolute identification doctrine and held that the rules of attribution 
should be tailored to fit particular cases. 33 
In relation to the discretionary disqualifications, the UK regulations adopt a different 
approach and mention individuals in relation to some offences (bankruptcy) and not in 
relation to others (winding-up). In relation to the disqualification for misconduct in 
the course of a business, the regulations do not mention the disqualification of natural 
persons at all, and this may either mean that a disqualifying entity may exercise its 
discretion or that the regulations do not contemplate the disqualification of a firm for 
these offences committed by a natural person. 34 Further, as discussed in ch. 5, the fact 
that the discretionary disqualifications do not generally require a conviction may 
mean that a disqualifying entity may struggle to obtain proof of the commission of a 
relevant offence making it inappropriate for such disqualifications to be extended. 
The US approach to the disqualification of related persons is more comprehensive 35 
than the EU/UK approach. The FAR identifies the persons whose offences may lead 
to the disqualification of the firm as well as the basis for the firm's disqualification. 
Under the FAR, a firm may be disqualified for the corrupt activity of an officer, 
29 Tesco Supermarket v Brent LBC [1993] 1 W. L. R 1037; Meridien Global Funds v Management Asia [1995] 2 A. C. 500 
° Sullivan, "The attribution of culpability to limited companies" (1996) 55 C. L. J. 515. 
31 S7 &8 Bribery Act. 
32 Lennards Carrying Company v Asiatic [ 1915] A. C. 705. 
39 Meridien, n. 29,507. 34 Reg. 23 (4) PCR. 
35 FAR 9.406.5 (a). 
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director, shareholder, partner or other individual associated with the firm, when the 
conduct occurred in connection with the person's performance of his duties for the 
firm and the firm knew, approved or acquiesced in the conduct. Where the firm 
benefits from the improper conduct, this will be an indication of such knowledge, 
approval, or acquiescence. 36 The requirement that the firm. will be disqualified where 
it knew, approved/acquiesced of the conduct puts limits on the requirement to 
disqualify related persons as in US law; the knowledge that may be imputed to the 
firm where there is wrongdoing is either the knowledge of a person in a position of 
responsibility 37 or the aggregated knowledge of the company's employees. 38 In 
practice, in the context of responsibility determinations, the GAO has generally 
upheld the exclusion of a firm where the integrity of a key employee or an employee 
who may exercise significant influence in the performance of a contract was in 
39 doubt. 
There are two important differences between the UK and the US approach to this 
issue. First, in the UK, under the mandatory disqualification provisions, the test to 
determine whether a firm will be disqualified for the conviction of a natural person is 
an objective one, and merely looks to whether the relevant person has been convicted 
of a relevant offence. In the US, the disqualification of the firm is tied to its 
knowledge. As stated, this knowledge may be attributed to a person in senior 
management or may be the aggregated knowledge of the firm's employeeS40 and the 
US provisions may be interpreted as requiring the disqualification of a firm where the 
employees as a collective were aware of the corrupt activity. 41 A firm may be held to 
have the required knowledge although different employees are aware of different 
aspects of the corrupt activity since it is the aggregated knowledge that is taken into 
account. 42 In any event the test is a subjective one in the US. 
36 FAR 9.406-5. 
" United States v Sun-Diamond Growers of California 138 F. 3d 961 (D. C 1998). 
38 United States v Bank of New England 821 F. 2d 844,826 (1's Cir 1987). Cf. Pollack, "Time to stop 
living vicariously: A better approach to corporate criminal liability (2009) 46 A. C. L. R. 1393,1394 who 
argues that the intent of a company should be based on the knowledge and intent of senior 
management. 
39 See for instance, Speco Corp B-211353 (Comp. Gen. Apr. 26 1983). 
40 Lederman, "Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From adaptation and imitation 
towards aggregation and the search for self-identity" (2000) 4 (1) B. C. L. R. 641,663. 
41 Borsch & Dworschak, "Criminal Liability of Corporations: A primer for procurement fraud" (1991) 
8 A. L. 7. 
42 United States v Bank of New England n. 38,856. 
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The second area of difference between the UK and the US is that in the UK, the firm 
will be disqualified where a decision-maker has obtained a relevant conviction, but in 
the US, a firm may be disqualified for the corrupt activity of persons who are not key 
decision-makers. This is due to the respondeat superior doctrine of corporate liability 
adopted by the US. 43 The US thus requires a higher level of internal monitoring 
within an organisation as the corrupt activity of junior members of staff where such 
persons were acting for the benefit of the firm could lead to the firm's 
disqualification. " Further, the US regulations are not limited to disqualifying a firm 
for the actions of employees as a firm could also be disqualified for the activity of 
"any other individual associated" with the firm. 45 Thus it is possible for a firm to be 
disqualified for the conduct of persons who are not employees, but consultants or 
agents where the firm is deemed to have approved the corrupt activity. 
Unlike the EU and UK, the FAR also deals with the position where the natural 
person's employment has been terminated by the contractor, by providing that 
disqualification may not be appropriate where the firm has taken "appropriate 
disciplinary action" against the individuals responsible for the corrupt activity46 or has 
"eliminated the circumstances" that led to the cause for disqualification. 47 This issue 
is discussed in ch. 8. 
The differences in approach between the UK and the US may be traced to the 
different approaches to corporate liability, the differing rationales for disqualification 
as well as the historical evolution of procurement regulation in the jurisdictions as 
was discussed in ch. 2. Thus, whilst the US adopts a respondeat superior doctrine of 
corporate liability, under which the employer is liable for the acts of an employee 
within certain limits, 48 the UK generally prefers to base corporate liability on the 
identification doctrine- where a firm is liable where persons whose actions may be 
43 Khanna, "Corporate Criminal Liability: What purpose does it serve? " (1996) 109 H. L. R. 1477,1499- 
1512; Beale, "Is Corporate Criminal Liability Unique? " (2007) 44 A. C. L. R. 1503,1522; Brickey, 
"Andersen's Fall from Grace, " (2003) 81 W. U. L. Q. 917,929. 
44 Standard Oil of Texas n. 16. 
45 FAR 9.406-5 (b). 
46 FAR 9.406-1 (a) (6). 
47 FAR 9.406-1 (a) (9). 
48 Gruner, Corporate Criminal Liability and Prevention (2004), chs. 2-4. 
204 
identified as the actions of the firm commit an offence. 49 As was mentioned, the US 
disqualification policy is intended to protect the government from dealing with 
corrupt contractors and this may necessitate an approach that requires the 
disqualification of a firm controlled by corrupt persons. Although the UK 
disqualification policy is intended to give effect to the policy and protective rationales 
of EU legislation, the EU has left this issue to be determined by Member States, and 
the UK has consequently relied on the narrow identification doctrine at common law. 
In relation to the evolution of procurement regulation in both jurisdictions, as was 
discussed in ch. 2, US procurement evolved with a very strong anti-corruption 
element- a feature that is not shared by the UK system, which may also explain the 
comprehensive nature of the US regime. 
Similar to the UK however, the US also does not extend disqualification to firms that 
the natural person may establish in future. As is the case in the EU/UK this may be 
due to the non-punitive nature of the US disqualification policy. 
The World Bank's approach to extending disqualification contains elements of the US 
and UK approach. The Bank Sanctions procedures provide that where a sanction is 
imposed on a contractor, appropriate sanctions may also be imposed on an affiliate of 
the contractor. 5° An affiliate is defined as "any legal or natural person that controls, is 
controlled by, or is under common control with the Respondent. "" Thus, a firm may 
be disqualified for the offences of a natural person if the firm either controls or is 
controlled by the natural person, or the same entity controls both the firm and the 
natural person. Although the Bank does not define the limits of the test of control, it is 
assumed that a natural person controls a firm when the natural person is a key- 
decision maker who is able to influence the activity of the firm. Further, and similar to 
the US approach, where a firm controls a natural person, such as where the natural 
person is an employee of the firm, the firm could also be disqualified on this basis. 
The Bank thus imports both the identification doctrine and vicarious liability into its 
procedures. The test of control used by the Bank is subjective and depends on the 
Bank's determination. Like the US, the Bank also deals with the position where a firm 
49 Tesco Supermarket v Nattrass n. 15; Meridian Global Funds v Securities Commission [1995] 2 A. C. 
500; Pinto & Evans. 
50 Art. IX S9.04 WBSP. 
31 Art! S1.02WBSP. 
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has terminated its connection with an individual implicated in corruption. The Bank 
may decide not to disqualify a firm that was only `peripherally associated' with 
corruption, where the firm has taken measures against the employee. 52 
There are two areas of difference between the Bank and the UK/US. First, the Bank 
provides that a firm could be disqualified for the offences of a natural person where 
the same principal controls the natural person and the disqualified firm and second, 
the Bank extends disqualification to the future business entities of a disqualified 
person, by providing that any sanction shall also apply to the disqualified persons 
successors and assigns. 53 This provision will prevent a disqualified entity from re- 
inventing itself with its constituents. In the Bank context, the disqualification of future 
firms is understandable given that the Bank considers itself to be at the forefront of 
the fight against corruption in the development arena. Further, contracting with the 
Bank may be considered an option for suppliers, but as will be discussed in the 
context of South Africa, which contains similar provisions in the Corruption Act, it is 
not clear whether the disqualification of future firms is appropriate in a domestic 
jurisdiction. 
In South Africa, the different legislation provide for the disqualification of a firm for 
the corruption of natural persons in different contexts. The Corruption Act provides 
for the disqualification of firms related to a convicted natural person, where the firm 
is owned or controlled by the convicted natural person and the firm is involved in the 
offence. 54 This aspect of the test requiring the involvement of the firm has parallels in 
the US provisions. 
Interestingly, and similar to the World Bank, the Corruption Act also provides for the 
disqualification of firms that may be established in future by the convicted natural 
person. 55 This has been criticized as stifling commerce as it essentially cripples the 
future business activity of the convicted person, possibly beyond the length of the 
52 Art. IX S9.02 WBSP. 
D Art. IX S9.05, WBSP. 
sa S28 (1) (c). 
55 S28 (1) (d). 
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conviction 56 and may be disproportionate in certain contexts. However as was 
discussed in ch. 2, the punitive nature of disqualification in South Africa may inform 
this approach. 
Unlike the US and World Bank, the Corruption Act is not clear on the position where 
the natural person's employment in the firm has been terminated. However, as the 
National Treasury has the power to vary or amend the terms of a disqualification, 57 it 
may be possible for the National Treasury to amend a disqualification where the 
natural person's connection with the firm has ceased. 
The PFMA regulations adopt two approaches to the disqualification of a firm for the 
activity of a natural person. The mandatory PFMA disqualifications do not provide 
for the disqualification of a firm for the offence of a natural person, whilst the 
discretionary disqualifications provide that a firm may be disqualified where the firm 
or any of its directors have committed a relevant offence. This approach has its 
parallels in the UK where a firm will be disqualified for offences committed by 
decision-makers. Similar to the UK, the PFMA regulations are silent as to whether a 
firm will be disqualified where the director's employment with the firm has been 
terminated and establish the basis of the firm's disqualification as the commission of 
an offence by the director. 
As will be discussed below, the PPPFA regulations provide that natural persons may 
be disqualified for the corrupt activity of a firm, but do not provide for the 
disqualification of a firm for the corrupt activity of a natural person. 
6.3.1.2 Disqualifying a natural person for the corrupt activity of a firm 
The provisions imputing the conduct of a firm to a natural person are intended to 
prevent persons who have participated in corrupt practices or have powers of control 
or management over a firm from escaping the consequences of their actions by hiding 
Williams & Quinot, "Public Procurement and Corruption: The South African Response" (2007) 124 
((2) S. A. L. J. 339. 
7 S28 (4) (a). 
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behind the corporate veil. 58 The approach is to disqualify natural persons who are 
regarded as being responsible for the corrupt activity in a firm, so that they are unable 
to obtain public contracts either in a personal capacity or through a new corporate 
identity. This may also increase the effectiveness of a disqualification measure as the 
culpable natural person will be unable to evade the effects of the disqualification. 
Also, where a jurisdiction is reluctant to impute criminal liability to a firm, 59 or it is 
difficult to convict a firm for corruption, 60 the disqualification of natural persons may 
be the only manner by which disqualification may be implemented. 
The issues posed by the disqualification of natural persons for the offences of a firm 
are determining who the relevant natural persons are and the basis for the natural 
person's disqualification. This basis may be complicity in the commission of the 
offence, control or the position of the person within the firm. In the jurisdictions, the 
relevant natural persons are sometimes, but not always those with decision-making 
powers in the firm such as directors, partners and senior managers. 61 However, the 
decision-making powers of such persons may vary with the size and nature of the firm 
in question, and a titled post may not necessarily be determinative of actual power 
exercised. 62 
Where a natural person is disqualified for the corrupt activity of a firm, the 
disqualification may be limited to the natural person in a personal capacity or may 
further prevent the natural person from obtaining public contracts through a new or 
existing corporate identity by extending the disqualification to other firms in which 
the natural person is involved. 
As discussed above, the EU directives are silent on the disqualification of related 
persons and this also applies to the disqualification of a natural person for offences 
attributable to a firm. This silence relates both to the mandatory and discretionary 
58 See for example, Robinson v Cheney, 876 F. 2d 152 (D. C. Cir 1989). 
39 Beale, "A response the critics of corporate criminal liability" (2009) A. C. L. R. 1481. 60 The UK SFO has admitted that it finds it difficult to prove corporate responsibility in corruption 
cases. Law Commission, Reforming Bribery Consultation Paper 313(October 2008), 68. 61 Pinto & Evans, 306. For instance, for a corporation to be liable for corruption in the UK, the 
prosecution needs to prove that the official had the necessary status and authority to make his acts the 
acts of the company. See Rv Andrews-Weatherfoil Ltd (1972) 56 C. A. R. 31. 62 See for example, Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens [2009] UKHL 39. 
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disqualifications. Although the directives permit a procuring authority to obtain 
information on the convictions of directors and persons with powers of 
"representation, decision and control" in the disqualification process, it is not clear 
whether a natural person who has not been convicted, but is a person with such 
powers over a firm may be disqualified for an offence attributed to a firm. The UK, in 
implementing the directives, adopted a similar approach to the directives and do not 
mention the disqualification of a natural person for the conviction or offences of a 
firm. 63 Although the UK regulations require the disqualification of a firm where a 
relevant natural person has been convicted, the fact that the regulations are silent on 
the disqualification of a natural person for the offences of a firm may indicate that the 
UK regulations did not intend this to be the case. This omission may not be too 
problematic in practice as many corruption cases involving UK companies show that 
the courts are more likely to convict the natural persons in control of a firm and not 
the firm itself. 64 However, if this is indeed the UK approach, it runs counter to the 
Serious Crime Act 2007, which applies to corruption offences and provides that 
where an offence committed by a "body corporate" is committed with the consent or 
connivance of an officer (defined to mean a director, manager or secretary), that 
person is also guilty of the offence. 65 Thus under the Act, where a firm is guilty of 
corruption, its culpable officers will also be guilty where they consented or connived 
in the commission of the offence. 
In relation to the discretionary provisions in the EU and the UK, as stated, the 
legislation is silent on the extension of these disqualifications. As discussed above, 
some of the offences and circumstances that may lead to disqualification may only be 
committed by individuals (bankruptcy) and some may only be committed by firms 
(winding-up), and it is thus appropriate that the provisions do not contain blanket 
rules requiring extension in circumstances where this may not be appropriate. It seems 
likely therefore that procuring authorities have the discretion to decide if a natural 
person will be disqualified for the offences of the firm. 
63 DPP v Kent & Sussex Contractors [ 1944] K. B. 146. 64 Rv Welcher & Others [2007] EWCA 480; Rv Tumukunde & Tobiasen (unrep. 09.08); Rv Bush 
[2003] EWCA Crim. 1056.; Rv Hinchl fe [2002] EWCA Crim. 2447; Rv Godden-Wood [2001] 
EWCA Crim. 1586; Rv Forsyth, [2011] UKSC 9. See however Rv Mabey & Johnson (unrep. 25.9.09); 
Rv Innospec [2010] Lloyds Rep. F. C. 462. 
65530. 
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Finally, neither the EU nor the UK provisions extend the disqualification to other 
firms in which the natural person is involved. A similar approach is adopted by the 
US but the World Bank and South Africa extend disqualification to the successors and 
assigns of the offender and future businesses of a disqualified natural person 
respectively. 
Unlike the position in the EU and UK, the US FAR. provides for the disqualification 
of a natural person for offences committed by a firm. 66 Under the FAR, a person who 
is an officer, director, shareholder, partner, employee or other individual associated 
with a firm may be disqualified for the actions of the firm, where the person 
participated in, knew of, or had reason to know of the firm's improper conduct. 67 The 
test to determine whether an individual `had reason to know' of the cause for 
disqualification is not a strict liability test, and the duty imposed on the disqualifying 
official is to draw reasonable inferences from the information known to him. 68 This is 
a subjective test, 69 and without actual or `blind-eye' knowledge, the conduct of a firm 
will not affect natural persons. 70 This approach is informed by the respondeat 
superior doctrine of corporate liability and is supported by the Department of Justice 
Principles for the Federal Prosecution of Business Organisations 71 which require 
prosecutors to pursue action against a firm and the culpable individuals where an 
offence is committed by a firm. 
As discussed above, the World Bank provides for the disqualification of affiliates, 
which includes natural persons who control or are controlled by disqualified 
companies. 72 The Bank is the only jurisdiction that appears to disqualify employees 
(natural persons controlled by a firm) without basing this on the employee's 
culpability and it is difficult to see why the disqualification of employees is 
warranted, unless there is evidence to show their complicity in the commission of the 
relevant offences- as is the case in the US. In the World Bank, a natural person may 
66 FAR 9.406-5 (b). 
67 FAR 9.406-5 (b); Novicki v Cook, 946 F. 2d 938 (D. C. Cir 1991). 
" Novicki v Cook, ibid, 941. 69 FAR 9.406-5. 
70 Cibinic & Nash, 1998,474; In Facchiano Constr. Co. v Department of Labour, 987 F. 2d 206 (3'l 
Cir. 1993), the court held that the agency could disqualify `responsible officers' of a contractor, but not 
officers who did not know about the misconduct. 
71 Available at www. iustice. gov 
72 Art. 1 S 1.02 & Art. IX S9.04 WBSP. 
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also be disqualified for the offences of a firm where the person exercises control over 
the firm. This may apply to decision-makers in the firm and Bank practice is that the 
Bank normally disqualifies directors, partners and senior personnel who control the 
disqualified company. This approach is similar to that of the US, except that in the 
Bank there is no requirement that the natural person knows of or participates in the 
corrupt activity, and compared to the US, a wider range of persons may be caught by 
the Bank's provisions. 
South Africa also provides for the disqualification of a natural person for offences 
committed by a firm. The South African approach is similar to the US approach in 
that senior personnel may be disqualified where such personnel were involved in or 
knew of the corrupt activity. Thus, the Corruption Act provides for the 
disqualification of specified natural persons related to a convicted firm where the 
natural person's complicity in the offence is established. Under the Act, where a firm 
is convicted and disqualified by the court, the disqualification may be extended to any 
partner, manager, director or other person who wholly or partly exercises control over 
that firm; who was involved in the offence; or who knew or ought reasonably to have 
known or suspected that the firm committed the offence. 73 The Act thus uses the tests 
of control, complicity and knowledge. The Corruption Act also applies the 
disqualification to every future firm of the disqualified natural person, if such firm is 
wholly or partly controlled or owned by the disqualified person. 74 As argued above, 
this may jeopardize the commercial future of such a person, and may be unduly 
punitive and disproportionate. 
The PPPFA regulations also extend disqualification to natural persons and provide 
that where corruption has occurred in bidding for a public contract, the procuring 
authority may disqualify the supplier, its shareholders and directors. On the basis that 
directors of firms are required to be natural people, 75 this means a natural person may 
be disqualified for the offences of the firm. The regulations however do not provide 
the basis for the director's disqualification and it is not clear whether directors will be 
disqualified because they are directors (and control the firm) or because they were 
involved in the offence. The extension of disqualification to shareholders is not found 
's S28 (1) (b) (ii). 
74 S28 (1) (d). 
75 S69 (7) (a) Companies Act 2008. 
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in the other jurisdictions and is quite odd, if one considers that a publicly listed 
company may have thousands of shareholders, some of whom may be nominees who 
will only have a limited say in the company's affairs. 76 The regulations are also silent 
on the basis of the shareholders disqualification. It is suggested that the regulations 
should be interpreted as applying only to majority shareholders or shareholders with 
powers of management and control over the firm, 77 as any other interpretation may be 
impracticable. 
6.3.2 Analysis 
As can be seen, the jurisdictions adopt different approaches to the disqualification of a 
firm for the offences of a natural person and vice versa. However, there are certain 
issues which merit further discussion. The first issue is determining who the natural 
persons whose convictions/offences ought to lead to the disqualification of a firm and 
similarly, which natural persons should be disqualified for the offences/conviction of 
a firm. In some jurisdictions, such as the US, the legislation has spelt this out with 
sufficient clarity, whilst in others, a disqualifying entity is given the discretion to 
determine who these natural persons should be. Where the discretion rests with a 
disqualifying entity, the following guidelines may be adopted in determining whether 
a natural person ought to be disqualified. 
As a general rule, it is suggested that a firm should always be held responsible for the 
corrupt activities of its decision-makers to provide an incentive for internal 
monitoring within the firm and also because in some instances, this may merely be a 
case of piercing the corporate veil to hold the firm liable for the actions of its decision 
makers. Elements of this approach are found in all the jurisdictions under study and 
the importance of adopting such an approach was seen in a US case where a natural 
person was disqualified and the disqualification was not extended to the firm, the 
76 Sealy & Worthington, Cases & Materials in Company Law 8'" ed. (2007), 170. 
" By analogy with the intentions behind the Corruption Act disqualifications, where it was stated that 
the purpose of the disqualifications is to attach a crime to a person who represents a company. See 
Parliamentary Justice and Constitutional Development Portfolio Committee-Prevention of Corrupt 
Activities Bill Deliberations, 13 August 2003. Available at www. pmg. org. za. 
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natural person merely transferred ownership of the firm to a family member in order 
to continue receiving government benefits "g 
Second, the offences or conviction of an employee should affect the firm where it is 
determined that the corrupt activities were primarily intended to benefit the firm. This 
approach is also reflected to a limited extent in the US and South Africa. Third, a firm 
could be disqualified for the conviction of an employee where the conviction revealed 
an active and unchanged culture of corruption in the firm. 79 However, where a firm 
has terminated its connection with the corrupt and convicted employees, then as is 
discussed in ch. 8, the disqualification of the firm may no longer be necessary. 
These guidelines may ensure that a jurisdiction does not go too far in extending 
disqualification but ensure also that firms cannot avoid the responsibility of 
implementing adequate internal anti-corruption processes. The use of these guidelines 
will however depend on whether a disqualification regime is mandatory or 
discretionary and the limits of the disqualifying entities discretion in the 
disqualification of related persons. 
The second issue requiring further discussion is guidance on determining whether a 
firm is controlled by a natural person. As has been seen, most jurisdictions rely on the 
test of control to determine whether a natural person ought to be disqualified for the 
offences of a firm. However, it is not clear what criteria a disqualifying entity may use 
to determine whether a natural person is indeed in control of a firm. Thus, can a 
natural person be said to be in control of a firm because that person is the main 
shareholder, or because the person holds a position of power or authority and is the/a 
main decision maker, or is control based on an identity of interest between the natural 
person and the firm? This may not be easily determined. For instance, in the UK, 
although the directors of a company have day-to-day control over the company, it is 
arguable that it is the shareholders who really control a company, 80 as they appoint 
the directors and can remove them8' and may also give the directors direction by 
78 GAO, Suspended and debarred businesses and individuals improperly receive federal funds (GAO 
09-174 Feb. 2009), 4. 
79 Hetzer, n. 11,383; Ferguson, n. 11. 
80 See however, Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cunninghame [ 1906] 2 Ch. 34. 
S 168 Companies Act 2006. 
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means of a special resolution. 82 In a small company, the directors will often be 
majority shareholders and owners of the company, but in a large corporation, there 
may be a clear division between the directors and the shareholders. In such cases, how 
will a disqualifying entity determine who is in control of a firm- will it be those in 
day-to-day control of the company, or those who have overall supervision over the 
decision makers? Further, will a disqualifying entity take into account the position of 
de facto and shadow directors in determining controls a company? 83 
One approach that may be relied upon by a disqualifying entity is to disqualify the 
natural persons who directly authorised/approved the actions that led to the 
commission of the offence or the conviction of the firm. This approach finds support 
in the UK Enterprise Act 2002, which provides that a person controls a company 
where he can materially influence its policy, even if he does not have a controlling 
interest in it. 84 Of course this criterion may not always work as in a large 
multinational, it may not always be possible to identify this person and it has in fact 
been argued that some firms avoid this type of liability by decentralising 
responsibilities to make it impossible to identify a person in charge of any matter. 85 
A third issue is the extent of disqualification where a natural person such as a director 
is disqualified for the offences of a firm. Should other firms or future firms in which 
this natural person is/may be interested also be affected by the disqualification? If 
these other companies are not disqualified, the disqualification of the director may 
have little effect as he may still be able to access public contracts using his other 
corporate entities. However, an approach that disqualifies these other entities or firms 
may be problematic for three reasons. Firstly because of the extensive investigations 
that a disqualifying entity may need to conduct to discover the companies which are 
related to the director, especially where future business is concerned. Secondly 
because the basis of these firms disqualification will need to be determined- will it be 
the control or ownership the director exercises over them? Thirdly, the 
82 Art 70 Draft articles of association, Table A Companies Act 2006. 
83 In the UK, a de facto director is one who has not been formally appointed but in fact acts as a 
director: Re Kaytech International Plc [1999] B. C. C. 390 CA; a shadow director is usually a 
shareholder who in order to avoid the duties of a director avoids a formal appointment, but controls the 
decisions of the formally appointed board: Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd [1994] B. C. C. 161 
" S26 Enterprise Act 2002. 
85 Ferran, "Corporate Attribution and the directing mind and will" (2011) 127 L. Q. R. 239. 
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disqualification of these firms may be too remote from the commission of the initial 
offence and their disqualification may penalise employees and investors that may not 
be related to the original disqualified firm, except through their connection with the 
director and may be disproportionate to the aims of the disqualification policy. 
6.3.2 Connected companies 
Connected companies are defined in this thesis to mean sister, parent, and subsidiary 
companies. A connected company is one that is related to another through shared 
ownership or control in the sense that the same entity controls two separate companies 
or one entity controls another or two or more entities share a management structure. 86 
Connected companies are often included in the list of related persons to be 
disqualified alongside the primary supplier. The basis for the disqualification of a 
connected company may be the complicity of the connected company in the 
commission of the offence; the level of control which the connected company wields 
over the disqualified company or vice versa; inter-connected ownership structures 
such as where a third entity controls both the disqualified primary supplier and the 
connected company or because there is an identity of management and operations and 
the connected company is an integral part of the disqualified supplier. 
The issues presented by the disqualification of connected companies are similar to the 
issues presented in the case of natural persons, however as will be discussed, trying to 
ascertain the relationship between connected companies can often be a daunting task, 
especially where a company has undergone restructuring following corruption issues 
or disqualification proceedings. 
6.3.2.1 Disqualifying a parent company for the offences of a subsidiary 
A parent company may be defined as a company that owns enough voting stock in 
another firm to control the management and operations of that firm (the subsidiary). 
The definition of a parent company may differ in jurisdictions, but it is usually 
defined by reference to factors such as the parent being able to determine the 
86 S2 South African Companies Act 2008; S 1159 UK Companies Act 2006. 
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composition of the board of directors of the subsidiary; controlling the voting power 
of the subsidiary and owning more than half of the issued share capital of the 
subsidiary. 87 
A parent company may be disqualified from public contracts for offences committed 
by a subsidiary on the basis of the level of control exercised by the parent over the 
subsidiary, which makes the parent responsible for the offences of the subsidiary. 
However, a parent may not always exercise the kind of control over the subsidiary 
that would justify the imposition of disqualification, since the directors of a subsidiary 
are required to act independently for, and in the interests of the subsidiary. 88 To 
disqualify a parent, a disqualifying entity will need to identify the parent company. 
This may not always be easy, as a parent may be a holding company whose shares 
may be owned by the beneficial owners of the company or a trust company, making it 
difficult to determine the precise entities controlling the subsidiary. Secondly, the 
disqualifying entity will have to determine the basis of the parent's disqualification. If 
the basis is complicity in the commission of the offence and not control/ownership, 
the extent of this complicity may need to be determined by an investigation into the 
parent's role in the offence. 
In the EU, the directives are silent on the issue of connected companies in relation to 
the mandatory and the discretionary provisions and this may mean the issue was left 
to Member States discretion. One indication that Member States may rightly exercise 
this discretion in relation to the mandatory provisions is the provision permitting 
Member States to obtain information on convictions from legal and natural persons, 
including company directors and persons having powers of representation, decision 
and control of the contractor. 89 In relation to the discretionary disqualification 
provisions, as the directives omitted to mention the convictions of other persons, 
including legal persons in the same manner as was done for the mandatory provisions, 
this may either mean that connected persons are not intended to be disqualified under 
the discretionary provisions or that this issue has been left to the discretion of Member 
States. As it is not clear in relation to the mandatory provisions whether or in what 
contexts a procuring authority may disqualify a parent, limited guidance may be 
S7 S3 South African Companies Act 2008; S1162 UK Companies Act 2006. B6 For instance, in the UK see Charterbridge Corp v Lloyds Bank [1970] Ch. 62,74. 
89 Art. 45 (1) PSD. 
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found from EU jurisprudence in other contexts which has held parent companies 
liable for the legal infringements of a subsidiary. 
It should be noted that the directives permit the use of subsidiary companies in public 
contracts under provisions allowing a supplier to rely on the capacities of other 
entities, regardless of the nature of the legal links it has with them. 90 These provisions 
require a procuring authority to look beyond the corporate shell where a parent relies 
on the assets of a subsidiary to qualify for a contract. In Ballast Nedam Groep 191 the 
CJEU held that account must be taken of the companies belonging to a holding 
company where it applies for a public contract, provided that it actually has the 
resources of the subsidiaries available to it. 
EU law is also acquainted in other contexts with going behind the corporate veil to 
hold a parent company liable for the actions of its subsidiary. 92 In Tokai Carbon, 93 the 
CJEU held a parent company and its subsidiary jointly liable for alleged anti- 
competitive acts, imputing the acts of one company to the other. 94 Similarly, it is 
possible for a disqualifying entity to look beyond the corporate shell in deciding 
whether to disqualify a parent for a subsidiary's convictions. 
Some of the factors which the CJEU has taken into account in determining that a 
parent and subsidiary consist of a single economic entity so as to hold the parent 
responsible for the actions of the subsidiary include the fact that the companies form 
part of a "unitary organisation of personal, tangible and intangible elements" pursuing 
specific economic aims that are determined in the same way. 95 The CJEU will also 
find a parent responsible for the actions of a wholly owned subsidiary, as a 
presumption exists that the subsidiary follows instructions given by the parent, 
without actually confirming whether the parent exercised this power. 96 However, the 
court will also consider whether the parent has itself committed an infringement of the 
90 Art. 48(3) PSD. 
91 C-389/92, Ballast Nedam Groep NV v Belgian State [1994] E. C. R. 1-1289, para. 17. 
92 Joined Cases T-71/03, T74/03, T-87/03 and T-91/03, Tokai Carbon v Commission [2005] 5 
C. M. L. R. 13 paras. 62,295,384. 
93 ibid. para. 62. 94 T-9/99, HFB v Commission [2002] E. C. R. 11-1487 para. 54,524-525. 95 HFB v Commission, n. 94, para. 53-54. % Tokai Carbon, cited above n. 92 para. 60. Advocate-General Mischo in C-294/98P Metsa-Serla Oyj & 
Ors v Commission [2000] E. C. R. I-10065 para. 60. 
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rules either in its own right or through the subsidiary, before holding it liable for the 
actions of its subsidiary. 97 In Tokai Carbon, the Commission argued that a parent's 
responsibility for the acts of the subsidiary is based on the theory of economic unity 
and not on any separate legal concept of `attribution. ' 98 In other words, a parent 
company is not liable because it is a parent, but where specified criteria are satisfied 
in relation to its interaction with the subsidiary. 
From the above, one can arguably extrapolate the following principles in suggesting 
an EU approach in relation to the mandatory disqualifications. First, if the subsidiary 
is an agent of the parent, its actions will be imputed to the parent in so far as the 
subsidiary was acting within the scope of its authority. 99 However, this may be very 
difficult for a procuring authority applying the disqualifications to establish in any 
particular case. Secondly, if the subsidiary is not an agent, but is controlled by the 
parent to the extent that the two units consist of a single business enterprise, the 
subsidiary's conviction may be imputed to the parent. Thirdly, if the subsidiary 
operates independently of the parent company, there is no basis for imputing the 
conviction to the parent, unless one accepts the argument that a parent corporation 
should know and be liable for whatever is being done in its name. '°o 
The UK regulations in implementing the directives do not explicitly mention the 
position of parent companies, but provide that the supplier will be disqualified for its 
own convictions as well as where "any other person who has powers of 
representation, decision or control" has been convicted. Since the meaning of person 
in UK law includes legal persons, 1°' this provision may be interpreted as applying to 
parent companies (legal persons with powers of decision or control). In relation to 
imposing liability on a parent for acts of a subsidiary, UK jurisprudence has 
established, similar to EU jurisprudence discussed above, that a parent may be 
9' T-65/89 BPB Industries & Anor v Commission [1993] E. C. R. 11-389, para. 149,153. 
" Tokai Carbon, n. 92, para. 384. 99 Joined Cases T 339/94-342/94, Metsa-Serla v Commission [1998] E. C. R. 11-1727, paras. 58-59 and 
C-294/98P, Metsa-Serla Oyj v Commission [2000] E. C. R. I-10065, para. 27 10° Caiden, "A Cautionary Tale: Ten Major Flaws in Combating Corruption" (2004) 10 S. W. J. L. T. A. 
269,276. 
101 Schedule 1, Interpretation Act 1978. 
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responsible for the actions of a subsidiary where the subsidiary is subservient o the 
will of the parent and is essentially its alter-ego. 102 
Although a literal interpretation of the UK procurement regulations may give rise to 
an interpretation that parent companies may be disqualified for the offences of a 
subsidiary, the OGC Guidance is against this interpretation and states that the 
convictions of persons with powers of representation, decision and control relates to 
natural persons and not parent or subsidiary companies that are separate legal 
entities. 103 Although the OGC Guidance is not prescriptive, in the absence of any 
other direction, procuring authorities are likely to follow the Guidance. Whilst the 
OGC's approach is realistic, given that it may be prohibitively expensive for a 
procuring authority to investigate the networks of company ownership, 104 and such 
investigations may also delay the procurement process; this approach may affect the 
effectiveness of the disqualifications in practice. 105 Further, the OGC's limitation of 
persons in control of a supplier to natural persons may run counter to the provisions of 
the Enterprise Act 2002, which provides that enterprises will not be regarded as being 
distinct entities if they are brought under common control or common ownership and 
further, that a person or group of persons who is able, directly or indirectly, to control 
or materially influence the policy of a body corporate, but without having a 
controlling interest in that body corporate or in that enterprise, will be regarded as 
having control of it. 106 Thus, if the meaning of entities under Enterprise Act were 
applied to the disqualification provisions, parent companies in some instances may be 
regarded as being in control of subsidiaries, making them liable to disqualification. 
As will be seen, the US, the World Bank and South Africa provide for the 
disqualification of a parent company for the actions of its subsidiary and use the test 
of control to determine whether the parent ought to be disqualified. The US approach 
is however more comprehensive than the approach in the other jurisdictions. In the 
US, the FAR provides that disqualification affects all divisions or other organisational 
elements of the contractor, unless the disqualification is limited to specific 
1°2 Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Ltd [ 1980] 1 W. L. R. 627; Greene King Plc v Harlow District Council 
(2003) EWHC 2852. 
103 Para. 4.1. 
104 Anechiarico and Jacobs, 1995,162-172. 
los Ibid. 
106 S26 Enterprise Act 2002. 
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divisions/elements. 107 Some of the factors that may determine whether entities such as 
parent companies will be disqualified include "whether the level and extent of the 
misconduct is an isolated incident or a systemic problem; 
... 
the corporate culture; and 
the relationship among the company's various units. "los 
A disqualifying entity also has the discretion to disqualify the contractor's 
affiliates, '09 which is defined as an organisation that controls or is controlled by a 
supplier, or a third party that controls both the supplier and another organisation. 
Thus, a parent company comes within the definition of affiliate. The basis of the 
parent's disqualification in the US is the control it exercises over the disqualified 
supplier and not ownership. The adoption of control and not ownership as the basis 
for disqualification stems from a recognition that it is possible to control the activities 
of a separate firm without owning a majority interest in that firm. The FAR also lists 
the factors indicating one entity controls another. 110 These include interlocking 
management or ownership; lII an identity of interests amongst family members; 112 
shared facilities and equipment; common use of employees or the reorganisation of a 
business following a disqualification where the management, ownership or principal 
employees are similar to that of the disqualified supplier. 113 
In the US, the disqualification of a parent company is not based on the parent's 
participation/knowledge of the corrupt activity but is a matter of objective assessment 
once it is established that the parent wields the required control over the subsidiary. 
However knowing whether a parent ought to be disqualified in such cases is not 
always simple and in Bilfinger Berger v United States, ' 14 the procuring authority 
excluded a parent and another related company from a public contract based on the 
prior disqualification of a subsidiary. The companies had undergone an inter-group 
transfer and restructuring in which the contracts being performed by the disqualified 
subsidiary were transferred to a `branch' of the parent company. In making its 
107 FAR 9.406-1 (b). 
'08 Bednar (ed. ), 86. 
109 FAR 9.406-1 (b). 
10 FAR 9.403. 
11 Detek Inc., Comp-Gen Dec. B-261678,95-2 CPD ¶ 177. 
"2 ABL Indus., Inc., Comp-Gen. Dec. B-207335,82-2 CPD ¶ 119. 
13 FAR 9.403; Solid Waste Servs. Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-218445,85-1 CPD ¶ 703. 
114 94 Fed. C1.538 (2010). 
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decision, the procuring authority complained that it could not identify the "lines of 
authority" between the companies. The GAO accepted the determination of the 
procuring authority to exclude the parent, but this decision was ultimately overturned 
by the Court of Federal Claims (COFC). 
The World Bank adopts an approach similar to that of the US, and uses the test of 
control to determine if a parent company should be disqualified. The Bank may 
disqualify any "affiliate" which is defined to mean any legal person that controls the 
offender. "5 Thus, a parent company, which controls a disqualified subsidiary, may 
also be disqualified. Similar to the US, the World Bank does not include any 
subjective criteria such as the knowledge or participation of the parent for the 
disqualification of the parent. 
Similarly, in South Africa, the Corruption Act provides that in addition to the primary 
offender, a court may disqualify any other person, who wholly or partly exercises or 
may exercise control over that firm and who was involved in the offence concerned; 
or who knew or ought reasonably to have known or suspected that the firm committed 
the offence 116 This may be interpreted as providing for the disqualification of parent 
companies as s 28 (7) of the Corruption Act defines a person to include legal persons. 
The basis of a parent's disqualification is the control the parent wields over the 
subsidiary or the parent's knowledge/complicity in the offence. 
Unlike the Corruption Act, the PPPFA regulations are not clear on the issue of parent 
companies being disqualified for the offences of a subsidiary. However, the PPPFA 
regulations provide that a disqualifying entity may disqualify the supplier and its 
shareholders (and directors) from public contracts where a relevant offence is 
committed. This may be interpreted as providing for the disqualification of parent 
companies who are shareholders in the offending company. However as was 
discussed in the context of natural persons, the basis of the shareholders 
disqualification is not treated under the regulations. 
The PFMA regulations only permit the disqualification of the supplier and its 
directors and do not provide for the disqualification of parent companies. 
"s Art I, S1.02; Art. IX S9.04 WBSP. 
116 S28 (1) (b). 
221 
6.3.2.2. Disqualifying a subsidiary company for the offences of a parent 
Apart from the possibility of disqualifying a parent for offences committed by a 
subsidiary, a subsidiary may be disqualified for offences committed by the parent. A 
subsidiary is defined as a company in which another entity (the parent) owns more 
than 50% of its voting stock. "? The disqualification of a subsidiary may ensure that 
the disqualified parent is unable to avoid the effects of the disqualification by relying 
on an entity it controls for public contracts. Again, for the disqualification of a 
subsidiary, a disqualifying entity will need to identify the subsidiary and the basis for 
the subsidiary's disqualification- although this will usually be the control which the 
disqualified parent exercises over the subsidiary. 
The legislative provisions on disqualification in the EU are silent on whether a 
subsidiary company will be disqualified for the offences of its parent, and as 
previously mentioned, this issue has been left to Member States discretion. Relying on 
the EU jurisprudence discussed above, it is suggested that Member States may adopt 
an approach similar to what obtains in relation to parent companies. Thus, a 
subsidiary may be affected by the conviction of a parent, where it is decided that the 
two units consist of a single business unit and because of the level of control, which 
the parent is deemed to exercise over the subsidiary. I 8 
The US and the World Bank adopt a similar approach and disqualification extends to 
the affiliates of the disqualified firm, which includes any firm controlled by the 
disqualified firm. ' 19 Also, in the US, in the context of responsibility determinations, 
the COFC has held that a procuring authority could exclude a subsidiary based on the 
violations of a parent company, although another procuring authority had previously 
elected not to disqualify the parent for its offences. 120 
In the UK, as discussed above, the procurement regulations have been interpreted by 
the OGC as precluding the disqualification of subsidiaries or other legal persons that 
"7 S3 South African Companies Act 2008; S1162 UK Companies Act 2006. 
1'$ Williams, 2006,724. 
' 19 Bilfinger Berger n. 114; FAR 9.403; Art. I S 1.02 & Art. IX S9.04 WBSP. 
120 OSG Product Tankers v United States 82 Fed. Cl. 570 (2008). 
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are legally distinct from the primary contractor. 121 However, procuring authorities are 
not bound by the Guidance and may adopt an approach that accords with UK 
jurisprudence, under which companies may be liable for each others actions where the 
companies are alter-egos of each other. 122 
In the South African system, only the Corruption Act permits the disqualification of a 
subsidiary by permitting the courts to disqualify any firm, which is owned or 
controlled by the convicted supplier. 123 The Corruption Act goes further than the other 
jurisdictions by permitting a court to also disqualify firms established in the future by 
the convicted parent, if that future firm is wholly or partly controlled or owned by the 
person convicted. 124 
6.3.2.3 Disqualifying a firm for the offences of a sister company 
A sister company is an entity that is owned by the same principal that owns the 
disqualified firm. The disqualification of a firm for offences committed by its `sister' 
is not particularly favoured by the jurisdictions but where sister companies are 
disqualified, the rationale for doing so is to prevent the principal of the disqualified 
firm from assisting it to avoid the effects of its disqualification by bidding through a 
sister company. 
In the EU, as previously mentioned, the procurement directives are silent on this 
issue, but direction on the EU's future approach may be found in its jurisprudence. 
Current European jurisprudence is not wholly in favour of imputing the actions of 
sister companies to each other, unless strong grounds exist for doing so. In HFB v 
Commission, it was held that where there was no holding company co-ordinating the 
activity of a group of companies, the component companies could be held jointly and 
severally liable for a legal infringement. 125 However, this will only occur where there 
was either no person at the head of the group to which the violations of the group 
might be imputed or it was "impossible or excessively difficult to identify the person 
121 Para 3.2. 
'22 Lonrho n. 102. 
123 S28 (1) (a). 
124 S28 (1) (d). 
123 T-9/99, HFB v Commission [20021 E. C. R. 11-1487, para. 66. 
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at the head of the group. " 126 Thus, by way of analogy, it is arguable that in the 
disqualification context, the conviction of a sister or related company will not affect 
the primary supplier as long as the convicted company is not participating in the 
contract; unless it is determined that the companies constitute a single business 
enterprise. 
As has been discussed above, the UK regulations as interpreted by the OGC, limit 
disqualification to natural persons. However, as discussed earlier, the OGC Guidance 
is not prescriptive and procuring authorities may adopt an approach in line with UK 
jurisprudence in which the veil of incorporation may be pierced where necessary. 127 
Unlike the EU and UK, the US and World Bank regulations expressly permit the 
disqualification of sister companies. The FAR and the World Bank Sanctions 
Procedures extend disqualification to `affiliates' of the disqualified company, which is 
defined to include sister companies or an entity controlled by the same entity that 
controls a disqualified contractor. 128 The US regulations provide more detail the 
World Bank provisions and provide that a sister company may be disqualified for the 
offence of a primary supplier where the necessary connection exists between the 
entities. 129 A necessary connection will exist where there is interlocking management 
or ownership; ' 30 an identity of interests amongst family members; 131 shared facilities 
and equipment; and common use of employees. 132 
The South African provisions do not contemplate the disqualification of sister 
companies. In South Africa, it is not clear why a firm established in the future will be 
disqualified under the provisions of the Corruption Act, whilst a sister firm will retain 
access to public contracts, since the only difference between a sister company and a 
firm established in future, where both are owned by the same principals that own the 
convicted firm is in their respective dates of establishment. '33 
126 Ibid. 
127 DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1976] 1 W. L. R. 852. 
128 FAR 9.403; Art. I, S1.02 WBSP. 
'Z' FAR 9.406-1 (b). 
"o Detek Inc., Comp-Gen Dec. B-261678,95-2 CPD 1177. 
13' ALB Indus., Inc., Comp-Gen. Dec. B-207335,82-2 CPD ¶ 119. 
132 FAR 9.403; Solid Waste Servs., Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-218445,85-1 CPD 1703. 
133 Williams and Quinot, n. 56,353. 
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6.3.2.4 Analysis 
As has been seen, there are varied approaches to the disqualification of connected 
companies. The disqualification of related connected companies is a complex issue 
which creates several problems, which are not all addressed by the jurisdictions. 
One issue that may prove problematic is the application of the test of control, which is 
relied on to determine whether a parent, subsidiary or sister company ought to be 
disqualified alongside a primary supplier. Apart from the US, none of the jurisdictions 
provide disqualifying entities with any guidance on how to determine whether the 
necessary connection exists between related companies for the purpose of 
disqualification. This is particularly so where the test of control is used in 
parent/subsidiary cases. It is suggested therefore, that disqualifying entities in other 
jurisdictions may rely on similar criteria as the US to determine if the necessary level 
of control exists. Criteria such as interlocking management (such as where the same 
persons are directors in both companies) or ownership may assist in properly 
determining whether one company controls another. In practice, it may be difficult 
where the parent is a holding company whose shares are in turn held by another entity 
to determine whether one company is ultimately in control of another. 
Where the disqualification of a related company is based on the knowledge or 
complicity of the related company in the commission of the offence as is the case in 
South Africa, the disqualifying entity may be required to investigate the connected 
company's involvement in the commission of the offence. Determining the connected 
company's knowledge of the offence will also be difficult as the disqualifying entity 
may be required to discover the persons in connected firms whose knowledge may be 
identified as the knowledge of that firm. 
Another issue that merits discussion is the proportionality of disqualifying related 
firms, where these firms were not implicated in any wrongdoing, especially where 
disqualification is not intended to be punitive. As was discussed, the disqualification 
of related firms may affect the business, investors and employees of a firm that has 
not committed any wrongdoing and in the long term may discourage investment in 
firms specialising in government business. 
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Finally, none of the jurisdictions apart from the US are clear on the position where a 
related company terminates its connection with the offending company, such as where 
it divests itself of the offending company. 134 This is similar to the issue of the 
termination of the employment of the offender in the context of natural persons. A 
jurisdiction may consider such divestment as precluding the necessity to disqualify 
the related person 135 but such divestment may not always mean that the related 
company will be readmitted to a procurement process. 136 Thus in the US, the courts 
have held that where a supplier was disqualified based on its relationship to another 
disqualified firm, the procuring authority was not required to readmit the supplier to 
the procurement process although the disqualification was lifted prior to the 
conclusion of the procurement process. 137 
6.3.3 Cooperating companies 
The final category of related persons that may be disqualified alongside a primary 
supplier are cooperating companies. Cooperating companies are defined here as 
subcontractors and joint venture partners who are connected by virtue of a voluntary 
business arrangement. In relation to cooperating companies, a disqualifying entity will 
need to identify the relevant cooperating company and determine the basis for the 
disqualification of the cooperating company. The issues that affect cooperating 
companies are whether a primary supplier will be disqualified for an offence 
committed by a subcontractor and whether joint venture partners will be disqualified 
for each other's offences. The disqualification of subcontractors and joint venture 
partners is given the least attention in the jurisdictions and where this is the case, it 
may be necessary to consider the approach to the liability of cooperating companies in 
other contexts. 
134 FAR 9.406-4 (c). 
'35 Bilfinger Berger n. 114. 
136 FAR 9.405 (d) (3). 
137 FAS Support Services LLC V United States (Case 10-289C, 2010). 
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6.3.3.1 Subcontractors 
A subcontractor is a person hired by a primary supplier to perform part or even all of 
the obligations of the supplier under a public contract. The issue here is whether a 
primary supplier will be disqualified where it intends to utilise a subcontractor that 
has been disqualified, has committed or been convicted of relevant offences. For the 
disqualification of a primary supplier on the basis of the subcontractors' offences, two 
hurdles must be overcome. First, the disqualifying entity will need to know in 
advance the identity of the subcontractors and second, the disqualifying entity may 
need to have reserved a right to approve or veto the subcontractors that will 
participate in a contract. This may be difficult, as a primary supplier is not always 
required to reveal the details of subcontractors when it bids for a public contract. 
The EU procurement directives are silent on the issue of subcontractors, in relation to 
both the discretionary and the mandatory disqualifications and it is thus necessary to 
consider the treatment of subcontractors in European jurisprudence to determine 
whether a primary supplier will be disqualified if it intends to use a convicted 
subcontractor under the mandatory provisions. Although the directives generally 
permit contractors to insist on the use of subcontractors, the fact of subcontracting 
will not limit the primary supplier's liability under the contract138 and restrictions on 
subcontracting may be justified where the procuring authority cannot verify the ability 
of the subcontractor to perform. 139 In relation to the disqualifications, if a procuring 
authority is aware of the subcontractor's conviction, the subcontractor will of course 
be disqualified since the text of the directives disqualifies convicted persons from 
participation in a public contract. Where a primary supplier insists on the use of a 
convicted subcontractor, this should be regarded as indicating the incapability of the 
primary supplier to perform on the contract, 140 prejudicing its ability to participate in 
the procurement, especially where the primary supplier relies on the subcontractor's 
qualifications as a means of fulfilling the technical/financial requirements under the 
138 Art. 25 PSD. 
139 C-176/98, Holst Italia SpA v Comune di Cagliari [1999] E. C. R. 1-8607 para. 28-29; C-314/01, 
Siemens AG Osterreich, ARGE Telekom & Partner v Hauptverband der Osterreichischen 
Sozialversicherungstrager Bietergemeinschaft EDSIORGA [2004] E. C. R. 1-2549. 
140 Art. 48 PSD. 
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contract. 141 Where procuring authorities reserve the right to approve or veto 
subcontractors, 142 Piselli suggests that procuring authorities should use this power to 
prevent convicted companies avoiding public control by working as subcontractors on 
public contracts. '43 
In relation to the discretionary disqualifications, similar considerations may apply. 
Where the subcontractor has been convicted or is guilty of a relevant offence, that 
subcontractor may be precluded from participating in a public contract under the EU 
directives and may prejudice a primary supplier's participation in the contract. 
Thus, although the EU directives are silent on the issue, European jurisprudence 
provides grounds to establish that a proposed subcontractor's conviction may affect 
the primary supplier, in which case, the primary supplier may not be 144 
but denied the contract on the grounds that it does not meet the technical/financial 
requirements to qualify for the contract because of the presence of a disqualified 
subcontractor. 145 However, where a procuring authority is not aware of the identity of 
proposed subcontractors and does not reserve a power to approve or veto them at a 
later date, there may be no way of preventing the participation of a convicted 
subcontractor in a public contract. 
The UK regulations did not go any further than the EU directives and do not mention 
the disqualification of subcontractors. In the UK, a supplier may be required to reveal 
the part of the contract, which is intended to be subcontracted as well as the identity 
of its subcontractors. 146 In relation to the mandatory and the discretionary provisions, 
where the procuring authority is aware of the identity of the subcontractor and is 
aware that the subcontractor has been convicted or is otherwise guilty of corruption, 
the subcontractor may be prevented from participating in a public contract. In R (On 
the application of A) vB Council, 147 the court held that a local Council could deny a 
141 Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 12; Trepte, 2004,319. 142 Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 6.190. 
143 Piselli, 281. 
144 Ibid. 
145 C-5/97, Ballast Nedam Groep NV v Belgian State [1997] E. C. R. 1-7549, para. 13; Shannon, 
"Debarment and Suspension Revisited: Fewer Eggs in the basket" (1995) 44 C. U. L. R. 363,382. 
46 Reg. 45 PCR. 
147 [20071 EWHC 1529 (Admin). 
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supplier permission to use a convicted subcontractor on a public contract. The OGC 
guidance document also suggests that procuring authorities may ask an economic 
operator not to use a subcontractor that has a relevant conviction. 148 Thus, a procuring 
authority has the power to veto the use of a convicted subcontractor on a public 
contract. This does not necessarily mean that the primary supplier will be disqualified, 
but it will not be permitted to use the convicted/guilty subcontractor, and where it 
insists on the use of that subcontractor, then as was discussed in the context of the EU 
above, the primary supplier may not qualify for the contract on this basis. 
Unlike the EU and the UK, in the US, the presence of a disqualified subcontractor 
may not necessarily prevent a primary supplier from obtaining a public contract but 
there are certain restrictions on the use of disqualified subcontractors. It used to be the 
case that a disqualified firm could be used as a subcontractor where the contract was 
not over a certain threshold and did not require government consent. However in 
2010, Congress amended the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 1994 to require 
that disqualification be extended to all subcontracts at any tier, except where 
commercial items are concerned, in which case, disqualification will extend only to 
first tier subcontracts. 149 The FAR was subsequently amended to reflect this change. 
The FAR provides restrictions on subcontracting with a disqualified contractor in two 
instances. First, a disqualified firm may be not be used as a subcontractor where the 
subcontract requires government consent unless the head of the procuring authority 
states in writing "compelling reasons" for approving the subcontract. 150 Second, 
unless the subcontract is one for "commercially available off-the-shelf items", a 
primary contractor may not enter into a subcontract with a value in excess of $30,000 
with a disqualified subcontractor unless there is a compelling reason to do so. ' 51 
Where a primary contractor proposes to enter into a subcontract with a disqualified 
contractor for non-commercially available goods, the primary contractor must notify 
the procuring authority before concluding such subcontracts stating the compelling 
reasons for doing so and the measures it has taken to protect the government's interest 
148 Para 4.1. 
149 S 815 National Defence Authorization Act 2010. 
1S0 FAR 9.405 
-2 (b). A subcontract may require consent depending on the type, complexity, or value, 
or because the subcontract needs special surveillance. See FAR 44.201-1. 
151 FAR 9.405-2; 52.209-6 
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in view of the reasons behind the subcontractor's disqualification. 152 However, a 
primary supplier runs the risk of being declared non-responsible if significant 
purchases are to be made from a disqualified subcontractor, or the disqualified 
subcontractor will play an excessive role in the performance of the contract. 153 
The World Bank procurement guidelines require the highest standard of ethics from 
suppliers and subcontractors'54 whose details are included in a bid for a Bank-funded 
contract. 155 In the context of the Bank's one-off disqualification measure, where the 
proposal for the award of a contract is rejected by the Bank, the Bank procurement 
guidelines provide that all the bidders, including subcontractors will be disqualified 
from the contract. 156 This is because where a bid included the particulars of 
subcontractors 157 and the bid is rejected; any subcontractors included in that bid will 
also be affected as it is impossible to separate the contactors who are reliant on each 
other's expertise to submit a successful bid. A supplier disqualified by the Bank 
cannot act as a subcontractor in future contracts as such a person is not permitted to 
participate in any Bank-funded contracts for the period of its disqualification. '58 
The South African legislation is silent as to the disqualification of subcontractors, but 
the South African approach may be similar to that of the EU and the UK and a 
subcontractor who is guilty of a relevant offence will be precluded from participating 
in a public contract. 159 In South Africa, the use of subcontractors is permitted in 
public contracts, 160 in so far as the subcontracting is done in accordance with the 
terms of the contract. Although the Corruption Act is silent on the issue of 
subcontractors, where a procuring authority is presented with a primary supplier 
wishing to rely on a disqualified subcontractor, the procuring authority will be 
required to refuse a contract to such a primary contractor, where the identity of the 
subcontractor is known to the procuring authority. This is because the Corruption Act 
'52 FAR 9.405-2 (b); 52.209-6. 
's' Cibinic & Nash, 1998,486; Shannon n. 145,382. 
'54 Para 1.16 BPG. 
155 C1.4 & 24, World Bank, Standard Procurement Document: Prequalification Document for 
Procurement of Works and Users Guide (2004) (hereafter Prequalification Document for Works). 
'-56 Para. 1.16 (b) BPG. 
'57 C1.25 Prequalification Document for Works. 
158 Para 1.16 (d) BPG. 
139 Cf. Bolton, "The Exclusion of Contractors from Government Contract Awards" (2006) 10 L. D. D 
25. 
160 Reg. 1 (n) PPPFA. 
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obliges procuring authorities to ignore any offer tendered by a person who is 
disqualified and prohibits procuring authorities from making any offer to or obtaining 
any agreement from a disqualified person. 161 This may be interpreted as prohibiting a 
public body from entering into a contract that involves a disqualified subcontractor. A 
subcontractor's disqualification will come to light when a procuring authority 
examines the Register of Tender Defaulters before awarding a contract, in cases 
where the identity of the subcontractor is revealed to the procuring authority during 
the procurement process. 
The PPPFA Regulations are also silent on the issue of subcontractors. However, a 
firm disqualified under the PPPFA regulations may not act as a subcontractor in 
another contract as the disqualified person is prevented from "obtaining business" 
from any procuring authority for the period of its disqualification. As discussed in 
ch. 4.4.3.1, under the PPPFA regulations, even where the identity of the subcontractor 
has been revealed, it is not clear how a procuring authority may obtain information on 
the prior disqualification of the subcontractor, since the regulations do not require the 
information on disqualifications made under the PPPFA regulations to be listed in the 
Register for Tender Defaulters, or any similar database. 
The PFMA regulations are also silent on the issue of subcontractors. Whilst the 
disqualification of a bidder under the PFMA will affect all subcontractors included in 
that bid, the disqualification will not affect the ability of the disqualified primary 
supplier and any subcontractors from obtaining public contracts in future since the 
disqualifications are limited to a particular procurement process. 
6.3.3.2 Joint ventures 
A joint venture (JV) denotes cooperation between commercial entities that is not a 
partnership, and is defined by reference to factors such as an agreement to associate 
for joint profit; a contribution of money, property, knowledge or skill to a common 
undertaking; a right to participate in the management and profits of the enterprise; a 
161 S28 (3) (a) (iii). 
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duty to share in losses; and a limitation to a single undertaking. 162 The World Bank 
defines a JV as an "ad-hoc association of firms that pool their resources and skills to 
undertake a large or complex contract.. 
," 
163 A JV arrangement may involve the 
creation of a new company- the N company or may merely be a contractual 
agreement between existing parties. 164 
Two scenarios are possible in relation to JVs. First is whether where there is the 
creation of a separate JV company, and one of the principal's of the new JV company 
has been convicted or is guilty of corruption, this will affect the ability of the new JV 
company to obtain public contracts. In such cases it seems likely that a JV will be 
treated under the rules applying to connected companies discussed in ch. 6.3.2 above. 
Second, where there is no new company, but merely a contractual arrangement 
between existing companies and one of these companies has been convicted or 
disqualified for corruption, what effect will this have on the other JV partner? In 
disqualifying JV partners or companies, the disqualifying entity will need to 
determine the basis of the JVs disqualification. This may either be the complicity in 
the commission of the offence, or the reliance of the innocent JV partner on the 
skills/expertise of the guilty partner. 
The EU procurement directives are silent on the issue of disqualification and JVs and 
it is again necessary to examine such relationships under European law. The 
directives permit contractors to tender in groups, without requiring them to be in any 
specific legal form165 and European jurisprudence has established that companies may 
rely on each other's expertise where a joint tender is made. 166 
In the context of the mandatory disqualifications, where there is the formation of a 
separate JV company and the new company is convicted of corruption, the JV 
company will be disqualified in that form from public contracts under the directives. 
Further, the conviction of the new JV company may affect the future ability of its 
162 Hewitt, Joint Ventures (2005), ch. 1. 
163 Glossary to World Bank Prequalification Document for Works. 
Trepte 2007,49. 
165 Art 
.4 PSD. 166 C-5/97, Ballast Nedam Groep NV n. 145; C-176/98 Holst Italia n. 139. 
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principals to obtain public contracts. This approach finds support in European 
jurisprudence in the context of anti-competitive agreements. Thus in Avebe, 167 the 
CJEU held that where a separate company had been formed for the purpose of 
carrying out a JV, the two companies who were the shareholders in the JV company 
(i. e. the principals of the JV company) would be jointly responsible for the 
infringements committed by the JV company. Thus, it is arguable by way of analogy 
that in the context of both mandatory and discretionary disqualifications, where a 
separate JV company is convicted/guilty of an offence, the separate principals of the 
JV company may also be disqualified from public contracts. Alternatively, such 
principals may be disqualified where they are regarded as the parents of the N 
company as discussed in the context of connected companies. 
Where there is a JV arrangement without the formation of a separate company and 
one of the partners has been convicted of corruption, this will affect the ability of the 
innocent partner to tender for a contract, where it would have been relying on the 
resources, skills or expertise of the convicted/disqualified partner. Where the innocent 
partner was not reliant on the convicted/disqualified partner or is able to find an 
alternative JV partner, then the innocent partner may be permitted to tender for a 
public contract. This may however depend on how the jurisdiction deals with the loss 
of joint venture or consortium partners during the tendering process. 168 
In implementing the EU directives, the UK provisions are also silent on the issue of 
JV's. The UK regulations similarly permit suppliers to tender in groups without 
requiring them to be in any specific legal form. 169 The approach to the disqualification 
of JV's may depend on the form or nature of the JV arrangement, which determines 
how the JV will be treated in UK law. Under UK law, a JV may take the form of a 
contractual agreement between the JV partners, the creation of a new company, or the 
formation of a partnership agreement between the JV partners. 170 
167 T-314/01 Cooperative Verkoop- en Productievereniging van Aardappelmeel en Derivaten Avebe BA 
v Commission [2006] E. C. R. 11-3085. 
'" Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 12.56. In the EU, the loss of a consortium partner or subcontractor after the 
award of a contract may give rise to a new award procedure where that loss constitutes a material 
amendment to the contract- C-454/06 Pressetext GmbH v Austria [2008] E. C. R. 1-4401. 169 Reg. 28 PCR. 
170 Hewitt, n. 162, ch. 3. 
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Where there is the formation of a new JV company, which is convicted of corruption, 
this company will be disqualified under the UK regulations. The principals of this 
company will also be disqualified where they are natural persons and fall within the 
definition of persons with powers of representation, decision and control of the new 
JV company as discussed in the context of natural persons above. Where there is no 
separate company, and the JV operates as a contractual agreement between the 
partners, it is likely that the conviction of one JV partner will not lead to the 
disqualification of the other partner. However, the innocent partner may not be 
awarded the contract where it is relying on the skills/expertise of the convicted 
partner. Where the JV takes the form of a partnership under UK law, then it is likely 
that the innocent partner may be disqualified alongside the convicted/guilty partner, 
since in UK partnership law, partners are jointly liable for the liabilities of the 
partnership and disqualification may be regarded as one such liability. 171 
Unlike the EU and UK approach, the US FAR clearly spells out the JV position. 
Under the FAR, the improper conduct of one JV partner may be imputed to the other 
participating partners where the conduct was intended to benefit the JV, or occurred 
with the knowledge, approval or acquiescence of the JV partners. 172 Accepting the 
benefits of the improper conduct will constitute sufficient knowledge, approval and 
acquiescence of the improper conduct. Thus, if one JV partner offers a bribe or other 
inducement to a public official to secure the award of a contract to the JV, this may 
lead to the disqualification of the other JV partners. 
Although the US approach to JVs is clearer and thus more preferable than the EU and 
UK approach, it is suggested, that intending to benefit the JV may not be a sufficient 
test to impose liability on the other JV partners and a preferable test is subjective 
knowledge, as one JV partner may carry out the prohibited actions for the benefit of 
the JV, but against the knowledge or ethos of the other JV partners and these other 
partners should not be disqualified unless it can be shown that they did in fact 
acquiesce in the prohibited conduct. 113 
171 S9& 10 Partnership Act 1890. 
1n FAR 9.407-5,9.406-5 (c ). 
1'3 Corporate cultural differences have been highlighted as one of the problems of JV's. See Hewitt, 
n. 162,13-14; Shapiro & Willig, "On the Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint Ventures" (1990) 4 
(3) J. E. P. 113,114. 
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In the World Bank context, foreign bidders may enter into a JV with a domestic 
supplier, as it is believed that such JVs increase the chances of obtaining the contract 
as Borrowers prefer them, believing that local participation will benefit the domestic 
economy. 174 Research has also shown that in a corrupt environment, foreign investors 
prefer JVs as the vehicle of investment, to assist them in negotiating the corrupt 
bureaucracy. 175 Also, as many Bank contracts are large development projects, the size 
and complexity of these projects means that persons participating in aN may bid for 
Bank contracts. 
In relation to the Bank's one-off disqualification measure, the position of JV partners 
is similar to the position of subcontractors, and the rejection of a bid will affect all the 
persons included in the bid including JV partners. This is because under the Bank's 
procurement guidelines, the liability of the partners in a JV in relation to the bid and 
the contract is joint and several. 176 Thus, all the partners will share any liability faced 
in respect of the bid, such as disqualification. In addition, in bidding for the contract, 
the joint venture partners would have submitted only one bid'77 and if that bid is 
disqualified, all the parties included in the bid will be affected by the disqualification, 
irrespective of their complicity in the offence. 
In relation to the Bank's longer disqualification measures, the position is slightly 
different and where a Bank contract is performed by a JV arrangement and a Bank 
investigation reveals that either one or both of the partners in the JV engaged in 
corruption within that project, the Bank may disqualify the firm(s) involved in the 
corruption. 178 Where only one of the JV partners participated in the corruption, then 
that firm alone will be disqualified from future Bank contracts and the innocent joint 
venture partner would not be affected. 
14 Cf. Aitken & Harrison, "Do Domestic Firms Benefit From Direct Foreign Investment? Evidence 
from Venezuela" (1999) 89 (3) A. E. R. 605-618. 
"s Smarzynska & Wei, "Corruption and Composition of Foreign Direct Investment: Firm Level 
Evidence. " (2000) Available at www. worldbank. org; Ware & Noone, "The Anatomy of Transnational 
Corruption" (2005) 14 (2) I. A. R. 29,34. 
'76 para. 1.12 BPG; cl. 4.1 Prequalification Document for Works. 
177 C1.4.5 Prequalification Document for Works. 
178 Para. 1.16 (d) BPG. 
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The South African legislation is silent on the position of JV partners. The position of 
JVs under the Corruption Act may be similar to the position of subcontractors. 
Although the Act does not expressly mention the position of JVs, where a JV partner 
or a new JV company has been convicted of corruption, that firm may be disqualified 
by the court. Whether a JV partner that is not convicted of corruption under the Act, 
will be disqualified for the conviction of its JV partner will depend on whether the 
innocent JV partner falls within the categories of related persons who may be 
disqualified alongside a convicted person under the Act. As was discussed earlier, 
these are parent and subsidiary companies as well as firms to be established in the 
future. 179 Thus if the innocent JV partner falls into one of these categories, it will be 
disqualified for the conviction of a partner, where it exercises control over the 
convicted partner and was involved in the offence or knew the convicted partner 
committed the offence. 
Like the Corruption Act, the PPPFA regulations are also silent as to the possible 
disqualification of JV partners. However, where a JV arrangement is involved in 
corruptly obtaining a preference under the regulations, all the partners will be 
disqualified under the regulations as the partners fall within the definition of the 
`contractor' who is to be disqualified. Where the JV involved the formation of a 
separate company, that company may be disqualified, and its principals may also be 
disqualified where those principals are shareholders in the joint venture, since as 
discussed earlier, the PPPFA regulations call for the disqualification of a "contractor, 
its shareholders and directors". 180 
The PFMA regulations are silent on the position of JV partners. However, where a JV 
commits an offence, apart from the disqualification of the company, the principals of 
the JV may be disqualified where it is deemed that they fall within the definition of 
the `bidder' who is to be disqualified under regulations. '8' 
1 79 (1) (b) (ii). 
180 Reg. 15 (1) (d) PPPFA. 
18' Reg. 16A9.2 (a) PFMA. 
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6.4 Analysis 
Disqualifying related natural and legal persons raises several issues, which are not 
always considered by the legislative provisions on disqualification. Many of these 
issues have been highlighted and discussed in the preceding sections, but a number of 
issues require further discussion. 
6.4.1 Discovering the existence and complicity of related natural and legal 
persons: the expense and difficulty of investigations 
One problem accompanying the disqualification of related persons is the difficulty 
that may be faced by a disqualifying entity in discovering the relevant related persons 
for the purposes of disqualification. This is especially so in the context of connected 
companies, natural persons and subcontractors. Where the related persons are 
identified and the basis for their disqualification is their complicity in the offence, the 
disqualifying entity may be required to investigate whether those persons were 
implicated in any wrongdoing. 
In relation to discovering the identities of connected companies i. e. subsidiaries, 
parent and sister companies, the often complex networks of company ownership may 
make it difficult and expensive to discover whether one firm is related to another. 
Research from the US suggests that it typically costs between $2000 and $10,000 to 
investigate a typical applicant for a public sector contract. 182 This is a steep sum, and 
certainly not an amount that may be spent by disqualifying entity in every case. The 
cost of conducting these investigations will place a financial burden on the 
procurement system where disqualifying related persons is required and the amount 
spent on investigating related persons may not be justified on the balance of costs and 
benefits and further may not be worth the expense where it turns out to be extremely 
difficult to prove that a new firm is the alter-ego of one previously disqualified. ' 83 In 
the context of subcontractors, a procuring authority may not be aware of the identity 
of subcontractors and there may be no way of discovering whether a primary supplier 
182 Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1995,162-172. 
183 Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1995,172. 
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intends to use a guilty or convicted subcontractor in a public contract. In the context 
of parent companies and natural persons, it may be difficult for a procuring authority 
to determine the level of control that a parent company wields over a subsidiary or the 
precise decision-making powers of a natural person for the disqualification of such 
persons to be justified. 
Where the related persons have been identified, a procuring authority may need to go 
further, as is the case in the US and South African legislation to determine whether 
the related person was implicated in the corrupt activity. This may be also be difficult 
as it may involve investigations of a criminal nature, which as discussed in ch. 5, the 
disqualifying entity may not be authorised, competent or equipped to conduct. 
6.4.2. Procedural burden and delays to the procurement process 
Apart from the expense involved, discovering the existence and the extent of the 
relationship between the primary supplier and related persons may impose a 
significant burden on the procurement process, especially where the disqualifying 
entity is a procuring authority. The task of investigating the relationships between 
related persons will fall to the disqualifying official, who may also be the procurement 
official. Such investigations may place an unnecessary burden on these officials and 
result in a deflection of organisational competence away from their primary goal, '84 
which is to conduct and manage public procurement. Further, these investigations will 
result in delays to the procurement process, where the procurement process is halted 
pending the completion of the disqualification process. This will impact the efficiency 
of the procurement process and may cause delays to the delivery of public services. 
6.4.3 The absence of procedural safeguards 
Clear procedural safeguards for related persons in the disqualification process are 
lacking in the jurisdictions excepting the US and World Bank. This omission is 
indicative of the lack of a coherent approach to disqualifications and the gaps that 
184 Klitgaard, 1988,27. 
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exist in the legislation. As discussed in ch. 4, adequate procedural safeguards are an 
important aspect of the disqualification process and are necessary to ensure that 
disqualification decisions are fair, non-discriminatory, justifiable and transparent. 
Similar arguments may be made in relation to the disqualification of related persons 
and procedural safeguards in relation to related persons are important given that some 
related persons may not have been involved in corrupt activity. 
Without repeating the discussion in ch. 4, it is important that related persons are given 
adequate procedural rights in the disqualification process to ensure they are able to 
challenge the disqualification decision if desired. The approach of the US and World 
Bank which give related persons the same procedural rights as the primary offender 
and consolidate the disqualification hearing of the primary offender and the related 
person 185 may be relied on by other jurisdictions to meet the procedural requirements 
in relation to related persons. 
6.4.4 The lack of clarity in the legislation 
As can be seen from the preceding discussions, there are varying degrees of clarity in 
the legislation on related persons in the jurisdictions. In jurisdictions where there is a 
lack of information on the position of related persons, a clearer approach is necessary 
for two reasons. 
First, a clearer approach may provide limits on the disqualification of related persons. 
Where the legislation is not sufficiently clear on which related persons ought to be 
disqualified, a disqualifying entity may use its discretion in a manner that may be 
disproportionate to the aims sought to be achieved by the jurisdiction's 
disqualification policy. Where the legislation grants discretion to the disqualifying 
entity, the disqualification of related persons ought to be limited to cases where the 
related persons were implicated in the corrupt activity. This approach will minimise 
both the burden that a rigorous extension of disqualification may place on a 
185 Art. IX S9.04 WBSP; FAR 9.406-1 (b) 
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disqualifying entity and limit the potential for abuse of the measure or an excessive 
reliance on the measure. 
Second, the tests that are used to determine the basis for the disqualification of related 
persons ought to be spelt out with sufficient clarity for the benefit of the disqualifying 
entity and the related persons. As discussed, the limits of the test of control are not 
elaborated upon in any jurisdiction except the US. Whilst the proximity of the World 
Bank to the US may result in a reliance by the Bank on the guidance offered by the 
US legislation, South Africa provides little clarity on what a disqualifying entity may 
take into account in determining that one firm controls or is controlled by another. 
Similar comments may be made about the EU and UK system. The absence of any 
indication in these jurisdictions whether and to what extent related persons may also 
be disqualified means that disqualifying entities will have to determine what they 
think is appropriate within the confines of what they believe the legislation permits 
them to do. This may lead to differences in the treatment of related persons between 
the Member States and even within the same State. Such disparities may however lead 
to legal challenges, which may eventually lead to a more coherent approach in the 
EU. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE EFFECT OF DISQUALIFICATION ON EXISTING CONTRACTS 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter will examine the effect disqualification may have on the continuation of 
existing contracts between the disqualified supplier and a procuring authority. The 
issue is whether where disqualification occurs during the pendency of a public 
contract, the disqualification will lead to the termination of the ongoing contract, 
where that contract is not tainted by corruption. The termination of existing contracts 
may depend on whether disqualification is prospective or retrospective, and where 
the legislation is silent on this issue, it may depend on the circumstances in which the 
legislation calls for the termination of public contracts and whether disqualification 
falls within these circumstances as well as whether the rationales for disqualification 
in the jurisdiction support the case for termination. 
The termination of ongoing contracts where a supplier has been disqualified is a 
known, but not widely used concept in public procurement. ' The reluctance of 
procurement systems to terminate existing contracts is reflected in the UNCITRAL 
Model Law which does not provide for the cancellation of a contract as part of the 
remedies where there has been a breach of the procurement process prior to the 
conclusion of a contract, 2 although the guidance notes accompanying the Model Law 
contemplate that national systems might utilise contractual termination in cases of 
fraud or corruption. 3 As will be seen, the domestic jurisdictions under study also have 
mechanisms for terminating contracts where that contract is affected by corruption. 
The unwillingness of procurement systems to provide for contractual termination is 
due to the far-reaching consequences of termination. As stated in the UNCITRAL 
1 Arrowsmith, Linarelli & Wallace, 785-795. 
2 Art. 54, UNCITRAL Model Law on the Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services with 
Guide to Enactment (1995) 34 I. L. M. 718. 
3 Art. 54, para. 12, Guide to enactment of UNCITRAL Model law, n. 2.; Wallace, "UNCITRAL Model 
law on procurement of goods, construction and services" (1994) 1 P. P. L. R. CS2. 
241 
Model law, "annulment of procurement contracts may be particularly disruptive of 
the procurement process and might not be in the public interest. "4 
Contractual termination raises several difficult issues, which may account for the 
disinclination of national systems to utilise termination in disqualification cases. The 
first issue is determining whether termination is prospective or retrospective. In other 
words, will the termination be retroactive and affect completed actions under the 
contract or will the termination only affect future actions under the contract. The 
approach to this issue also affects the outcome of the second problem 
- 
the 
restitutionary aftermath of termination and the apportionment of losses. Where a 
contract is terminated for disqualification, whether the supplier will be paid for work 
completed or benefits the procuring authority has received and whether the procuring 
authority will be entitled to recover amounts paid out under the contract, including 
advance payments will need to be determined. Thirdly, contractual termination may 
be at odds with a non-punitive rationale behind disqualification as termination may 
be considered punitive and disproportionate, and may also offend the rule against 
double jeopardy. Fourthly, contractual termination may not be economically efficient 
due to the waste that may result. For instance the supplier may have commenced the 
delivery of specialised goods, which may be useless if the contract is not completed. 
Another area of waste is in relation to the procurement procedure and where a 
contract is terminated, a procuring authority may need to restart the procurement 
process and it may be necessary to decide who bears the costs of the wasted 
procurement procedure and the costs of a new procedure. Fifthly, contractual 
termination may cause significant problems for the procuring authority and the public 
by affecting the delivery of public services and may also cause problems for third 
parties such as subcontractors and financiers. 
Apart from the outright termination of contracts, a jurisdiction may also legislate 
against a disqualified supplier obtaining extensions to existing contracts or obtaining 
work under framework contracts. Termination is generally not favoured by the 
jurisdictions and different approaches to the issue are adopted. This chapter will 
4 Art. 54. para. 12, ibid. 
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examine the rationales for contractual termination, whether termination is permitted 
and the problems that arise with contractual termination. 
7.2 Rationales for contractual termination 
The reasons for adopting a policy that requires or permits contractual termination for 
disqualification are related to the rationales for disqualification in a jurisdiction as 
discussed in ch. 1.5. In the first place, terminating existing contracts may fulfil the 
policy requirement for disqualification. Thus where disqualification is intended to 
support the anti-corruption policies of the government and show a lack of tolerance 
for corruption, terminating existing contracts ensures that the government is not 
associated with unlawful behaviours by ending the government's interaction with the 
supplier proven to be corrupt and illustrates the extents to which the government will 
go in fulfilment of its policy in refusing to engage with corrupt contractors. 
Secondly where disqualification is intended to punish contractors and act a deterrent 
against unlawful behaviour, terminating existing contracts may serve as a further 
penalty towards this end. Contractual termination may provide an "additional 
enforcement tool for securing compliance with the general law. ,6A supplier likely to 
lose future as well as present government business if guilty of corruption may be 
more inclined to comply with anti-corruption law and termination may thus act as a 
powerful deterrent against corruption. 
Thirdly, where disqualification has a protective rationale and is intended to protect 
the government from corrupt contractors, terminating existing contracts will protect 
the government by ensuring that the supplier is unable to act corruptly within existing 
contracts. 
5 Arrowsmith, "A taxonomy of horizontal policies in public procurement" in Arrowsmith & Kunzlik 
4eds. ), 112. 
Ibid. 
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7.3 Is there a duty to terminate existing contracts for disqualification? 
Most jurisdictions do not require contractual termination on disqualification and in 
some jurisdictions the legislation is silent as to whether there is even a discretion to 
terminate. Where the legislation is silent, the existence of a duty to terminate for 
disqualification may depend on the circumstances in which procuring authorities are 
permitted or required to terminate contracts with suppliers and whether 
disqualification may be regarded as falling within these circumstances. 
The existence of a duty or discretion to terminate existing contracts for the 
disqualification of a supplier depends in part on the rationale for disqualification in a 
jurisdiction. As was discussed in ch. 2, the mandatory disqualifications in the EU are 
intended to give effect to EU anti-corruption policy and protect the EU from the 
cross-border effects of corruption. Contractual termination may thus be necessary in 
certain instances to give effect to these rationales. 
The EU procurement directives are however silent as to whether disqualification will 
affect ongoing contracts. This is the case in relation to the mandatory and the 
discretionary disqualifications. Although EU law gives Member States the freedom 
to terminate concluded contracts in various contexts, 7 and requires termination in 
other contexts, it is silent as to whether contracts should be terminated for 
disqualification. However, the fact that disqualification is not retrospective and the 
EU's general approach to contractual termination discussed below indicates that 
there is no duty on Member States to terminate existing contracts for the 
disqualification of a supplier. 
At present, there is no principle of EU law which requires contractual termination in 
order to comply with EU law or Treaty principles. In the context of public service 
concessions, which are not governed by the procurement directives, the CJEU held 
that Member States are not required to terminate concluded contracts in order to 
comply with the obligation of transparency in the Treaty 
.8 This may mean that the 
EU does not presently require contractual termination as a general principle to give 
7 C-91/08 Wall AG v Stadt Frankfurt am Main (unrep. 13.04.10). 8 Wall AG ibid. 
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effectiveness to any EU policy, including its disqualification policy except in 
situations where termination is expressly required. As will be seen, the EU requires 
Member States to terminate contracts where there have been procedural violations of 
the procurement rules in limited contexts. Contractual termination is also permitted 
in the context of procurement by EU institutions, and thus it is likely that whilst the 
EU does not require Member States to terminate existing contracts for 
disqualification, Member States are free to adopt such a policy. 9 
There are two contexts in which contractual termination is provided for by EU 
legislation. First, the recent amendments to the procurement remedies directive lo 
impose an obligation on Member States to terminate contracts concluded in breach of 
EU law in certain cases. These provisions have implemented a shift from the 
previous position in the old remedies directive, " which did not require contractual 
termination where there were breaches of the procurement directives and a contract 
had been concluded. 12 The approach under the old remedies directive may partly 
have been informed by the difficulties that accompany the termination of contracts as 
well as the desire in some legal systems to maintain the sanctity of concluded 
contracts. 13 There has however, been a shift away from this position both by the 
CJEU and European legislators. In Commission v Germany, 14 the CJEU decided that 
in failing to terminate contracts concluded in breach of the procurement directives, 
Germany had failed to comply with a previous decision of the CJEU establishing a 
breach of the directives. 's 
9 Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 21.99 
10 Art. 2d and 2e, Directive 89/665/EEC on the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating 
to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts 
[1989] O. J. L395/33 as amended by Directive 2007/66/EC amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC 
and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award 
of public contracts [2007] O. J. L335/31 [remedies directive]. 
" Williams, "A new remedies directive for the European Community" (2008) 2 P. P. L. R. NA 19; Art. 2, 
Council Directive 89/665/EEC on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the application of review procedures for the award of public supply and public 
works contracts [1989] O. J. L395/33 [old remedies directive]. 
12 Art. 2, old remedies directive; C448/01 EVN AG, Wienstrom GmbH v Austria [2003] E. C. R. I- 
14527; Arrowsmith, 2005, chs. 21.98-21.103; Joined cases 20/01 and 28/01 Commission v Germany 
[2003] E. C. R. 1-3609; Arrowsmith (ed. ) Remedies for enforcing the public procurement rules (1993), 
84-87; Treumer, "Towards an obligation to terminate contracts concluded in breach of the EC public 
procurement rules: the end of the status of concluded contracts as sacred cows" (2007) 6 P. P. L. R. 371 
and the articles cited therein. 
13 Arrowsmith, Linarelli & Wallace, 785. 
14 C-503/04 Commission v Germany [2007] E. C. R. 1-6153. 
15 Joined Cases C-20/01 and C-28/01 Commission v Germany [2003] E. C. R. 1-3609. 
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Whilst Commission v Germany16 established that there may be a duty to terminate 
concluded contracts for the breach of the procurement directives in order to give 
effect to the directives and to act as a deterrent against breaches of EU law, ' 7 the 
decision gave no indication as to the circumstances in which termination may be 
appropriate, or whether termination is necessary in every case in which there has 
been a breach of the procurement directives. Treumer suggested that the obligation to 
terminate a concluded contract for a breach of the procurement directives should be 
interpreted in a narrow fashion and a decision to terminate should only be made after 
a consideration of the seriousness of the breach, the impact on the internal market if 
the contract is not terminated, the degree of completion of the contract and a 
consideration of the public interest and the interests of the procuring parties. 18 
The amendments to the EU remedies directive specified the cases in which the 
termination of concluded contracts or ineffectiveness is required when a supplier 
seeks a remedy in proceedings in a national court. 19 The remedies directive now 
provides that a contract shall be ineffective where there are specified breaches of EU 
procurement law. 20 These breaches are: awarding a public contract without prior 
publication where publication is required by the procurement directives; 21 awarding a 
public contract in breach of the mandatory standstill period where this breach is 
accompanied by a breach of the public sector directives and deprives the supplier 
from obtaining a review to obtain the contract; 22 and where a contract is concluded in 
breach of the obligation to suspend the award procedure automatically, pending a 
review procedure by the procuring authority or a body independent of the procuring 
authority and this breach is accompanied by a breach of the public sector directives 
and deprives the tenderer of the chance to apply for a review to obtain the contract. 23 
16 [2007] E. C. R. 1-6153. 
" Ibid. para. 76-77. 18 Treumer, n. 12; See also Advocate-General Alber in C-328/96 Commission v Austria [1999] E. C. R. 
I-7479. 
19 Arts. 2d and 2e remedies directive. 
20 Clifton, "Ineffectiveness- the new deterrent: will the new remedies directive ensure greater 
compliance with the substantive procurement rules in the classical sectors? " (2009) 18 P. P. L. R. 165. 21 Art. 2d (1) (a) remedies directive. 
22 Art. 2d (1) (b) remedies directive. 
23 Art. 2d (1) (b) remedies directive. See also Art. 2d (1) (c). 
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Where these breaches occur in a Member State, the obligation exists for such 
contracts to be declared ineffective. 
The termination provisions in the remedies directive give Member States the 
discretion to determine the consequences of a contract being ineffective: which may 
be the retroactive cancellation of all contractual obligations or the prospective 
cancellation of obligations which remain to be performed under the contract. 24 
Member States also have the discretion to provide that a contract subsists where 
"overriding reasons relating to a general interest require that the effects of the 
contract should be maintained. "25 The remedies directive clarifies that the economic 
consequences linked to the contract such as the costs of the delay of the contract; the 
costs of a new procurement procedure; the legal costs of termination and the costs of 
the change of supplier may not amount to "overriding reasons in the general 
interest. "26 However, economic interests not linked to the contract may be taken into 
account where ineffectiveness will lead to disproportionate consequences. 27 Thus, 
although the economic consequences of termination may not normally be used by 
Member States to defeat the requirement for termination, 28 the EU has left it to 
Member States to determine the circumstances in which the disproportionate effects 
of termination may justify the maintenance of a contract that ought to be declared 
ineffective. 
The second context in which contractual termination exists in the EU is in 
procurement by EU institutions. The Financial Regulations applicable to the general 
budget of the EU, 29 which governs procurement by EU institutions, permits the 
termination of contracts in some instances. Art. 103 of the Financial Regulations 
provides: 
24 Art. 2d (2) remedies directive. 25 Art. 2d (3) remedies directive. The meaning of a similar phrase is considered in ch. 8. 26 Art. 2d (3) remedies directive. 27 Ibid. 
28 Golding & Henty, "The new remedies directive of the EC: Standstill and Ineffectiveness" (2008) 3 P. P. L. R. 146. 
r' Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 1605/20021EC of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation 
applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, [2002] O. J. L248/1, as amended by Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 1995/2006/EC [2006] O. J. L390/16 [Financial Regulations]. 
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"Where, after the award of the contract, the award procedure or the performance of 
the contract prove to have been subject to substantial errors, irregularities or fraud, 
the institutions may, depending on the stage reached in the procedure, refrain from 
concluding the contract or suspend performance of the contract or, where appropriate, 
terminate the contract. Where such errors, irregularities or fraud are attributable to 
the contractor, the institutions may in addition refuse to make payments, may recover 
amounts already paid or may terminate all the contracts concluded with this 
contractor, in proportion to the seriousness of the errors, irregularities or fraud. " 
This provision is explained by the Regulations Implementing the Financial 
Regulations which provides that a "substantial error or irregularity shall be any 
infringement of a provision of a contract or regulation resulting from an act or an 
omission which causes or might cause a loss to the Community budget. , 30 Thus, 
reading Art. 103 of the Financial Regulations with Art. 153 of the Implementing 
Regulations, a contract may be terminated where there has been the commission of 
an act which amounts to a breach of the terms of the contract, amounts to a breach of 
EU legislation and is likely to cause loss to EU finances. The commission of a 
corrupt act in the particular procurement will trigger these provisions as such an act 
will be a breach of EU legislation against corruption31 and is also likely to cause loss 
to the EU. 
From the above, it is argued that the specific instances in which the EU requires 
termination and the approach of the CJEU in Wall AG may point to the fact that 
termination is not required in the disqualification context but Member States are free 
to adopt an approach terminating existing contracts once a supplier is disqualified. 
The EU procurement directives are also silent on the position of concluded contracts 
where the concluded contract was tainted by corruption. This issue has been left to 
the discretion of Member States but generally where an existing contract is affected 
by corruption, the presence of corruption within the contract may lead to the 
termination of that contract. 32 
30 Art. 153 Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2342/2002 of 23 December 2002 laying down 
detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/ 2002 on the 
Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities [2002] O. J. 
L357/1 [Implementing regulations]. 
31 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 2988/95 of December 18,1995 on the Protection of the 
Communities Financial Interests [1995] O. J. L312/1. 
32 Arnould, "Damages for performing an illegal contract- the other side of the mirror. Comments on 
three recent judgments of the French Council of State" (2008) 6 P. P. L. R. NA274; Treumer, n. 12; 
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The EU directives do not mention the situation where a procuring authority 
concludes a public contract with an option to extend or a framework agreement has 
been concluded with a supplier who is subsequently disqualified. 33 In the EU, some 
but not all framework agreements may involve a further competition between the 
previously selected suppliers. 34 Where this is the case, it may be possible for the 
disqualification to be taken into account as a basis for the refusal to select the 
supplier. 
As there does not appear to be a requirement for procuring authorities in Member 
States to terminate existing contracts for the mandatory disqualification of a supplier 
and Member States are free to do so at their option, it is likely that in relation to the 
discretionary provisions, Member States also have the discretion to decide whether to 
terminate existing contracts in this context. 
In implementing the EU procurement directives, the UK procurement regulations did 
not go any further than the directives and are also silent on whether disqualification 
will lead to the termination of existing contracts. This silence relates to both the 
mandatory and the discretionary disqualifications. As discussed, the EU does not 
presently require Member States to terminate existing contracts to give effect to the 
EU's disqualification policy, but Member States are free to adopt such a policy at 
their discretion. The UK has not adopted an express policy requiring termination for 
disqualification but procuring authorities are permitted to terminate concluded 
contracts depending on the provisions of the contract between the procuring authority 
and the supplier as well as the reasons for contractual termination under the general 
contract law, in public law, and under the procurement regulations. 
In relation to the situations in which existing contracts must be terminated, the UK 
implemented the amendments to the EU remedies directive through the Public 
Rubach-Larsen, "Damages under German law for breach of EU procurement law" (2006) P. P. L. R. 
179; Kruger, "Action for damages due to bad procurement: on the intersection between EU/EEA law, 
national law, with special reference to the Norwegian experience" (2006) P. P. L. R. 211 33 Art. 32 PSD, Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 11. 
34 Art. 32 (4) PSD. 
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Contracts (Amendment) Regulations 2009,35 which implemented the EU provisions 
on the termination of concluded contracts. Before the transposition of these 
provisions, the old remedies provisions in the UK procurement regulations provided 
that a court did not have the power to order any remedy other than an award of 
damages where a contract was concluded in breach of the procurement regulations. 36 
This restriction was intended to protect the winning bidder, (who may have had 
nothing to do with the breach of the procurement regulations) as well as the 
procuring authority. 37 In Ealing Community Transport v London Borough of 
Ealing, 38 the court suggested that in the absence of bad faith, a contract could not be 
set aside for a breach of the procurement regulations. 39 The traditional approach to 
concluded contracts discussed in the context of the EU was confirmed by the court in 
this case. 40 
However, there may have been an exception to this rule where the winning bidder 
was aware of the underlying breach or illegality in the procurement process. 
Arrowsmith suggests that the principle of effectiveness may require that where the 
winning bidder was aware of the illegality, this should provide an exception to the 
rule that concluded contracts may not be terminated for breaches of the procurement 
regulations. 41 
In implementing the contractual termination provisions of the EU remedies directive, 
the UK regulations substantially mirror the directive and a contract will be declared 
ineffective where the contract is awarded without prior publication of a contract 
notice where required; 42 the contract is awarded in breach of the mandatory 10-day 
standstill period or during proceedings challenging the contract award decision; 43 
awarding a contract pending a challenge to the procurement process; ` 4 and where the 
35 S. I 2009/2992. 
36 Reg. 47 (9) PCR. 
37 Ealing Community Transport v London Borough of Ealing [1999] C. O. D. 492; Arrowsmith, 
2005, ch. 21.68 
38 Ealing Community Transport ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Williams, "When is a contract not a contract?: The significance of third party rights in remedies 
available in UK law under the EU public procurement regime" (2000) 1 P. P. L. R. CS27. 
41 Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 21.69. 
42 Reg. 47K (2) PCR. 
43 Reg. 47K (5); D. R Plumbing & Heating Services v Aberdeen City Council (unrep. 2009). 
44 Reg. 47K (5) PCR. 
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contract is based on a framework or dynamic purchasing arrangement and is awarded 
in breach of that arrangement 45 The consequence of `ineffectiveness' in the UK is a 
prospective discharge of the contract from the time when the declaration of 
ineffectiveness is made. 6 The provisions give the courts the power to determine the 
implications of the ineffectiveness of a contract in relation to "consequential matters 
arising from ineffectiveness" 47 and compensation and restitution as between the 
parties to the contract 48 The court is also required to give effect to any contractual 
arrangements between the parties dealing with the consequences of ineffectiveness 49 
The provisions on contractual termination appear to be exhaustive and do not create 
an obligation for a procuring authority to terminate a contract for the disqualification 
of a supplier. However, the provisions do not in any way limit the right of a 
procuring authority to terminate a contract under a term of the contract; the general 
contract law; where there is a breach of legislation or public law such as where the 
so contract as concluded is unlawful. 
As the principles governing public contracts in the UK are the general principles of 
the law of contract, 51 in the absence of any intention to the contrary in the 
procurement regulations, the rules for contractual termination in general contract law 
may apply to public contracts. In contract law, a contract may come to an end for a 
number of reasons. First, a contract may be terminated for a repudiatory breach of 
contract, 52 where the party in breach makes it clear that he will not perform the 
contract, or by his own act makes performance of the contract impossible, or there is 
a substantial failure to perform the contract. 53 A substantial failure of performance 
will justify termination where the failure attains a required degree of seriousness or it 
is a failure to comply with a condition of the contract. Secondly, a contract may be 
terminated where the parties mutually agree to release each other from performance 
45 Reg. 47K (6) PCR. 
46 Reg. 47M (1) PCR. 
47 Reg. 47M (3) (b) PCR. 
48 Reg. 47M (4) PCR. 
09 Reg. 47M(6) PCR. 
50 Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 21.13. 
S' Turpin, Government Procurement and Contracts (1989) chs. 1-4; Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 2, Lewis, 
470. 
52 Dalkia Utilities Services Pk v Celtech International Ltd [2006] EWCA 63. 
53 Peel & Treitel, Treitel on the Law of Contract 12`h ed. (2007), 869. 
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of their obligations under the contract. Thirdly, a contract may be rescinded, where 
the contract was induced by means of fraud, corruption, 54 misrepresentation, 
mistake, 55 duress, undue influence or other unconscionable conduct. Rescission in 
contract law is not prospective, but operates as a retrospective unravelling of the 
contract and the substantive restoration of the parties to their pre-contractual 
positions, and will be unavailable where it is impossible to restore the parties to their 
pre-contractual positions. 56 
Fourthly, a contract may be terminated pursuant to an express or implied term in the 
contract. In the UK, procuring authorities may reserve a power to terminate a 
contract by virtue of a contractual term for various reasons or for no reason at all. 57 
These clauses are referred to as termination for convenience clauses and give the 
government the power to terminate public contracts without the necessity for a 
breach. 58 These clauses are justified on the grounds that a government may have to 
break a contract because of a change in policy. 59 Where such clauses exist and are 
sufficiently clear, 60 they may possibly be relied on to terminate contracts where the 
procuring authority becomes aware of the subsequent disqualification of a supplier. 
Although these clauses are generally very wide, the courts have put judicial limits on 
their use. 61 As a remedy, this termination is prospective and brings the contract to an 
end with the subsequent determination of rights and liabilities under the contract. As 
will be seen, such clauses exist in the US and are explicitly linked to the 
disqualification context. In addition, some UK procuring authorities include in their 
standard contractual terms, a right to terminate a contract where a supplier has 
54 Mahesan SSO Thambiah v Malaysia Government Officers Cooperative Housing Society [1979] A. C. 
374 PC; Panama & South Pacific Telegraph Co v India Rubber, Gutta Percha and Telegraph Works 
(1875) L. R. 10 Ch. App. 96; Goff & Jones, The Law of Restitution (1998), para. 33-023; Berg, 
"Bribery-transaction validity and other civil law implications" [2001] L. M. C. L. Q. 27,34. 
55 Shogun Finance v Hudson [2003] UKHL 62. 56 Salford v Lever [ 1891 ]1Q. B. 168. 57 Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 2.47. 
58 Turpin, n. 51,243-246; Hadley Design Associates v Westminster City Council [2003] EWHC 1617. 
59 Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local, 4t' ed. (2009), 239. 
60 Abbey Developments v PP Brickwork Ltd [2003] EWHC 1987. 61 Rice v Yarmouth Council [2000] All E. R. 902; R (Birmingham & Solihull Taxi Association) v 
Birmingham International Airport [2009] EWHC 1913 (Admin); Hirst "Termination for convenience 
clauses- A shield or a sword in times of economic downturn" (2010) 27 (4) I. C. L. 419-431. 
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engaged in corruption in the procurement or execution of the particular public 
contract, or is otherwise in default. 62 
Lastly, a contract may come to an end due to a supervening event, which frustrates 
the contract and makes the contract impossible to perform or radically different from 
what the parties contemplated at the time of entering the contract. 63 
The reasons for which a contract may be rescinded or terminated in English contract 
law suggests that contracts may not be terminated without the agreement of the 
parties, unless there is a deficiency or abnormality in the formation or the execution 
of the contract or the contract is frustrated. However, a procuring authority may find 
it difficult to plead that an existing contract has become frustrated as a result of the 
subsequent disqualification, as the orthodoxy in relation to frustration is that the 
supervening event has to make the contract "impossible, illegal or radically different" 
to what was in the contemplation of the parties at the time they entered into the 
contract. M Accordingly, unless the existing contract is tainted with corruption or a 
procuring authority includes termination for convenience clause in the contract it 
may not be possible for UK procuring authorities to rely on contract law principles to 
terminate public contracts for the disqualification of a supplier. 
Another body of law, which may be relevant to this issue, is public law. It is possible 
that the breach of public law principles65 or statute66 will entitle a procuring authority 
to terminate a contract. However, where a public contract is terminated for the breach 
of a statute this occurs because the public contract is governed by the statute in 
question. 67 It may thus be possible to argue where disqualification is based on a 
conviction for corruption, the breach of anti-corruption legislation may give the 
62 Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland Combined Fire Authority (Standing Orders relating to 
contracts)- http: //www. leicestershire- 
fire. gov. uk/documents/Standing%200rders%2ORelating%2Oto%2OContracts. pdf; Sefton Council 
Contracts Procedure Rules- http: //www. sefton. gov. uk/Default. aspx? page=4405#17; Rother District 
Council Contract Procedure Rules- http: //www. rother. ggv. uk/media/pdf/s/t/CPRs 1. pdf ; Berg, n. 54, 
34. 
63 Davis contractors v Fareham UDC [1956] A. C. 696, per Lord Radcliffe; Peel & Treitel, n. 53, 
ch. 19. 
64 McKendrick, Contract Law, 8t' ed (2007), 245. 
63 Rv Port Talbot Borough Council ex p. Jones [1988] 2 All E. R. 207. 
66 Rv Basildon DC ex p. Brown (1981) 79 L. G. R. 655. 
67 Ibid. 
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procuring authority the discretion to terminate its contractual relationship with a 
supplier. 
Similar to the EU, the UK regulations are also silent as to whether a disqualified 
supplier may obtain work under framework agreements or agreements with options. 
As discussed in the context of the EU, where a framework agreement operates as a 
multi-provider agreement that is subject to further competition, the disqualification 
provisions may be applicable to the mini-tender. 
From the above, it can be seen that the limitations on termination in the remedies 
provisions and the reluctance of the general contract law to set aside concluded 
contracts without the agreement of the parties or where the existing contract is 
unaffected by corruption or other vitiating circumstances shows that UK procuring 
authorities are not under a duty to terminate existing contracts for disqualification. 
Whilst there is at present no duty under EU law to terminate exiting contracts for 
disqualification, if the EU in future decides that the disqualification regime will be 
better served by the termination of existing contracts, the UK will be required to 
adopt a similar approach. 
Unlike the position in the UK and the EU, the US provides for the termination of 
contracts for disqualification in limited circumstances and also deals with framework 
agreements and contracts with options. Although disqualification in the US is 
prospective and is not intended to affect existing contracts, once a supplier has been 
disqualified, procuring authorities may not place orders exceeding the guaranteed 
minimum under indefinite quantity contracts, place orders under blanket purchase 
agreements, add new work or extend the duration or exercise other options under 
existing contracts. 68 
Whilst the termination of existing contracts is not automatic upon disqualification, 
and there is no duty to terminate, the FAR grants procuring authority's discretion in 
some cases to terminate existing contracts for the disqualification of the supplier. 69 
68 FAR 9.405-1 (b); Kramer, 539. 
69 FAR 49, FAR 52.249. A convenience termination clause is also implied into government contracts 
by virtue of Christian & Assoc. v United States 312 F. 2d 518 (1963). 
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There are two circumstances in which a procuring authority may terminate a public 
contract under the FAR. 7° These are where the supplier is in breach of contract 
(default termination) and where termination is in the government's interest 
(convenience termination). 7' Termination may follow a disqualification either where 
the reasons giving rise to disqualification also constitute a default in performance, or 
where the supplier presents a significant risk to the government in relation to his 
being able to complete the contract, making termination in the government's interest. 
Also, as is the case in the UK, termination may occur where the supplier is convicted 
of a corruption offence or is otherwise deemed guilty of such offences in relation to 
the particular contract. 
A default termination72 is a means of dealing with a supplier's failure to perform the 
contract in accordance with the contract specifications and schedule73 and may be 
likened to the UK common law approach to termination of contracts for a substantial 
failure of performance. A default termination may occur where the supplier fails to 
deliver the goods or services within the stated time, fails to make progress in 
executing the contract, 74 or is otherwise in breach of contract. 75 Default terminations 
are based on breaches in relation to the contract, 76 and a subsequent disqualification 
will not necessarily lead to a default termination unless the reasons leading to the 
disqualification also constitute a default in the performance of the contract. 
Similar to the UK, where termination is based on a reason unrelated to performance 
and is thought to be in the government's interest such termination is referred to as a 
`convenience termination. ' 77 This is defined as "the exercise of the Government's 
right to completely or partially terminate performance of work under a contract when 
it is in the Government's interest. " 78 Terminations for convenience have been 
criticised as giving the government "complete authority to escape from contractual 
70 Tiefer, "Forfeiture by Cancellation or Termination" (2003) 54 M. L. R. 1031. 
71 FAR 12.403 (b); FAR 52.212 (m); Cibinic & Nash, 1998,485; Integrated Systems Group Inc. v 
Dept of the Army GSBCA 12613-P, 94-2 BCA ¶ 26,618. 
72 Norris, "Terminations for default" (2008) A. L. 55 
1 Cibinic & Nash, Administration of Government Contracts (2006), ch. 10 [Cibinic & Nash, 20061. 
74 Fagg, "Default terminations for failing to make progress" (1995) 25 (1) P. C. L. J. 113. 
7s FAR 49.402 
76 Tiefer & Shook, Government Contract Law (2003), 516. 
" FAR 12.403; Pederson, "Rethinking the termination for convenience clause in federal contracts" 
(2001) 31 (1) P. C. L. J. 83. 
FAR 2.101. 
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obligations"79 since these terminations may be unrelated to the performance of the 
contract or default of the supplier in executing the contract. Although convenience 
terminations must be in the government's interest, the FAR provides no guidance on 
what factors may be considered in determining what is in the government's interest. 80 
However, convenience terminations may not be done in bad faith'81 or be arbitrary or 
capricious 82 and a contract may not be terminated for convenience so that the 
government may obtain a lower price from a different supplier. 83 Contracts have been 
terminated for convenience for various reasons including the fact that the government 
no longer requires the work; where there is a shortage of funds to complete the 
contract; 84 where there are questions regarding the propriety of a contract; 85 and 
where there has been a cardinal change of circumstance. 86 
Procuring authorities have also sought to terminate public contracts for convenience 
because the supplier was subsequently disqualified. 87 Where termination is proposed 
on this basis it is not clear whether the supplier may challenge the termination if he 
has subsequently removed the cause for disqualification. However, because of the 
wide discretion possessed in terminating for convenience, it is possible that a supplier 
may not challenge the termination as long as it is done in good faith. When a 
procuring authority decides to terminate an existing contract for convenience 
following the imposition of disqualification, the termination must be in accordance 
with the established procedures for termination under the FAR, 88 which relate to the 
provision of a detailed notice of termination to the contractor, 89 and the settling of 
outstanding claims under the contract. Once a contract is terminated for convenience, 
79 Cibinic & Nash, 2006, ch. 11; Krygoski Construction Co v United States 94 F. 3d 1537 (Fed. Cir. 
1996). 
80 Cibinic & Nash, 2006, ch. 11. 
s Krygoski Coonstruction n. 79; Kalvar Corp v United States 543 F. 2d 1298 (Ct. C1.1976); Allied 
Materials & Equipment Co v United States 215 Ct. C1.192 (1978). 
82 Gould Inc. v Chafee 450 F. 2d 667 (1971). 
83 Torncello V United States 231 Ct. C1.20 (1982); Vibra-Tech Engineers Inc. v United States 567 
F. Supp. 484 (1983). 
Jacobs Engineering Group Inc v United States 434 F. 3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
Bs Cibinic & Nash, 2006,1076. 
T&M Distribution Inc v United States 185 F. 3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
87 Integrated Systems Group Inc. v Dept of the Army GSBCA 12613-P, 94-2 BCA ¶ 26,618; TMD 
USA Inc. /Vincent Schickler v General Services Administration GSBCA 15420-R. 
88 FAR 12.403 and FAR 49.102. 
89 FAR 49.102. 
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the government's liability for terminating the contract is admitted, 90 although 
termination does not amount to a breach by the government. 91 
The approach to convenience terminations seeks to strike a balance between the 
government's power to terminate contracts unilaterally and the contractor's right not 
to be unduly prejudiced by the termination. Where contracts are terminated for 
convenience either for disqualification, or for any other reason, such termination is 
subject to the decision of the procuring authority head, taken in consultation with 
relevant staff. Similar to the UK, contractual termination is also subject to review 
by the courts, providing judicial limitations on the discretion to terminate for 
convenience. 93 
As is the case in the other jurisdictions, contractual termination is also permitted 
under the FAR where the existing contract is tainted with corruption. Where a person 
has been convicted of bribery or corruption offences, or bid information has been 
disclosed in exchange for a bribe, 94 the head of the procuring authority may rescind 
or cancel a contract with the contractor95 and recover payments made under the 
contract. 96 The Supreme Court has affirmed that in such cases, the government may 
cancel the contract and need not pay for work done, 97 and other jurisprudence 
illustrate that the government may recover the full amount paid on a completed 
contract that is subsequently found to be tainted with corruption. 98 
The World Bank's approach to contractual termination differs from that of domestic 
jurisdictions. Disqualification by the World Bank is prospective and does not affect 
the completion of existing contracts. In fact, prior to the 2010 revision of the Bank's 
sanctions procedures, which now impose a temporary disqualification on contractors 
90 Cibinic & Nash, 2006,1076. 
91 Pederson, n. 77,85. 
92 FAR 9.405-1. 
" See cases cited in n. 81,83 & 82. 
9' FAR 3.700. 
95 FAR 3.702. 
'6 FAR 3.704. 
97 Pan American Petroleum & Transp. Co. v United States, 273 U. S. 456 (1927). 
"K&R Engineering Co. v United States, 222 Ct. C1.340,616 F. 2d 469 (1980); Godley v United 
States 5 F. 3d 1473 (1993 U. S. App. ); J. E. T. S., Inc. v. United States, 838 F. 2d 1196,1200 (Fed. Cir. ); 
United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U. S. 520,565,5 L. Ed. 2d 268,81 S. Ct. 294 
(1961). 
pending the conclusion of the disqualification process, 99 it used to be possible for a 
supplier to obtain a contract during the pendency of disqualification proceedings, and 
such new contracts would not be affected by the subsequent disqualification. 100 The 
Bank's refusal to terminate existing contracts for disqualification is intended to 
prevent the adverse consequences that may result for the Borrower. 101 Terminating a 
contract for disqualification may mean that the Borrower does not obtain the 
intended benefit of the loan in the form of the contracted for goods or services, but 
will still be required to repay the loan to the Bank. As such, contractual termination is 
not appropriate in the Bank context. 
However, although existing contracts will not be terminated, the Bank will not 
finance any modification to an existing contract signed with a disqualified person 
after the date of disqualification. 102 In other words, although disqualification will not 
affect existing contracts, the Bank will not permit any changes in the contractual 
relationship between a Borrower and a firm that is subsequently disqualified. This 
approach has parallels in the US, which does not permit changes or extensions to 
existing contracts with a disqualified supplier. 
Apart from a desire not to cause undue hardship to its Borrowers, there is a practical 
limitation preventing the Bank from terminating existing contracts. As discussed in 
ch. 2, because the Bank relies on the Borrower to conduct procurements for Bank- 
funded contracts, the Bank is in practice unable to cancel concluded contracts as it 
does not have a contractual relationship with suppliers. 103 The power of contractual 
termination is reserved to the Borrower who can cancel a contract where there has 
been a breach of the contract (known as termination for default); where the supplier 
becomes insolvent; where the supplier has acted corruptly in competing for or in 
executing the contract and where the termination is in the Borrower's interest (known 
as termination for convenience). 104 Should the Bank in future choose to adopt an 
approach where it wishes a Borrower to terminate existing contracts with disqualified 
"9 Art II, WBSP. 
10° Thornburgh Report, 39. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Appendix 1, para. 8 BPG. 
103 Williams, 2007a. 
104 World Bank, Standard Bidding Documents (Procurement of goods) General Conditions of 
Contract, cl. 34. 
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contractors, it may include an obligation to terminate in the Loan Agreement, which 
governs the conditions of the loan granted by the Bank to the Borrower. Although 
some jurisdictions may not permit contractual termination in order to maintain the 
sanctity of contracts, the Loan Agreement is regarded as a treaty in international law 
and will thus not be affected by domestic approaches to termination. 
Contractual termination in South Africa contains elements of the approaches from all 
the jurisdictions. Like the US, there is no duty to terminate, but the Corruption Act 
gives the National Treasury the discretion to terminate contracts for disqualification. 
Like the EU and UK, the PPPFA and the PFMA regulations are silent on the issue of 
whether contractual termination may accompany disqualification but provide for 
contractual termination as stand-alone remedies where there has been corruption or 
fraud in the award or the execution of a particular contract. 105 
The Corruption Act permits the termination of existing contracts on disqualification. 
Where a supplier has been disqualified, the National Treasury, may, after 
consultation with the relevant procuring authority terminate any agreement with the 
disqualified supplier. 106 It is not clear whether the procuring authority may veto the 
National Treasury's decision to terminate the contract or whether the procuring 
authority may only make representations to the National Treasury, which may be 
taken into account. The National Treasury is required to take several factors into 
account before it terminates a contract to ensure termination is not capricious or 
unduly prejudicial to the government. These factors are the extent and duration of the 
agreement concerned; whether it is likely to conclude a similar agreement with 
another person within a specific time-frame; the extent to which the agreement has 
been executed; the urgency of the services to be delivered or supplied in terms of the 
agreement; whether extreme costs will follow such termination; and any other factor 
which may impact on the termination of the agreement. 107 The National Treasury 
may terminate an existing contract irrespective of whether there are deficiencies in 
the existing contract. The powers granted to the Treasury are very broad and are 
ios Reg. 16. A9.1 PFMA; Reg. 15 (2) (b) PPPFA 
106S28(3). 
107 S28 (3) (a) (i). 
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similar to the powers given to UK and US procuring authorities to terminate 
contracts for convenience. 
As stated, the PPPFA and PFMA regulations are silent as to whether a procuring 
authority will be required to terminate existing contracts with a disqualified supplier. 
However, the PPPFA regulations provide for contractual termination as an additional 
stand-alone remedy where there has been fraud in obtaining preferences for a public 
contract. Thus a procuring authority may "cancel the contract and claim any damages 
which it has suffered as a result of having to make less favourable arrangements due 
to such cancellation. " 108 Similarly, the PFMA regulations provide that a procuring 
authority may cancel a contract awarded to a supplier of goods or services if (i) the 
supplier committed any corrupt or fraudulent act during the bidding process or the 
execution of that contract; or (ii) if any official or other role player committed any 
corrupt or fraudulent act during the bidding process or the execution of that contract 
that benefited that supplier. 109 Under these regulations, the termination of existing 
contracts is in addition to, but not consequent upon disqualification. 
The power to cancel contracts is thus utilised by procuring authorities where there is 
corruption in the procurement process"° and in the execution of the contract. 11' This 
power may be derived from the procurement legislation, from the contract 112 or from 
common law. ' 13 Where the power to terminate a contract is derived from legislation, 
the power to terminate must be exercised in accordance with the PAJA114 and a 
procuring authority will be required to ensure the decision to terminate is 
accompanied by procedural safeguards such as the requirement of notice, a right to a 
hearing and a right to a decision that is reasonable and fair. 15 Where procedural 
requirements are not taken into account, this may open the government to a legal 
challenge by the supplier in question. In Supersonic Tours, the court set aside the 
procuring authority's decision to disqualify the supplier and terminate concluded 
108 Reg. 15 (2) (b) PPPFA 
. 109 Reg. 16A9.1 (f) PFMA. 
10 Supersonic Tours (Pty) Ltd v State Tender Board [2007] JOL 19891 (T). 
"' Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection Services (Western Cape CC) and others 2001 (3) 
SA 1013 (SCA). 
"Z Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO & Others 2003 (2) SA 460 (SCA) paras. 9 & 10. 
13 Cape Metropolitan Council n. 111, para. l8. 
14 Supersonic Tours (Pty) Ltd n. 110. 
15 S3 and 6 PAJA; Cape Metropolitan Council n. 111. 
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contracts on the grounds that the decision was made without the necessary procedural 
safeguards. 
However, where the power to terminate a contract derives from the contract or the 
common law, this does not amount to administrative action within the meaning of 
PAJA' 16and the decision to terminate need not accord with the procedural safeguards 
for taking administrative action under PAJA as discussed in ch. 4. 
7.4 Problems with contractual termination 
7.4.1 Determining if termination is prospective or retrospective 
Where a procuring authority wishes to terminate an existing contract with a 
disqualified contractor, it will have to determine whether the termination will operate 
prospectively or retrospectively. This may depend on the legislative provisions on 
termination, but may also depend on the reason for the termination of the contract. 
For instance if the existing contract is tainted with corruption, the contract may be 
regarded as an illegal contract in most jurisdictions and will possibly be terminated 
retrospectively- in other words, the contract may be regarded as void, "? and treated 
as if it never existed, or unravelled in its entirety. l 18 Where the existing contract is 
not affected by corruption but is terminated in furtherance of a policy requirement, 
then it is likely that the contract will be terminated prospectively. This means that the 
contract will be terminated either as from the time of the disqualification, or from the 
time the procuring authority becomes aware of the disqualification, but all the 
activity that went before the termination will be regarded as valid and subsisting. 
Knowing whether a contract is to be terminated retrospectively or prospectively is 
important as this may affect the restitutionary consequences of termination and the 
manner in which losses may be apportioned. This section will examine this issue in 
relation to contracts that are not affected with corruption. 
116 Temoso Emergency Equipment CC v state Tender Board 17444/2006 TPD; cf Cape Metropolitan 
Council n. l l 1. 
117 See generally, Buckley, Illegality and Public policy (2002); Enonchong, Illegal Transactions 
(1998). 
"8 Nell, "Contracts obtained by means of bribery: Should they be void or valid? " (2009) Eur. J. L. & 
Econ. 159. 
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As most of the jurisdictions are silent on this issue, the nature of termination in other 
contexts may provide an indication on the likely approaches that a jurisdiction may 
adopt in future. As discussed, in the EU, the procurement directives are silent as to 
the possibility of termination on disqualification, and have left this to the discretion 
of Member States who may adopt different approaches to deciding whether 
termination should be prospective or retrospective. 119 At present there is no 
consistent European law approach to guide Member States in deciding whether 
termination in such contexts ought to be prospective or retrospective. In Commission 
v Germany, the court was not clear as to whether the proposed termination ought to 
be retrospective or prospective as the Commission, the Court and the Advocate- 
General used the terms rescission and termination interchangeably, 120 although they 
may not always mean the same thing in contract law. 121 
In the UK, if a procuring authority decides to terminate contracts for disqualification, 
it is likely that termination will be prospective- this view is supported by the UK's 
approach to termination under the `ineffectiveness' provisions and the approach to 
termination under the general law of contract where there are no deficiencies in the 
formation of the contract. 
In the US, the termination provisions of the FAR suggest that termination on 
disqualification is intended to be prospective. This is because the FAR requires the 
procuring authority to settle all outstanding claims of the supplier on termination- 
including the payment of lost profits on the completed portions of the contract- an 
approach that may be deemed inconsistent with a contract that is retrospectively 
terminated. 
As was discussed earlier, in the World Bank context, the power to terminate contracts 
is reserved to the Borrower, or the agency conducting the procurement process on the 
Borrower's behalf. Thus, the law of the Borrower and the governing law of the 
contract will determine whether termination will be prospective or retrospective. 
119 Arnold, "Damages for Performing an Illegal Contract 
- 
the other side of the mirror: comments in 
three recent judgments of the French Council of State" (2008) 17 P. P. L. R. NA274; Chong, Void 
Contracts and their Aftermath: A Choice of Law Analysis (Phd Thesis, University of 
Nottingham: 2004). 
120 C-503/04 Commission v Germany [2007] E. C. R I-6153, para. 25. 
121 AG Trstenjak, in Commission v Germany, para. 71. 
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In South Africa, the provisions permitting contractual termination are not clear on 
whether termination will be prospective or retrospective. However, the procuring 
authority's that have terminated contracts on the basis of provisions similar to 
PPPFA and PFMA regulations have treated termination as retrospective, although 
those circumstances were such that the contract had been concluded but not 
implemented. 122 
Whilst there is little clarity on whether termination is meant to be prospective or 
retrospective, it is suggested that for jurisdictions that adopt a policy of termination 
on disqualification, termination should only be retrospective where the contract has 
not been executed. In all other cases, termination should be prospective. This 
approach will make dealing with the restitutionary claims following termination less 
problematic, and may support a non-punitive rationale for disqualification where this 
is the case. 
7.4.2 Restitution and apportionment of losses 
Another problem accompanying termination is determining the restitutionary 
aftermath and apportionment of losses between the affected parties. This section is 
not concerned with restitution under illegal contracts, as except where otherwise 
stated, it is assumed that the contracts, which are the subject of termination are not 
illegal or affected by corruption. ' 23 
Restitution will normally be available to a claimant where a contract has been 
discharged124 and the claimant has been wronged or the defendant has been unjustly 
enriched at the claimant's expense or the claimant wishes to assert his property 
rights. 125 In Anglo-US law, the availability of a restitutionary claim may be limited 
by a requirement that there be a total failure of consideration and the extent of 
122 Supersonic Tours n. 110. 
123 In the UK, see generally Birks, "Recovering value transferred under an illegal contract" (2000) 1 
T. I. L. 155; Arrowsmith, "Ineffective transactions, unjust enrichment and problems of policy" (1989) 9 
(3) L. S. 307; Arrowsmith 2005, ch. 2. For the US see Dagan, The Law and Ethics of Restitution (2004). 
12 The Evia Luck [1992] 2 AC 152,165; Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (2006), ch. 2 
at 40. Note that damages may also be available where the contract is prospectively discharged. 
125 Virgo n. 124, ch. 1. 
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restitution may be affected in part by whether termination is retrospective or 
prospective. Where termination is retrospective, the contract will be unravelled in its 
entirety and restitution involves a return of the parties to their pre-contractual 
positions. 126 Where termination is prospective, restitution may include payments for 
benefits conferred on either party as well as the allocation of losses. 127 
Where a contract is terminated, two restitutionary issues arise for consideration: (i) 
has there been an unjust enrichment of either party, which requires reversal and (ii) 
how will the losses flowing from the termination be apportioned? An unjust 
enrichment will include any benefits retained by either party- such as goods, services, 
property or money transferred, where such retention is at one party's expense and is 
considered to be unjust. ' 28 The issue of apportionment includes determining who 
bears losses that cannot be recovered under restitutionary principles such as the 
tender costs of the contractor, the disposal of specialised goods or goods that are 
unusable if the contract is not fully performed because of intellectual property rights 
or the need for licences and losses arising from the wasted procurement procedure 
and the new procurement procedure that may later be conducted. 
Determining the restitutionary aftermath of termination is no easy feat and few of the 
jurisdictions have clear rules on how the issue is to be approached. Where the 
legislation is silent, then restitution in the general law may provide a model to be 
used in the disqualification context. 
As stated, the EU procurement directives are silent on the issue of contractual 
termination for disqualification and the consequences of termination. There is also no 
indication as to whether the EU will limit Member States discretion to terminate by 
imposing requirements for the consequences of termination. Thus whilst there is at 
present no obligation on Member States to terminate existing contracts and no 
requirements in relation to the restitutionary consequences of termination, draft 
'26 Burrows, The Law of Restitution (2002), 56-59. In the US see Dagan n. 123. 127 Burrows, "Absence of Basis: The New Birksian Scheme" in Burrows & Rodger (eds. ), Mapping 
the Law: Essays in Memory of Peter Birks (2006), 41. 
128 Burrows, n. 126 at ch. 1. 
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model laws and European legislation 129 and jurisprudence in other contexts may 
illustrate future EU requirements in this area. 
For instance the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) 130 deal with the 
consequences of termination of contracts and provide that on termination a party may 
recover money paid for a performance which it did not receive or which it properly 
rejected, 131 which is in essence, restitution for a total failure of consideration. Also, a 
party who supplied property which can be returned and for which it has not received 
payment or other counter-performance may recover the property. 132 By Art. 9: 309, a 
party who has rendered a performance which cannot be returned and for which it has 
not received payment or other counter-performance may recover a reasonable 
amount for the value of the performance to the other party. 
A similar approach is found in the European Draft Common Frame of Reference 
(DCR), 133 which provides extensive model rules on restitution and unjust 
enrichment. 134 Under the DCR, a person who has been unjustly enriched must 
reverse the enrichment. 135 Unjust enrichment will be deemed to have occurred unless 
the enriched person is entitled by contract to the enrichment, or the disadvantaged 
person consented freely and without error to the enrichment. 136 Where a contract 
becomes retrospectively avoided or ineffective, the enriched person is not permitted 
to retain the enrichment on this basis. 137 In addition, where a contract is terminated, a 
party who has received any benefit by the other's performance of obligations under 
the terminated contractual relationship is obliged to return it. 138 Under the DCR, 
129 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
European Contract Law [2001] O. J. C255/1 which provides a list of Community acquis on contract 
law. 
'30 Lando & Beale (eds), Principles of European Contract Law (1999). 
13' Arts. 9: 307-9.309. 
132 Art. 9: 308. 
133 Eidenmulller, Faust et al, "The common frame of reference for European private law- policy 
choices and codification problems" (2008) O. J. L. S. 659. 134 Smits, "A European Law on Unjustified Enrichment? A Critical view of the law of restitution in 
the Draft Common Frame of Reference" (2008) S. L. R. 179. 
135 Book VII Art 1: 101. 
136 Book VII Art 2: 101. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Book III Art 3: 510. 
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enrichment may be reversed by returning the asset or its monetary value to the 
disadvantaged person. 139 This reversal extends also to the fruits of the enrichment. '40 
Finally, clarity on the approach to restitution may be obtained from CJEU 
jurisprudence. There are several cases that illustrate the principle that a public 
authority is permitted to restitution of money wrongly-paid out, '4' and is in fact under 
a legal duty to recover such payments, 142 in order to prevent the unjust enrichment of 
the recipient, prevent the unauthorised use of public funds and maintain the principle 
of legality. '43 An individual is also entitled to recover charges made to a public 
authority in breach of EU law. ' ' Although these cases deal with restitution where 
there is a breach of EU law, this approach may be instructive if in future, 
disqualification becomes a requirement under EU law. Should this ever be the case, 
there may be a duty on a public authority to recover payments which ought not to 
have been made or benefits transferred to a supplier under a contract that is 
subsequently terminated. Such benefits in the procurement context may include 
advance payments for work that has not been performed and access to services in the 
context of the contract, such as the use of civil servants expertise. In addition, a 
supplier on a terminated contract may be permitted to recover the benefits that have 
been conferred on a procuring authority such as payment for goods or services 
supplied, or the recovery of unconsumed goods. 
As discussed earlier, the UK procurement regulations are silent on the issue of 
termination and as discussed, there is no EU law duty on UK procuring authorities to 
terminate existing contracts on disqualification. As there is also no indication of how 
the issue of restitution and apportionment of losses will be dealt with where a 
contract is terminated, this issue may be dealt with under the general law of 
restitution. 
139 Book VII Art. 5: 101 
140 Book VII Art 5: 104 
141 C-54/81 Firma Wilhelm Fromme v Bundersanstalt fur Landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung [1982] 
E. C. R. 1449; C-265/78 HFerwerda BV v Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees [1980] E. C. R. 617; C-205 
- 215/82 Deutche Milchkontor GmbH v Germany [1983] E. C. R. 2633; C-336/00 Huber [20021 E. C. R. 
1-7699; C-158/06 ROM-projecten [2007] E. C. R. 1-5103, para. 23. 
142 C-205-215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor GmbH v Germany [1983] E. C. R. 2633. 
143 Jones, Restitution and European Community Law (2000), 130. 
144 Tatham, "Restitution of charges and duties levied by the public administration in breach of 
European Community law" (1994) E. L. R. 146. 
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The availability of restitution is tied to the grounds for which a contract comes to an 
end and as a general principle, restitution may be granted to a claimant where a 
contract has been discharged and it is necessary to reverse an unjust enrichment. '45 
As was discussed in ch. 7.3, a contract may be terminated because there is a 
contractual term to that effect, or because there has been a breach of statute by the 
supplier and money paid out by a public authority may be recovered in cases where 
the money is paid in breach of statute, mistakenly or ultra vires the public 
authority. '46 Should termination for disqualification become a statutory requirement 
in the UK, based on possible future EU law requirements, restitution may be ordered 
on basis of the breach of this statutory requirement. '47 
At present, the most likely basis for termination for disqualification in the UK is a 
contractual term, such as a termination for convenience clause, and thus where a 
procuring authority includes such a clause permitting termination for disqualification 
in the public contract, it will be possible for the authority to claim restitution 
following the termination of a contract where there has been a failure of 
consideration. 148 As a basis of restitution, failure of consideration will be available to 
a party where there is no contractual obligation to confer the relevant benefit on the 
defendant such as where the relevant contract has become ineffective. 149 As stated in 
Fibrosa, a failure of consideration occurs where money was paid to secure 
performance and this performance fails. '5° Whilst the traditional approach has been 
that there has to be a total failure of consideration for restitution to be possible, this 
appears to have been interpreted loosely by the courts and there are cases where 
restitution was allowed on the basis of a total failure of consideration even though 
some aspect of performance of the contract had been obtained. '5' 
145 Virgo, n. 124, ch. 1; Burrows, n. 126, ch. 1; Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (1989), 
ch. 1. 
146 Auckland Harbour vR[ 1924] A. C. 318. 
147 Jones, n. 143,121. 
148 Virgo, n. 124, ch. 17. 
149 Burrows, n. 126, ch. 10,323. 150 Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [ 1943] A. C. 32,48. 
's' See Virgo, n. 124, ch. 12; Rowland v Divall [1923] 2 K. B. 500; DO Ferguson & Associates v Sohl (1992) 62 B. L. R. 95; Goss v Chilcott [1996] A. C. 788. 
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In the construction context where the contract is one for work and materials, there 
will be no failure of consideration once the work has commenced, ' 52 and the contract 
is not performed in apportioned stages. In such contexts, a procuring authority will be 
unable to obtain restitution on the basis of a failure of consideration as the test for 
whether there has been a failure of consideration in such contracts was stated in 
Stocznia to be whether "the promisor has performed any part of the contractual duties 
in respect of which the payment is due". 153 There can thus be no failure of 
consideration where performance under such a contract has commenced, even if the 
claimant has not received the expected benefit under the contract. 
Another possible approach to the issue of restitution may be seen in the Local 
Government Act 1997, which gives local authorities the power to include termination 
clauses in public contracts. 154 The Act gives an indication of how restitutionary 
issues may be approached where a contract is discharged because it is ultra vices and 
there is no agreement on the consequences of the discharge. Thus in s 7, where a 
contract is terminated by the courts, and there are no termination provisions in the 
contract, the supplier shall be entitled to be paid as he would have been paid had the 
contract had effect until it was determined by the courts, or as he would have been 
paid had the contract been discharged due to a breach of contract. Although this Act 
is not directly relevant to the issue of restitution on termination for disqualification, 
the approach in the Act may provide by way of analogy, an indication of how 
procuring authorities may deal with the issue of restitution, especially where there is 
no failure of consideration. 
From the above, it is possible to conclude that where a contract is terminated for the 
disqualification of the contractor, whether the termination arises from possible future 
EU law requirements or as a result of a contractual term, UK procuring authorities 
may be entitled to restitution for sums paid out under the contract. However, for 
restitution to be ordered the supplier must have obtained the benefits sought to be 
recovered at the expense of the procuring authority and the contractor's enrichment 
must be deemed unjust and there must not be any reason (or defences) for denying 
132 Burrows, n. 126, ch. 10,327. 
153 Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvia Shipping [1998] 1 W. L. R. 574,588. 
154 S6. 
268 
the procuring authority a remedy. 155 Similarly, the supplier on a terminated contract 
ought to be able to recover the benefits or value conferred on a procuring authority 
where the retention of such benefits would be unjust. '56 This will be the case, even 
though it is the contractor's disqualification that has led to the termination, by 
analogy with the cases where a party in breach of contract is permitted to seek 
restitution where there has been a failure of consideration. 
In relation to the apportionment of losses in the UK, there is no indication as to how 
this issue is to be addressed, where termination does not give rise to a contractual 
right to damages. However, one may draw an analogy with the common law 
approach to apportionment in frustrated contracts before the passage of the Law 
Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943. Thus in Fibrosa, the House of Lords held 
that where a contract is frustrated, the parties were not permitted to recover any 
expenditure incurred in reliance on the contract. Although this position has been 
rectified in relation to frustrated contracts by the above Act, it may be an appropriate 
approach to be taken in relation to contracts terminated for disqualification. The 
losses that are relevant here are those that do not constitute the unjustified enrichment 
of either party, barring the restitutionary remedies discussed above. Such losses may 
include the tender costs of the contractor, expenditure in preparation for the contract 
such as the employment of staff engaged exclusively for the contract by the 
procuring authority and the costs of the procurement procedure. 
The US adopts a clearer approach to the restitutionary and apportionment issues 
following the termination of a public contract and provides extensive rules on post- 
termination settlements. 157 Although US restitution law is similar to UK restitution 
law in several respects, 158 the FAR and the jurisprudence have provided clarity on the 
consequences of the termination of a public contract and as such a consideration of 
the general US law on restitution is not required. 
155 Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2005), chs. 9 & 10; Banque Fianaciere de la Cite v Parc (Battersea Ltd) 
[1999] 1 A. C. 221; Portman Building Society v Hamlyn Taylor Neck [1998] All E. R. 202,206; Lipkin 
Gorman v Karnpnale [1991] 3 W. L. R. 10. 
'56 Arrowsmith, Civil Liability and Public Authorities (1992), 290-291; Virgo, n. 124 ch. 14. 
's' FAR Part 49. 
158 See S 1, Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (2000); Dagan, n. 123, ch. 2. 
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In the US, convenience terminations ensure that the supplier is not unduly prejudiced 
by the termination, even where the termination is based on the contractor's 
disqualification and the approach to restitution and the apportionment of losses in the 
legislation is concerned with covering the losses the supplier may suffer as a result of 
the termination. 159 Termination for disqualification in the US is prospective and there 
is no issue of returning the parties to their pre-contractual positions. The FAR 
provides for the manner in which losses are to be apportioned between the supplier 
and the procuring authority. 160 Once a contract is terminated, the supplier is required 
to stop all work under the contract and is entitled to payment for work done prior to 
the termination, 161 the preparations made for the terminated portions of the contract, 
including a reasonable allowance for profit on the completed work, 162 but precluding 
the recovery of anticipated profits on the uncompleted portions of the contract. 163 The 
supplier may also claim any charges he may prove resulted from the 164 
as long as the entire settlement does not exceed the contract price. 165 Allowing the 
recovery of profits and losses in line with the contract price is consistent with the 
general law where restitution is claimed for terminated contracts and the contract 
price is used as a "cap for restitutionary recovery. " This is intended to avoid 
competition in the measures of recovery that may be available in contract and under 
the law of restitution. 167 
As was discussed earlier, in the World Bank context, the power to terminate contracts 
is reserved to the Borrower, or the agency conducting the procurement process on the 
Borrower's behalf. Thus, the approach to restitution and the apportionment of losses 
will depend on the law of the Borrower country or the governing law of contract. 
The South African Corruption Act also provides limited guidance on the 
consequences of the termination of public contracts for disqualification. However, 
1s9 Holland, Terminations for Convenience: A contractor's guide (1998) ch. 8. 
160 Henderson, "Terminations for Convenience and the terminations costs clause" (2002) 53 A. F. L. R. 
103. 
161 FAR 12.403 (d); FAR 52.212-4. 
162 Maxima Corp v United States 847 F. 2d 1549 (Fed Cir 1988). 
163 FAR 49.201; McConnell, "Bad faith as a limitation on terminations for convenience: As bad as 
they say, or not so bad" (2003) 32 (2) P. C. L. J. 411,412. 
164 FAR 12.403 (d); FAR 52.249. (1). 
165 FAR 49.207. 
66 Dagan, n. 123, ch. 8, at 283. 
167 Skelton, Restitution and Contract (1998) ch. 1. 
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unlike the US and possibly owing to the punitive nature of disqualification in South 
Africa, the provisions are concerned with the recovery of the procuring authority's 
losses from the supplier. The Act provides that where the National Treasury has 
terminated an agreement, it may in addition to any other legal remedy, recover from 
the supplier, any damages incurred or sustained by the State as a result of the tender 
process or the conclusion of the agreement, or any losses which the State may suffer 
by having to make less favourable arrangements thereafter. 168 
Although it is not clear whether the State may also obtain restitution for benefits 
conferred on the contractor, these provisions are wide enough to include actions for 
unjust enrichment, since the Act provides that the State may recover losses "in 
addition to any other legal remedy. " For such an action to succeed in South African 
law, the plaintiff must be able to show that the defendant was enriched at his 
expense; 169 that there is a causal link between the defendant's enrichment and the 
plaintiffs impoverishment 170 and there is the absence of cause that justifies the 
retention of the enrichment by the defendant. '" It is thus possible that once a 
procuring authority can show that the supplier on a terminated contract has been 
enriched at the procuring authority's expense without cause172 (since the underlying 
contract would have been terminated) the procuring authority ought to be permitted 
to recover any economic benefits173 such as advance payments that were conferred 
on the supplier. 
In the context of the South African PPPFA and PFMA regulations, it had earlier been 
discussed that termination under these regulations is not a consequence of 
disqualification, but termination is a stand-alone remedy for corruption and fraud in a 
public contract. Both regulations are silent as to the apportionment of losses where a 
contract is terminated but it is arguable that where a contract is terminated for 
corruption, a supplier will not be permitted to recover outstanding payments on the 
168 S28 (3) (c). 
169 Basselaar v Registrar, Durban and Coast Local Division 2002 (1) SA 191 (D). 
170 ABSA Bank da Bann v CB Stander t/a CA W Paneelkloppers 1998 (1) SA 939 (C). 
1" du Bois (ed), Wille's Principles of South African Law (2007), ch. 39. 
172 du Bois n. 171, ch. 39,1068-1072. 
173 du Bois n. 171, ch. 39,1047. 
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basis of the rule of law, which denies payment under an illegal transaction. 174 In such 
situations, it is also possible that the procuring authority will be able to obtain 
restitution for other benefits conferred on the supplier as well as compensation for the 
procuring authority's losses as a result of the termination. South African 
jurisprudence has established that illegal contracts cannot be enforced175 and as was 
discussed above, the law of unjust enrichment will prevent the supplier from 
retaining benefits obtained under such a contract where there is no basis for the 
benefit to be retained. 
From the above, it can be seen that not all the jurisdictions are clear on the approach 
to the restitutionary and apportionment issues that arise post-termination. This may 
cause problems in practice, as it is unlikely that a public official responsible for 
entering into post-termination settlements with suppliers will appreciate the 
technicalities of the law of restitution in the jurisdiction. In the absence of clarity on 
these issues, it is likely that where the procuring authority and the supplier cannot 
come to an agreement on how to proceed in relation to these issues, the courts will 
determine how these issues should be addressed. 
One issue that emerges in relation to restitution is determining whose interests are 
preferred as between the supplier and the procuring authority. The South African 
approach is at the end of the spectrum of possible approaches as compared with the 
UK and the US. The South African approach appears to favour the procuring 
authority by giving priority to the interests of the State, but the US appears to favour 
the supplier in relation to the procuring authority. In the UK, it is likely that based on 
the general law of restitution, the UK may adopt an approach, which seeks to strike a 
balance between the competing interests of the supplier and the procuring authority. 
Another issue that arises on which all the jurisdictions are silent is whether a supplier 
may challenge a termination for its disqualification on the basis that the cause for 
disqualification has been removed. This may not be possible where termination is 
14 Vuurman 
v Universal Enterprises, Ltd. 1924 TPD 488; Chipunza v Muzangaza NO [2004] J. O. L. 
12880 (ZH), 
175 Chipunza ibid. 
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based on a termination for convenience clause as exists in the UK and US as such 
clauses give the government a very wide discretion to terminate public contracts. 
7.4.3 Disproportionality and the rule against double jeopardy 
Terminating a contract on the basis of the disqualification of the supplier may raise 
issues of proportionality, 176 especially where disqualification is based on a conviction, 
since the conviction and the consequent disqualification would have already served 
to penalise the supplier for the criminal activity and further `punishment' in the form 
of the cancellation of existing contracts may be unnecessary. '77 This is especially 
relevant where the existing contract is not affected by corruption. The termination of 
existing contracts for disqualification may also be at odds with the non-punitive 
rationales for disqualification in relevant jurisdictions. 
The termination of a contract for the disqualification of a supplier may 
disproportionately affect the supplier in three ways. First, past supplier performance 
and experience is generally an important aspect of the qualifications of a supplier 
bidding for public contracts and termination may mean that in future, the supplier is 
unable to prove a sufficient number of projects that illustrate its experience in a 
particular sector. Secondly, and depending on the size of the terminated contract, the 
termination may adversely affect the contractor's finances, including share prices, 178 
especially if the supplier operates in a specialised sector such as defence and is 
unable to obtain business from the private sector. Thirdly termination may act as a 
further penalty for an offence for which the supplier has already been convicted and 
disqualified. As was discussed in ch. 1, where a supplier is subject to both criminal 
and administrative sanctions such as where disqualification is based on a conviction, 
the disqualification of the supplier by administrative process in addition to its 
criminal conviction may offend the rule against double jeopardy, 179 where the 
sanctions pursue the same ends. 
176 C-213/07 Michaniki AE, paras. 46,48, and 61. 
"' Tomko & Weinberg, 355. 
18 Gonzalez v Freeman 334 F2. d 570,574 (D. C. Cir. 1964). 
19 Garoupa & Gomez-Pomar, "Punish once or Punish twice: A theory of the use of criminal sanctions 
in addition to regulatory penalties" (2004) 6 A. L. E. R. 410; Tomko & Weinberg. 
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As discussed in ch. 1.5, in the EU, the rule against double jeopardy is a fundamental 
aspect of EU law, 180 and applies where multiple sanctions for the same offence 
pursue the same ends or protect the same legal interest. 181 It is possible to argue that 
in the context of the mandatory provisions, the termination of a contract following a 
disqualification and a conviction may amount to more than one sanction for the same 
offence, unless a procuring authority is able to show that the purpose behind 
termination differs from the purposes behind both the conviction and the 
disqualification of the supplier, which may be difficult to do. Similarly, as discussed 
in ch. 1.5, the UK also adopts a common law182 prohibition against being tried or 
punished for the same offence, and similar to the EU, multiple penalties will not 
offend the double jeopardy rule where the penalties do not have the same purpose. 183 
However, a procuring authority may find it difficult where challenged, to argue that 
the purpose for terminating the contract is not met by the other measures already 
taken against the supplier. In the US, the rule against double jeopardy also extends to 
a prohibition against multiple punishments for the same offence. ' ' Where a supplier 
has been convicted, disqualified and has had a contract terminated, it is possible to 
argue that in reality, the supplier is faced with multiple punishments for the same 
offence- even if the termination is not intended to be punitive-185 This is because as 
was discussed in ch. 1.5, the rule against double jeopardy may be offended where an 
additional civil sanction may not be characterised as remedial. 186 Where a contract is 
terminated on disqualification in the US, it is difficult to see how such a termination 
can be considered to be remedial, as the termination will not in itself eliminate 
corruption and the termination is final, in that the supplier may not resume the 
contract by promising to do or refrain from doing something. In addition, where the 
supplier has implemented rehabilitation measures, which eliminate the cause for 
180 Gutmann v Commission of the European Atomic Energy Community (18/65 R) [1966] E. C. R. 135; 
Art. 4, Protocol 7, European Convention on Human Rights. 
18` T-236/0 1, Tokai Carbon Co Ltd v Commission of the European Communities (Graphite 
Electrodes) [2004] E. C. R. 11-1181. 
182 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Book 4,1800), ch. 26 at 355-336; Law 
Commission: Double Jeopardy- A summary, Consultation Paper 156 (2001). 
183 Borders (UK) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2005] EWCA Civ. 197, para. 17. 1&4 United States v Halper 490 U. S. 435 (1989). Thomas, Double Jeopardy: The History, The Law (1998), chs. 1 & 2; Poulin, "Double Jeopardy and multiple punishment: Cutting the Gordian Knot" (2006) 77 U. C. L. R. 595. 
t85 Halper, ibid., 448. 
`86 Halper, ibid. 
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disqualification prior to the termination of the contract, this may lend further 
credence to the punitive nature of the termination. 187 
Similar to the other jurisdictions, South African law also recognises a rule against 
double jeopardy. As discussed in ch. 1.5, the judicial nature of disqualification under 
the Corruption Act means that disqualifications under the Act do not offend the rule 
against double jeopardy because the double jeopardy rule does not "limit legislative 
authority to define punishment. "' 88 However, where termination follows a prior 
disqualification, it is arguable that the termination may amount to a multiple 
punishment for the same offence, offending the double jeopardy rule unless the aim 
of the termination differs from the aims of the preceding conviction and 
disqualification. As the main rationale for the disqualification regime in South Africa 
is punitive, this may suggest that termination is also punitive and may thus offend the 
double jeopardy rule. 
Whether a jurisdiction is under an obligation to consider the disproportionate effect 
of termination on a supplier may be informed by the rationales for termination in that 
jurisdiction. However, none of the jurisdictions, which provide for the possibility of 
termination, have expressly addressed this issue. This is not surprising in the context 
of the EU and UK given that the legislation here is silent on the issue. However, it is 
arguable that in line with the EU principle of proportionality, 189 a procuring authority 
ought to consider the impact termination will have on the supplier. In Michaniki, it 
was held that in accordance with the principle of proportionality, a disqualification 
regime must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve its objectives. 190 Thus, 
where a supplier claims that the termination of a contract following disqualification 
is a disproportionate penalty, the courts may be open to revoking the termination as 
long as this does not undermine the disqualification regime. 191 Arrowsmith has also 
suggested in the context of contracts concluded in breach of the procurement 
187 Tomko & Weinberg, 363. 
188 Poulin, n. 184,597. 
189 Emiliou, The Principle of proportionality in European law (1996); Ellis (ed. ) The Principle of 
Proportionality in the laws of Europe (1999); de Burca, "The Principle of Proportionality and its 
application in EC law" (1993) 13 Y. B. E. L. 105. 
190 Michaniki paras. 47-49; Opinion of AG Maduro at para 34 [2008] E. C. R. 1-9999. See also C-21/03 
and C-34/03 Fabricom South Africa v Etat Belge [2005] E. C. R. 1-1559, para 34. 191 Craig & de Burca, 2007, ch. 9. 
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procedure that a procuring authority should consider the consequences to the supplier 
in coming to a decision to terminate the contract. 192 
In the US, the provisions in the FAR dealing with the apportionment of losses post- 
termination may limit the disproportionate impact of termination on the supplier and 
where a contract is terminated in circumstances where the effect of the termination is 
unduly disproportionate on the contractor, the courts have held that the termination 
was unlawful. 193 
In South Africa, whilst the National Treasury is permitted to terminate existing 
contracts with a disqualified contractor, the Treasury is required to take several 
factors into account, including the impact of the termination. 194 Although this 
provision does not indicate whether it is the impact of the termination on the supplier 
that may be considered, it is possible to interpret this provision in such a manner as to 
give the Treasury pause if the impact of the termination on the supplier will be 
unduly disproportionate. 
In conclusion, it is clear that most jurisdictions convicting for corruption will aim to 
ensure that the penalties are tailored to fit the offence. Where further penalties in the 
form of disqualification and termination are permitted outside of the judicial process, 
these penalties increase the penalty load of the convicted person, possibly without a 
formal consideration of the criminal penalties the supplier has already been subject to. 
Thus even where termination does not offend the double jeopardy rule, the 
disproportionate effect of termination on a supplier should mean that termination is 
only utilised where it is absolutely necessary to fulfil policy objectives that were not 
met by the conviction and disqualification of the supplier and termination should be 
limited to situations where it is necessary to protect the public interest. 195 
192 Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 21.15. 
193 Art-Metal USA Inc. v Solomon, 473 F. Supp. 1 (D. D. C. 1978). 
194 S28 (3) (a) (i) Corruption Act. 
'95 Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 21.13. 
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7.4.4 Waste and inefficiency 
Termination may be wasteful and economically inefficient and may have extreme 
resource and cost implications, especially in the construction context. 196 Termination 
could be wasteful in relation to the substance of the contract, where the nature of the 
contract is such that the contract must be fully completed before the procuring 
authority may derive the benefits from the contract such as the installation of a 
computer network system and in cases where it is not possible to engage another 
supplier midway through the contract. 197 
Another area in which termination may be wasteful is in relation to the losses that 
may follow termination. This relates to both the financial losses of the parties as well 
as procurement costs. As was discussed in ch. 7.4.2, depending on the approach to the 
apportionment of losses in a jurisdiction, a procuring authority may be liable for the 
losses suffered by the supplier on the terminated contract. Where termination is not 
based on a contractual term and there are no deficiencies in the terminated contract, 
the procuring authority or the government may be liable to pay damages to the 
supplier. 198 Such damages may include expenditure for loss of profits and 
consequential losses such as the loss of future contracts as a result of the stigma of 
the terminated contract or losses that that may result from the supplier being unable 
to meet turnover requirements for future contracts. ' 99 The reality of such damages are 
recognised and provided for by the US FAR in the provisions on convenience 
terminations. 
In addition, unless the costs of the wasted procurement procedure are recoverable 
from the contractor, as is the case in South Africa, 200 the procuring authority will 
have to bear this loss. Further, where the contract is terminated for disqualification 
and is not based on the malafides of the supplier in respect of the terminated contract, 
196 Henty, "OGC Consultation on the Implementation of the new remedies directive" (2009) 1 
P. P. L. R. NA48,50. 
197 Treumer, n. 12,371,380. 
'98 Arrowsmith, Linarelli, Wallace, 789. 
199 Ronald J. Rhen v US, 17 Cl. Ct. 140 (1989). 
200 S28 (3) (c) Corruption Act. 
277 
in the absence of regulations to the contrary, the costs of re-procurement are likely to 
be borne by the procuring authority, as is the case in the US 20' 
The waste that could result when a public contract is terminated is also at odds both 
with the value for money and efficiency goals of domestic public procurement202 and 
also with the movement towards increasing efficiency and reducing waste in public 
procurement203 and is another reason why termination for disqualification should be 
used circumspectly. The South African provisions give effect to this by requiring the 
National Treasury under the Corruption Act to consider whether extreme costs will 
follow from the termination. 204 It is assumed that where a contract is awarded, the 
award is made on the best terms possible and thus, apart from the losses that arise 
from the termination, where the contract is re-tendered it is likely that the 
government is not going to obtain best value in the re-procurement procedure, if the 
contract was initially awarded to the most economically advantageous supplier in the 
terminated contract. 
7.4.5 The effect of termination on the delivery of public services 
The decision to terminate a public contract may be accompanied by consequences 
that do not occur in the private sector and may compromise the delivery of public 
services. The adverse effect of termination on the delivery of public services is a 
public interest concern that ought to be taken into account when termination is 
considered and may also signal that termination is disproportionate in a particular 
circumstance. 
Although there is no indication on how this issue should be addressed in the 
jurisdictions, some clarity may be obtained from the approach in other contexts. As 
was discussed in the context of ineffective contracts in the EU, a Member State has 
201 FAR 12.402. 
202 Arrowsmith, Linarelli & Wallace, ch. 2. 
203 For the UK see HM Treasury, Efficiency in Civil Government Procurement (July 1998); Gershon, 
Review of Civil Procurement in central government (April 1999) and Norris, "The Gershon Review: A 
Driver for Reform at the heart of central government procurement" (1999) 6 P. P. L. R. CS177; 
Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 2. For the US see Kelman, Unleashing Change: A study of organizational 
renewal in government (2006), 18-21. For South Africa see Green Paper on Government Procurement 
(1999) and Bolton, 2007, ch. 5. 
204 S28 (3) (a). 
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the discretion not to terminate a contract (or declare it ineffective) where there are 
overriding interests in the general interest, and this provision may be used to take 
public interest concerns into account. Thus, by way of analogy in the disqualification 
context, where termination may affect or compromise the delivery of public services, 
especially where those services are essential, then a public contract should not be 
terminated for disqualification. 205 
In Commission v Spain, 206 the Commission challenged a provision in Spanish 
procurement law which provided that where a contract is declared invalid for a 
breach of procurement law and implementing this decision will disrupt public 
services, the contract may continue until steps are taken to avoid any harm to the 
public. In support of Spain, the CJEU held that "the aim of the provision is not to 
prevent the enforcement of the declaration of invalidity of a specific contract, but to 
avoid, where the public interest is at stake, excessive and potentially prejudicial 
consequences of the immediate enforcement of the declaration, pending the adoption 
of urgent measures, in order to ensure the continuity of public services"207 and that 
consequently, the provision did not undermine the procurement remedies directive. 
A similar approach may apply in relation to the UK. As discussed in the context of 
the ineffective provisions, a contract may not be declared ineffective by the courts 
when there are overriding reasons in the general interest- including when declaring a 
contract ineffective would lead to disproportionate consequences. 208 Thus, it is 
arguable that the adverse effect of termination on the delivery of public services may 
be regarded as a disproportionate consequence that should preclude termination in a 
given case. This has been the approach in France where effects of termination on the 
public interest are a key consideration in termination decisions. Arrowsmith suggests 
that where termination is considered, other interests that would be prejudiced apart 
from those of the procuring authority and the supplier should be taken into 
205 Treumer, n. 12,381. 206 C-444/06 [2008] E. C. R. 1-2045. 
207 Ibid., para. 55. 
208 Reg. 47L. 
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account. 209 Similarly, Treumer suggests that a decision to terminate a public contract 
should only be made after a consideration of the public interest 210 
In the US, where a procuring authority wishes to terminate a contract for the 
disqualification of a contractor, the procuring authority is required to consider the 
propriety of the termination 211 and it is arguable that termination will not be 
appropriate where it will adversely affect the delivery of public services. 
As was discussed earlier, under the South African Corruption Act, where the 
National Treasury is contemplating contractual termination for the disqualification of 
a contractor, it must consider the urgency of the goods or services to be supplied 
under the contract and any other factor that may impact the termination of the 
contract. 212 Thus, similar to the position in the other jurisdictions, termination may be 
avoided if it will adversely affect the delivery of public services. 
The effect of termination on the delivery of public services necessitates a flexible and 
considered approach to termination and a procuring authority must seek to balance 
the adverse impact of termination against the desire to fulfil the rationales supporting 
the disqualification regime. 
7.4.6 The effect of termination on third parties 
Contractual termination may have severe implications for third parties. Where a 
contract involves subcontractors, lenders/finance providers, termination may 
adversely affect these persons and a contractor on a terminated contract may be 
forced to terminate subcontracts and repay unspent portions of finance with possible 
penalties. Termination may also affect a subcontractor's finances and ability to 
tender for future work in the same way as it affects those of the primary contractor. 
The issue that arises in relation to third parties is determining what remedies such 
third parties may have either against the procuring authority or the disqualified 
primary contractor where a contract is terminated. 
209 Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 21.15. 210 Treumer, n. 12,382. 21 FAR 9.405-1; Torncello v US 231 Ct. Cl. 20 (1982). 
212 S28 (3) (a) Corruption Act. 
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In relation to obtaining remedies against a procuring authority, in the absence of 
overriding statutory requirements, the doctrine of privity of contract may prevent an 
aggrieved subcontractor from obtaining remedies against the procuring authority. 
The doctrine of privity of contract operates in very similar ways in all the 
jurisdictions. 
In the EU, although there is no European law of contract, the DCR mentioned above 
provides that a contract is not binding on persons who are not parties to the 
contract, 213 although the parties to a contract may by the contract confer a right or 
other benefit on a third party. 214 Thus if the contract confers a remedial right against 
the procuring authority on the subcontractor, the subcontractor may assert this right. 
However, in the absence of such a provision, the doctrine of privity will prevent the 
subcontractor from being able to assert remedial rights against a procuring 
authority. 215 
The doctrine of privity in the UK is governed by both common law and statute. The 
common law was adamant in providing that a person who was not a party to a 
contract could not sue to enforce that contract, even if the contract was entered into 
for his benefit. 216 The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 however gives a 
third party a limited right to sue to enforce a contract in cases where the contract 
expressly provides that he may do so, 217 and where the contract purports to confer a 
benefit on the third party218 and there is no indication to the contrary. 219 Thus, if a 
public contract confers a right on a subcontractor to sue the procuring authority, he 
may do so under the 1999 Act. The remedy available to the subcontractor in such a 
case will be any remedy that would have been available to him had he been a party to 
the contract. 220 
213 MacQueen, Clive & Macgregor, "Privity of Contract in the DCFR" (2009) European Private Law 
News Available at http: //www law ed ac uk/epln/blogentry aspx? blogentryref=7704. 
214 Art II: 11-9-301 (1). 
215 Kotz & Flessner, European Contract Law (Vol. 1 1997), ch. 13; Kluwer Law (ed. ), Towards a 
European Civil Code (1998), ch. 19. 
216 Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) 1B&S 393; Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co v Se fridge [1915] A. C. 847. 
217 SI (1) (a). 
218 S1 (1) (b); Prudential Assurance v Ayres [2007] EWHC 775 (Ch). 
219 S1 (2); Nisshin Shipping Co Ltd v Cleaves & Co [2003] EWHC 2602 (Comm). 
220 S1 (5). 
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A similar approach to the UK common law doctrine of privity obtains in the US and 
only a person with whom the government has privity of contract may sue the 
government in relation to public contracts. 221 In relation to terminations for 
convenience in the US, the contract law approach is given statutory force by the FAR, 
which provides that a subcontractor has no contractual rights against the government 
on the termination of a contract and the subcontractor's rights exist against the 
primary contractor. 222 Once a contract is terminated, the primary contractor is bound 
to terminate all subcontracts that relate to the terminated contract and primary 
contractors are encouraged to include termination clauses in subcontracts for their 
protection. 223 In addition, the failure of a primary contractor to include an appropriate 
termination clause in a subcontract shall not affect the government's right to require 
the termination of the subcontract. 224 Under the FAR, the primary contractor is 
required to enter into a settlement with its subcontractors, which will be incorporated 
into the settlement between the primary contractor and the government. 225 The FAR 
thus regulates the relationship between the primary contractor and subcontractor on 
the termination of a public contract. 
South African law is silent on this issue. However under the general law and similar 
to the other jurisdictions, the only persons who may obtain rights or incur obligations 
under a contract are the parties to the contract 226 For a third party to incur liability or 
acquire rights under a contract, the contract must contain a provision accepted by the 
third party. 227 Accordingly, if a public contract does not contain a stipulation 
conferring a right to sue the government directly for the subcontractor's losses on the 
termination of the contract, which stipulation has been accepted by the subcontractor, 
then the doctrine of privity will preclude the subcontractor from seeking remedies 
from the government. 
221 Flexfab, L. L. C. v. United States, 424 F. 3d 1254,1263 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Erickson Air Crane Co. v. 
United States, 731 F. 2d 810,813 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Thrasher, "Subcontractor Dispute Remedies: 
Asserting Subcontractor Claims against the Federal Government" (1994) 23 P. C. L. J. 39. 
222 FAR 49: 108-1. 
223 FAR 49: 108-2 (a). 
224 FAR 49: 108-2 (b). 
225 FAR 49: 108-2 and 108-3. 
226 Christie, The Law of Contract in South Africa (2006), 260-261; Compass Motor Industries (Pty) 
Ltd v Caliguard (Pty) Ltd 1990 (2) SA 520 (W). 
227 du Bois, n. 171 at ch. 26,815. 
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Where the doctrine of privity of contract precludes the subcontractor from asserting 
remedial rights against the procuring authority as has been discussed, the 
subcontractor will have to seek remedies against the primary supplier. The nature of 
the remedies will depend on the effect that the terminated primary contract is deemed 
to have on the subcontract. Although a detailed examination of this issue is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, there are three possible approaches that may be taken. First, it 
is possible that the primary supplier will be in breach of contract to the subcontractor 
owing to the termination of the primary contract. This may mean the primary 
supplier becomes liable in damages for the full extent of the subcontractor's losses 
subject to the rules on remoteness and mitigation in the jurisdiction. Second, the 
primary supplier may have included a cancellation clause in the contract, which 
would permit it to cancel the subcontract if the primary contract is terminated. This is 
the approach suggested by the US FAR to primary contractors. Thirdly, the remedial 
consequences may depend on whether the jurisdiction regards the subcontract as 
frustrated by the termination of the primary contract. For instance, under common 
law, it is possible that the termination of the primary contract frustrates the 
subcontract by making the subcontract impossible to perform, since the primary 
supplier and those associated with it will no longer have access to the procuring 
authority's premises for delivery of goods and services and of course, the underlying 
basis of the subcontract would have ceased to exist. 28 
The adverse effect of termination on third parties is another reason why jurisdictions 
should be reluctant to terminate contracts for disqualification. A policy of 
termination may also deter would-be subcontractors from entering into public 
contracts and may lead to disproportionate consequences where subcontractors are 
concerned. 
7.5 Analysis 
As can be seen, the termination of existing contracts for disqualification is a complex 
issue on which there is little clarity in many of the jurisdictions. The lack of a clear 
228 Davis Contractors n. 63; Peel & Treitel, n. 53, ch. 19. 
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approach to termination and the difficulties associated with the consequences of 
termination may create problems for procuring authorities wishing to terminate 
contracts for disqualification and may result in unnecessary litigation in such 
jurisdictions. 
7.5.1 The existence of a duty to terminate 
As was seen, there is no duty on procuring authorities in any of the jurisdictions to 
terminate a subsisting contract solely because the supplier has been disqualified for 
corruption in cases where the existing contract is unaffected by corruption. In the EU, 
the limited circumstances in which contractual termination is required under the 
amendments to the remedies directive and the court's attitude in Wall AG in the 
context of proceedings by a supplier before national review bodies points to the fact 
that Member States are currently not under a duty to terminate existing contracts for 
a mandatory disqualification. However, it is possible in future for the CJEU to 
require termination for disqualification given that the decision in Commission v 
Germany2'29 left open the circumstances in which termination may be required in EU 
law. 
In the UK, as discussed, there is no duty to terminate existing contracts for a 
mandatory disqualification based on EU law. There is also currently no duty to 
terminate such contracts under UK public law or under the common law. However as 
discussed, some UK procuring authorities include termination for convenience 
clauses in their contracts, which may be relied on by a procuring authority to 
terminate an existing contract based on the disqualification of the supplier. In cases 
where there is corruption within the existing contract, as discussed above, public 
contracts often contain clauses entitling the procuring authority to terminate such 
contracts. The general contract law also permits the rescission of contracts induced 
by corruption. 
In the US, there is similarly no duty to terminate existing contracts solely on the basis 
of the supplier's disqualification. However, all US public contracts contain a 
229 [2007) ECR I-6153. 
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termination for convenience clause which may be used by procuring authorities to 
terminate subsisting contracts for disqualification. Unlike the situation in the UK/US, 
South African procuring entities are not permitted to terminate an existing contract 
for the subsequent disqualification of the supplier, and instead, the National Treasury 
is given the power to determine whether it will terminate a subsisting contract with a 
disqualified supplier. In the US and South Africa, the general contract law permits 
termination where a contract is tainted with corruption as is the case in the UK. 
In the World Bank as discussed, Borrowers are not required to terminate existing 
contracts for the disqualification of a supplier, but similar to the US, the contract 
between the Borrower and the supplier contains a termination for convenience clause 
which may possibly be used by the Borrower to terminate an existing contract in this 
context. 
7.5.2 The nature and consequences of termination 
Determining the nature and consequences of termination is a complex issue which 
may present several problems for a procuring authority. As was discussed, the first 
issue to be addressed will be determining whether the termination will be 
retrospective or prospective. In cases where the existing contract is tainted by 
corruption, the position is clearer as most jurisdictions regard corruption in the 
formation of a contract as a reason for the retrospective cancellation of the contract. 
In the cases where the termination of an existing contract is based solely on 
disqualification and that contract is not tainted with corruption, most jurisdictions 
treat termination as being prospective. As was seen, there is no clarity on this issue in 
the EU and where this issue is determined under the law of Member States, this will 
result in an inconsistent approach among the Member States that decide to exercise 
their discretion to terminate existing contracts for disqualification. In the UK, where 
the contract is unaffected by corruption, termination is most likely to be prospective, 
given the approach to termination in the remedies provisions of the UK regulations 
and the statutory approach as illustrated by the Local Government Act 1997. 
Termination in the US also appears to be prospective given the provisions on 
termination payments in the FAR. In South Africa, it is not clear from the law 
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whether termination by the National Treasury under the Corruption Act is 
prospective or retrospective and the limited jurisprudence available suggests that 
termination may be retrospective where the contract has not been executed. 
The restitutionary consequence of termination is another complex issue on which 
there is little clarity in the jurisdictions. In the EU, the current position is that the EU 
has not circumscribed Member States' discretion to determine these issues and the 
restitutionary consequences of termination will thus be based on the domestic law of 
the Member State concerned. It was seen that there are similarities between what 
may be the EU law approach to restitution (based on the model laws) and the 
approaches in the UK, the US and South Africa, and in each jurisdiction, restitution 
is permitted where there is an unjust enrichment and depending on the jurisdiction, a 
total or partial failure of consideration. 
In determining the apportionment of other losses not covered by a restitutionary 
claim, in the EU, this again has been left to Member States discretion. The UK has 
not provided any indication on what approach it mat take, but the US FAR provides 
for the payments of the supplier's losses, as long as those losses do not exceed the 
contract price. In contrast, the South African provisions permit the National Treasury 
to recover the government's losses from the supplier. A better approach which lies 
between the South African and the US approach may be for a jurisdiction to either 
seek to apportion the losses between the procuring entity and the supplier, or to let 
the losses lie where they have fallen, in cases where termination is sought in 
fulfilment of a policy objective and not because of any deficiencies in the contract. 
As was discussed in ch. 7.4, the adverse and disproportionate effect of termination on 
the disqualified supplier, third parties and the public requires a cautious approach to 
termination for disqualification. It may be difficult, however, for a government to 
resist the calls to terminate a contract with a disqualified supplier where the 
disqualification involved a high profile supplier and attracted media attention and the 
supplier is still seen to be performing public contracts. The upshot is that in 
considering termination, a government must try to balance the public interest in 
seeking to fulfil the policy rationale for disqualification with the interests of the 
parties that may be affected by the termination. 
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It is suggested that jurisdictions that adopt a policy of contractual termination for 
disqualification or that permit authorities to terminate public contracts should provide 
clarity in the legislation on the nature and consequences of termination as is done by 
the US. This will clarify the expectations of suppliers and procuring entities and 
reduce the potential for litigation where such contracts are terminated. 
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CHAPTER 8 
DEROGATING FROM DISQUALIFICATION 
8.1 Introduction 
A supplier may avoid being disqualified where a cause for disqualification exists because 
the legislation grants a disqualifying entity the discretion in limited circumstances to 
derogate from the requirement to disqualify a supplier, or because an entity such as a 
procuring entity is permitted where justifiable to enter into a contract with a disqualified 
supplier. There are two main grounds on which a supplier may avoid disqualification: 
exceptional situations and rehabilitation measures. Exceptional situations include public 
interest (including public health), national security, emergencies and the economic 
consequences or impact of disqualification, the presence of which make it inappropriate 
to disqualify the supplier even though the supplier has committed a relevant offence. 
Rehabilitation measures are those measures that a supplier may take to ensure that it is no 
longer regarded as corrupt, such as eliminating the cause for disqualification by 
terminating the employment of persons who committed offences and internal 
reorganisation to ensure that corrupt activity can no longer flourish within the firm. ' 
The possibility to derogate from a disqualification requirement may depend on the 
rationale for disqualification in a jurisdiction and the discretion the disqualifying entity 
possesses in deciding on the different aspects of the disqualification decision as discussed 
in ch. 4.4. The availability of derogation provisions in a disqualification system is 
important for two reasons. First, such provisions provide procuring authorities with the 
flexibility to refrain from disqualifying suppliers where the disqualification is not 
appropriate and second, derogations introduce an element of proportionality and fairness 
into the disqualification system and provide a means of relaxing what could be an 
otherwise harsh measure especially where the supplier has subsequently become 
rehabilitated. 
Arrowsmith, Priess & Friton, 259. 
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This chapter will examine the reasons for which disqualification may be avoided in the 
jurisdictions and how to prevent abuse in the implementation of derogations. 
8.2 Reasons for derogating from disqualification 
8.2.1 Exceptional situations 
The exceptional situations that could be relied on to derogate from a disqualification 
requirement are public interest (including public health), national security and the 
economic costs and impact of disqualification. These are not mutually exclusive and may 
often overlap in practice. For instance, national security concerns and the adverse impact 
of disqualification may often be regarded as public interest considerations. In addition, 
these situations are not finite categories of situations in which derogation may be 
appropriate, but have been chosen as the most common and justifiable reasons for 
derogating from a disqualification requirement. 
8.2.1.1 Public interest (including public health) 
Public interest may be defined as anything, which is of serious concern and benefit to the 
public and is in the interest or serves the interest of the public. 2 The concept of public 
interest assumes that there is a common good, which is in the interest of the community, 
even if it is against the interest of some individuals in the community. 3 Although the term 
`public interest' is common in legal and political discourse, there is no universal 
acceptance of its meaning and many uses of `public interest' are indistinguishable from 
concepts of morality, 4 public health and safety. 
2 See Freedom of Information Act Awareness Guidance No 3: Public Interest Test. Available at 
www. ico. gov. uk; Exemption briefing series: Public interest test- Section 2 of Freedom of Information Act 
(Scotland) 2002: http: //www itspublicknowledge. info/nmsruntimelsaveasdialogasR? IID=2677&slD=684 
3 Bozeman, Public values and public interest: counterbalancing economic individualism (2007), 89. 
4 Bozeman, ibid., 84. 
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The EU, the UK and the US explicitly state that derogations from the disqualification 
requirement could be made for public interest reasons. The EU directives permit 
derogation from the mandatory requirement to disqualify where there are "overriding 
requirements in the general interest. "5 Although the directives do not define the 
circumstances in which derogations might be appropriate and have left this to the 
discretion of Member States, the derogations from the disqualification requirement may 
be interpreted in the same manner as existing public interest derogations6 under the EU 
Treaty and the procurement directives. 
Specific public interest concerns in the EU include ensuring public health and or safety, 7 
and as such, public health may be relied on as a reason for derogating from the 
mandatory disqualification provisions. The preparatory documents to the directives 
indicated that derogations from the disqualifications may apply in cases of public health 
problems, where the only available medicines are provided by a supplier who is to be 
disqualified. 8 Although there is no explicit derogation from the procurement directives 
for public health, the recitals to the directives indicate that the directives do not affect the 
application of measures necessary to protect public health in so far as those measures are 
in conformity with the Treaty, 9 which permits derogation from the free movement 
provisions for public health reasons. '° 
In applying the health derogations under the Treaty, the CJEU has considered whether 
such measures are the least trade restrictive means of achieving the stated objective" and 
whether the public health claim is sustainable in light of available scientific evidence. 12 
5 Art. 45 (1) PSD. 
6 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament of concerning the common position of 
the Council on the adoption of a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
coordination for the procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts, and public 
supply contracts (25/3/2003) SEC(2003) 366 final, 8. 
Arts. 9,36,45,52 TFEU. 
European Parliament's Legislative resolution on the Council common position with a view to adopting a 
European parliament and Council directive coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating 
in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors (12634/3/2002-C5-0142/2003-2000/0117(COD)). 
9 Recital 6 PSD. 
10 Arts. 36,45 and 52 TFEU. 
"C-40/82, Commission v United Kingdom [ 1982] E. C. R. 2793, para. 41. 
12 C-174/82 icier van Justitie v Sandoz BV [1983] E. C. R. 2445. 
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Similar reasoning may be applied to derogations from the disqualification requirement 
invoked on public health grounds. In addition, where such derogations are invoked, they 
must be interpreted in line with existing EU jurisprudence, such that any derogation 
would need to be appropriate, necessary and proportionate to its objective, and must not 
be used to discriminate against suppliers from other Member States. 13 
In implementing the EU directives, the UK procurement regulations repeat verbatim the 
derogation provisions of the directives without clarifying the limits of the provision. 14 As 
the UK must comply with the EU directives in effect, 15 the reasons for derogating in the 
UK may be similar to the reasons for derogating in the EU. 
The OGC Guidance document attempts to clarify the derogation provisons in the UK 
regulations and suggests that national emergencies as defined by the Civil Contingencies 
Act 2004 would be an appropriate reason for derogating from the mandatory 
disqualifications. 16 The Act defines an emergency as an event or a situation which 
threatens serious damage to human welfare in the UK; threatens serious damage to the 
environment, and war or terrorism which threatens serious damage to the security of the 
UK. Under the Act, such an event includes one which may cause loss or injury to human 
life; homelessness; damage to property; disruption of supplies of money, food, water, 
energy or fuel; disruption of communication, transport or health services and 
contamination of land, water, air with biological, chemical or radioactive matter. " The 
Act thus includes varying public health concerns in its definition of `emergency' and as 
such, public health seems a likely reason for which a UK procuring authority may 
derogate from the mandatory disqualification provisions. 
From the above, the UK regulations may coincide with EU law in relation to appropriate 
reasons to derogate from the requirement to disqualify. However, as stated, procuring 
13 C-318/86, Commission v French Republic (1988] E. C. R. 3559. 
14 Reg. 23 (2) PCR. 
15 Brent London Borough Council & Ors v Risk Management Partners [2011] UKSC 7 
16 Para. 9. 
17 S1(2) and 1 (3). 
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authorities will need to ensure that when they are invoking these reasons to derogate, the 
measure is exercised in line with the requirements of EU law. 18 
There are no derogation provision in relation to the discretionary disqualification 
provisions in the EU and the UK. This is appropriate, given that procuring authorities 
have discretion to decide on all aspects of the discretionary provisions. 
The US approach to derogations is to permit other procuring authorities that are bound to 
respect a prior disqualification to contract with a disqualified supplier where it is 
appropriate to do so. Thus, although there are slight differences in the approach of the 
EU/UK and the US, the practical effect remains the same- a supplier who has been or 
who ought to be disqualified remains eligible to obtain a public contract. 
The FAR permits procuring authorities to enter into a contract with a disqualified 
supplier where there are "compelling reasons" for doing so. 19 Although compelling 
reason is not defined in the FAR, some guidance may be found in the Defence Federal 
Acquisition Regulations (DFARS), and agency-specific procurement regulations which 
model the FAR for specific agencies. Under these regulations, "compelling reasons" 
include public interest (e. g. where only a disqualified supplier can provide the supplies or 
services; 20 the exigencies of urgency; 21 preventing a severe disruption of the agency's 
operations to the detriment of the government or the general public), 22 rehabilitation 
measures and national security. 23 
Although these agency-specific procurement regulations provide some guidance as to 
what may amount to a compelling reason, the lack of explicit guidance in the FAR on 
what constitutes an appropriate reason for derogation has led to a situation where the term 
IS C-31/87, Beenjes [1988] E. C. R. 4635, para. 37; C-72/83, Campus Oil v. Ministry for Industry and 
Energy[1984] E. C. R. 2727. 
19 FAR 9.406-1 (c). 
20 DFARS 209.405 (a) (i); Dept of Health and Human Services Acquisition Regulations (HHSAR) 309.405 
(a) (1) (i); J. B. Kies Construction Co Comp. Gen. B-250797,93-1 CPD ¶ 127. 
21 DFARS 209.405 (a) (ii). 
22 FAR 23.506 (e). 
23 DFARS 209.405 (a) (iv). 
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`compelling reason' has been used loosely in some cases. For instance, derogations 
granted by federal agencies to MCI WorldCom in the aftermath of its temporary 
disqualification from government contracts by the General Services Administration 
(GSA)24 was given in one instance in order not to hinder the ability of residents of an 
Armed Forces Retirement Home to stay in touch with family and friends. 25 In relation to 
WorldCom, another plausible explanation for the tenuous derogations may be because 
WorldCom was the US government's largest telecommunications provider26 and 
switching to an alternative supplier would be expensive, time consuming and disruptive- 
and possibly not in the public interest. However, the WorldCom example shows that 
where the legislation is vague as to the kind and scope of justifiable reasons for 
derogating from disqualification, procuring agencies may adopt very broad concepts of 
derogations and there may also be a lack of uniformity in the use of derogations by 
procuring authorities. 27 
The World Bank and the South African legislation adopt similar approaches to the issue 
of derogations. In the World Bank, there is no possibility for Borrower's to derogate 
under any circumstances from disqualifications imposed by the Bank and Borrowers are 
required to examine the Bank's list of disqualified suppliers to ensure that a contract is 
not awarded to a disqualified supplier. 28 There are two reasons why the World Bank does 
not allow derogations from its disqualification measure. First, as discussed in ch. 2.5.2, 
the Bank has mainstreamed its anti-corruption agenda and prioritises its anti-corruption 
measures over the circumstances that may make derogations for exceptional reasons 
appropriate to national jurisdictions. Secondly, it must be remembered that borrowing 
from the Bank is optional at the behest of the Borrower and should a Borrower feel that 
procuring from a disqualified supplier is unavoidable, the option remains for the 
Borrower to utilise alternative funds for the procurement. 
24 GAO, GSA Actions leading to proposed debarment of WorldCom (GAO-04-741 R, May 26,2004). 
25 Collins, "What the MCI case teaches about the current state of suspension and debarment" (2004) 5 
P. P. L. R. 218. 
16 Ibid. 
27 Ibid, 221. 
28 Appendix 1, para. 8 BPG. 
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Although the Bank does not permit Borrowers to derogate from a disqualification for 
exceptional situations, as discussed below, the Bank takes rehabilitation measures into 
account in deciding whether to disqualify a corrupt supplier. 
In South Africa, there is also no possibility for a disqualifying entity to derogate from the 
mandatory requirement to disqualify under the PFMA regulations or from a 
disqualification imposed by the courts under the Corruption Act. South Africa is the only 
domestic jurisdiction, which denies procuring authorities the flexibility to derogate from 
a mandatory requirement to disqualify. This may be due to the punitive rationale for 
disqualification in South Africa, but this approach may be problematic for procuring 
authorities because public interest concerns may legitimately override the reasons for 
disqualification. This is especially so in relation to disqualifications imposed by the 
courts, as the courts may impose a disqualification where there are exceptional factors 
necessitating the continued business relationship between a supplier and a procuring 
authority, which are not apparent to the courts. However, under the Corruption Act, once 
the court orders a disqualification, all procuring authorities must apply the 
disqualification and are denied the flexibility to deal with peculiar or one-off cases that 
could not have been anticipated. 
In imposing a disqualification under the Corruption Act, it is not clear whether the courts 
may take into account exceptional reasons before imposing disqualification as part of the 
sentence. It is possible that the courts have the discretion to take similar considerations 
into account as the draft sentencing guidelines in South Africa require the courts to aim at 
protecting society and giving the offender the opportunity to live a crime free life. 29 Thus 
it is arguable that where public interest concerns (such as protecting society from the 
corrupt supplier) will not be served by the supplier's disqualification, disqualification 
may not be necessary. It may be noted that derogations are often appropriate for specific 
contracts rather than for a supplier in general 
- 
but where the court takes exceptional 
reasons such as public interest factors into account in imposing a general disqualification, 
29 Draft Sentencing Framework Act 2000, available at http: //www. justice. gov. za/salrc/dRapers/dr)9l Qdf; 
Terblanche, "Sentencing Guidelines for South Africa: Lessons from elsewhere" (2003) 120 (4) S. A. L. J. 
858. 
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a general derogation will be made, meaning the supplier will avoid disqualification 
altogether. 
Where the court imposes a disqualification under the Corruption Act, it should be noted 
that the Act does not permit procuring authorities to derogate from the disqualification 
decision of the court, but the Act gives the National Treasury the power to vary the 
period of disqualification 30 The Act is silent as to the circumstances in which the 
National Treasury may take this action, but it is possible that public interest or public 
health may be a reason for the National Treasury to reduce the length of the 
disqualification, by analogy with circumstances in which South African procurement 
legislation permits procuring authorities to dispense with complying with procurement 
legislation in public contracts. 31 For instance, under the Municipal Supply Chain 
Management Regulations, municipal authorities are not required to apply procurement 
procedures in cases of emergencies, where there is only one provider or in exceptional 
cases where it is impractical or impossible to comply with the legislated procurement 
process. 32 The Green Paper on public procurement clarifies the meaning of emergency 
and provides that an emergency includes the possibility of human injury or death, the 
prevalence of human suffering or deprivation of rights, the possibility of damage to 
property or livestock, the interruption of essential services, national security, and the 
possibility of damage to the environment. Thus, the reasons that may permit the 
derogation from procurement legislation in South Africa include public interest and 
public health reasons. By way of analogy therefore, it is possible that the presence of 
these circumstances in relation to a disqualified supplier may be relied on by the National 
Treasury to reduce the length of the disqualification. 
8.2.1.2 National security 
Another reason that may be relied on to derogate from a disqualification requirement is 
national security. Like `public interest' national security is an ambiguous term that may 
30 S28 (4) (a). 
31 Bolton, 2007, ch. 4. 
32 Reg. 36 (1). 
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not be capable of a precise definition. Buzan argues that the ambiguity surrounding the 
definition of national security is intentional as "[a]n undefined notion of national security 
offers scope for power maximising strategies to political and military elites because of 
the considerable leverage over domestic affairs which can be obtained by invoking it "33 
The definitions of national security range from narrow definitions, which define national 
security in terms of a state being able to maintain its territorial integrity34 or military 
security to broader definitions, which define national security as the ability of a state to 
protect its (fundamental) values and interests. 5 In light of the broad spectrum of 
definitions, Romm argues that the term has rapidly become meaningless as every 
problem faced by a nation is characterised as a threat to its security. 36 However, labelling 
a problem as "national security" implies that it is a more severe threat than other 
"37 problems and may require "more than normal attention and sacrifice by the nation. 
National security is one reason for derogating from procurement law requirements38 and 
the requirement to disqualify in most of the jurisdictions. The jurisdictions adopt 
definitions of national security that include both broad and narrow definitions, which are 
often limited to issues with a military bias. 
In the EU, there are two kinds of national security exemptions which apply to public 
contracts: namely general exemptions from the Treaty, including derogations from the 
free movement provisions on public security grounds39 and specific exemptions from the 
procurement directives, precluding the application of the procurement directives to public 
contracts declared secret, contracts which must be accompanied by special security 
measures and other contracts when the essential interests of the Member State so 
33 Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (1983), 4,9. 
34 Romm, Defining National Security: The Non-military aspects (1993), 4. 
3s Ibid. 5-6. 
36 Ibid., 8. 
37 Ibid. 81. 
38 Campus Oil Ltd n. 18. 
39 Art. 36 TFEU. On the standard of scrutiny applied see Campus Oil n. 18, para. 36.; C-398/98, Commission 
v Greece, [2001 ] E. C. R. 1-7915; Pourbaix, "The future scope of application of Article 346 TFEU' (2011) 
P. P. L. R. 1; Trybus, "Defence Procurement: The new public sector directive and beyond" (2004) 13 
P. P. L. R. 198; Trybus, "On the application of the EC Treaty to Armaments" (2000) 25 E. L. R. 663; 
Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 4; Trybus European Union Law and Defence Integration (2005), ch. 5 and 
Georgopoulos, "Defence Procurement and EU Law" (2005) 30 E. L. R 559. 
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require-40 Thus it seems likely that the derogation from the mandatory disqualification 
requirement could also be invoked on national security grounds. The security exemption 
in the procurement directives was considered in Commission v Belgium41 where the 
exemption was invoked to justify limiting contracts for aerial photography to firms with a 
special security clearance in order to protect military secrets. Here, the CJEU held the 
exemption to apply without examining whether measures less restrictive of the 
procurement directives were available to achieve the stated objective. Thus, at least 
where military contracts are concerned under the procurement directives, it seems that 
whilst the CJEU may still examine whether the contract is one which falls within the 
derogations42 by determining whether it relates to the security interests of a Member 
State, it will apply a low level of scrutiny to the application of the provision and in 
particular, may not consider at all the availability of alternative measures. 43 
The CJEU may apply the same approach when dealing with a derogation from the 
mandatory disqualification based on military security 
- 
for example, when a procuring 
entity claims that it is necessary to give military work to a convicted supplier on the basis 
that only that supplier can maintain confidentiality, or do the work to the desired 
standard. 
It should be noted that the derogation from the mandatory disqualification does not 
permit a procuring authority to derogate from the other requirements of the directives, 
nor, from the Treaty principles of transparency and non-discrimination-44 However, the 
facts giving rise to the derogation from the mandatory disqualification provision 
- 
such 
40 Art. 346 TFEU; Art. 14 PSD. The procurement directives exclude hard defence material from their ambit, 
which are subject to Directive 2009/81/EC 
- 
the Defence Procurement Directive [2009] O. J. L216/76. See 
Heuninckx, "The EU Defence and Security Directive: Trick or Treat" (2011) 1 P. P. L. R. 9. 
41 C-252/01 Commission v Belgium, [2003] E. C. R. 1-11859. See also C-337/05 Commission v Italy [2008] 
E. C. R. 1-2173 and C-157/06 Commission v Italy [2008] E. C. R. 1-7313. 
42 C-414/97 Commission v Spain [1999] E. C. R. I-5585; C-318/94 Commission v Germany [1996] E. C. R. I- 
1949, para. 13. 
43 T-26/01 Fiocchi Munizioni SpA v Commission [2003] E. C. R. I1-3951. See Trybus, "The EC Treaty as an 
Instrument of European Defence Integration: Judicial Scrutiny of Defence and Security Exemptions" 
(2002) 39 C. M. L. R. 1347 
44 Trybus, n. 39,221. 
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as a need to give the work to one supplier in particular 
- 
may sometimes also justify 
excluding the procurement from the directives as a whole and from the Treaty. 45 
A similar approach to national security considerations may apply in the UK, since the 
UK regulations do not go further than the EU directives in relation to derogations. As 
such, it seems likely also that in the UK, national security will be considered as an 
appropriate reason for derogating from the mandatory requirement to disqualify. The UK 
procurement regulations do not apply to contracts classified as secret or contracts that 
must be accompanied by special security measures or to contracts governed by Art. 346 of 
the Treaty. 46 Thus, the mandatory disqualification provisions should also not apply where 
there are national or military security concerns in relation to a contract. 
Although national security is not defined in the procurement regulations, UK courts will 
be required to interpret a national security exemption under the regulations in a manner 
consistent with EU law. 47 At present, there are areas of coincidence between UK 
jurisprudence and EU approaches to national security. Thus in Tinnelly & Sons v UK, 48 
the procuring authority argued that national security concerns included the threat of 
terrorism. It should be noted however, that where a UK procuring authority relies on 
derogations for reasons of national security, it must do so in good faith. Where this is not 
the case, the courts have indicated a willingness to declare that the procuring authority 
acted in bad faith 49 
As discussed earlier, the US relies on the broad phrase `compelling reason' for invoking 
derogations and national security qualifies as a `compelling reason' for derogating from 
disqualification of a supplier. 50 The DFAR indicates that a disqualified supplier may still 
obtain public contracts where national defence requires continued business dealings with 
45 Pourbaix, n. 39. 
46 Reg. 6,33,36 PCR. The UK has not yet implemented the Defence procurement directive. 
47 Brent London Borough Council v Risk Management Partners [2011] UKSC 7. 
48 (1999) 27 E. H. R. R 249. 
49 Tinnelly, n. 48, para. 25. 
50 FAR 23.506 (e). 
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the supplier. 51 The application of a national security derogation was also seen in the case 
of WorldCom discussed above, where a derogation was given in one instance to prevent 
the "great harm to the national security of the United States and potential danger to its 
citizens and war fighters. "52 
In South Africa, although procuring authorities are not permitted to derogate from the 
mandatory requirement to disqualify under the PFMA regulations or from a 
disqualification imposed by the court under the Corruption Act, the National Treasury 
may vary the length of a disqualification. As discussed above, national security is a 
reason for derogating from the requirements for competitive bidding in public contracts 
and it is arguable that in the absence of guidance as to when it may be appropriate for the 
National Treasury to reduce the length of a disqualification, national security may be 
considered an appropriate reason for doing so. 
8.2.1.3 The economic costs and impact of disqualification 
It is possible that the cost implication of not contracting with a disqualified supplier or 
the adverse impact that a supplier's disqualification could have on the delivery of public 
services may necessitate derogating from a disqualification requirement in the public 
interest. The disqualification of a major supplier may also adversely affect competition as 
the remaining suppliers in the market may have little incentive to maintain competitive 
prices, leading to higher prices for the government, especially in consolidated sectors like 
defence. 53 
In the EU and the UK, derogations may be necessary where either the cost of switching 
suppliers or the consequences of a reduction in competition would be unduly prohibitive. 
However, in view of the jurisprudence prohibiting Treaty derogations for purely 
51 DFARS 209.405 (a) (iv). 
52 See "Federal Ban Does not Hurt WorldCom Much", Washington Post, (24.10.03). 
53 Zucker, `The Boeing Suspension: Has Increased Consolidation Tied the United States Department if 
Defense's Hands? '(2004) 13 P. P. L. R. 260; Castelli, "EPA defends action against IBM", Fed. Times 
(15.04.08). 
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economic reasons, 54 the CJEU might consider that higher procedural costs in the 
procurement context do not merit derogation from the mandatory requirement to 
disqualify, unless such costs will "seriously undermine the financial balance"55 of the 
procurement system. As was seen in ch. 7 in the context of the derogations from the 
ineffectiveness provisions, higher costs or economic detriment is not generally 
considered to be an appropriate reason for non-compliance with procurement rules. 
In the US, the phrase `compelling reason' is broad enough to cover derogations for 
economic reasons and the disruption that disqualification may cause. In 2004, Boeing's 
disqualification was shortly overturned due to the price increases that the Department of 
Defence suffered as a result. 56 In the WorldCom case discussed above, the disruption that 
would be caused in switching from a disqualified supplier in large and complex contracts 
was relied on by procuring authorities as a reason for derogating from WorldCom's 
disqualification. More recently, the temporary disqualification of IBM from public 
contracts in 2008 was terminated after eight days, and it was suggested that the brevity of 
the disqualification was due to the severe disruption the government would face if the 
disqualification had remained in effect for longer. 57 
As was discussed above, in South Africa, procuring authorities are absolved from 
applying procurement procedures in cases of emergencies, where there is only one 
provider or in exceptional cases where it is impractical or impossible to comply with the 
legislated procurement process. 58 Similarly, the Green Paper lists the disruption of 
essential services as a reason for derogating from procurement legislation. Under the 
Corruption Act, although procuring authorities may not derogate from a disqualification 
imposed by the courts, as discussed above, it is possible that in the exercise of the 
54 C-104/75, icier van Justine v de Pepper [1976] E. C. R. 613; C-120/95, Decker v Caisse de Maladie 
des Employs Prives [1998] E. C. R. 1-1831 para. 39; C-398/98, Commission v Greece [2001] 3 C. M. L. R. 62. 
55 Decker, n. 54, para. 39. 
56 Zucker, n. 53. 
57 Canni, "Shoot First, Ask Questions Later: An examination and critique of suspension and debarment 
practice under the FAR, including a discussion of the mandatory disclosure rule, the IBM suspension 
and other noteworthy developments" (2009) 38 (3) P. C. L. J 547,594. 
58 Reg. 36 (1), Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations; Bolton, "Grounds for dispensing with 
public tender procedures in government contracting" (2006) P. E. L. J. 7. 
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National Treasury's power to amend or vary a disqualification imposed by the courts, the 
impact of disqualification or the costs to the government may be a reason for varying the 
length of a disqualification imposed by the courts under the Corruption Act. 
8.2.1.4 Factors to be taken into account in deciding if an exceptional situation exists 
None of the jurisdictions provide information on what factors should be taken into 
account in determining if an exceptional situation justifying derogation exists. It would 
be preferable if clearer guidelines were provided as a clearer approach would increase 
transparency in the disqualification process; ensure that derogations granted were not 
discriminatory; maintain consistency in the granting of derogations59 and better equip 
disqualifying officials to decide if an exceptional situation exists. In jurisdictions where 
the disqualification decision lies within the remit of procurement officials, such officials 
may not always be competent to decide if there is an exceptional situation that may 
justify derogation, especially where the exceptional circumstance is a national security 
consideration. A clearer approach to derogations may also help to prevent abuse in the 
use of such derogations. However, as the issue of derogations is litigated in the 
jurisdictions, the courts may provide clarity on the limits of the derogations provisions in 
the jurisdictions. Such litigation may be instituted by suppliers who suffer a loss when a 
derogation is used in another supplier's favour. 
As a guideline, there are a number of questions that a disqualifying official should be 
required to ask where derogation for an exceptional situation is considered to ensure 
consistency and transparency in the use of these derogations. In relation to national 
security reasons, two questions are relevant- first, will there be a real or a potential threat 
to life and liberty if a particular supplier is disqualified or not awarded a contract? 
Second, will entering into a contract with another supplier compromise military security 
or intelligence? If any of these questions can be answered in the affirmative, then there 
may be a case for derogating on national security grounds. 
59 Kramer, 2005,549. 
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Similar questions may be asked in relation to public interest concerns and a disqualifying 
official should consider whether there would be a real or potential threat to life, liberty, 
public health/safety or public values/morals if a particular supplier is disqualified or not 
awarded a contract. A second question is whether entering into a contract with a 
disqualified supplier can be justified on the balance of costs and benefits. In other words, 
do the benefits to the public of entering into a contract with the disqualified supplier 
outweigh the costs to the system of transacting with a corrupt supplier? In this respect, 
the procuring authority will essentially be weighing public interest concerns against the 
losses that may be suffered by entering into business with a corrupt supplier- such as the 
fact that the supplier may not carry out the work to the required standard and the loss of 
public confidence in the procurement system where it is seen that the government 
engages with a corrupt supplier. 
In relation to the economic costs and impact of disqualification, the questions that may be 
asked are whether disqualifying a particular supplier will result in a significant increase 
in costs to the government and also, whether the impact of the disqualification on the 
procuring authority's goals may be justified on the balance of costs and benefits. 
Answering these questions however may not be easy for a procuring authority and 
reinforces the need for the legislation to provide clearer guidance on the issue of 
derogations- either in the form of broader principles or as is the case under the 
`ineffectiveness' provisions in the EU remedies directive, a negative list of situations that 
will not justify derogation. 
8.2.2 Rehabilitation measures 
A supplier may also avoid disqualification through the implementation of rehabilitation 
measures. Rehabilitation measures include preventive and remedial elements and include 
measures implemented by the supplier, which show that the cause for disqualification no 
longer exists, has been eliminated, or that the supplier has implemented internal 
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procedures to ensure that in future, the cause for disqualification cannot arise or corrupt 
activity will no longer be a problem 60 
Rehabilitation measures are often referred to as `corporate compliance' measures and are 
defined as "a formal system of policies and procedures adopted by an organisation with 
the purpose of preventing and detecting violations of law, regulation and organisational 
policy and fostering an ethical business environment. , 61 These measures may include 
implementing codes of ethics, corruption and fraud detection and prevention mechanisms 
(including whistleblower procedures), the creation of ethics compliance departments and 
implementing anti-corruption policies 62 There has been a focus on such measures as a 
way of avoiding and combating corporate corruption and other corporate ills under the 
banner of corporate social responsibility. 63 
In the jurisdictions, rehabilitation measures may be a way for a supplier to limit the 
severity/length of its disqualification or avoid disqualification altogether. The kinds of 
rehabilitation measures that will be considered adequate will depend on the approach of 
the jurisdiction to rehabilitation and the purpose of disqualification- since rehabilitation 
measures may not be appropriate in a jurisdiction where the purpose of disqualification is 
punitive. 64 
The issues that arise with rehabilitation measures in relation to disqualification are 
- 
first, 
to what extent do procuring authorities have an obligation or discretion to take 
60 These measures are not limited to avoiding disqualification, but could be used to avoid criminal 
penalties, defer prosecution or obtain leniency in criminal trials. See the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
(2009) Ch8 pt. B- Remedying Harm from Criminal Conduct and Effective Compliance and Ethics Program. 
For the EU see Arrowsmith, Priess & Priton. 
61 Walker, "International Corporate Compliance Programmes" (2006) 3 (1) I. J. D. G. 70. 
62 UN Global Compact, Business against corruption: case stories and examples (2000). Available at 
http: //www. unilobalcoml2act. ora/docs/issues doc/7.7/BACbookF-INAL. pdf; Tran, "Corporate Ethics: An 
end to the rhetorical interpretations of an endemic corruption" (2008) 4 S. R. J. 63-81; Murphy, "Taking 
Multinational corporate Codes of Conduct to the next level" (2005) 43 C. J. T. L. 389. 
63 See US Federal Guidelines, n. 60; McInerney, "Putting Regulation before Responsibility: Towards 
Binding norms of corporate social responsibility" (2007) 40 C. I. L. J. 171; Almond & Syfert, "Beyond 
Compliance, Corporate Responsibility and Ethical standards in the new global economy" [1997] 
N. C. J. I. L. C. R. 389; Bednar, Styles & McDowell, "Self-Cleaning under non-EU jurisdictions: United 
States", in Punder, Priess & Arrowsmith (eds. ) Self-Cleaning in Public Procurement Law (2009), 157 
Zunder, Priess & Arrowsmith]. 
Arrowsmith, Priess & Friton, 274. 
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rehabilitation measures into account in making the disqualification decision and second, 
what kind of measures will be regarded as sufficient and third, how does a jurisdiction 
prevent rehabilitation measures from being abused? 
8.2.2.1. Does a disqualifying entity have a discretion or obligation to take 
rehabilitation measures into account? 
It is not always clear whether a disqualifying entity is required or has the discretion to 
take rehabilitation measures into account and the US and the World Bank are the only 
jurisdictions, which explicitly grant disqualifying entities the discretion to consider 
rehabilitation measures. In the EU, some Member States already took account of 
rehabilitation measures and have continued to do so after the passage of the current 
procurement directives. 65 
The EU procurement directives are silent on whether rehabilitation measures 
implemented by a supplier may mean it avoids disqualification. In relation to the 
discretionary disqualifications, the discretionary nature of the measures and the fact that 
procuring authorities are not given clear guidelines on what factors may be taken into 
account for these disqualifications suggests that a procuring authority retains discretion in 
not disqualifying the supplier, if the supplier is able to show that the causes for 
disqualification no longer exists, or that the supplier is no longer a risk to the procuring 
authority or public funds 66 Relying on rehabilitation measures to defeat the discretionary 
disqualifications may also support some of the rationales behind the disqualifications 
discussed in ch. 2, such as ensuring the (present) reliability of suppliers67 and protecting 
the government by ensuring it only transacts with responsible suppliers. 
In relation to the mandatory disqualifications, the position is less clear. Although the 
directives are silent on this issue, rehabilitation measures are taken into account in 
65 Punder, Priess & Arrowsmith, 33-118. 
66 This approach is supported by the CJEU in La Cascina 
67 AG Maduro in La Cascina, para. 24. 
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various contexts in some Member States, 68 and in procurement by EU institutions. Thus, 
the EU Financial Regulations and its Implementing Regulations, which call for 
mandatory exclusions for a range of offences similar to those in the EU procurement 
directives provide for rehabilitation measures to be taken into account when excluding 
suppliers from EU contracts. 69 Specifically, the Implementing Regulations provide that 
for the purpose of determining the length of exclusion under the Financial Regulations, 
an EU institution may take into account factors, including "measures taken by the entity 
concerned to remedy the situation. "70 Thus, in the context of procurement by EU 
institutions, rehabilitation measures may shorten the length of an exclusion, although the 
Financial Regulations do not contemplate that these measures will defeat exclusion 
altogether. 
In relation to the EU procurement directives, it has been suggested that procuring 
authorities may retain the discretion to rely on rehabilitation measures to defeat the 
mandatory disqualification requirement. " Although the directives are silent on the issue, 
four factors suggest that EU procuring authorities may have an implied power to take 
rehabilitation measures into account. First, the draft proposals of the EU procurement 
directives provided for rehabilitation measures as a means of defeating the mandatory 
disqualification requirement. 72 This provision was however deleted from the final text 
and substituted with the provision permitting derogation from the mandatory 
disqualification "for overriding requirements in the general interest. " In the absence of 
any evidence as to why the rehabilitation provision was deleted, it is arguable that the 
68 Punder, Priess & Arrowsmith; Davidsson, "Legal Enforcement of Corporate Social Responsibility in the 
EC" (2002) 8 C. J. E. L. 529; Kocher, Codes of conduct and framework agreements on social minimum 
standards- Private regulation? in Dilling, Herberg & Winter (eds. ) Responsible Business: Self-Governance 
and Law in Transnational Economic Transactions; Delga, "Codes of Ethics, corporate ethics and business 
law in continental Europe" (2005) I. C. C. L. R. 463; Hurst, "Corporate ethics, governance and social 
responsibility: comparing European business practices to those in the United States" (Spring 2004). 
Available at http: //www. scu. edu/ethics/publications/submitted/hurst/comparitive study. pdf 
69 Art. 93 Financial regulations; Art. 133a Implementing Regulations. 
70 Art. 133a Implementing Regulations. 
" Arrowsmith, Priess & Friton, 265. 
72 Art. 46 (1), Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the co-ordination 
of procedures for the award of public supply contracts, public service contracts and public work contracts 
DG C II, Brussels, 31 May 2001 SN2325/1/01 REV 1 (MAP). 
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deleted provision has been subsumed within and given expression through the derogation 
provision. 
Second, it has been argued that the EU principle of proportionality imposes an obligation 
(independent of the derogation provisions) on procuring authorities to take rehabilitation 
measures into account in deciding to disqualify a supplier. 73 Third, the provisions 
requiring Member States to specify the "implementing conditions" for the 
disqualifications, may grant Member States the discretion to decide in accordance with 
national law whether rehabilitation measures may be used to defeat the requirement for 
the mandatory disqualifications. As stated, some Member States have always taken 
rehabilitation measures into account in disqualifying suppliers- an approach that has not 
been queried by the Commission. 74 
Lastly, the non-punitive purpose behind the mandatory disqualifications in the EU may 
require Member States to take rehabilitation measures into account. 75 As discussed in 
ch. 2, the mandatory disqualifications exist for both policy and protective reasons. It is 
thus arguable that where sufficient rehabilitation measures have been implemented, this 
may eliminate the necessity to protect both the government and the EU from corruption 
and also fulfil the EU policy against corruption as a reliance on rehabilitation measures 
by procuring authorities provides firms with an incentive to eradicate corruption. 76 
In the UK, the procurement regulations did not go further than the EU directives on this 
issue and are also silent as to whether a procuring authority may decline to disqualify a 
supplier where the supplier has implemented sufficient rehabilitation measures. As the 
discretion to decide on the applicability of rehabilitation measure appears to have been 
left to Member States, UK procuring authorities may exercise this discretion as permitted 
by the EU. As was discussed in the context of the EU, the principle of proportionality 
may also require UK procuring authorities to take rehabilitation measures into account in 
73 Arrowsmith, Priess & Friton, 276. 
74 Punder, Priess & Arrowsmith, 33-118. 
's Anowsmith, Priess & Friton, 270. 
76 Arrowsmith, Priess & Friton, 263. 
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the disqualification context. 77 As discussed below, rehabilitation measures are already 
relied on in other contexts and they may possibly be taken into account in the 
disqualification context as well. 
In relation to the discretionary disqualifications, where a supplier has implemented 
rehabilitation measures, the procuring authority may decide not to disqualify the supplier, 
since a procuring authority has the discretion to determine what factors it will take into 
account in deciding to disqualify. Where a procuring authority decides that rehabilitation 
measures can defeat a discretionary disqualification, this may also accord with the 
rationales behind the discretionary disqualifications in the UK discussed in ch. 2. 
An example of how rehabilitation measures may be relevant in the context of 
discretionary disqualifications may be discussed in relation to BAE Systems78 In the 
aftermath of the company's investigation by the Serious Fraud Office, in February 2010 
BAE pleaded guilty to false accounting offences (in lieu of bribery and corruption 
charges). Since BAE was not convicted of corruption in any jurisdiction'79 the issue of its 
mandatory disqualification for corruption in the UK does not arise, but it is possible that a 
UK procuring authority may feel that BAE's conduct amounts to `grave professional 
misconduct' and it would have to decide whether to disqualify BAE, taking into account 
the rehabilitation measures subsequently implemented by BAE. 8° 
In relation to the mandatory disqualifications, as was discussed in the context of the EU, 
it may be possible for a UK procuring authority to rely on the derogation provisions in 
the UK procurement regulations8' to defeat the mandatory requirement for 
" Ibid. 
78 Williams, 2008. 
79 The plea bargain BAE entered into with the US Department of Justice and the UK Serious Fraud Office 
means that all other charges against the company have now been dropped. See "BAE pays fines of £285m 
over arms deal corruption claims", The Guardian, 5/2/2010. 
B0 Woolf Committee, Business Ethics, global companies and the defence industry: Ethical business conduct 
in BAE Systems plc- The Way Forward, May 2008. Available at 
http: //217.69.43.26/woolf/Woolf report 2008. pdf ; BAE Systems Press Release, BAE Systems announces 
implementation programme for Woolf Committee recommendations, 22 July 2008. Available at 
http: //ir baesystems. com/investors/storage/2008-07-22. p ff 
81 Reg. 23 (2) PCR. 
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disqualification based on the wording of the derogation provision and the EU principle of 
proportionality. 
Apart from the above, there are two other factors that make it likely that UK procuring 
authorities may consider rehabilitation measures in the disqualification context. First is 
the use of Independent Private Sector Inspector's General (IPSIG's) in the context of 
construction contracts in Northern Ireland (NI). 2 The concept of the IPSIG was 
transplanted from the US procurement context where IPSIG's are used to ensure that a 
supplier that has ` integrity issues' may still gain access to public contracts, where the 
supplier undertakes to implement rehabilitation measures as supervised by the IPSIG. In 
NI, IPSIG's were initially used in pilot projects to determine whether they will be useful 
in reducing extortion in construction procurement in NI. 83 The successful completion of 
the pilots led the NI Central Procurement Directorate to hire several IPSIG's (renamed 
Construction Contract Monitors) 84 to be used in NI construction procurement. 85 These 
Monitors are deployed on contracts where there is a likelihood of risk to the public, to 
ensure that suppliers are meeting their requirements under the contract and detect whether 
extortion occurs in the contract. 
The limited context in which Construction Contract Monitors are used makes it difficult 
to assess the future role they may play in UK procurement and it is difficult to judge 
whether they will ever be used in the same manner they are used in the US, where a 
supplier's prior disqualification may be waived by a procuring authority where the 
supplier recruits an IPSIG to monitor its processes and ensure that corrupt activity does 
not take place, or whether Contract Monitors will always be divorced from the 
disqualification process. 
82 Goldstock, Organised Crime in Northern Ireland: A report for the Secretary of State (January 2004). 
Available at http: //www. nio. gov. uk/government response to ¢oldstock report. pdf; Lupkin & 
Lewandowski, "Independent Private Sector Inspectors General: Privately Funded Overseers of Public 
Integrity" (2005) 10 (1) N. Y. L. 6,14. 
83 Northern Ireland Organised Crime Task Force, Threat Assessment 2004- Serious and Organised Crime 
in Northern Ireland. Available at www. octf. ggv. uk 
84 House of Commons Hansard Debates 30 November 2006, Col. 174 WH. Available at 
httn"//www. publications. parliament. uk/na/cm200607/cmhansrd/em061130/halltextJ6l l 30h0006. htm 
83 Central Procurement Directorate, Public procurement in Northern Ireland, Annual Report to the Board 
2006-2007, para. 5.1; Lyons, "Mob busters target NI building racketeers" Independent IE (26.08.06). 
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Secondly, in 2009, the SFO issued guidance on its approach to dealing with firms 
engaged in overseas corruption. 86 This guidance encourages firms to self-report cases of 
corruption to the SFO in exchange for more lenient civil (and not criminal) sanctions 
where the SFO feels that a self-reporting company will impose adequate rehabilitation 
measures at the conclusion of the investigative process. This illustrates that rehabilitation 
measures by corporate entities are becoming mainstreamed in the UK criminal justice 
system. 87 
The US approach to rehabilitation measures differs from the approaches of the EU and 
the UK. The FAR provides that the existence of a cause for disqualification should not 
necessarily lead to disqualification and provides a list of remedial or mitigating factors 
that should be taken into account. 88 Accordingly, if a cause for disqualification exists, it 
is up to the supplier to demonstrate that disqualification is not necessary due to the 
presence of rehabilitation measures. 89 Apart from the rehabilitation provisions of the 
FAR, since 2008, US federal suppliers have been required to establish corporate 
compliance programs, self-report any wrongful conduct and exclude wrongdoers or 
potential wrongdoers from their organisation. 90 Compliance with such measures will also 
be taken into account where a supplier is facing disqualification. Thus, disqualifying 
entities in the US have the discretion to decide that disqualification is not necessary 
where the supplier has taken measures to eliminate or prevent future corrupt activity. 91 
Rehabilitation measures may also be relied on to reduce the length or extent of 
disqualification where the reason for the disqualification has been eliminated. 92 
86 SFO, Approach of the SFO to dealing with overseas corruption (21.7.09). Available at www. sfo. stov. uk $' Note also that under the UK Bribery Act 2010, it is a defence to an offence of corruption if a firm can 
show that it had adequate procedures to prevent bribery in place. See s 7(2). 
88 FAR 9.406-1; Roemer v Hoffman 419 F. Supp 130, (D. D. C 1976), 132. 
89 FAR 9.406-1 (a); FAR 9.407-1 (b). 
90 Contractor Business Ethics Compliance Program and Disclosure Requirements, 73 Federal Register 
67067 (Nov. 12 2008). 
91 Bednar, Styles & McDowell, n63. 
92 FAR 9.406-4 (c). 
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The approach to rehabilitation measures in the US adequately reflects the protective 
rationale for disqualification in the US as discussed in ch. 2. Thus, where the circumstance 
from which the government needs protection is no longer present, there will be no need to 
disqualify the supplier. 
The World Bank adopts a similar approach to rehabilitation measures as the US and 
rehabilitation measures may defeat a proposed disqualification. Rehabilitation measures 
affect disqualification in two ways in the Bank context. Firstly, the under the Bank 
Sanctions Procedures, the Sanctions Board may consider mitigating factors in 
determining the appropriate sanction for a supplier, 93 and the range of possible 
disqualification sanctions takes into account rehabilitation measures by the supplier. 
Thus, a supplier may avoid disqualification and instead be sanctioned with a "conditional 
non-debarment" in which the supplier will not be disqualified but will be required by the 
Bank to implement a compliance program to the satisfaction of the Bank. This program 
will be monitored by a compliance monitor, similar to those used in US and NI 
procurement. If the supplier fails to implement the program, this will result in the 
supplier's disqualification. 94 Alternatively, a supplier may be sanctioned with a 
"temporary debarment with conditional release" under which the supplier will be 
disqualified for a period of time and but would become eligible for Bank contracts once it 
has satisfied certain conditions set by the Bank, which could include rehabilitation 
measures. 95 Secondly, under the Bank's Voluntary Disclosure Program (VDP) instituted 
in 2006, a supplier could avoid or limit the length of its disqualification if it implemented 
specified rehabilitation measures. 96 The VDP aims to fight corruption through prevention 
and deterrence97 and improve the Bank's investigative capabilities through private-sector 
cooperation. Under the VDP, suppliers engaged in corruption in Bank-financed contracts 
are given incentives to disclose the corrupt practices in those projects. 98 In exchange, the 
93 Art. IX, S9.02 (e) WBSP. 
94 Art. IX, S9.01 (b), WBSP. 
9,5 Art. IX, S9.02 (d) WBSP.. 
96 Williams, 2007c; Williams 2007a, 299. 
97 Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Launches Voluntary Disclosure Program (Aug. 1,2006); 
Dubois & Matechak, "World Bank Battles Corruption Through New Voluntary Disclosure Program", 
(2006) 3 I. G. C. 73. 
98 World Bank, VDP Guidelines for Participants, 12 (2006). 
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Bank will not disqualify the supplier and will keep the supplier's participation in the VDP 
confidential. However, if the supplier breaches the conditions of the VDP by continuing 
to engage in misconduct, withholding information relating to past misconduct, or failing 
to implement a compliance program or cooperate with a compliance monitor, the Bank 
will impose a mandatory ten-year disqualification on that supplier. 99 
The Banks approach to rehabilitation measures is also informed in part by the rationales 
underpinning the Banks disqualification system. As was discussed in ch. 2, the Bank's 
disqualification system is intended to support the Bank's policy against corruption and 
protect Bank funds from being lost to corruption. Thus, rehabilitation measures ought to 
be taken into account where the measures are sufficient to eliminate the need to 
disqualify a supplier. 
The South African approach to rehabilitation measures differs from the other 
jurisdictions. As discussed in the context of exceptional situations, the South African 
disqualification system does not permit procuring authorities to derogate from the 
mandatory disqualifications under the PFMA or from the disqualifications imposed by a 
court under the Corruption Act. However, as stated earlier, the Corruption Act gives the 
National Treasury the discretion to vary the length of a disqualification. Whilst the Act is 
silent on when this may be appropriate, it is possible that the rehabilitation of the supplier 
may be relied upon by the Treasury to reduce the length of the supplier's disqualification. 
However, whether the National Treasury will adopt this approach remains to be seen. 
It has been suggested that where the purpose of disqualification is punitive, it may not be 
necessary to take rehabilitation measures into account10° and the punitive nature of the 
South African disqualifications may inform the South African approach. 
99 Art. IX, S9.02 (c) (iii) WBSP. 
10° Arrowsmith, Priess & Friton. 
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8.2.2.2 The kinds of measures sufficient to avoid disqualification 
The range of measures that may suffice as rehabilitation measures may depend on the 
legal and corporate culture in each jurisdiction. However, an examination of the 
approaches of the jurisdictions gives an indication as to the kinds of measures that are 
considered adequate for rehabilitation. 
In the EU, the lack of clarity on rehabilitation measures makes it difficult to determine 
what kinds of measures may be considered sufficient in the disqualification context. 
However, some guidance may be obtained from procurement by EU institutions. Thus the 
Implementing Regulations1°' provide that in determining the period of exclusion, the 
Community should take into account "measures taken by the entity concerned to remedy 
the situation. " Although there is no further description of such measures, this may include 
measures taken to undo the damage caused by the corrupt activity, such as restitution, 
cooperation with law enforcement and possibly the termination of the employment of 
culpable persons. 
Arrowsmith et al, in examining the use of rehabilitation measures in the EU have created 
a four-fold classification of rehabilitation measures: clarifications of facts through 
cooperating in audits and investigations; repairing the damage through payment of 
damages and other restitution; personnel measures- such as terminating the employment 
of the relevant staff and structural and organisational measures which will prevent a 
recurrence of the corrupt activity in the future, such as corporate compliance measures. 102 
This classification takes into account the remedial and preventive aspects of rehabilitation 
measures and may usefully be adopted by a Member State seeking to determine what 
should suffice as acceptable rehabilitation measures. 
Since the UK in adopting the EU directives did not go further than the EU in relation to 
the issue of derogations and possible rehabilitation measures, it is possible that the 
101 Art. 133a. 
102 Arrowsmith, Priess & Friton, 259-261. 
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classification suggested by Arrowsmith et al may be adopted by the UK. The SFO 
Guidance mentioned above may also give an indication as to what may be appropriate in 
the UK context. 
The US approach to rehabilitation measures differs from that of the EU and UK and the 
FAR clearly specifies the kinds of rehabilitation measures that a disqualifying entity may 
take into account. These measures are listed as: effective standards of conduct and 
internal control systems; timely and full cooperation with the authorities during the 
investigation into corrupt activity and any court action; independent investigation by the 
supplier and submission of the investigative report to the procuring authority; payment of 
all criminal, civil, and administrative liability for the improper activity, including costs 
incurred by the government; the taking of appropriate disciplinary action against the 
individuals responsible for the corrupt activity; the implementation of remedial measures, 
including any identified by the government; the institution of new or revised review and 
control procedures and ethics training programs; and a recognition and understanding of 
the seriousness of the misconduct and the implementation of programs to prevent 
recurrence. 1 03 
Further, US procuring authorities may utilise suppliers that have committed acts that 
could lead to their disqualification by requiring such "flawed but competent" suppliers to 
conform to integrity standards by hiring IPSIGs. 104 In the US, the role of the IPSIG is to 
promote corporate integrity, prevent corruption and fraud in public procurement, ensure 
that a supplier complies with relevant laws and also to uncover, detect and report 
unethical conduct within the supplier and supervise the reform of corporations. 1°5 The 
IPSIG reports both to the supplier and the procuring authority and where a supplier hires 
an IPSIG, its prior disqualification may be waived by a procuring authority. 106 
'03 FAR 9.406-1. 
1°4 Jacobs & Goldstock, "Monitors & IPSIGS: Emergence of a new criminal justice role" (2007) 43 (2) 
C. L. B. 217,223; Lupkin & Lewandowski, n. 82; Anechiarico and Goldstock, "Monitoring Integrity and 
Performance: An assessment of the Independent Private Sector Inspector General" (2007) 9 (2) P. I. 117- 
132. 
105 Anechiarico & Goldstock, ibid; Jacobs & Goldstock, ibid. 
106 Lupkin & Lewandowski, n. 82,6. 
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Where a supplier relies on the presence of rehabilitation factors to avoid disqualification, 
it bears the burden of proving that its disqualification is not necessary 107 and the courts 
may annul a disqualification where a procuring authority has not taken mitigating or 
rehabilitation factors into account. 108 
The World Bank adopts a similar approach to the US and provides a list of the kinds of 
measures that would be sufficient for the supplier to avoid or limit its disqualification. 
The Bank suggests that a supplier's disqualification would be withheld and the supplier 
sanctioned instead with a conditional non-debarment during which the supplier must 
comply with remedial, preventative or other conditions such as actions taken to improve 
business governance, the implementation of corporate compliance or ethics programs, 
restitution, disciplinary action or reassignment of employees. 109 If the supplier meets the 
expectations of the Bank, it may avoid disqualification altogether. Alternatively, a 
supplier could be temporarily disqualified from Bank contracts until it meets the Bank's 
requirements in relation to specified internal measures. ' 10 
Further, under the Bank's VDP, firms that are not under active investigation by the Bank 
may also avoid a subsequent disqualification by the Bank where they voluntarily admit to 
and disclose past corruption and adopt a "robust best practice corporate governance 
compliance program" acceptable to the Bank. "' The Bank is not prescriptive as to the 
contents of the compliance program and the supplier determines what the elements of the 
program will be. ' 12 The program must however be acceptable to the Bank. 
As has been mentioned previously, the South African legislation is silent on the issue of 
rehabilitation measures and as it has been suggested, rehabilitation measures in South 
Africa may be relevant in relation to the power of the National Treasury to vary the 
length of a disqualification imposed by the court under the Corruption Act. In South 
107 FAR 9.406-1. 
108 Roemer v Hoffman 419 F. Supp 130, (D. D. C 1976); Silverman v Defense Logistics Agency, 817 F. Supp 
846 (D. S. D. Cal 1993). 
109 Art. IX, S9.01 (b) WBSP. 
110 Art. IX, S9.01 (d) WBSP. 
'.. World Bank, Voluntary Disclosure Program: Guidelines for Participants, para. 3. 
112 ibid. pars 5.6. 
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Africa, there is no information on the content of rehabilitation measures and the use of 
corporate compliance measures in other contexts is of little probative value in the 
rehabilitation context, since corporate compliance in the South African procurement 
context is directed towards ensuring that firms promote the participation of historically 
disadvantaged individuals in business and also that suppliers applying for public 
contracts on the basis that they are `empowerment' companies, meet those 
requirements. 113 
From the above approaches of the jurisdictions, one may extrapolate a general view of 
the kinds of rehabilitation measures that ought to be sufficient to limit the length of a 
disqualification or prevent it altogether. These measures will either be preventive or 
remedial. Preventive rehabilitation measures will generally include corporate compliance, 
organisational measures or internal controls that are aimed at preventing the occurrence 
of corrupt activity. Such measures may include the adoption of written codes of business 
ethics or conduct; ethics training or awareness programs as well as the employment of 
compliance monitors. Remedial measures may include investigation-related measures 
such as cooperation with government agencies in investigations as well as making the 
results of independent investigations available to relevant government agencies; 
restitutionary measures such as the payment of damages to the government, including 
costs incurred in investigations; disciplinary measures against individuals responsible for 
the corrupt activity, including the termination of employment and voluntary self- 
reporting measures. 
8.3 Preventing abuse in the use of derogations 
One issue that arises where derogations are permitted is how to prevent abuse in the use 
of derogations. Abuse is likely where there are unclear or non-existent guidelines as to 
the factors that may be taken into account in deciding to derogate from a disqualification 
requirement or there is a lack of transparency and accountability in the use of 
113 Bolton, 2007,293-296. 
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derogations. Abuse may take the form of using derogations in a manner that may be 
discriminatory to favour certain suppliers or granting derogations for reasons that may 
not be justifiable. Where derogations are abused this is inequitable to suppliers who have 
not committed any offences and may give an unfair advantage to suppliers who have 
neglected their statutory or ethical obligations and are more competitive as a result- such 
as where the offence relates to the non-payment of taxes or social security 
contributions. 1 14 
In relation to the discriminatory granting of derogations, empirical evidence from the US 
suggests that large businesses appear to benefit more from derogations than small 
businesses. ' 15 Evidence for this may be obtained from the high-profile disqualifications in 
2004 of WorldCom and Boeing, which were both granted derogations by some federal 
procuring authorities! 16 However, derogations in favour of large firms may be 
attributable to the fact that it may be impractical to use disqualification against large 
firms, especially in consolidated sectors or where there are few firms operating in the 
sector. 117 This is because disqualification may have adverse effects on competition, 118 
and where a major supplier exits the market as a result of its disqualification, ' 19 the 
suppliers that remain are not under pressure to keep their bids low as they are aware that 
they may not face much or any competition. 120 An example can be seen from Boeing's 
disqualification, which was shortly overturned due to the price increases that the US 
Department of Defence suffered as a result. 121 
114 Arrowsmith, Priess & Friton, 273; Advocate General Maduro in Michaniki and La Cascina. 
15 Brian, "Contractor debarment and suspension: A broken system" (2004) 5 P. P. L. R. 235,236; Karpoff, 
Lee & Vendrzyk, "Defense Procurement Fraud, penalties and contractor influence" (1999) 107 (4) J. P. E. 
809; Canni; Schooner, "Suspensions are just a side show" (May 1 2002). Available at 
httn: //www. izovexec. com/features/0502/0502viewl. httn 
116 Brian, ibid; Schooner, ibid. 
117 Zucker, n. 53,260. 
118 Berrios, "Government Contracts and Contractor Behaviour" (2006) 63 J. B. E. 119,122. 
119 Schutz, "Too little too late: an analysis of the General Service Administration's Proposed Debarment of 
WorldCom" (2004) 65 A. L. R. 1263,1273. 
120 Cosentino, "New York City's Procurement System: Reversing the cycle of corruption and reactionary 
reform" (1998) N. Y. L. S. L. R 1183,1186; Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1995,165-168. 
121 Zucker, n. 53. 
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Kramer also suggests that large firms appear to benefit more from derogations than small 
firms as larger firms have the resources to fix the problems for which they were 
disqualified, such as implementing corporate compliance measures or recruiting IPSIG's. 
As a result, larger disqualified firms may eventually pose less of a business risk to the 
government than smaller firms. She also suggests that more compelling reasons may be 
available to derogate from disqualification against a larger firm that may have a large 
market share in a specialised sector, whilst smaller firms will usually supply goods or 
services that may easily be procured elsewhere. 122 Evidence for this view may also be 
seen in the 2008 disqualification of IBM, which lasted for just eight days due to IBM's 
large share of government contracts 
- 
it was the 16th largest federal supplier in 2008 and 
used its resources and leverage based on the government's need for IBM products to 
negotiate its way out of the disqualification. '23 
In relation to the granting of unjustifiable derogations, again the US provides practical 
evidence for this. It was seen that in relation to the disqualifications against WorldCom in 
2004, several procuring authorities granted derogations for reasons that may not have 
been justifiable if those derogations had been subject to critical scrutiny. In the US, one 
reason why it is possible for unjustified derogations to be granted is because procuring 
authority heads wield absolute discretion in granting derogations124 
- 
there are no 
guidelines or reviewable standards for the decision, which remains that of the procuring 
authority head and is rarely overturned by the GSA. 125 
Although the derogation provisions in the EU and the UK have not been tested by the 
courts, the discretion available to procuring authorities and the lack of guidance in the 
legislation may also lead to the abuse of derogations in these jurisdictions. 
There are several factors that may limit the potential for abuses in derogations. Firstly, in 
all jurisdictions, the enabling instrument ought to provide more guidance as to when the 
122 Kramer, 548-9, Bednar, Styles & McDowell, 170. 
123 Canni, 593-594. 
124 FAR 23.506 (e). 
125 Collins, n. 25,222. 
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use of derogations is appropriate. Such guidance need not be prescriptive; to retain the 
flexibility that may be required in unexpected situations, but should be clear enough to 
ensure that procuring authorities know what is not an appropriate exceptional reason or 
rehabilitation measure. If such an approach is regarded as being too restrictive, given the 
range of circumstances that may warrant derogation, then an analogous approach to 
derogations in the amendments to the EU remedies directive discussed in ch. 7 may be 
considered. The remedies directive provides that EU procuring authorities must declare a 
contract `ineffective' in given situations, 126 and also provides that procuring authorities 
may derogate from this requirement to declare contracts ineffective. Instead of giving a 
list of when derogation is appropriate, the remedies directive adopts a negative approach 
by enumerating the instances when derogation would not be appropriate. 127 Similarly, 
disqualifying entities in the jurisdictions may be given guidance as when derogation is 
not appropriate in order to guide their coming to a decision to derogate from a 
disqualification requirement. Secondly, as is the case in the US, the power to grant 
derogations may be reserved to the head of a procuring authority, or where one exists, a 
central authority that has supervisory functions over procuring authorities. Although 
reserving the power to grant derogations to senior personnel may not have been too 
successful in the US, it is preferable to giving this power to the procurement officials who 
may be desirous of procuring with a particular supplier. 
Thirdly, another approach could be that where derogations are granted, the decision may 
need to be confirmed by an independent entity. For instance, in the UK, the OGC 
guidance suggests that the "[a]ccounting Officer or Minister, as appropriate, should be 
satisfied that the circumstances are such that they will justify the exception. " 128 Although 
this may lead to delays in the procurement process whilst the procuring authority awaits 
confirmation, procuring authorities may be more careful in granting derogations as they 
know their decision will be subject to scrutiny. This will also increase transparency and 
126 Art. 2 (d) remedies directive. 
127 Art. 2 (d) (3) remedies directive. 
128 Para. 8. 
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accountability in the derogation process and may facilitate the collation and 
dissemination of data on derogations. 129 
Whichever approach is adopted in a jurisdiction, the emphasis should be on ensuring that 
procuring authorities have the flexibility to derogate but that derogations are applied in a 
manner that is transparent and non-discriminatory. 
8.4 Analysis 
As was seen from the above, the jurisdictions approach the issue of derogations by 
providing broad statements permitting derogation from a mandatory requirement to 
disqualify as in the case in the EU/UK or permitting derogation from a general 
disqualification imposed by another entity as is the case in the US and in South Africa 
under the Corruption Act. 
The problem with this broad approach however, is that procuring entities are left to 
define both the content of a justifiable derogation and the circumstances in which 
derogation is appropriate. This may be an undue burden on procuring authorities who 
may not have the competence or resources to determine what amounts to a sufficient 
reason for derogation, especially where rehabilitation measures are concerned. As was 
discussed in ch. 4.4.2.2, a procuring authority required to decide whether a supplier's 
rehabilitation is sufficient to warrant a derogation in favour of the supplier may not 
understand the nuances of company law and ownership presented by the suppliers 
rehabilitation. It was seen in the context of derogations in the US that procuring entities 
may apply derogations that may not stand up to critical scrutiny and this will ultimately 
weaken the disqualification regime. 
As was suggested, what may be required is for the legislation to provide clearer 
guidelines- either in terms of clearer general principles, or perhaps an indication of the 
129 GAO, Additional data reporting could improve suspension and debarment process (GAO 05-479, July 
2005). 
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kinds of appropriate measures or the circumstances in which derogation is not justifiable. 
The provision of clearer guidelines will strengthen and improve the effectiveness of the 
disqualification system and limit the potential for abuses in the use of derogations. 
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CHAPTER 9 
REMEDIES FOR AFFECTED SUPPLIERS 
9.1 Introduction 
The procurement system of most jurisdictions provides suppliers with some form of 
remedies where the procurement legislation is not complied with or there are other 
breaches of the procurement process. ' The availability of remedies for procurement 
violations may be necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the procurement 
system by securing compliance with, deterring and correcting violations of the 
procurement rules. 2 The nature and availability of remedies for procurement 
violations may depend on the nature of the forum reviewing the procurement decision 
and the kind of breach that has occurred. There are various approaches that may be 
adopted in implementing a procurement remedial system which have been detailed 
elsewhere, which include a review of procurement decisions by the procuring 
authority or review by an external authority, which could be judicial or 
administrative. 3 The jurisdictions generally adopt a multiple forum approach in 
providing for a system of review of procurement decisions, the appropriate forum 
being determined by the nature of the breach complained of, the kind of relief sought 
and the supplier's standing to obtain this relief. 4 
Whilst providing suppliers with remedies for procurement violations may enhance the 
efficiency and transparency of the procurement system, a remedial system may also 
be accompanied by certain drawbacks, such as costs and delays to the procurement 
1 Arrowsmith, Remedies for Enforcing the Public Procurement Rules (1993); Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 2 1; 
Tyrell & Bedford, Public procurement in Europe: Enforcement & Remedies (1997); Arrowsmith, 
Linarelli & Wallace, 2000, ch. 12; Zhang, "Supplier Review as a mechanism for securing compliance 
with government public procurement rules: a critical perspective" (2007) 5 P. P. L. R 325; Gordon, 
"Constructing a bid protest process; the choices that every procurement challenge system must make" (2006) 35 (3) P. C. L. J. 427; GAO, Bid Protests at GAO: A descriptive Guide (2009); Shaengold & 
Brains, "Choice of Forum for Government Contract Claims: Court of Federal Claims vs. Board of 
Contract Appeals" (2008) 17 F. C. B. J. 279; Shaengold et al, "Choice of Forum for Federal Government 
Contract Bid Protests" (2009) 18 F. C. B. J. 243. 
2 Arrowsmith, Linarelli, Wallace, ch. 12; Zhang, n. 1,326-328; Guide to Enactment, UNCITRAL Model 
Law 1995, p. 99 3 Arrowsmith, Linarelli & Wallace, ch. 12 
Zhang, "Forum for review by Suppliers in public procurement: An analysis and assessment of the 
models in international instruments" (2009) 5 P. P. L. R. 201. 
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process; the difficulties of proving that a violation has occurred and determining 
appropriate damages as well as the possibility of "over-compliance" by procuring 
authorities, to avoid procurement disputes, which may make procurement more 
bureaucratic. 5 
As is the case in other areas of procurement decision-making, 6 remedies may be 
available to a supplier in respect of actions taken during the disqualification process. 
In relation to disqualification decisions, an aggrieved supplier will generally be 
seeking redress where it claims that it ought not to have been disqualified, either 
because the disqualifying entity did not take relevant factors into account and as such 
the decision to disqualify is not justified or the disqualification decision was taken in 
breach of due process. A supplier may also challenge specific aspects of the 
disqualification decision such as the length of the disqualification as being 
disproportionate or excessive or may claim that another supplier who ought to have 
been disqualified was not disqualified in breach of mandatory rules on 
disqualification. 
This chapter will examine the availability of remedies to a supplier who challenges a 
disqualification made in respect of that supplier or another person. The chapter will 
consider whether a supplier has a right to challenge a disqualification decision, the 
forum in which this challenge may be brought and the basis on which a supplier may 
challenge a disqualification decision (i. e. whether the supplier possesses the required 
standing to bring a challenge) and the kind of remedies available to a supplier in a 
successful challenge procedure. 
9.2 The availability of a right of review 
A supplier aggrieved by actions taken within the procurement process may be entitled 
to a review of the disputed actions. Rights of review are an aspect of developed 
procurement systems and a supplier challenging a disqualification decision ought to 
have the same rights, subject to the issue of standing, as suppliers challenging other 
aspects of procurement decision-making. In granting a right of review, a jurisdiction 
s Zhang, n. 1 6 Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 21. 
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ought to specify the forum in which this right may be expressed and the basis on 
which a supplier may approach the forum. 
9.2.1 The EU 
In the EU, the discretionary and the mandatory disqualification provisions do not 
indicate what rights of review are available where a supplier contests the decision to 
disqualify him or the decision in respect of another supplier. However, all contracts 
covered by the procurement directives are subject to the EU public sector remedies 
directive? or the utilities remedies directives which specifies the redress that should be 
available in domestic courts to affected persons where the procurement directives are 
infringed. The public sector remedies directives impose an obligation on Member 
States to provide aggrieved suppliers with effective and rapid rights of review where 
there have been breaches of procurement legislation. 9 The utilities remedies directive 
also imposes a similar obligation on Member States. 1° The EU requires domestic 
courts to enforce these remedies in accordance with Treaty principles requiring that 
remedies available to persons affected by violations of EU law should be effective 
and comparable to those available for similar violations of domestic law. " 
The EU remedies directive gives standing to challenge procurement decisions to a 
supplier where he has or had an interest in obtaining a particular contract and has been 
or risks being harmed by a legal infringement. 12 Thus, a supplier challenging his 
disqualification in respect of past or present offences, or a supplier who did not obtain 
a public contract, which was given to a supplier who ought to have been disqualified, 
ought to have access to review procedures, since he is a person who has or is likely to 
7 Directive 89/665/EEC on the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the 
application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts [1989] O. J. 
L395/33 as amended by Directive 2007/66/EC amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 
92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of 
public contracts [2007] O. J. L335/31 [remedies directive]. 
Directive 92/13/EEC coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the 
application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, 
energy, transport and telecommunications ectors [1992] O. J. L76/14 [utilities remedies directive] 9 Art. 1 remedies directive. 
10 Art. 1 (1) utilities remedies directive. This chapter will not deal with remedies in relation to the 
special complexities of utilities. 
' Craig & de Burca, 2007, ch. 9; Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 21 
12 Art. 1 (3) remedies directive; C-145/08 Club Hotel Loutraki AE v Ethniko Simvoulio Radiotileorasis 
(unrep. 06.05.10). 
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suffer harm where there are irregularities in the disqualification decision. It is up to 
Member States to determine within the requirements of EU law, the forum that will 
carry out review in the first instance which could be the procuring authority or an 
independent entity. 13 The CJEU has also interpreted the remedies directive as 
imposing an obligation on Member States to provide judicial review of review 
decisions taken by non judicial bodies. 14 
9.2.2 The UK 
As a Member State, the UK is bound to provide an effective remedial system against 
breaches of EU procurement law. This has been done by including provisions on 
remedies in the procurement regulations. " Under these provisions, a procuring 
authority owes a duty to suppliers to comply with the procurement regulations, and a 
breach of this duty is actionable in the High Court. 16 A supplier may institute 
proceedings in the High Court where he suffers or risks suffering loss or damage as a 
result of a breach of the procurement regulations. '7 Therefore, in challenging a 
wrongful disqualification, a supplier who asserts that he was wrongly disqualified18 
either in respect of past offences or offences committed within the specific award 
procedure or who asserts that a supplier who ought to have been disqualified was 
allowed to participate in the procurement19 ought to be able to apply to the High Court 
for redress, since he is likely to suffer loss or damage from the decision taken by the 
procuring authority. 20 
The UK regulations provide for the court as the forum for review in the first instance. 
However, there is scope in the regulations for an aggrieved supplier to obtain 
information from the procuring authority on both disqualification and procurement 
decisions. Thus, although the remedies provisions no longer impose an obligation on 
suppliers to give a procuring authority a chance to remedy a breach complained of 21 a 
13 Art. 2 remedies directive. 
14 C-570/08 Simvoulio Apochetefseos LeJkosias (unrep. 21.10.10). 
" Reg. 47 PCR. 
16 Reg. 47A & 47C PCR. 
" Reg. 47C; Letting International Ltd v Newham LBC [2008] EWHC 1583 (QB), paras. 136-148. 
18 Rv London Borough of Enfield ex parte Unwin [1989] C. O. D. 466. 
19 Rv National Lottery Commission ex p. Camelot Group [2000] All E. R. (D) 1205. 
20 Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 21.6 et seq. 
21 Reg. 47 (7) (a) old PCR. 
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procuring authority is required to notify a disqualified supplier of its disqualification 
and a supplier may possibly challenge the disqualification decision with the procuring 
authority at this time, 22 ensuring that a procuring authority serves as the first line of 
review of disqualification decisions. In addition, a procuring authority is required to 
give bidders notice of its award decision and the reasons why they were 
unsuccessful. 23 Where suppliers are notified of their disqualification at this stage, it 
may give the aggrieved supplier the opportunity to challenge the disqualification with 
the procuring authority before a contract is concluded. 24 Where a supplier challenges 
its disqualification before the courts, the regulations provide a time limit for 
instituting proceedings in the High Court. 25 This time limit however infringes EU 
law26 and recent jurisprudence has stated that the proper time limit is that an action 
should be brought within three months from the time the applicant had actual or 
constructive knowledge of the facts underlying an infringement and knowledge that 
those facts give rise to an infringement. 27 The provisions in the UK regulations are 
due to be revised to give effect to EU law. 28 
As stated, the UK regulations give an aggrieved supplier a right to institute 
proceedings against a procuring authority, where there has been a breach of the 
procurement regulations. Whilst this approach may be appropriate in cases where the 
rules are clear and the breach can be clearly identified, it may be difficult for a 
disqualified supplier to claim that there has been a breach of the rules regarding the 
disqualification process, since as discussed in ch. 4, the procedural rules and standards 
for disqualification are not identified in the UK procurement regulations. This lack of 
clarity may mean that an aggrieved supplier may be unwilling to claim that an 
infringement has occurred. 
22 Reg. 29A PCR; T-465/04 Evropaiki Dynamiki v Commission [2008] O. J. C272/16. 
23 Reg. 32 PCR; C-455/08 Commission v Ireland (unrep. 23.12.09). 
24 Reg. 32A PCR; Commission v Ireland ibid.; D. R Plumbing & Heating Services Ltd v Aberdeen City 
Council (unrep. ). 
25 Reg. 47D (2) PCR. 
26 C-006/08 Uniplex (UK) Ltd v NHS Business Services Authority (2010) 2 C. M. L. R. 47. 
27 Sita UK v Greater Manchester Waste Disposal Authority [2011] EWCA Civ. 156. 28 OGC, Procurement policy note- Time limits for challenges under the Public Procurement 
Regulations (22.02.10). 
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An aggrieved supplier may also seek remedies in an action for judicial review of the 
procuring authority's decision. 29 Judicial review is available to a supplier for public 
law breaches- such as a failure of due process unconnected with specific provisions of 
the Regulations. 30 As discussed in ch. 4, public bodies are under a duty to exercise 
their functions in accordance with common law principles of natural justice and 
procedural fairness, 31 and their decisions must not be unreasonable, 32 arbitrary or 
reached without sufficient evidence. 3 In the disqualification context, an action for 
judicial review34 may be available in circumstances where the disqualification 
decision is in breach of these public law principles. 35 
9.23 The United States 
As discussed in ch. 4, procedural differences exist between the longer and shorter 
disqualifications in the US and there are also slight differences in the area of access to 
remedial rights. As will be discussed, both kinds of disqualifications may be 
challenged before the procuring authority and the courts. Procuring authorities are 
required by Executive Order to establish inexpensive and informal protest procedures 
at a level above that of the procuring (disqualifying) offiCial36 and a supplier is 
permitted, although not required to submit protests to the procuring authority37 in the 
first instance. 38 The cheapest and quickest forum for an aggrieved supplier to apply to 
is the procuring authority, although it has been argued that such protests are often 
29 R (on the application of Cookson & Clegg) v. Ministry of Defence [2005] EWCA Civ. 811. 
30 Bailey, "Judicial Review and the public procurement regulations" (2005) 6 P. P. L. R. 291,307; 
Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 2 1.1 et seq. 31 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A. C. 374; R. v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department Ex p. Pierson [ 1998] A. C. 539 at 591 F per Lord Steyn; Lewis, ch. 1. 32 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corp. [1948] K. B. 223. 
33 Gavaghan v Secretary of State for the Environment (1989) 60 P. & C. R. 515. 
34 Bailey, "Judicial Review and Contracting Decisions" (2007) 3 P. L. 444-463; Bailey, n. 30; Cookson 
& Clegg n. 29; Lewis, 2009, chs. 2 & 4. 35 Including where there has been fraud, corruption, or bad faith in decision-making- R (on the 
application of Menai Collect Ltd & North West Commercial Services Ltd) v Dept. of Constitutional 
Affairs (2006] EWHC Admin. 724; Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand 
[1994] 1 W. L. R. 521, Rv Lord Chancellors Department exp. Hibbit & Saunders [1993] C. O. D. 326, R 
v Legal Aid Board ex p. Donn & Co [1994] 3 All E. R. 1; Bailey, n. 34,446. 
36 Exec. Order No. 12979,60 Fed. Reg. 55171 (1995). 
37 FAR 33.102- 33.103. 
38 Troff, "The United States Agency-Level Bid Protest Mechanism: A model for bid challenge 
procedures in developing nations" (2005) A. F. L. R. 113. 
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tainted with the perception that the procuring authority may not be impartial in 
reviewing its decision to disqualify the supplier. 39 
In relation to the longer disqualifications, as discussed in ch. 4, a supplier is given the 
opportunity to make representations and challenge a proposed disqualification before 
the procuring authority. 40 However, in relation to the shorter disqualifications, a 
supplier is granted more limited remedial rights and is only given the opportunity to 
oppose the disqualification with the procuring authority after the decision to 
disqualify has been made. 41 Once he has been given this opportunity, a supplier is not 
permitted to bring a challenge against the shorter disqualification in any other forum 
apart from the courts. The limits on the remedial rights in relation to the shorter 
disqualifications may be due to the need to balance the tension between the 
government's right to quickly temporarily disqualify persons with which it does not 
wish to deal, 42 with the supplier's rights to be able to challenge its disqualification. 43 
This balance is found in permitting a procuring authority to impose the shorter 
disqualification without extensive procedural or challenge rights, with the supplier 
being able to challenge a shorter disqualification before the procuring authority within 
30 days of the disqualification being imposed. 44 
For a supplier to have standing to bring an action at the level of the procuring 
authority, his challenge must meet two criteria: the challenge must be regarded as 
valid45 and a challenge may only be submitted by a person who is an actual or a 
prospective bidder. 46 It should be noted that unlike the UK approach, a supplier in the 
US may not challenge a procuring authority's decision not to disqualify another 
39Wittig, "A Framework for Balancing Business and Accountability within a Public Procurement 
System: Approaches and practices of the United Practices" (2001) 3 P. P. L. R. 139,152; Zhang, n. 4, 
210; Shaengold et al, n. 1,274. 
40 FAR 9.406-3. 
41 FAR 9.407-3 (b). 
42 Castelli, "EPA defends action against IBM" Fed. Times (15.04.08). 
43 Canni, 550 
- 
551; Shinwha Electronics Comp. Gen. B-291064, (Sept. 3 2002). 
44 FAR 9.407- 3 (c); Canni, 550. 
as FAR 33.101; 31 U. S. C. § 3551-3556. 
46 31 U. S. C § 3551. 
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supplier, 47 but may only challenge the determination that a supplier is responsible, 
which is required prior to contract award. 8 
Although the Government Accountability Office (GAO) is vested with statutory 
authority to adjudicate bid protests by the Competition in Contracting Act 1984,49 
both the shorter and the longer disqualification disputes are excluded from the GAO's 
jurisdiction50 and the GAO has held that a disqualified supplier has no standing to 
appear before the GAO and is not an "interested party" for the purposes of 
maintaining a challenge. 51 However, as discussed in ch. 4, disqualification in the US is 
government-wide, and all federal agencies are required to apply a disqualification 
decision taken by any other federal agency, by examining the EPLS and excluding 
any listed supplier. In relation to a challenge to the application by one agency of a 
disqualification imposed by another agency, a supplier may not be able to bring such 
a challenge before the GAO, as stated above, but an exception occurs in cases where 
the supplier is alleging that the other federal agency is mistaken in excluding it, 
perhaps because its disqualification has expired. 52 In such cases, the procedures for 
submitting a dispute to the GAO are stated in the GAO Bid Protest Regulations53 and 
the FAR. 54 
At the court level, an aggrieved supplier may seek judicial review of a shorter or 
longer disqualification decision in the Court of Federal Claims (COFC), 55 which has 
exclusive jurisdiction over federal procurement claims. The courts have upheld the 
right of a disqualified supplier to have the disqualification procedure conform to the 
47 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821,831-832 (1985) 
48 Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F. 3d 1324,1334-39 (Fed. Cir. 
2001); FAR 9.103 (b). 
49 Pub. L No. 98-369; Patoir, "An overview for agency counsel" (2002) A. L. 29. 
50 4 C. F. R 21.5 (i). 
s' Waste Conversion Inc. B-23476 1, (April 11,1989). 89-1 CPD ¶ 371; K&K Engineered Prods. Inc. 
Comp. Gen. B-239838.2, (July 9,1990), 90-2 CPD ¶ 22; Triton Electronic Enterprises Inc. B-294249, (July 9 2004). 
52 RI Crowley Inc. Comp-Gen B-253783, (Oct 22,1993), where the GAO sustained a protest of a disqualified supplier, when a contracting official improperly relied on an outdated eligibility list in 
excluding the supplier from a procurement. 53 4 CFR part 21. 54 FAR 33.104. 
55 28 U. S. C § 1491 (2006); Schwatz, "Public contracts specialisation as a rationale for the court of federal claims" (2003) 71 G. W. L. R. 863 cf Schooner, "The Future: Scrutinizing the Empirical Case for 
the Court of Federal Claims" (2003) 71 G. W. L. R. 714. 
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tenets of due process, 56 and be accompanied by "exacting procedural safeguards, " 
thus giving judicial recognition to bidder's rights in relation to disqualification. 57 A 
supplier may base its action on the lack of due process in the disqualification decision 
or on the grounds of review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 194658 and the 
court will overturn a disqualification where it is "arbitrary or capricious, "59 an abuse 
of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law. 60 However, it is usual for a 
claimant to first exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial redress. 61 
Standing in the COFC is extended to an "interested party" defined as an actual or 
prospective bidder whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award or 
failure to award the contract. 62 A bidder would thus have access to the courts where it 
can be shown that it was "denied a reasonable opportunity to compete. "63 In 
adjudicating on disqualification issues, the COFC makes its decision on the evidence 
found in the record and gives a lot of deference to agency disqualification decisions64 
and will not will not substitute its decision with that of the agency or overturn a 
decision unless the decision cannot be "substantiated by the record. 110 
9.2.4 The World Bank 
As discussed earlier, the World Bank utilises two kinds of measures against corrupt 
suppliers- the one-off disqualification and the longer disqualifications. The Bank's 
approach to the review of disqualification decisions differs considerably from that of 
domestic jurisdictions and the availability of rights of review are very limited. 
56 Gonzalez v Freeman, 334 F. 2d 570,574 (D. C. Cir 1964), Related Indus. Inc v United States, 2 Cl. 
Ct. 517,526 (1983). 
s' Kovacic, "Procurement Reform and the Choice of Forum in Bid Protest Disputes" (1995) 9 
A. L. J. A. U 461,472; Scamvell Labs Inc. v Shaffer, 424 F. 2d 859 (D. C. Cir. 1970), Transco Security Inc 
o (Ohio v Freeman, 639 F. 2d 318 (6th Cir. 1981). 
ss Pub. L 79-404, s 10 (e); 5 USC §500. 
s' Lion Raisins Inc v United States 51 Fed. Cl. 238 (2001). 60 Banknote Corp. of Am. Inc. v United States 365 F. 3d 1345,1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Axiom Resource 
Management 
v United States 564 F. 3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 61 Facchiano v United States Dept of Labor, 859 F. 2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1988). 62 31 USC § 3551 (2000); 28 USC § 1491 (b) (1) 2006; Claybrook, "Standing, Prejudice and 
Frejudging bid protest cases" (2004) 33 P. C. L. J. 535. 3 Peckinpaugh, Government Contracts for Services: The Handbook for Acquisition Professionals 
L1997), 238. 
Impresa Construzioni n. 48,1334 
-1335. 6s OSG Product Transfers LLC v United States 82 Fed. Cl. 570 (2008); Axiom Resource Management 
n. 60. 
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In relation to the rejection measures, a bidder who has his bid rejected by the 
Borrower at the instance of the Bank is entitled to an explanation from the Borrower 
in writing or at a debriefing meeting. 66 The outcome of this meeting should be 
submitted to the Bank and bidders may write to the Bank directly if the bidder has a 
complaint against the Borrower. 67 Where a bidder is not satisfied with the explanation 
offered by the Borrower, the bidder may request a meeting from the Bank's Regional 
Procurement Adviser (RPA) of the borrowing country. 68 The meeting between the 
bidder and the RPA is not a hearing and a bidder is not entitled to submit 
representations on the Bank's decision to reject its bid. The purpose of this meeting is 
for the supplier to obtain further information on why it was disqualified from the 
particular procurement process and the meeting is limited to a discussion of the 
complainant's bid and not those of competitors, 69 and there is no provision for the 
taking of remedial action by the Bank. 
The absence of remedial rights in this context stems from the fact that suppliers do not 
have any rights of recourse against the Bank, as there is no legal relationship created 
between suppliers or potential suppliers and the Bank for the purpose of instituting a 
challenge procedure. 7° The relationship between a supplier and a Borrower is 
governed by the bidding documents and any contracts which arise exist between the 
supplier and the Borrower, 7' and suppliers do not have rights or claims arising from 
the existence of the loan between the Borrower and the Bank. 72 
However, where a Borrower improperly rejects the bid of a supplier without the 
authority of the Bank, it may be possible for the supplier to seek remedies against the 
Borrower under its domestic law. 73 This would however depend on the extent to 
66 Para. 2.65 BPG. 
67 Appendix 3, para. l5 BPG. 
68 Ibid. 
69 ibid. 
70 Arrowsmith, Linarelli & Wallace, 110. 
" Para. l 
.1 BPG. 72 Ibid. See de Castro Meireles, A critical analysis of remedies and secondary policies under the World 
Bank procurement system (PhD. Thesis, University of Nottingham: 2006), 95-97. 
73 Malmendier, "The Liability of International Development Banks in Procurement Proceedings: The 
Example of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-American Development Bank" (2010) 4 P. P. L. R. 135, 
137. 
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which the actions of the Borrower are subject to judicial scrutiny in the procurement 
context. Further, in relation to obtaining remedies against the Bank, although as has 
been discussed, there is no possibility for a supplier to directly obtain a remedy from 
the Bank, it is possible that where a supplier appraises the Bank of the improper 
actions of the Borrower, such actions may constitute a breach of the Loan Agreement 
between the Borrower and the Bank under which the Bank may compel the Borrower 
to fulfil its obligations under the Agreement, which usually incorporate the Bank's 
procurement guidelines. 
It has also been argued that the Bank is under an obligation to provide effective 
remedies to a supplier where a Borrower has failed to properly conduct the 
procurement process as this failure stems from the Bank's failure to properly 
supervise the Borrower. 74 According to Malmendier, the Bank has a responsibility 
borne out of its authority over the Borrower to "efficiently use the monitoring and 
review instruments" available to it75 and that even though there is no direct 
contractual relationship between the Bank and suppliers, an extra-contractual 
relationship exists, which obliges the Bank to ensure that a "bidder will not be 
discriminated against in breach of the procedural principles issued by the bank. "76 
In relation to the Bank's disqualification measures, whilst a supplier may challenge a 
proposed disqualification at the Sanctions Board, there is no indication whether a 
supplier may obtain relief either against the Bank or a Borrower where a Borrower 
mistakenly or improperly excludes from a Bank-funded contract, a supplier that was 
not previously disqualified by the Bank. 
In Sanctions Board proceedings, once the Board has affirmed a disqualification 
proposed by the Evaluations Officer, 77 the supplier may not challenge its 
disqualification in a domestic court or in any other forum. Further, the Bank does not 
provide remedies for suppliers with complaints against the manner in which the 
disqualification process was conducted. Thus where the Bank did not comply with its 
own disqualification procedures, a disqualified supplier will have no recourse against 
74 Maldmendier, n. 73,139. 
751bid. 
761bid., 145. 
77 Art. VI1I WBSP. 
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the Bank as the procedures do not confer any rights or privileges on a supplier. 78 In 
addition, where a supplier feels he was unfairly treated or the length of a 
disqualification is too harsh or that a supplier who engaged in fraud or corruption was 
not disqualified, such a person has no legal or administrative remedies against the 
Bank or its staff. 
There are several reasons for this. First, the Bank and its staff have immunity from 
domestic jurisdiction for anything done in connection with their employment. 79 This 
also applies to actions taken in the disqualification context. This immunity frees the 
World Bank from the peculiarities of national politics by immunizing the Bank from 
legal process. 80 Secondly, the procurement guidelines and anything arising out of it, 
once incorporated by reference into the Loan Agreement, become international law 
and cannot be overridden by domestic law. 81 Thus a supplier may not allege that the 
Bank's actions are not in conformity with due process as determined by national law, 
as the Bank is "insulated from accountability within domestic legal systems. "82 
Thirdly, as mentioned, bidding for a Bank contract does not create any legal 
relationship between the Bank and potential suppliers for the purpose of instituting a 
review procedure. The Bank's refusal to create a remedial system for suppliers has, 
however, been criticised, 83 and as argued by Malmendier, suppliers ought to be able to 
rely on an extra-contractual relationship created between the Bank and bidders on a 
Bank contract. 
Where a Borrower improperly disqualifies a supplier, there is no indication whether a 
supplier may obtain remedies against the Bank or the Borrower. Although the Bank 
does not conduct the procurement process, and despite the absence of a formal 
relationship with the supplier, the Bank influences the outcome of the procurement 
process and should thus "take responsibility for the fate of procurements" since it is in 
78 Art. XIII, S3.03 WBSP. 
79 Sands & Klein, Bowett: The law of International Institutions (2001); Jenks, International Immunities 
(1961); Art. Vll, IBRD Articles of Agreement. Cf. Wellens, Remedies against International 
Organisations (2002), 118. 
so Mendaro v World Bank 717 F. 2d 610 (D. C Cir. 1983), 615. 
81 Head, "Evolution of the Governing Law for Loan Agreements of the World Bank and other 
Multilateral Development Banks" (1996) 90 A. J. I. L. 214,229. 
82 Arrowsmith, Linarelli & Wallace, 149. 
s' Meireles, n. 72, ch. V; Williams, 2007a; Malmendier n. 73. 
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fact substantially involved in decision making. TM Thus, where a Borrower has wrongly 
excluded a supplier from a Bank-funded procurement, mistakenly or out of malice, 
the supplier ought to be able to request an investigation into the circumstances from 
the Bank and the Bank should not tolerate or acquiesce in breaches of its procurement 
principles or procedures by Borrowers. 85 
Providing suppliers with an opportunity to challenge improper decisions by the 
Borrower in the disqualification context may improve the effectiveness of the 
disqualification policy. It has been argued that a review system could significantly 
increase the ability of the Bank to uncover corruption and impropriety in 
procurements, 86 as these challenges will serve as an avenue for such acts to be 
revealed, 87 and serve as a "deterrent to improper conduct. "88 
As discussed in the context of the Bank's one-off disqualification measures, whether a 
supplier may obtain remedies against the Borrower under domestic law for improper 
disqualification will of course depend on the law of the jurisdiction in question, but it 
has been suggested that in some developing countries, judicial enforcement in relation 
to public procurement leaves a lot to be desired89 and in some cases, remedies in 
respect of Bank contracts may be wholly unavailable under the domestic law of the 
borrowing country. 90 
9.2.5 South Africa 
South African law grants aggrieved suppliers rights to review of procurement 
decisions before the procuring authority and the courts. 91 Similar to the US, there is a 
statutory obligation for procuring authorities and an independent entity to review 
procurement decisions. In relation to procuring authorities, the Municipal Supply 
Chain Management Regulations, applicable to local authorities provides that the 
84 Malmendier, n. 73,150. 
85 Malmendier n. 73,136. 
86 Arrowsmith, Linarelli & Wallace, 129. 
97 Gordon, n. 1. 
as Ibid. 
89 Malmendier, n. 73,136. 
90 Arrowsmith, Linarelli & Wallace, 143. 
9' Bolton, 2007, chs. I 1-13. 
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authority must appoint "an independent and impartial" person to assist in the 
resolution of disputes arising from a procurement procedure or contract award 
decision. 92 In addition, the PFMA regulations provide that the National Treasury and 
each provincial treasury must establish a mechanism to consider complaints regarding 
alleged non-compliance with the prescribed minimum norms and standards and make 
recommendations for remedial action if non-compliance is established. 93 Thus, if a 
supplier makes a complaint about the procedural standards used to disqualify him, he 
is entitled to have his complaint investigated by either the procuring authority or the 
relevant Treasury and provided with adequate remedies if his complaint is justified. 
On the judicial plane, because as discussed in ch. 4, all aspects of the procurement 
process amount to administrative action within the meaning of S1 PAJA, the decision 
to disqualify a supplier must accord with PAJA, and afford the supplier remedies in 
judicial review proceedings where procedural standards have not been met. Under 
PAJA, the courts are not required to review administrative action until internal 
administrative remedies have been exhausted. 94 Access to judicial review is also 
available in terms of a general power under the common law and judicial review 
would be available where there has been an abuse of discretion, where power has 
been exercised unlawfully, without authority or where there has been an error of 
law 95 However, as PAJA has incorporated many of the common law reasons for 
judicial review, it is expected that most actions for judicial review will be brought 
under the PAJA. 
Standing in South African courts is granted to a person who has a "sufficient, direct 
and personal" interest in the matter in the sense that the person's rights must have 
been infringed or his financial interests prejudiced 96 Thus a supplier who is claiming 
that he ought not to have been disqualified or that another person ought to have been 
disqualified should meet the requirements for standing. 
Apart from judicial and agency-level review, an aggrieved supplier may be able to 
seek redress from the Office of the Public Protector (OPP) established under the 
92 Reg. 50 (1). 
93 Reg. 16A9.3 PFMA. 
94 S7 PAJA. 
95 van de Merwe & du Plessis, Introduction to the Law of South Africa (2004), ch3. 
% Ibid. 
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Constitution, 97 which is empowered to investigate improper conduct in the public 
administration or conduct that will result in impropriety or prejudice and take 
appropriate remedial action. 98 Thus, in the disqualification context, an aggrieved 
supplier may approach the OPP where there was impropriety in the disqualification 
process. 
To summarise, a supplier disqualified by a procuring authority under the PPPFA or 
PFMA regulations may approach the agency, the relevant Treasury, the courts or the 
OPP for a review of the disqualification decision. However, where a supplier has been 
disqualified by the courts as part of a criminal sentence for corruption under the 
Corruption Act, the supplier has limited avenues for redress. With the exception 
discussed below, the judicial disqualification under the Corruption Act cannot be 
subject to review by a procuring authority, since disqualification is a part of a criminal 
sentence for corruption. The disqualification cannot also be subject to judicial review 
since redress under PAJA does not apply to judicial decisions-99 The only option 
available to a supplier is to seek for the disqualification to be overturned in an appeal 
against the conviction, which includes the disqualification order. '°° 
Although a supplier disqualified by the courts may not ordinarily challenge its 
disqualification before a procuring entity, where a supplier claims that the procuring 
entity is mistaken as to the identity of a listed supplier, it may ask the procuring 
authority to review the decision to exclude it or apply for judicial review of the 
procuring authority's decision. Also, in relation to disqualification imposed by the 
court, if the complaint relates to other aspects of the disqualification that are 
considered to be `administrative action', a supplier may be entitled to seek judicial 
review of that aspect of the decision. For instance, as discussed in ch. 4, it is the 
National Treasury that determines the period of disqualification and maintains the 
Register for Tender Defaulters containing information on disqualified suppliers. It is 
thus possible for a disqualified supplier to seek judicial review of the decision 
determining the period of the disqualification where there are irregularities in this 
97S 182 South African Constitution. 
%S 182 (1) South African Constitution. 
99 S1 (ee) PAJA. 
100 S28 (3) (b) Corruption Act. 
335 
determination or where incorrect information on the supplier is entered into the 
Register. 
9.3 The kinds of remedies available 
The kinds of remedies available to a disqualified supplier who mounts a successful 
challenge in the disqualification context will depend on the nature of the forum in 
which the challenge is brought. Thus, whilst review at the level of the procuring 
authority or an independent administrative entity may lead to interim remedies; a 
reversal of the disqualification decision; or a cancellation of the procurement 
procedure in which the disqualification decision was taken, a procuring authority or 
independent entity may not have the power to award damages. However, where the 
review is heard in a court or other judicial forum, the court would generally have the 
power to award damages in addition to other remedies, as long as the supplier is able 
to prove his loss. 
In the EU, as discussed, Treaty principles require that remedies provided by national 
courts in relation to breaches of EU law should be effective and comparable to the 
remedies available for similar violations of domestic law. 101 Aside from this 
obligation and because of the importance of national remedies in ensuring the 
effective enforcement of EU procurement rules, 102 the public sector remedies 
directive specifies the types of redress that should be available in national courts for a 
breach of award procedures covered by the procurement directives. The directive 
provides for several types of remedies: interim relief, 103 the setting aside of unlawful 
decisions- a remedy which must be effectively available against any reviewable 
decision in the award procedure, 104 ineffectiveness, '05 damages'06 and penalties that 
101 Craig and de Burca, 2007, ch. 9; Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 21. 102 Pachnou, "Enforcement of the EC procurement rules: The standards required of national review 
systems under EC law in the context of the principle of effectiveness" (2000) 2 P. P. L. R. 55; 
Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 21; Tyrell and Bedford, n. 1; Brown, "Effectiveness of Remedies at National 
Level in the Field of Public Procurement" (1998) 8 P. P. L. R. 9; Williams, "A new remedies directive 
for the European Community" (2008) 2 P. P. L. R. NA19-25; Arrowsmith, "Public Procurement: Example 
of a Developed Field of National Remedies Established by Community Law", in Micklitz and Reich (eds. ) 
Public Interest Litigation before European Courts (1996), 125-156. 
10' Art. 2 (I xa) remedies directive. 
104 Art 
.2 (1)(b) remedies directive; C-8 1/98 Alcatel Austria v Bundeministerium fur Wissenschaft und Verkehr [1999) E. C. R. I-7671, para. 43. 
105 Art. 2d and e remedies directive. 
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may be imposed on the procuring authority such as fines or the shortening of the 
duration of the contract. 107 The utilities remedies directive is similar, although with 
some additional and alternative provisions. 
Where a successful challenge is brought for a wrongful disqualification, the remedies 
will comprise of those specified in the remedies directive. An effective remedy (from 
the supplier's point of view) will be to suspend or set aside the decision taken, '°8 
which clearly may cause disruption to the procurement process. Where it is claimed 
that a supplier who ought to have been disqualified was not disqualified, the 
complainant may, if successful, be entitled to interim relief or a set-aside of the 
decision to include that supplier in the process, which again may cause disruption. 
Where a supplier requests interim measures in the disqualification context, it is likely 
that the CJEU will apply the same approach that is used in determining whether 
interim measures are warranted in other contexts. Here the standard is quite high and 
interim measures will be granted on the balance of interests and must be necessary to 
prevent "serious and irreparable" damage to the applicant. IN 
Generally, where a dispute arises during the procurement process, prior to the contract 
award, most jurisdictions have procedures to stay the procurement process. In the EU, 
the remedies directive provides that where a supplier seeks review of a procurement 
decision before a procuring authority, the application for review shall result in the 
immediate suspension of the procurement process. "o This suspension may give the 
procuring authority enough time to review the decision complained of, and also grant 
the supplier sufficient time to request interim relief in court. Further, where an 
authority independent of the procuring authority reviews a procurement decision in 
the first instance, this must also have a suspensory effect on the procurement process 
until a decision has been made. '" Beyond these provisions, review measures are not 
106 Art. 2 (I Xc) remedies directive. Proof of fault is not required: C-3 14/09 Stadt Graz v Strabag AG [2011] 1 C. M. L. R. 26; Leffler, "Damages Liability for breach of EC procurement law: governing 
principles and practical solutions" (2003) 4 P. P. L. R. 151. 07 Art. 2 (e) remedies directive. 
108 Alcatel n. 104. 
109 C-87/94R Commission v Belgium [1994] E. C. R. 1-1395; T-511/08R Unity OSG FZE v Council of 
the European Union [2009] E. C. R. II-0010, para. 22. 
1° Art. 1 (5) remedies directive. 
111 Art. 2 (3) remedies directive. 
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required to have a suspensory effect on a procurement procedure. 112 The rules 
requiring the suspension of a procurement process in the EU are a departure from the 
old remedies directive and cases heard under those provisions which provided that 
review procedures need not have a suspensory effect on the procurement to which 
they relate. 113 
Finally, damages are also available in principle, although this may be difficult to 
claim in practice because of the problems of proving loss. "4 It should be noted that 
the EU does not give any indication as to the conditions or extent of damages, "5 but it 
seems to be settled that damages must compensate for the loss suffered! 16 However, 
in the disqualification context, proving loss would be difficult where a supplier has 
been disqualified before it has had a chance to submit a tender, as it would be 
extremely difficult to determine whether its tender would have stood any chance. This 
may make damages unlikely in this context, and suppliers may focus instead on 
obtaining interim relief whilst they attempt to have a disqualification decision set- 
aside. 
As discussed in ch. 7, the amendments to the remedies directive introduced some 
changes to the EU remedial scheme. ' 17 One important change is the introduction of a 
10-day mandatory standstill period prior to the conclusion of contracts to grant 
aggrieved bidders a chance to lodge complaints. "8 This provision gave legislative 
force to the CJEU decision in Alcaltel. 119 Also, procuring authorities are now under a 
duty to declare a contract `ineffective' where there are certain breaches of the 
directives. 120 As discussed earlier, the list of circumstances under which a contract 
"Z Art. 2 (4) remedies directive. 
113 Art. 2 (3) old remedies directive; C-568/08 Combinatie Spiker v Provincie Drenthe (unrep. 9.12.10). 
14 Art. 2(1) (c) remedies directive; Leffler, n. 106; Treumer, "Damages for the breach of the EC public 
procurement rules- changes in European regulation and practice" (2006) 4 P. P. L. R. 159. 
's Pachnou, The effectiveness of bidder remedies for enforcing the EC public procurement rules: A 
case study of the public works sector in the United Kingdom and Greece (Phd thesis, University of 
Nottingham: 2003), ch. 3. 16 Joined cases C-46-48/93 Brasserie du Pecheur SA v. Germany and R. v. Secretary of State for 
Transport, ex p. Factortame Ltd (No. 3) [1996] E. C. R. I-1029. 
"' Williams, n. 102. 
"s Art. 2a remedies directive. 
19 Alcatel, n. 104. 
120 Arts. 2d and 2e remedies directive. Golding & Henty, "The new remedies directive of the EC: 
standstill and effectiveness" (2008) P. P. L. R. 146. 
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may be declared ineffective appear to be exhaustive and a breach of a duty in relation 
to disqualification may not render a concluded contract ineffective. 
The problem of providing effective protection for participants and an effective system 
for enforcing EU rules, whilst avoiding undue disruption to the procurement process 
is a difficult one: suffice it to say that Member States will no doubt apply in the 
disqualification context, the same system of remedies they have implemented for 
other procurement violations, the disqualifications merely adding another possible 
violation that may form the basis of legal proceedings. 
In addition to the rights of suppliers and tender participants to challenge a 
procurement procedure under the remedies directives, the Commission may initiate 
proceedings against a procuring authority under Article 258 TFEU for non- 
compliance with EU law. 121 
The UK procurement regulations provide for several kinds of relief, as required by the 
EU remedies directive. 122 These are interim relief, 123 setting aside of the contract, 124 
awarding damages, 125 a declaration of ineffectiveness, 126 which is the prospective 
termination of the contract and the mandatory standstill period. 127 However, once a 
contract has been concluded, and the grounds for a declaration of ineffectiveness do 
not apply, the only remedy available to an aggrieved supplier is an award of 
damages. ' 28 
A supplier who challenges a wrongful disqualification129 or who asserts that a supplier 
who ought to have been disqualified was allowed to participate in the contract ought 
121 Martin, "The European Commission's Centralised Enforcement of Public Procurement Rules: 
A Critical View" (1993) 2 P. P. L. R. 40; Martin, The EC Public Procurement Rules: a Critical 
Analysis (1996); Delsaux, "The Role of the Commission in Enforcing EC Public Procurement Rules" 
(2004) 13 P. P. L. R. 130; Pachnou, "Bidders Use of remedies to enforce European Community 
procurement law" (2005) 2 P. P. L. R. 256. 
22 Art. 2 remedies directive. 123 Reg. 47H PCR. 
'u Reg 47! PCR. 
125 Reg. 471 & 47J PCR; Harmon CFEM Facades (UK) Ltd v. Corporate officer of the House of 
Commons [2000] 2 L. G. L. R. 372 (QBD). 
X26 Reg. 47J, K&M PCR. 
127 Reg. 32 & 32 A PCR. 
128 Reg. 47 J (2) (d) PCR; Ealing Community Transport v London Borough of Ealing [ 1999] C. O. D. 492 
129 Rv London Borough of Enfield ex parte Unwin [19891 C. O. D. 466. 
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to be able to apply to the High Court for interim relief or a setting aside of either the 
decision to disqualify him from participating in the contract, or a setting aside of the 
decision to include a supplier in the procurement process. 130 As mentioned, damages 
may also be available in each case, as long as the supplier can show that the procuring 
authority's breach was the cause of his loss, 131 although as discussed above, this may 
be unlikely where the supplier has been excluded from the tendering process. 132 
In implementing the amendments to the EU remedies directive, the UK also provided 
for the suspension of the decision to enter into a contract, where proceedings are 
instituted and the contract has not been entered into. 133 This suspension continues in 
effect until the court determines the proceedings or makes an interim order. 134 In 
determining whether to suspend a procurement procedure, UK courts also adopt the 
balance of convenience test, which is used in deciding whether an interim injunction 
ought to be granted in other contexts. 135 The courts consider whether there is a serious 
issue to be tried and the harm to the parties and the public were the procurement 
suspended. The governing principle here is whether an award of damages would 
adequately compensate the supplier for the losses it would suffer should the 
procurement procedure continue. Whilst this question will be answered in the 
affirmative in other contexts, 136 in the disqualification context it may be hard for a 
supplier to prove its losses and this may mean that in practice, interim relief may often 
be granted in disqualification challenges. 
As discussed earlier, if a supplier seeks judicial review of the disqualification 
decision, then his remedies will be the specialised remedies granted in a successful 
action for judicial review. The remedies available in an action for judicial review are 
"o Lion Apparel Systems v Firebuy Ltd [2007] EWHC 2179 (Ch. ). 131 Bowsher and Moser, "Damages for breach of the EC public procurement rules in the United 
Kingdom" (2006) 15 P. P. L. R. 195,198; Aquatron Marine v Strathclyde Fire Board [2007] C. S. O. H. 
185. 
132 Rv Portsmouth City Council ex parte Bonaco Builders (1997) 95 L. G. R. 494; Arrowsmith, 
"Interpretation of the Procurement Directives and Regulations: A Note on Rv Portsmouth City 
Council, ex parte Bonaco Builders" (1996) 5 P. P. L. R. CS90-CS96. 
133 Reg. 47 (G). 
: 34 Reg. 47 (G) (2).. 
135 Exel Europe v University Hospitals Coventry and Warwickshire NHS Trust [2010] EWHC 3332; 
American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd (No 1) [1975] A. C. 396. 
'36 B2Net Ltd v HM Treasury (2010) EWHC 51 (QB); McLaughlin & Harvey v Department of Finance 
and Personnel [2008] N. I. Q. B. 25; Burroughs Machines Ltd v Oxford Area Health Authority [1983] 
E. C. C. 434; European Dynamics v HM Treasury [2009] EWHC 3419. Cf. Letting International v 
Newham (2007) EWCA Civ. 1522. 
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namely, the prerogative remedies which are quashing orders, mandatory orders, 
prohibiting orders; declarations, injunctions as well as damages and recovery of 
money. These remedies may be granted in combination where it is appropriate to do 
so. These remedies are similar in some respects to the remedies provided for in the 
regulations, with the exception of the specific rules relating to ineffectiveness and the 
standstill period and with a more limited right to damages. 
Damages are available in an action for judicial review where the action complained of 
constituted a tort or a breach of contract. In the disqualification context, a claimant 
will clearly be unable to make a claim for damages for breach of contract, but may be 
able to claim damages for either the tort of misfeasance in public office or the tort of 
breach of statutory duty. 137 Where damages are granted in tort, they will include lost 
profits, but will generally not include bid costs. 138 The payment of lost profits and the 
exclusion of bid costs from damages in the UK differs from the US approach as will 
be seen where bid and procurement related costs are recoverable whilst lost profits are 
not generally recoverable where there have been anomalies in the procurement 
process. 139 
In the US, there are different remedies available to a supplier depending on the forum 
in which the challenge is brought. The powers granted to procuring authorities in the 
US to resolve disputes are quite wide and they have the power to take any action to 
ensure disputes are resolved, such as overturning a disqualification decision and the 
payment of costs and in general may take any action that could have been 
recommended by the GAO. 140 Also, similar to the EU/UK, where a challenge is filed 
before a procuring authority before the contract award decision is made, the award 
will not be made, but where the challenge is made after the award decision, the 
procuring authority is not required to suspend the contract unless the challenge is filed 
within ten days of the contract award decision. 
141 Although there is no automatic 
standstill period, the filing of a protest results in the suspension of the procurement 
'37 Harmon CFEM Facades v The Corporate Officer of the House of Commons [2002] 2 L. G. L. R. 372; 
Xv Bedfordshire County Council, [1995] A. C. 633,739B; see generally, Arrowsmith, Civil Liability 
and Public Authorities, (1992), ch. 7. 
"a Harmon, ibid.; Arrowsmith, 2005, ch. 21.19. 
139 Heyer Products Co V US 135 Ct. Cl. 63 (1956). 
140 FAR 33.102 (b). 
141 FAR 33.103 (t). 
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process where a protest is received within 10 days of a contract being awarded and 
procuring authorities are required to immediately suspend the award of the contract 
pending resolution of the dispute unless the performance of the contract is necessary 
for urgent and compelling reasons or is in the best interests of the government. 142 The 
FAR also gives procuring authorities the discretion to implement a voluntary 
suspension of contract award and contract performance where a protest does not 
succeed at the agency level and the supplier files a protest at the GAO. '43 Suspension 
in the US will take effect until the dispute is 144 As will be seen, South 
African legislation does not provide for a similar suspension mechanism. 
However in the US, where a procuring authority decides to continue with the 
performance of the contract, a supplier may challenge this decision in the COFC, '45 
and the courts will review the procuring authority's decision on the standards in the 
Administrative Procedure Act and will override the decision where it is arbitrary, 
capricious, irrational, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law. 146 Although the courts give substantial deference to agency determinations 147 that 
continuing with a procurement or contract is in the best interests of the government 148 
in examining the decision to override the suspension provisions, the courts will 
among other factors, consider whether an authority had reasonable alternatives open 
to it and will overturn the decision to override the suspension where this is the case. '49 
The courts however may give more deference to agency decisions where the override 
is made in the interests of national security. '50 
In the limited circumstances in which the GAO may review a disqualification 
decision, the remedies that the GAO may provide include the payment of costs to the 
142 FAR 33.103 (f); 31 U. S. C § 3553. 
143 FAR 33.103 (f) (4). 
144 FAR 33.103 (f) (3); FAR 33.104 (c). 
145 31 U.. S. C § 3553 (c) (2); RAMCOR Servs. Group Inc. v United States 185 F. 3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 
1999). 
146 Cho, "Judicial review of the best interests of the United States justification for CICA overrides: 
Overstepping boundaries or giving the bite back" (2005) 34 P. C. L. J. 337; DTH Management Group v 
Kelso, 844 F. Supp. 251(1993); PGBA LLC v United States 57 Fed. Cl. 655 (2003). 
147 Honeywell Inc. v United States 870 F. 2d 644 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
'48 Universal Shipping v United States, 652 Fed. Supp 668 (D. D. C. 1987). 
149 Reiney's wholesale v United States 73 Fed. Cl. 705 (2006); Superior Helicopter LLC v United 
States 78 Fed. Cl. 181 (2007). 
150 Maden Tech Consulting v United States 74 Fed. Cl. 786 (2006). 
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aggrieved supplier (excluding lost profits) as well as tender preparation Costs 
. 
15 1 The 
GAO may also recommend that the procurement is repeated, or a contract terminated, 
or that the procuring authority reimburses the applicant's costs of the suit. 152 GAO 
determinations have the status of recommendations, which may be disregarded by the 
procuring agency provided it informs the GAO of its intentions not to comply. 153 In 
addition, a dispute decided by the GAO may still be the subject of a lawsuit. '54 
As is the case where a challenge is brought before a procuring authority, challenges 
brought before the GAO may also result in the suspension of the procurement process 
once the procuring officer has notice that a challenge has been filed with the GAO, 
unless urgent and compelling reasons justify the award of the contract. '55 Where a 
contract has been awarded and the challenge is filed within 10 days of the contract 
award, a stay of performance may be imposed pending the outcome of the protest. 156 
Where a bidder seeks judicial relief from the courts, he is entitled to equitable relief in 
the form of an injunction or a declaratory judgment if his action is filed prior to 
contract award. ' 57 Other than obtaining injunctive relief or reimbursement for bid and 
procurement costs, a bid protester is not entitled to damages against a procuring 
authority for irregularities in the procurement process. '58 
In South Africa, there are similar as well as further remedies for alleged breaches in 
the disqualification context. The PAJA lists six remedies that may be available where 
`administrative action' is challenged before the courts. Firstly, a court may order the 
procuring authority to furnish the supplier with written reasons for its decision. 159 
Secondly, a procuring authority may be ordered to do160 or refrain from doing a 
's' FAR 33.104 (h). 
ist 31 U. S. C § 3554. 
153 31 U. S. C. § 3554 (b). 
134 Shaengold et al, n. 1; Peckinpaugh, n. 63,230; Ace-Federal Reporters v Inc. v FERC, 734 F. Supp. 
20 (D. D. C. 1990). 
155 31 U. S. C § 3553 (c ) (1). Dairy Maid Dairy Inc. v United States, 837 F. Supp. 1370 (E. D. Va. 
1993). 
156 31 U. S. C § 3553 (d) (1). 
's' United States v John C. Grimberg Co Inc. 702 F. 2d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
use Hadaller v Port of Chehalis, 97 Wash. App. 750,986 P. 2d 836 (Div. 2 1999). For remedies in the 
contractual context see Hutmacher, "Government Contracting Disputes: Its not all about the money' (2009) 8 A. L 31. 
159 S8 (1) (a) (i) PAJA. 
160 S8 (1) (a) (ii) PAJA. Bolton, 2007, ch. 11. 
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particular action. 161 Thirdly, a decision may be set-aside and remitted for re- 
consideration by the procuring authority. 162 A set-aside will be ordered where the 
decision to set aside will not be `unduly disruptive or practically impossible to 
implement'. 163 A similar remedy to set-aside and remitting for re-consideration is the 
order to set-aside the decision and correct it. 164 In such situations, the court sets aside 
the decision of the procuring authority and substitutes its own decision. 165 
Fourthly, PAJA permits in exceptional circumstances that the public official pays 
compensation to the affected parties, 166 where the administrative action is wrongful, 
invalid and a loss has occurred for which there is no appropriate remedy. 167 Further, 
the court may issue an order declaring the rights of the parties in relation to the 
decision, which was taken. 168 Finally, a court is permitted to grant any other 
temporary relief. 169 
Where a successful challenge is brought for a wrongful disqualification, an effective 
remedy (from the supplier's point of view) will be to set aside the decision taken, 
which may cause disruption to the procurement process. Where a supplier claims that 
a supplier who ought to have been excluded from the procurement process was not 
excluded, the complainant may, if successful, be entitled to temporary or interim 
relief or a set-aside of the decision to include that supplier in the process, which again 
may cause disruption. However, PAJA allows the courts to refuse interim measures 
when warranted by their adverse effects, 170 and the courts may also refuse to order a 
set-aside where it would not be ` just and equitable' in the circumstances. 171 
161 S8 (1) (b) PAJA. 
162 S8 (1) (c) (i) PAJA; Claude Neon Ltd v Germiston City Council and Another 1995 (3) SA 710 (W). 
163 Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (2009), ch. 8.3; Sebenza Kahle Trade CC 
v Emalahleni Local Municipal Council and another [2003] 2 All S. A. 340 (T), where the court refused 
to grant an order of set-aside because the contract had been completed. 
164 S8 (1) (c) (ii) (aa) PAJA. 
165 Grinaker LTA Ltd v Tender Board (Mpumalanga) [2002] 3 All SA 336. 166 S8 (1) (c) (ii) (bb) PAJA. 
167 de Ville, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa (2003), ch. 7,353-362; Olitzki 
Property Holdings v State Tender Board and Another (2001) 3 SA 1247 (SCA). 1" S8 (1)(b) & (d) PAJA. 
169 S8 (1) (e) PAJA. 
170 GNH Office Automation CC and Another V Provincial Tender Board and Others (1996) 9 B. C. L. R. 
1144 (TK). 
171 S8 (1) PAJA. 
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South Africa differs from the other jurisdictions in that there is no provision for a 
procurement process to be stayed pending the resolution of a dispute. The Municipal 
Supply Chain Regulations provide that aggrieved persons may lodge a written 
objection or complaint within 14 days of becoming aware of the decision complained 
about, 1 72 but do not indicate whether the procurement process will be stayed pending 
the resolution of this dispute. However, where a supplier seeks judicial review, the 
courts are able to grant temporary relief, 173 as discussed above, which may include the 
stay of the procurement process where it has not been concluded. In South Africa, 
similar to the standard in the UK, interim relief will be granted where it is required by 
the urgency of the situation, where the claimant has a clear right, where he will suffer 
injury and no other remedy will suffice. 174 
Damages are also available in principle, although as was discussed in other contexts, 
these may be difficult to claim in practice because of the problems of proving loss, 175 
and a supplier may not claim for lost profits. 176 
9.4 Analysis 
The disqualification of suppliers from public contracts is a serious sanction against a 
supplier and has been described as a `corporate death penalty'. This is certainly true 
where a supplier's main or only business is derived from the public sector. To ensure 
that the disqualification mechanism is effective and is not abused, it is necessary that 
remedies are available to a supplier aggrieved by the disqualification process. Whilst 
the availability of a review system is a necessary component of any procurement 
system, it is important that reviewing decisions in the disqualification context is done 
as effectively and as quickly as possible. 
n Reg. 49 PCR. 
'n S8 (1) (e) PAJA. 
14 Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 A. D 221,227; Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties Pty Ltd [2008] 
ZAECHC 42. 
'" Arrowsmith, Linarelli & Wallace, 795-803; de Ville, n. 167,359. 
176 0litzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board and Another, n. 167. 
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9.4.1 Balancing the tension between effective remedies and delays to the 
procurement process 
In the jurisdictions, there are similarities in the nature of the administrative and 
judicial options for the review of the disqualification decision as well as in the kinds 
of remedies available to suppliers in the disqualification context. However, one issue 
that merits further consideration in relation to the provision of remedies is the 
approach in the jurisdictions to balancing the rights of the supplier with the need for 
the procurement process to be conducted with speed and efficiency. The tension here 
is how to prevent delay to the procurement process, whilst providing suppliers with 
effective rights when a breach has occurred. '77 This tension is met by the provision of 
interim relief remedies or remedies that suspend the procurement process, the 
conclusion of an awarded contract or the performance of a concluded contract 
pending or as a result of the adjudicative process. 
As discussed, where a dispute arises after the conclusion of the procurement process, 
but prior to the conclusion of the contract, the supplier's rights are usually preserved 
through the use of a standstill period in which the contract will not be signed. For 
instance as discussed above, the EU and the UK provide a mandatory minimum 10- 
day period between the decision to award a contract and the conclusion of the 
contract. 178 In the UK, where a contract award decision is challenged during the 
standstill period, this has the effect of extending the period until the dispute is 
resolved or the standstill period is lifted or an interim order is made. 179 Although there 
is no automatic standstill period in the US, similar to the UK, where a protest is 
received within 10 days of a contract being awarded, procuring authorities are 
required to immediately suspend the conclusion or performance of the contract 
pending resolution of the dispute. 
It should be noted that where a dispute arises after the conclusion of a contract, most 
jurisdictions do not provide for the suspension of contract execution pending the 
resolution of a dispute. This is due in part to the adverse effect that suspending 
"' Gordon, n. 1,430. See Lord Justice Dyson in Jobsin v Dept of Health [2001] ECWA 1241. 
"" Art. 2 a (2) remedies directive; Reg. 32A PCR. 
179 Reg. 47G, 47H (1) (a) PCR; Indigo Services v Colchester Institute Corp. [2010] EWHC 3237 (QB). 
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contract performance may have on the delivery of public services and the potential for 
litigation that a procuring authority may be exposed to, where it fails to deliver public 
services. However, the US differs from the other jurisdictions and provides for the 
suspension of contract execution where a dispute is filed with a procuring agency or 
the GAO within 10 days of the conclusion of a contract. 180 Where contract 
performance is suspended, the period of suspension will not last longer than 35 days 
where the dispute is filed with a procuring authority, as all disputes should be 
resolved within this time. '8' By these provisions, the US goes further than the 
suspension provisions of the EU and UK, although the fact that suspension only takes 
effect if the dispute is filed within 10 days of contract award, means that in most 
cases, actual performance may not have commenced or the incumbent may continue 
performance of the contract. 182 
Another area in which the US differs from the EU/UK is that where a procuring 
authority is required to suspend the procurement process where a challenge is 
instituted, the procuring authority has the power to override the requirement to 
suspend where this is justified. This override may be done for reasons similar to the 
reasons for derogating from the disqualification provision as discussed in ch. 8. As the 
suspension provisions are tested in the EU context, it may become necessary for a 
similar approach to be adopted by the EU. 
In conclusion, it can be seen that although interim measures are generally available in 
all the jurisdictions, the standard for obtaining interim relief is quite high, where the 
measures are not automatic on the commencement of a challenge procedure and this 
is one way the jurisdictions balance the tension between providing effective relief for 
suppliers and not causing undue delay to the procurement system. 
9.4.2 The availability of a right of review 
In relation to the availability of a right of review, it was seen that the domestic 
jurisdictions generally provide more than one forum for adjudicating procurement 
'80 FAR 33.103 (f) (3); FAR 33.104 (b); BDM Management Servs. Co Comp. Gen. Dec. B-228287,88- 
1 CPD 193 
1eß FAR 33.103 (g). ýn Superior Servs. Inc. v Dalton, 851 F. Supp. 381 (1994). 
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disputes. The UK however goes against this approach and establishes the High Court 
as the forum for procurement disputes. This may limit the effectiveness of the 
procurement remedial system as suppliers who do not wish to undertake an 
adversarial process are left without a less formal, more conciliatory avenue for dispute 
resolution unless the procuring authority exercises its discretion to resolve disputes 
informally. It should also be mentioned that research has shown that UK suppliers are 
often reluctant to institute judicial proceedings due to prohibitive legal costs. 183 This 
has the effect of limiting suppliers access to justice and it would have been preferable 
if suppliers were permitted to approach the procuring authority as is the case in the 
us. 184 
The US approach which provides multiple forum for procurement dispute resolution 
ensures that suppliers have comprehensive access to remedies. Suppliers may either 
submit a fonnal/informal complaint to the procuring authority, or submit a formal 
complaint to the GAO in limited circumstances or the courts. One drawback of the US 
system is the fact that disqualification is excluded from the GAO's jurisdiction in 
spite of the fact that the GAO has jurisdiction to examine determinations of 
responsibility, which have the effect of excluding a supplier from a particular 
procurement process. This is anomalous and it is not clear why the GAO cannot 
examine disqualification determinations, given the advantages the GAO possesses 
over the procuring authority and the courts- such as independence, experience and 
cheaper, less formal and faster resolution of disputes. 185 A second drawback is that in 
the limited cases in which a supplier can approach the GAO in the disqualification 
context, GAO determinations are not binding on procuring authorities, which may 
disregard them if they so wish. 196 It would be preferable if there could be mandatory 
enforcement of GAO decisions, given the wealth of experience possessed by the GAO 
in procurement dispute adjudication. 187 
Pachnou, n. 102, ch. 5. 
FAR 33.103 (b). 
185 Metzger & Lyons, "A critical assessment of the GAO bid-protest mechanism" (2007) W. L. R. 1225. 
1$6 However, agencies routinely follow GAO decisions as they are regarded as being legitimate- 
Saunders & Butler "Timely Reform: Impose Timeliness Rules for Filing Bid Protests at the Court of 
Federal Claims (2010) 39 (3) P. C. L. J. 539,555. 
127 Saunders & Butler, ibid 
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CONCLUSION 
I. Reflections on the research 
This thesis has analysed the legal texts of selected national and multilateral procurement 
instruments, which provide for the disqualification from public contracts of suppliers who 
are convicted or otherwise guilty of corruption and provided a legal critique of the 
provisions in these instruments. The research has also developed a coherent framework 
for understanding the use of procurement disqualifications as an anti-corruption tool. 
This study has highlighted the problems that are created by a disqualification mechanism 
from both a theoretical and a practical perspective. The use of a disqualification 
mechanism is problematic from the point of view of determining how much discretion 
should be given to a disqualifying entity, and which aspects of the disqualification 
mechanism should be legislated upon. It was seen throughout the thesis that the 
provisions in the UK, the EU and the South African PFMA and PPPFA regulations are 
particularly brief and do not deal with several of the issues that are raised in the practical 
application of a disqualification measure. In comparison, the provisions in the US and in 
the South African Corruption Act are quite detailed and cover several of the difficult 
issues surrounding disqualification such as time limits, the ability of a supplier to avoid 
disqualification, the effect of disqualification on existing contracts and procedural 
requirements for disqualification. The lacunae in legislative provisions may be 
problematic from a practical point of view as it means that procuring authorities required 
to make the disqualification decision will either have to formulate their own guidelines 
on these issues, or decide these issues on a case-by-case basis, which may lead to an 
inconsistent and incoherent application of the provisions in practice. 
In particular, the examination of the issues relating to foreign convictions in ch. 3 showed 
that most of the jurisdictions possess legislative gaps in this area. Thus, although the 
legislation on disqualification in the EU and the UK may point towards disqualification 
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being imposed on the basis of foreign convictions, the legal systems do not have the 
mechanisms in place for procuring authorities to rely on foreign convictions for 
disqualification- either in terms of a recognition of foreign convictions, or a means of 
easily sharing information on foreign convictions at least in the European context. As was 
discussed, the fact that foreign convictions may not lead to disqualification in the US may 
send a message to suppliers that foreign corruption is more tolerable than domestic 
corruption- a message, which will undermine international efforts to combat corruption. 
In ch. 5, it was seen in the context of the mandatory disqualifications in the EU, the UK 
and the South African PFMA regulations that although these disqualifications are 
mandatory, there is no investigative requirement on procuring authorities in those 
jurisdictions to discover the existence of convictions or the offences that will trigger the 
mandatory disqualifications. This issue is illustrative of the general lack of coherence that 
characterises the disqualification systems of many of the jurisdictions studied, where the 
lacunae in the legislation and the absence of clearly defined procedures as discussed in 
ch. 4 may make it difficult for disqualifying entities to properly and adequately implement 
the disqualifications. 
Ch. 6 considered the issues surrounding the disqualification of related persons and showed 
that apart from the US and World Bank, little consideration is given in the jurisdictions to 
whether and which related persons should be disqualified alongside the primary supplier 
and the basis of such persons disqualification. 
Ch. 7 highlighted the issue of whether termination of existing contracts would always 
follow a disqualification, and it was seen that except in the US and South Africa, the 
jurisdictions were not generally in favour of the use of contractual termination as an 
additional remedy or sanction where a contractor has been disqualified. This is welcome, 
due to the severe problems that contractual termination may cause for public contracts as 
discussed in the chapter. 
350 
In ch. 8, the thesis highlighted the fact that in many jurisdictions, the legislation did not 
consider the issue of the `rehabilitation' of suppliers through corporate compliance 
measures. It was seen in this context that the use of such measures by organisations to 
ensure and maintain integrity in their business practices may also be relied on by 
procuring authorities to waive a disqualification requirement where a contractor has 
eliminated the cause for its disqualification. This also shows that countries may need to 
consider a holistic approach to disqualification that is not divorced from the reality of 
modern business practices. 
Ch. 9 dealt with the remedies that may be available to a contractor who is dissatisfied with 
the disqualification process. Except in the World Bank, all the jurisdictions provide for 
remedies for aggrieved contractors in some form, and there are similarities in the nature 
of remedies and the judicial approach to balancing the tension between an efficient 
procurement process and effective remedies. 
H. Areas for further study 
As was stated in the introduction, the thesis was limited to a doctrinal and comparative 
examination of the legal texts on disqualification measures in the selected jurisdictions. 
One issue that came to light during the study is the need for empirical research on 
disqualification in all the jurisdictions. Some of the findings on the issues examined in 
the thesis were limited by the doctrinal approach adopted by the thesis and more robust 
information may be obtained on these issues by empirical study. Specifically, this thesis 
has highlighted the need for both qualitative and quantitative information on the issue of 
investigations, the disqualification of related persons, the effect of disqualification on 
existing contracts and the rehabilitation of corrupt suppliers. 
In relation to the issue of investigations examined in ch. 5, and related persons examined 
in ch. 6, empirical study may consider factors such as the extent to which procuring 
authorities in a jurisdiction conduct investigations into whether a relevant offence has 
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been committed and also the extent to which a jurisdiction investigates related persons 
for the purpose of disqualification. Such a study may give an indication to the efficacy of 
disqualification measures and the challenges faced by procuring authorities in conducting 
such investigations. In relation to related persons, empirical study may also examine the 
frequency of the disqualification of related persons and the reasons given for the 
disqualification of such persons. In relation to the effect of disqualification on existing 
contracts which was examined in ch. 7, empirical information on the kinds of contracts 
that are terminated for the subsequent disqualification of a supplier and the frequency 
with which this occurs may provide an insight into the hidden costs of a disqualification 
mechanism in a jurisdiction. In relation to the issues discussed in ch. 8, empirical study on 
the number of rehabilitated suppliers who are permitted to bid for government contracts 
and the kinds of rehabilitation measures that are regarded as adequate will provide 
information and transparency on an area of the disqualification process which as was 
discussed in ch. 8.3 may be prone to abuse as it is characterised by a lack of transparency 
and accountability. 
It was also mentioned in the thesis- namely in ch. 1.5 that some international agreements 
include disqualification provisions and ch. 3.5.3 also mentioned that since April 2010, the 
major international financial institutions have committed to the harmonisation of 
disqualification practices and the mutual recognition of each others disqualification 
decisions. Empirical study may also be relevant here to determine how the 
disqualification provisions in international agreements are implemented at national level 
and the challenges faced by the international financial institutions in the harmonisation of 
their disqualification measures. 
Another area where further study may be important, which was not covered by this thesis 
is determining the effect that disqualification may have on corruption prosecutions. It is 
possible that in jurisdictions where disqualification is mandatory, the threat of 
disqualification may lead firms that are under investigation for corruption offences to 
plead guilty to lesser offences, for which disqualification is not required. This may be 
favourable to prosecutors who will secure convictions without lengthy trials and of 
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course to the firm, who will know that its conviction will not lead to its subsequent 
disqualification from public contracts. Similarly, prosecutors may consider the impact of 
disqualification in deciding not to prosecute for corruption. For instance, in the UK, the 
Serious Frauds Office has asked prosecutors in deciding whether or not to prosecute a 
firm to consider the commercial impact of a conviction on a firm. ' 
III. Recommendations 
This thesis has highlighted many of the problems that accompany disqualification in a 
domestic jurisdiction. The increasing reliance on disqualification as an anti-corruption 
tool makes it important to find avenues to ameliorate the problems that accompany the 
use of disqualification. These avenues will lie in the proper consideration of all the facets 
of the disqualification measure before the measure is given legislative force. 
In the first place, it is necessary for a jurisdiction seeking to utilise disqualifications to 
consider the rationale for the measure, as this rationale will inform the approach and the 
specifics of the measure. In this study, it was seen in ch. 2 that only the US legislation 
elaborated on the rationale for the measure and this rationale informs the approach that 
the US takes such as the discretionary nature of the measure, the provision of time limits, 
differing procedural requirements and the fact that suppliers may avoid the measure 
altogether. 
Secondly, the jurisdiction will need to consider whether disqualification should be based 
on convictions or evidence short of this. It is suggested that as convictions for corruption 
are notably rare, evidence short of convictions may be preferable, if the measure is to be 
at all effective. As was discussed in ch. 3.7.1, the jurisdictions which do not require 
convictions for disqualification seem to utilise the disqualification measure more 
frequently than those jurisdictions that require convictions, although where convictions 
' Serious Frauds Office, Guidance on Corporate Prosecutions, para. 34. Available at www. sfo. &Q-v. uk 
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are not required, adopting adequate procedural safeguards to prevent the abuse of the 
disqualification measure becomes more pertinent. 
Thirdly, a jurisdiction will need to consider whether disqualification decisions should be 
centrally managed or should be made at the level of individual procuring authorities. This 
issue is important as it could have implications for the perceived fairness of the decision, 
as well as the efficiency of the decision-making. As discussed in ch. 4, a central entity 
may be a preferable option in jurisdictions wishing to adopt a disqualification measure as 
it will reduce the scope for errors, act as a central source of expertise and information and 
increase efficiency in the disqualification system. 
Fourthly, as was discussed in ch. 4.3, a jurisdiction considering utilising disqualification 
measures must provide time limits for the measure. This is important as time limits may 
affect whether the measure is considered punitive or otherwise and also affects the issue 
of the proportionality of the measures. 
Fifthly, a jurisdiction needs to consider its approach towards related persons. Although 
there are merits to disqualifying related persons, as was seen in ch. 6, the difficulties of 
investigating and locating such persons as well as the difficulties of determining their 
level of control over the primary offender or their complicity in the commission of the 
offence may mean that an approach that excludes related persons from disqualification 
may be more practical. Of course this may have implications for the effectiveness of the 
disqualification mechanism, but may be regarded as one of several trade-offs that are 
necessary. As stated above, more empirical research on this area would be useful. 
Finally, a jurisdiction needs to properly consider whether disqualification is intended to 
be applied properly and consistently in the fight against corruption, or whether the 
measure is merely supposed to have a symbolic effect by its presence in the legislation 
without the government really providing the resources to give `teeth' to the measure. It 
has been suggested that procurement measures that are intended to regulate behaviour 
may not always be successful unless proper attention is devoted to the enforcement of the 
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policy. 2 However, other scholars have argued that harsh penalties against corporate 
conduct, such as disqualification may actually undermine corporate incentives to monitor 
misconduct, 3 if a firm feels that it is in any event, due to its size or geographical spread, 
unable to prevent the kind of misconduct that may lead to disqualification. As an anti- 
corruption measure, disqualification may be too problematic, time and resource 
consuming to implement properly and may thus not be the most efficient anti-corruption 
measure. In addition, the use of disqualification may entail costs to the procurement 
process, which may outweigh any benefits as measured by reduced corruption. In their 
study of public procurement in New York State, Anechiarico and Jacobs illustrated that 
disqualification measures led to inefficiencies in government and increased bureaucratic 
controls, which did not necessarily reduce or control corruption. 5 
IV. Concluding remarks 
This thesis has been able to show the gaps, the inconsistencies and the lack of clarity in 
the framework for disqualification in the jurisdictions. This lack of clarity, especially in 
the jurisdictions Iike the UK, EU and South Africa where disqualifications are a relatively 
recent phenomena, may adversely impact on the effectiveness of the measure, as 
procuring authorities may not be inclined to utilise the measures where they are unsure of 
what is permitted or required by the legislation. 
2 Arrowsmith, "Public procurement as an instrument of policy and the impact of market liberalisation" 
1995) L. Q. R. 233.246. 
Hamdani & Klement, "Corporate Crime & Deterrence" (2008) 61 S. L. R. 271. 
Jacobs. "Dilemmas of Corruption Control" in Fijnaut (ed. ), Corruption, Integrity and Law Enforcement 
(2002). 
Anechiarico & Jacobs. 1995. 
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